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2009 DIGILAW 141 (GAU)

Aparajita Dutta v. State of Assam

2009-02-26

AFTAB H.SAIKIA, C.R.SARMA

body2009
JUDGMENT Aftab H. Saikia, J. 1. Heard Mr. J.M. Choudhury, learned Sr. Counsel assisted by Miss S. Khataniar, learned Counsel for the Appellants as well as Mr. K.C. Mahanta, learned P.P, Assam. 2. Both the Appellants namely, Smt. Aparajita Dutta (for short, 'A-1') and Shri Sudarshan Dutta (for short, 'A-2') were convicted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, FTC No. 2, Kamrup at Guwahati by impugned judgment and order dated 18.7.2007 passed in Sessions Case No. 253 (K)/2000 under Sections 302/498A IPC having found them guilty of committing of murder of Smt. Arunima (Dutta) Talukdar (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased'), being daughter-in-law and wife of A-1 and A-2 respectively. Accordingly, the A-1 and A-2 were sentenced to suffer Rigorous Imprisonment (for short, 'R.I.') for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 5000/- each, in default to suffer simple imprisonment (for short 'S.I') for 1 year for the offence under Section 302 IPC and further to suffer R.I. for 1 year each under Section 498A IPC and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/- each, in default to suffer 1 month S.I. Both the sentences were directed to run concurrently. 3. The conviction and sentence of the Appellants aforesaid were basically based on the testimony of P.W. 5 Mrs. Anjana Talukdar, mother of the deceased, who lodged an ejahar on 11.4.99 with the Jalukbari Police Station alleging that her married daughter, since deceased, wife of A-2 died due to torture meted out to her by A-1 and A-2 by way of pouring kerosene oil on the body of the deceased and the evidence of P.W. 7 Shri Chandan Talukdar, brother of the deceased. 4. The prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses including P.W. 5 and P.W. 7 as mentioned above and P.W. 9 Dr. Pratap Chandra Sarmah, who held autopsy on the dead body of the deceased and P.W. 11, Shri Pratap Chandra Mahanta, Investigating Officer (for short, 'I.O.') as official witnesses. 5. The learned Trial Judge, while coming to the conclusion to the effect that both the Appellants were involved in killing the deceased ignored the evidence adduced by as many as eight defence witnesses so examined by the defence. 6. 5. The learned Trial Judge, while coming to the conclusion to the effect that both the Appellants were involved in killing the deceased ignored the evidence adduced by as many as eight defence witnesses so examined by the defence. 6. Since the entire conviction was based on the deposition of P.W. 5 and P.W. 7, it would be appropriate and apt to have a close survey and meticulous analysis of those two witnesses, P.W. 5, who lodged the ejahar as indicated above, in her deposition, stated that the occurrence took place on 10.4.99 when she was at home. Her tenant Lambu, P.W. 6 told her that her daughter i.e. the deceased sustained burn injuries and that she was taken to the Medical. Taking Lambu @ Rajendra along with her, she went to the Medical and saw her daughter in the Medical who sustained burn injuries. Though she wanted to ask her daughter as to how she sustained burn injuries, she could not do so due to her mother-in-law's presence. She later on came home and informed the family members and thereafter taking along with her Rima, her younger daughter she went to her son-in-law's house. She found that the house was locked and ashes were lying in the courtyard. A 'Nutan'stove was also lying therein. However, she did not find or see any sign of burning in that room. She alleged in her examination-in-chief, that as her daughter, the deceased, had run away from home to get married with A-2 in the Kamakhya Temple against her consent, nothing was given to her in the marriage and for this reason she had been tortured, which fact was occasionally informed to P.W. 5 through letters. She also testified that during the pregnancy the deceased came to her house on the plea that she was beaten up by her husband and as she had refused to go back, the A-2 took her away. It was also stated by P.W. 5 that on 8.4.99 the deceased wrote a letter to P.W. 5 asking her Rs. 1000/- so as to collect some documents of Auto Rickshaw which was run by the A-2 and that though she wanted to pay the money on the next day her daughter died on the previous night itself. 7. In her cross examination, P.W. 5 categorically stated that in the ejahar she did not disclose that the Appellant demanded anything. 1000/- so as to collect some documents of Auto Rickshaw which was run by the A-2 and that though she wanted to pay the money on the next day her daughter died on the previous night itself. 7. In her cross examination, P.W. 5 categorically stated that in the ejahar she did not disclose that the Appellant demanded anything. She also stated that the deceased did not tell her that the Appellants committed atrocities on her, but this was told to her son. This witness denied the suggestion that she did not tell the police about the deceased asking for money through letter. She also denied the suggestion that she did not tell the police about the said demand. It has also come from the cross-examination of P.W. 5 that, in the medical, when she met the A-2 she saw some burn marks in his finger. 8. P.W.