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Rajasthan High Court · body

2009 DIGILAW 1439 (RAJ)

State of Rajasthan v. Modern Construction Co. Ltd.

2009-05-29

DALIP SINGH

body2009
JUDGMENT Hon'ble SINGH, J.—This misc. appeal under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 has been filed against the judgment dated 7.11.1970 of the learned District Judge, Kota in Civil Misc. Case No. 157/1967 by which the application submitted under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act for setting aside the award dated 3.11.1967 filed by the State of Rajasthan has been dismissed. 2. The facts in brief are that the respondent-Company entered into a contract with the appellant-State for construction of the Rana Pratap Sagar Dam at Rawatbhata in District Chhitorgarh in Rajasthan. The work of the Dam was completed on or about 31.12.1966. However, there were certain disputes which came to be referred to the sole Arbitrator under the orders of the Hon'ble Governor of the State of Rajasthan dated 25.8.1964. 3. The respondent-Company filed as many as 26 claims before the learned Arbitrator and the State of Rajasthan submitted their reply to the claims before the sole Arbitrator. The Arbitrator gave his award on 3.11.1967 in all the 26 claims and the Arbitrator filed the award before the court of the District Judge, Kota on 12.11.1967. The Court issued notices and on receipt of the notices, the appellant-State filed their objections on 13.12.1967 to the award. The respondents filed their reply to the aforesaid objections. 4. The learned District Judge on the receipt of the aforesaid objections and their reply framed the following issues:- "1. Whether the Court has no jurisdiction? 2. Whether the objections raised by the State are not maintainable under the provisions of Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940? 3. Whether the Arbitrator was bound to give 26 separate awards and therefore the award is invalid? 4. Whether the Arbitrator has misconducted himself in not deciding all the points raised for determination? 5. Whether the Arbitrator had no jurisdiction to make the award or part thereof in respect of washing of stones, screening of sand etc., wherein, in view of Clause 25 of the agreement, the decision of the Chief Engineer was allegedly final? 6. Whether the Arbitrator had no jurisdiction to award interest pendente lite and future? 7. Whether there was no valid and complete contract between the parties? If not, whether it has been validly ractified? 8. If issue No. 7 is decided against the petitioner, whether the reference to the Arbitrator was still valid? 9. Relief? 5. 6. Whether the Arbitrator had no jurisdiction to award interest pendente lite and future? 7. Whether there was no valid and complete contract between the parties? If not, whether it has been validly ractified? 8. If issue No. 7 is decided against the petitioner, whether the reference to the Arbitrator was still valid? 9. Relief? 5. During the course of hearing, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-State gave up the objection regarding the invalidity of the contract on account of non-compliance of Article 299 of the Constitution of India and accordingly the objections raised under the Issues No. 7 and 8 by the appellant-State were abandoned. 6. As regards the Issue No. 1 pertaining to the jurisdiction of the court at Kota, the learned District Judge decided against the State and the aforesaid objection has not been raised before this Court during the course of hearing. 7. So far as the Issue No. 2, the burden of which rested upon the respondent-Company, the same was not passed by the respondent-Company before the learned District Judge, as is evident from the impugned judgment of the learned District Judge dated 7.11.1970. 8. Issue No. 3 was not passed by the appellant-State before the learned District Judge and the same has not been pressed before this Court as well. 9. Shri B.P. Agarwal, Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant-State has while arguing the appeal pressed the Issue No. 4 with regard to the claim of the respondent-Company regarding the claim arising out of the case No. 4 pertaining to the amount awarded for the washing of stones under the award as extra item. 10. The submission of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant-State is that the respondent-Company raised the aforesaid claim under the case No. 4 for the amount by way of extra item as not being specifically covered by the agreement. The submission of the learned Senior Counsel Shri Agarwal in this behalf has been that under the terms of the agreement, the rates and the description of the work for the same has been specifically provided under `G' Schedule. The entry No. 2 of `G' Schedule reads as follows:- S.No. Quantity and description of work Reference to Specification. M/s. Mordern Construction Co. Rates in Rs. Amount 2. 28,34,000 Cft. 7-1/2 ft. section of masonry in rich bed cement mortar immediately next to the 1-1/2 ft. The entry No. 2 of `G' Schedule reads as follows:- S.No. Quantity and description of work Reference to Specification. M/s. Mordern Construction Co. Rates in Rs. Amount 2. 28,34,000 Cft. 7-1/2 ft. section of masonry in rich bed cement mortar immediately next to the 1-1/2 ft. front face of the demand masonry in spillway piers including all loads and lifts etc. complete. Sec. III para 302, 303, 305, 306 & 311. 200.00 per % cft. 56,68,000.00 11. From the above it was submitted that under Section 302 and 305 of the agreement dealing with masonry work it has been provided with regard to the stones as follows:- "302. Material. 302. 1 Stones: The stones used for masonry shall be hard, dense, durable, tough, sound and clean...." 12. It has further been pointed out under para 305 of the agreement as follows:- "305. Masonery General: Stone shall be free from dust and just on surface dry before being placed and the masonry shall be kept wet for at least 21 days after being built..." 