ORAL JUDGMENT 1. Respondent no. 1 was appointed as Helper at Rajura Depot under Chandrapur Division of petitioner-Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation. According to the petitioner, on 19.02.1996, respondent no. 1 unauthorisedly drove a Bus and dashed against Diesel Pump thereby causing loss and serious disruption in supply of diesel to other buses and vehicles. It adversely affected _ normal schedule of buses causing great inconvenience to the passengers and financial loss to the Corporation. On 09.03.1996, charge-sheet was served on him for serious misconduct. After holding Departmental Enquiry, the competent Authority passed an order on 30.06.1996 holding respondent no. 1 guilty for serious misconduct and imposed penalty of reduction of basic pay by three stages with cumulative effect. That order was challenged by respondent no. 1 before appellate Authority. The appellate Authority, by its order dated 20.09.1996, dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order passed by the competent Authority. However on 07.10.1996, the appellate Authority again issued a notice to respondent no. 1 to show cause why punishment should not be enhanced and why punishment of dismissal should not be awarded by exercising suo motu powers under Rule 9 of the Discipline and Appeal Procedure for Employees of the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation. Respondent no. 1 duly replied and on 23.11.1996, appellate authority passed an order exercising its suo motu jurisdiction under Rule 9 and imposed punishment of dismissal. _ 2. The order passed by the appellate Authority imposing punishment of dismissal was challenged by respondent no. 1 in Complaint ULP No. 177/1996 under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 alleging that there was unfair labour practice. He contended that there was no fair and impartial enquiry. It was common practice to direct the helpers to examine the buses and for that purpose helpers were required to drive vehicles. On the relevant date, the vehicle was defective and he was driving to examine it. As it got stuck and was not getting started, some other employees pushed the vehicle and helped to start it. In that attempt, the bus gave dash to a table, lying by the side of Diesel Pump, and Diesel Pump was uprooted. According to respondent no. 1, he was not at all at fault. There was no justification to impose any punishment and at least the punishment of dismissal from service. In that attempt, the bus gave dash to a table, lying by the side of Diesel Pump, and Diesel Pump was uprooted. According to respondent no. 1, he was not at all at fault. There was no justification to impose any punishment and at least the punishment of dismissal from service. It was further contended that the appellate Authority having confirmed the order of competent Authority while dismissing the appeal, could not review its own order by subsequent _ order and, therefore, the order of dismissal is illegal and was liable to be set aside. 3. Before the Labour Court, evidence was led by both the parties. After hearing the parties, the Labour Court found that the enquiry conducted by the competent authority was fair and reasonable and proper opportunity was given to respondent no. 1 to defend himself. The Labour Court did not find any fault either with the enquiry or with punishment of reduction in salary by three stages as awarded by competent authority. However, the Labour Court came to the conclusion that the order passed by the appellate Authority on 23.11.1996 pursuance to the notice issued on 07.10.1996 was illegal on two counts. Firstly, the appellate Authority could not review its own order dated 20.09.1996 whereby order of punishment imposed by competent Authority was confirmed and secondly taking into consideration the material on record punishment of dismissal was disproportionate to the mistake committed by respondent no.1. With this finding the Labour Court partly allowed the complaint and set _ aside the order passed by appellate authority and directed reinstatement of respondent no. 1 to service with full back-wages. The Labour Court, however, restored the order passed by competent Authority awarding the punishment of reduction in salary by three stages. 4. The petitioner challenged the order of Industrial Court in revision ULPA No. 327/1999. Respondent no.1 also challenged the order in Revision ULP No. 23/2000. Both the revisions were heard together and after hearing the parties, the Industrial Court dismissed the same. The orders of Labour as well as Industrial Courts have been challenged in the present petition by the petitioner. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the impugned orders passed by the Courts below. 6. To appreciate the controversy in proper perspective, it would be necessary to state something about the relevant rules. _ Respondent no. The orders of Labour as well as Industrial Courts have been challenged in the present petition by the petitioner. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the impugned orders passed by the Courts below. 