-7, Shri Chandan Talukdar, brother of the deceased, in his deposition, stated that one day at about 12.00 midnight when his sister was carrying five months pregnancy she came to their house from the Appellants' house and told them that A-2 had committed physical and mental excesses on her and that the accused sent her away during the night for asking money. Next day, A-2 came to their house, abused the deceased and took her back home. After one year from this incident when this witness went to the deceased's house to enquire about her, he noticed marks of scratching and slapping on her person. This witness further stated, that the deceased herself showed him those marks of torture, that when he wanted to talk to A-2 and A-1, none of them responded. He also stated that his mother told him that A-2 used to frequently send the deceased to their house demanding money. On 9.4.99 when the P.W. 7 came to know from their tenant Lambu, P.W. 6 that the deceased sustained bum injuries and that she was taken to the medical, his mother, P.W. 5 and Lambu P.W. 6 immediately went to the medical and he also followed them a little later. According to this witness the deceased, who was lying on a bed, wanted to say something, but she was not in a position to speak. According to this witness the deceased, who was lying on a bed, wanted to say something, but she was not in a position to speak. At that time A-1 was beside her and she did not allow them to speak to the deceased who died in the hospital on the night of 10.4.99. In his chief-in-examination the P.W. 7 stated that on the previous day of the incident, A-2 sent the deceased to their house asking her to bring R. 2000/- which amount they could not pay on that day due to some inconvenience. 9. In his cross examination, this witness, (P.W. 7) denied the suggestion that he did not tell the police that since 4 months after their marriage, A-2 started torturing the deceased. He also denied the suggestion, that he did not tell the police that A-2 had beaten the deceased for money and that when he went to the deceased's house to enquire about her well being he had seen injuries on her person. He also denied the suggestion that since the deceased eloped with the A-2, their relationship was strained and A-2 did not demand money. 10. We have also taken note of the evidence of P.W. 11, Shri P. Mahanta, I.O., who stated that P.W. 5 did not tell him about the dowry demand made by the Appellants from the deceased. It is also seen that the evidence of P.W. 6 corroborated with the deposition of P.W. 5 and P.W. 7 to the effect that it was P.W. 6 who informed them about the injuries of the deceased. Absence of any sign of damage caused by fire or bursting of the stove was a significant factor to negate the hypothesis of accidental fire taking place. That apart, according to P.W. 5, she saw a new stove of 'Nutan' brand. Absence of any sign of damage caused by fire or bursting of the stove was a significant factor to negate the hypothesis of accidental fire taking place. That apart, according to P.W. 5, she saw a new stove of 'Nutan' brand. It can be noticed from the statement of the A-2, made under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure that he was all along with his wife during the night and they went to sleep together with their baby at about 11 P.M. after watching a cricket match on the T.V. From the statement of the A-2, recorded under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure against question No. 9, it is revealed that on the day of occurrence both the deceased and A-2 took dinner together and watched a cricket match on the T.V. At 11 P.M. they went to bed. The deceased told the A-2 that as the baby cried she would feed her cerelac. He further stated that as the baby cried, the deceased arranged to feed cerelac to the baby and he had immediately fallen asleep. According to the A-2 all on a sudden, he heard the cry of the deceased calling him by his name and he saw that she caught fire and he tried to douse the fire. From the evidence on record, more particularly from the evidence of P.W. 5 it is found that the couple used to live in a room having the kitchen therein and no sign of catching fire was noticed by her. Rather she stated that the house was kept clean and that there was some ashes and a stove lying in the courtyard. There is no evidence of bursting of the stove. In view of the said circumstances the entire story so projected by the defence does not persuade us to believe that it was an accidental fire which caused the burn injury to the deceased. The evidence of the Medical Officer P.W. 9 that he found smell of kerosene oil on the scalp hair and on the body of the deceased remained unchallenged. It was not understood how there could be kerosene oil on the head (hair) and body of the deceased unless the same was poured on her. The hypothesis of accidental fire has been belied by absence of any sign of damage. According to P.W. 9 the deceased sustained 98% burn injuries. It was not understood how there could be kerosene oil on the head (hair) and body of the deceased unless the same was poured on her. The hypothesis of accidental fire has been belied by absence of any sign of damage. According to P.W. 9 the deceased sustained 98% burn injuries. In such a situation due to absence of any sign of damage in the room it is hard to believe that it was an accidental fire. The availability of ashes and the stove in the Court has also negated the defence version. The A-2 could not satisfactorily explain as to under what circumstances the ashes could be there in the courtyard, instead of the place of occurrence i.e. the room/kitchen. 