13. From the above portion of the agreement extracted above, the learned Senior Counsel Shri Agarwal pointed out that the structure of the masonry dam consisting of 3,355 feet was required to be built by stone and lime and looking to the size of the dam and the reservoir it was necessary to have the masonry dam with the required strength for which the size of stones had also been specifically provided under para 302.1. In this behalf attention was drawn to para 302.1 where it is mentioned that the size of the stones shall vary from 1 cft. to 3/8 cft. except for face stones. It was submitted that while carrying out such kind of work relating to masonry dams, it was necessary that all efforts should be made to bring the required strength in the structure. The stones were to be taken from the quarry nearby and used for the construction of the dam. to 3/8 cft. except for face stones. It was submitted that while carrying out such kind of work relating to masonry dams, it was necessary that all efforts should be made to bring the required strength in the structure. The stones were to be taken from the quarry nearby and used for the construction of the dam. Since the stones being quarried, may be carrying some dust, sand or clay, it was the excepted norm while building such kind of huge structures like the dam that the stones should be free from all sand and clay as in case the stones are used in the construction without removal of sand and clay, on the reservoir being filed in with water, the moisture may affect the masonry construction and seepage may result as a result of sand and clay attached to the stones being affected by watter/moisture leaving some gaps resulting in weakness in the dam. It is, therefore, submitted that in the contract agreement it was specifically stated in paras 302 and 305 which have been extracted above that the stones for masonry work would be hard dense, durable, tough and clean and further that the stones shall be free from dust and dry. It was during the construction of masonry dam that necessary instructions had to be issued by the Engineer-in-Charge on finding that the stones were not fully clean and hence, instructed that the stones be washed properly before being used for the construction and applying the motor to the same to avoid any weakness in the dam. 14. It was submitted that under the terms of the contract, the Engineer-in-charge on behalf of the appellant were empowered to issue necessary instructions at the site as per the clause (13). Clauses (12) and (13) of the agreement reads as follows:- "Clause 12. Works to be executed in accordance with specifications drawings orders etc. The contractor shall execute the whole and every part of the work in the most substantial and workmanlike manner and both as regards materials and otherwise in every respect in strict accordance with the specification attached and those to be given before or during the execution of the work. Works to be executed in accordance with specifications drawings orders etc. The contractor shall execute the whole and every part of the work in the most substantial and workmanlike manner and both as regards materials and otherwise in every respect in strict accordance with the specification attached and those to be given before or during the execution of the work. The contractor shall also confirm exactly fully and faithfully to the designs, drawings and instructions in writing relating to the work singed by the Engineer incharge and lodged in his office and to which the contractor shall be entitled to have access at such office, or on the site of the work for the purpose of inspective during office hours, and the contractor shall if he requiries, be entitled at his own expense to make or cause to make copies of the specifications, and of all such designs, drawings and instructions as aforesaid. Clause 13: Alternations in specifications and designs. The engineer-in-charge shall have power to make any alterations to the original specifications, drawings, designs and instructions, that may appear to him to be necessary or advisable during the progress of work in accordance with any instructions which may be given to him in writing signed by the Engineer-in-charge and such alteration shall not invalidate the contract; and any additional work which the contractor may be directed to do in the manner above specified as part of the work shall be carried out by the contractor on the same conditions in all respects on which he agreed to do the main work and at the same rates as are specified in the tender for the main work provided that in case of such items for which the tendered rates exceed the estimated rates by more than 25%, if the quantities of such items exceed the quantities put to tender by more than 5%, the quantities in excess of 5% will be paid at the estimated rates plus or minus over all percentage tendered above or below, as the case may be, the estimated rates of the total of schedule `G', subject to the maximum of tendered rate of such items. The time for the completion of the work shall be extended in the proportion that the additional work bears to the original contract work and the certificate of the Engineer-incharge shall be conclusive as to such proportion and if the additional work includes any class of work, for which no rate is provided in this contract, then such class of work shall be carried out at the rates entered in the schedule of rates of the Government applicable to Chambal Project and in force on the date of inviting tenders and if such last mentioned class of work is not entered in the said schedule of rates of the Government then the contractor shall, within seven days of the date of this receipt of the order to carry out the work, inform the Engineer-in-charge of the rate which it is his intention to charge for such class of work, and if the Engineer-in-charge does not agree to this rate, he shall, by notice in writing be at liberty to cancel his order to carry out such class of work, and arrange to carry it out in such manner as he may consider advisable provided always that if the contractor shall commence work or incur any expenditure in regard thereto before the rates shall have been determined as lastly here in before mentioned, then in such case, he shall be entitled to be paid in respect of the work carried out for expenditure incurred by him prior to the date of the determination of the rate as aforesaid according to such rate or rates as shall be fixed by the Engineer-in-charge. In the event of a dispute, the decision of the Chief Engineer will be final." 