6. To appreciate the controversy in proper perspective, it would be necessary to state something about the relevant rules. _ Respondent no. 1, being an employee of the petitioner, is governed by Discipline and Appeal Procedure for Employees of the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation. The misconducts are classified in clause 3 of the Rules. The punishments for minor lapses and dereliction and punishment for the major misconducts are prescribed by said rules. Rule 8 provides that an employee against whom departmental proceeding have been taken in the manner prescribed under this procedure and who has been punished shall be entitled to prefer appeal. It also provides that no second appeal shall lie in the cases not involving punishments of dismissal, discharge, reduction to the lower pay, withholding of annual increments. Rule 9 and rule 10 are relevant and they read as follows:- 9. The appellate Authority may, suo motu call for the enquiry papers and review the decision in any case as it may deem fit within on eyear and set aside the competent Authority's order of punishment and substitute its own order by enhancement or reduction of the punishment as the case may be or retain the original order of the competent Authority. Provided that the delinquent employees shall be given _ notice to show cause if it is proposed to enhance the punishment awarded by a competent Authority. 10. In the case of an appeal against an order imposing any punishment referred to in Clauses 7, the Appellate Authority, shall consider:- (a) Whether the facts on which the order was based have been established; (b) Whether the facts established afford sufficient ground for taking action; (c) Whether the punishment is unwarranted, excessive, adequate and after such consideration, shall pass such order as it thinks proper.. 7. Even though, in Rule 9 it is mentioned that the appellate Authority may suo motu call for the enquiry and review the decision, the word .review. as used in Rule 9 has been interpreted by this Court in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation ..vs.. 7. Even though, in Rule 9 it is mentioned that the appellate Authority may suo motu call for the enquiry and review the decision, the word .review. as used in Rule 9 has been interpreted by this Court in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation ..vs.. R. D. Toplewar, Ex-Conductor, Pusad & anr.; 1987 I CLR 280 and it was held that in fact the word Review is wrongly used in this Rule and in fact it should be Revision and under rule 9, the appellate authority has got suo motu powers of revision. 8. It is material to note that against the punishment awarded by the competent Authority, the delinquent employee can prefer appeal under Rule 8 but there is no provision for an appeal by the department if the department is not satisfied with the finding of the competent authority or with the punishment awarded to the delinquent employee and, therefore, appellate authority has been conferred with suo motu revisional jurisdiction under Rule 9 and while exercising that power the appellate authority may set aside the competent authority's order of punishment and substitute its own order by enhancing or reducing the punishment, as the case may be, or retain original order of the competent authority. This power may be exercised suo mout when there is no appeal from the concerned employee and can also be exercised when the appeal has been preferred by concerned delinquent. While considering that appeal, if the appellate authority is of the opinion that the punishment needs to be enhanced, a notice to show cause to that effect may be given and after hearing the concerned delinquent employee, may enhance the punishment. Thus, when an appeal has been preferred and the record _ is produced before the appellate authority, it may exercise suo motu revisional jurisdiction under rule 9 while deciding the appeal. 9. Clause (c) of Rule 10 is very important and relevant. Thus, when an appeal has been preferred and the record _ is produced before the appellate authority, it may exercise suo motu revisional jurisdiction under rule 9 while deciding the appeal. 9. Clause (c) of Rule 10 is very important and relevant. From this it is clear that while deciding the appeal, the appellate authority has to come to conclusion whether the punishment is unwarranted, excessive or adequate and while considering adequacy of the punishment, the appellate authority may normally consider whether the punishment is inadequate and after it comes to the conclusion that punishment is inadequate and needs to be enhanced, he may exercise his suo motu powers under rule 9, after issuing show cause notice to the delinquent employee and then after hearing the parties he may pass the final order. 10. In the present case, the appellate authority, after hearing the appeal had passed the order on 20.09.1996 whereby the appeal preferred by respondent no. 1, against the punishment awarded to him by competent authority, was dismissed. While dismissing the appeal, _ the appellate authority not only found that the charges leveled against respondent no.1 were proved and that there was sufficient material to take action against him, but also must have come to the conclusion that the punishment awarded by the competent authority was adequate. Had appellate Authority come to the conclusion that punishment was inadequate, it would not have passed the order at that stage, confirming the order of competent authority. In view of the fact that at that stage the appellate authority did not come to the conclusion that punishment was inadequate, it should be deemed to have come to conclusion that punishment awarded by the competent authority was adequate. Thus, in respect of quantum of punishment the chapter would be closed, of course, subject to second appeal or any other remedy, which would be available to the employee. However, the admitted