11. In a case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1984 SC 1622 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has enumerated the following five golden principles of circumstantial evidence for relying conviction (i) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt of the accused, that is so say, they should not concerned must or should and not may be established; (ii) the facts so established should be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; (iii) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; (iv) the circumstances should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; (v) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 12. In the case of State of Rajastan v. Kashi Ram (2006) 12 SCC, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that if the accused cannot throw light upon facts which are specially within his knowledge and which could not support any theory or hypothesis compatible with his innocence, the Court can consider his failure to offer satisfactory explanation as an additional link which completes the chain. This principle has been succinctly stated in Naina Mohd. Re AIR 1960 Md. 218. 13. The admitted position is that A-2 was along with his wife in the room. This principle has been succinctly stated in Naina Mohd. Re AIR 1960 Md. 218. 13. The admitted position is that A-2 was along with his wife in the room. Therefore, as the deceased sustained the burn injuries in a closed room in which there was none other than the couple and their baby, the A-2 should have reasonably explained the circumstances under which the deceased caught fire. The story of the A-2 that the deceased caught fire when the deceased arranged to feed the baby, who was crying, that he had immediately fallen asleep and that he had awaken up suddenly hearing the cry of his wife, is not believable. For, it is hard to believe that a father would fall asleep leaving the crying baby, that too, when the mother started preparing food for the baby. We do not find any cogent or plausible reason to believe that the fire engulfed the deceased due an accident. There is no indication that it was a case of suicide. 14. In our considered view, the following unbroken chain of the circumstances have been established by cogent and reliable evidence. (i) Both the A-2 and the deceased resided in the same room with the kitchen therein. (ii) On the day of occurrence, in the same room, they went to sleep together and there was none other than their baby with them. (iii) When their baby cried the deceased went to feed her. Immediately A-2 went to bed and fell asleep leaving the crying baby, while the deceased was preparing food for the baby; (iv) All of a sudden he heard the cry of the deceased calling him by name. (v) When he woke up he found that the deceased caught fire. There is no such satisfactory explanation from A-2 as to why and how the deceased caught fire; (vi) P.W. 5 clearly stated that she did not see any sign of fire taking place in the room. She found a new stove and ashes in the courtyard. The house was kept clean. (vii) The Medical Officer found smell of kerosene oil poured on the head and body of the deceased indicating that kerosene oil was poured on the deceased. (viii) There is no evidence that the stove had burst causing the fire. 15. She found a new stove and ashes in the courtyard. The house was kept clean. (vii) The Medical Officer found smell of kerosene oil poured on the head and body of the deceased indicating that kerosene oil was poured on the deceased. (viii) There is no evidence that the stove had burst causing the fire. 15. In view of the above principle, in our present case the failure of A-2, who was with the deceased in the same room immediately prior to the occurrence, to satisfactorily explain as to how the deceased caught fire goes against his innocence. Therefore, it can be safely believed that none other than the A-2 was responsible for the death of the deceased. 16. In view of the prevailing circumstantial evidence that has surfaced from the evidence on record, we are of the considered view that the chain of circumstances has been established by reliable and cogent evidence indicating that none other than the A-2 had set the deceased on fire and thus caused the injuries to which the deceased succumbed. 17. In the light of the above strong and unrefutable circumstantial evidence exclusively pointing to the guilt of A-2, we have no hesitation to disbelieve the evidence of P.W. 5 and 7 as regards the involvement of A-2 in killing of the deceased. However, having gone through the entire factual position and also upon evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses, we do not find any sufficient ingredients to rope in the Appellants under Section 498A IPC. We also do not find any such convincing and conclusive evidence to hold A-1 liable for the commission of offence under Section 302 IPC. 18. In the circumstances, we are of the considered view that A-1 deserves to get benefit of doubt. Thus the conviction and sentence under Sections 302 and 498(A) IPC awarded against the A-1 and the conviction and sentence awarded under Section 498(A) IPC against the A-2 are set aside. 19. As regards A-2, we do not find any sufficient ground to interfere with the conviction and sentence under Section 302 IPC imposed upon him. Consequently, we do affirm the conviction and sentence so handed down to A-2 Sudarshan Dutta under Section 302 IPC. 20. In view of the above, this appeal stands partly allowed with the modification of conviction and sentence as indicated above. Consequently, we do affirm the conviction and sentence so handed down to A-2 Sudarshan Dutta under Section 302 IPC. 20. In view of the above, this appeal stands partly allowed with the modification of conviction and sentence as indicated above. A-1 be released and set at liberty forthwith, if she is not wanted in any other case. 21. Send down the L.C.R. forthwith.