15. Relying upon the above, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant-State contended that no case for being awarded a claim for extra item on account of washing of the stones as claimed by the respondent-Company could be made out as washing of stones was covered in the agreement and could not be said to be an extra item for which the learned Arbitrator could pass an award, further that the learned Arbitrator has not given any reasons why the claim falls within to catergory of extra item before allowing the same. 16. 16. Learned Senior Counsel Shri Mehta appearing on behalf of the respondent-Company, on the other hand, firstly contended that it was a non-speaking award passed by the Arbitrator and, therefore, the Arbitrator was not required to give any reasons for allowing the claim in respect of the extra item. Relying upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raipur Development Authority and Others vs. M/s. Chokhamal Contractors and Others reported in 1989 (2) SCC 721 ; Engineers Syndicate vs. State of Bihar and Others reported in 2007(3) SCC 99 ; Continental Construction Ltd. vs. State of U.P. reported in 2003(8) SCC 4 ; and D.D. Sharma vs. Union of India reported in 2004(5) SCC 325 wherein their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the non-speaking award held that questions relating to the interpretation of the Contract was a matter for the Arbitrator to decide and dealing with the non-speaking awards, it was held that the Court's jurisdiction in this behalf is merely to see whether the Arbitrator has exceeded its jurisdiction. 17. Based upon the above, learned Senior Counsel Shri Mehta contended that since the award in question passed by the Arbitrator was a non-speaking award, the Arbitrator was not required to give any reasons for accepting the claim with regard to the extra items on account of washing of the stones, which has in any case not been covered by the terms of the agreement. 18. Learned Senior Counsel Shri Mehta supported the judgment of the learned District Judge where the learned District Judge held in favour of the respondent-Company and upheld the award passed by the Arbitrator. 19. It may be useful to extract the findings of the learned District Judge on the objection of the State in this behalf while dealing with case No. 4 in respect of washing of stones. The same reads as under:- "The learned Advocate General then urged that in cases Nos. 4, 7, 10 and 11 the arbitrator has awarded the amounts claimed by the contractors without giving any findings on the objections raised by the State. The same reads as under:- "The learned Advocate General then urged that in cases Nos. 4, 7, 10 and 11 the arbitrator has awarded the amounts claimed by the contractors without giving any findings on the objections raised by the State. Case No. 4 related to washing of stones for which the contractors claimed extra charges for extra item and the State objected that this can not be claimed as extra item and that the rate claimed was also excessive but the arbitrator allowed the claim without giving any findings on these objections...." 20. Learned Senior Counsel Shri Agarwal contended on the basis of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajasthan State Mines and Minerals Ltd. vs. Eastern Engineering Enterprises and Another reported in 1999 (9) SCC 283 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court after considering the judgment in Raipur Development Authority's case (supra) and other judgments in para 44 of the said report has held as follows:- "44. From the resume of the aforesaid decisions, it can be stated that: (a) it is not open to the Court to speculate, where no reasons are given by the arbitrator, as to what impelled arbitrator to arrive at his conclusion. (b) It is not open to the Court to admit to probe the mental process by which the arbitrator has reached his conclusion where it is not disclosed by the terms of the award. (c) If the arbitrator has committed a mere error of fact or law in reaching his conclusion on the disputed question submitted for his adjudication then the Court cannot interfere. (d) If no specific question of law is referred, the decision of the Arbitrator on that question is not final, however much it may be within his jurisdiction and indeed essential for him to decide the question incidentally. In a case where a specific question of law touching upon the jurisdiction of the arbitrator was referred for the decision of the arbitrator by the parties, then the finding of the arbitrator on the said question between the parties may be binding. (e) In a case of a non-speaking award, the jurisdiction of the Court is limited. The award can be set aside it the arbitrator acts beyond his jurisdiction. (e) In a case of a non-speaking award, the jurisdiction of the Court is limited. The award can be set aside it the arbitrator acts beyond his jurisdiction. (f) To find out whether the arbitrator has travelled beyond his jurisdiction, it would be necessary to consider the agreement between the parties containing the arbitration clause. The Arbitrator acting