Nanhey Singh (since deceased) v. Parshadi (since deceased)
2009-03-31
PRAFULLA C.PANT
body2009
DigiLaw.ai
Hon’ble Prafulla C. Pant, J. 1. This second appeal, preferred under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is directed against the judgment and decree dated 18.10.1988, passed by lower appellate court (Special Judge / Addl. District Judge, Nainital), in Civil Appeal No. 67 of 1986, whereby said appeal is dismissed upholding the decree passed by the trial court, in favour of the plaintiff. 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused of lower court record. 3. Brief facts of the case, giving rise to this appeal are that the plaintiff / respondent Punia has pleaded that the plaintiff and the defendant have a common passage of their houses which leads to a public road in Mohalla Ganj, Kashipur. It is further pleaded by the plaintiff / respondent that the defendants have no right to obstruct the plaintiff to use the pathway shown by red arrows in the plaint map. The plaintiff’s case is that there had been dispute over this land earlier also between the parties in the year 1969, and after intervention of responsible persons the parties to this suit entered into an agreement, wherein the plaintiff’s right to use the disputed path way was recognized. However, the defendants with malafide intentions started tethering their cattle on the passage and raised a toilet and, as such, they have started obstructing the use of the rasta land by the plaintiff. As such, relief for prohibitory injunction directing the defendants not to interfere in the rasta land was sought. 4. The defendants contested the suit instituted by the plaintiff and filed their written statement denying the allegations made in the plaint. However, it is admitted that in the year 1969, when the dispute arose between the parties they entered into a compromise. As to the tethering of the cattle, it is pleaded by the defendants that they are using the disputed portion of the land for that purpose for more than 40 years and, as such, have matured their easementary rights over the disputed land. 5. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed following three issues: 1. Whether, the disputed land is a public path way, or a private path way? 2. Whether, the defendants were using the disputed rasta land since 1945, and had they got an easementary right to that effect. If so, its effect? 3.
5. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed following three issues: 1. Whether, the disputed land is a public path way, or a private path way? 2. Whether, the defendants were using the disputed rasta land since 1945, and had they got an easementary right to that effect. If so, its effect? 3. To what relief, if any, the plaintiff is entitled? 6. The trial court after recording the evidence and hearing the parties, decided all the three issues in favour of the plaintiff, and decreed the suit directing the defendants not to obstruct the use of disputed rasta land by the plaintiff, by tethering their cattle or in any other manner. Aggrieved by said judgment and decree dated 21.10.1986, passed by the trial court (Munsif, Kashipur), in Suit No. 180 of 1985, the defendants filed Civil Appeal No. 67 of 1986 before the first appellate court. The first appellate court, after hearing the parties, concurred with the findings of the trial court, and dismissed the appeal. Hence, this second appeal filed by the defendants before the Allahabad High Court, where it was admitted on 09.01.1989. Though, no substantial questions of law were formulated by the Allahabad High Court, but at the time of admission it is observed that the appeal was admitted on the suggested substantial questions No. (i), (ii) and (iv) as mentioned in the memorandum of appeal, which reads as under: A. Whether, the impugned judgment and decree passed by the courts below decreeing the suit for permanent injunction is wholly illegal, and no right has accrued to the plaintiff / respondent to claim permanent injunction? B. Whether, the plaintiff / respondent have failed to prove common passage so as to claim any injunction against the rightful owner of the private rasta? C. Whether, the agreement of 1985 has any relevancy with regards to the easementary rights of the appellants for the use of land for the last 40 years, and no finding has been recorded by the courts below to that effect, and as such, the entire judgment is liable to be quashed? The appeal is received by transfer to this Court under Section 35 of the U.P. Re-organization Act, 2000 (Central Act No. 29 of 2000), for its disposal. Answer to questions of law: 7.
The appeal is received by transfer to this Court under Section 35 of the U.P. Re-organization Act, 2000 (Central Act No. 29 of 2000), for its disposal. Answer to questions of law: 7. Admittedly, the plaintiff’s house is shown in the plaint map as well as in the map with the written statement with letters ‘Aa’ ‘Ba’ ‘Sa’ ‘Da’and there is a lane of the plaintiff’s house between the house of Kamla Rana and that of the defendants which connects the disputed rasta land used by the defendants, and also claimed by the plaintiff for their passage to reach the public road on the north. The dispute between the parties is as to the user of the disputed rasta land (shown by red arrows in the plaint map and by letters ‘CD’ in the map with the written statement). In para 3 of the written statement, in clear words, the defendants have admitted that contents of para 3 of the plaint are admitted. In para 3 of the plaint it is pleaded by the plaintiff that there had been a dispute between defendants and the plaintiff in the year 1969, over the rasta land and after responsible persons intervened, an agreement was entered between the parties on 25.09.1969. Copy of said agreement is on the record which shows that the parties to the suit have signed it. Para 6 of said agreement on record clearly provides that third party (present plaintiff Punia) shall have a right to use the land towards East as rasta, and she can use it as before. That being so, the finding arrived at by the trial court and the lower appellate court upholding right of plaintiff to use the disputed land as her rasta land with defendants suffers from no illegality, nor can it be said that the plaintiff has not proved the right of common passage. 8. As far as the easementary right of tethering the cattle pleaded by the defendants is concerned, there is concurrent finding of fact of the trial court and the first appellate court that the defendants have no easementary right for tethering the cattle on the rasta land to obstruct the path way of the plaintiff. This Court in its second appellate jurisdiction cannot interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the courts below, which is based on evidence on record.
This Court in its second appellate jurisdiction cannot interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the courts below, which is based on evidence on record. The substantial questions of law stand answered, accordingly. 9. For the reasons as discussed above, this appeal is liable to be dismissed. The same is dismissed. No order as to costs.