fact is that after having passed the order on 20.09.1996 while dismissing the appeal, on 07.10.1996 the appellate authority reopened the matter and issued show cause notice to respondent no. 1 about the proposed enhanced punishment and on 23.11.1996 fresh order was passed whereby the punishment was enhanced and the ___ order of dismissal was passed. However, the admitted fact is that after having passed the order on 20.09.1996 while dismissing the appeal, on 07.10.1996 the appellate authority reopened the matter and issued show cause notice to respondent no. 1 about the proposed enhanced punishment and on 23.11.1996 fresh order was passed whereby the punishment was enhanced and the ___ order of dismissal was passed. The question before this Court is, whether the appellate authority could review its own order dated 20.09.1996 and enhance the punishment particularly when on earlier occasion, it was deemed to have come to the conclusion that the sentence awarded to respondent no. 1 was adequate. If rule 9 is carefully perused, it would become clear that the appellate authority, in its suo motu revisional jurisdiction can find out whether the punishment awarded by the competent authority was proper or not. Thus the power under rule 9 is revisional jurisdiction in respect of the punishment awarded by the competent authority. This rule does not give any power to the appellate authority to suo motu review its own order. In the present case, the appellate authority did exactly the same by issuing show cause notice on 07.10.1996 and passing the order on 23.11.1996, whereby punishment of dismissal was awarded. This order is contrary to its own order passed on 20.09.1996 when as per rule 10 (c) appellate authority was presumed to have come to the conclusion that punishment awarded by the competent authority was adequate. Having once came to the conclusion that punishment was __ adequate, it could not again issue a show cause notice and enhance that punishment. In view of this, I find that the order of dismissal passed by the appellate authority on 23.11.1996 was beyond its jurisdiction and, therefore, was liable to be set aside on that ground itself. 11. Coming to the merits, the parties had led evidence before Labour Court and taking into consideration the material on record, the Labour Court came to the conclusion that punishment of dismissal was excessive and disproportionate to the mistake committed by respondent no. 1. On perusal of that judgment it appears that several witnesses were examined. It was found that not only in that particular depot but also in whole of the Division it was common practice to direct the Helpers to examine vehicles and for that purpose helpers were required to drive the vehicles. 1. On perusal of that judgment it appears that several witnesses were examined. It was found that not only in that particular depot but also in whole of the Division it was common practice to direct the Helpers to examine vehicles and for that purpose helpers were required to drive the vehicles. Therefore, it cannot be said that respondent no. 1 had driven the vehicle unauthorisedly. There is also material on record to show that after withdrawal of the suspension order, respondent no.1 was allowed to ___ drive the vehicles while testing as it was part of his duty to examine the same. In view of this, I find that the Labour Court was justified in coming to the conclusion that punishment of dismissal was excessive and disproportionate to the mistake, if any, committed by respondent no.1. 12. In view of above, I am satisfied that the Courts below were right in setting aside the order of dismissal passed by appellate authority on 23.11.1996. Learned counsel for the petitioner points out that respondent no. 1 was dismissed from service on 23.11.1996. The Labour Court passed judgment on 31.08.1999 directing reinstatement of respondent no.1 with full back wages. That order was stayed by Industrial Court as well as this Court pending writ petition and thus the order of Labour Court has not been implemented and respondent no. 1 is still not reinstated. Thus, he is out of job since 23.11.1996 till this date. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, it would not be justified to direct the petitioner to pay full back wages for the period of more than 12 years during which respondent no.1 has not done any work. According to him, it is also impossible to believe that respondent no. 1 was not gainfully employed during this period. After some discussion at Bar and after seeking instructions from their respective clients, learned counsel for both the sides concede that respondent no. 1 may be granted 50% back wages from the date of his termination till reinstatement in service. 13. For the aforesaid reasons, the petition is partly allowed only in respect of back wages. The petitioner shall reinstate respondent no.1 in service within eight weeks from this date and shall also pay 50% of the back wages from the date of termination of service till the date of his reinstatement. 13. For the aforesaid reasons, the petition is partly allowed only in respect of back wages. The petitioner shall reinstate respondent no.1 in service within eight weeks from this date and shall also pay 50% of the back wages from the date of termination of service till the date of his reinstatement. The arrears of back wages shall be deposited in this Court within eight weeks from this date. Writ petition stands disposed of. No orders as to costs. Rule made absolute accordingly.