beyond his jurisdiction is a different ground from the error apparent on the face of the award. (g) In order to determination whether the arbitrator has acted in excess of his jurisdiction what has to be seen it whether the claimant could raise a particular claim before the arbitrator. If there is a specific term in the contract or the law which does not permit or give the arbitrator the power to decide the dispute raised by the claimant or there is a specific bar in the contract to the raising of the particular claim then the award passed by the arbitrator in respect thereof would be excess of jurisdiction. (h) The award made by the Arbitrator disregarding the terms of the reference or the arbitration agreement of the terms of the contract would be a jurisdictional error which requires ultimately to be decided by the Court. He cannot award an amount which is ruled out or prohibited by the terms of the agreement. Because of a specific bar stipulated by the parties in the agreement, that claim could not be raised. Even if it is raised and referred and referred to arbitratation because of a wider arbitration clause such claim amount cannot be awarded as agreement is binding between the parties and the arbitrator has to adjudicate as per the agreement. This aspect is absolutely made clear in Continental Construction Co. Ltd. by relying upon the following passage from M/s. Alopi Parshad vs. Union of India which is to the following effect: (SCC p. 88 para 5) "There it was observed that a contract is not frustrated merely because the circumstances in which the contract was made, altered. The Contract Act does not enable a party to a contract to ignore the express covenants thereof, and it claim payment of consideration for performance of the contract at rates different from the stipulated rates, on some vague plea of equity. The Contract Act does not enable a party to a contract to ignore the express covenants thereof, and it claim payment of consideration for performance of the contract at rates different from the stipulated rates, on some vague plea of equity. The parties to an executory contract are often faced, in the course of carrying it out, with a turn of event which they did not at all anticipate, a wholly abnormal rise or fall in prices, a sudden depreciation of currency, an unexpected obstacle to execution, or the like. There is no general liberty reserved to the courts to absolve a party from liability to perform his part of the contract merely because on account of an uncontemplated turn of events, the performance of the contract may become onerous. (i) The arbitrator could not act arbitrarily, irrationally, capriciously or independently of the contract. A deliberate departure or conscious disregard of the contract not only manifests the disregard of his authority or misconduct on his part but it may tantamount to mala fide action. (j) The arbitrator is not a conciliator and cannot ignore the law or misapply it in order to do what he thinks just and reasonable; the arbitrator is a tribunal selected by the parties to decide the disputes according to law." 20. From the above, the learned Senior Counsel Shri Agarwal sought to contend on the basis of the sub-paras (e), (f) and (g) that the Arbitrator had exceeded his jurisdiction by passing the award in respect of washing of stone as an extra item without reference to the specific clauses in the arbitration agreement. It is further submitted that it was necessary for the Arbitrator to have considered whether the claim for the washing of the stone could be awarded as an extra item as claimed by the respondent-Company particularly in view of the specific paras 302 and 305 of the contract when the clause in the agreement specifically provided that stones had to be clean, free from dust and dry before being used for construction in the masonry dam and for this purpose the rates have already been fixed under the `G' Schedule. It was submitted that this was a jurisdictional fact which was required to be decided by giving reasons. 21. It was submitted that this was a jurisdictional fact which was required to be decided by giving reasons. 21. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the aforesaid contention and I have gone through the terms of the agreement which have been quoted above as well as the judgment of the learned District Judge in this regard. As has been seen above, the dispute centers around the claim made by the respondent-Company with regard to the washing of stones which as per the respondent-Company amounted to "extra item". So far as the award is concerned, the case No. 4 pertaining to the payment for washing of stones as extra item is concerned, the learned Arbitrator has decided the same in the following manner:- "2.04 Case No. 4. 2.04 10 Against demand No. 1, I award that Government should pay to the contractors the sum of Rs. 7,59,381.30 (Rs. Seven lac, fifty nine thousand, three hundred and eighty one, paisa thirty) only. 2.04.20 Demand No. 2, is rejected totally. 2.04.30 Against demand No. 3, award that Government should pay to the contractors the sum of Rs. 1,26,325.07 (Rs. One lac, twenty six thousand, three hundred and twenty five, paisa seven) only, as PENDENTE LITE interest. 2.04.31 I further award against demand No. 3, that Government should pay to the contractors simple interest at 6% per annum, on the sum of Rs. 7,59,381.30; for the period from the date of this award, to the date of payment or of decree, whichever is earlier. 2.04.40 Demand No. 4, was allowed to be withdrawn with the consent of both parties on 15.1.1967. Hence no award is to be made." 22. A look at the above goes to show that the learned Arbitrator has decided the matter in para 2 which has been quoted above and specific claim for washing of stone which arises under the case No. 4 has been decided in para 2.04. 23. From the above, it does not appear that the learned Arbitrator proceeded to examine whether the claim arising for washing of stones could be said to be an extra item which would give rise to the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator to entertain the claim in this behalf. 23. From the above, it does not appear that the learned Arbitrator proceeded to examine whether the claim arising for washing of stones could be said to be an extra item which would give rise to the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator to entertain the claim in this behalf. Whether or not the claim for washing of stones in the face of the provisions of paras 302 and 305 of the agreement could be said to be an extra item as contended by the contractor-respondent or was covered under the terms of "cleaning of stones" as is sought to be contended by the appellant-State under paras 302 and 305 of the agreement was a jurisdictional issue which was required to be decided by the learned Arbitrator as, in case it is held that the work of washing of stones is covered by the agreement under clauses 302 and 305 where it is provided that the stones should be cleaned and free from dust and dry, in that event the plea of the State that with a view to clean the stones and keep them free from dust, the State was entitled to issue instructions to the respondent-Company that stones should be washed so as to ensure that no clay or sand remains attached to the stones while being and dry before being used for masonry work which in the event of their coming into contract with moisture and humidity on account of filling up of the reservoir of the dam or on account of rainfall or otherwise, would make the construction weak by enlargement of the gap between the stones if the dust or clay left its place resulting into weakening of the dam. This as per the contention of the State is an accepted norm in the construction of dams etc. and which the respondent being a reputed company in this field of work would have well known while entering into the agreement with State for this purpose. 24. This as per the contention of the State is an accepted norm in the construction of dams etc. and which the respondent being a reputed company in this field of work would have well known while entering into the agreement with State for this purpose. 24. I am in agreement with the submissions of the learned Senior Counsel Shri Agarwal appearing on behalf of the State that as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajasthan State Mines and Minerals Limited (supra) that it was necessary for the Arbitrator to have considered the terms of the agreement to find out whether the claim being made by the claimant is beyond the scope of work assigned and contemplated under the terms of the contract so as to give rise to a claim for "extra item" which would result in the said question being a jurisdictional fact to be adjudicated by the Arbitrator even while passing a non-speaking award. As has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in sub-para (e) of para 44 of the aforesaid judgment, the award may be set aside if the Arbitrator has acted beyond his jurisdiction. In the present case, therefore, the plea of the State based upon paras 302 and 305 of the agreement that it was necessary in reference to the nature of the construction that the stones should be clean and free from dust and that the stones should have been washed by the Contractor and dry before being used in the masonry dam. 25. In my view, therefore, the learned District Judge erred in deciding the objection raised by the State with regard to the case No. 4 in the impugned judgment, as has been quoted above, where the learned District Judge has merely held that the learned Arbitrator could not be held guilty of misconduct on account of not having recorded any finding with regard to the disputes and the objections raised by the State regarding case No. 4. 26. 26. In the light of the law which has developed and which was cited at the bar it becomes clear that the learned Arbitrator not having decided the question by giving reasons as to whether the claim on account of washing of stones would fall within the category of "extra item" not covered by clauses 302 and 305 of the agreement cannot be accepted merely because the award is a non-speaking award. As has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajasthan State Mines and Minerals Limited (supra) that the learned Arbitrator cannot act arbitrarily and independently of the contract and disregard the terms of the contract. The same would amount to misconduct for the purposes of Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. 27. In view of the above, I would allow this appeal in respect of case No. 4 and set aside the judgment of the learned District Judge dated 7.11.1970 in that behalf. 28. As has been held above, on a plan reading of clauses 302 and 305 read with `G' Schedule of the agreement and looking to the nature of the work namely that of the construction of Rana Pratap Sagar Dam which was though to be partially a masonry structure, it was necessary that the stones which were used were required to be free from dust and ought to have been cleaned and dry before being used for the construction. Under para 302 it has specifically been provided that the stones had to be clean and under para 305 it has further been provided that they were to be free from dust and were required to be surface dry before being used for the masonry work. The words "free from dust" and "dry" would signify that not only the stones were required to be cleaned and free from dust but they were also required to be dry on the surface. The term "dry" must be seen in the contest of the claim raised by the claimants for washing of the stones as an extra item. The using of dry stones in the masonry work would imply when read along with "clean" and "free from dust" that the stones were required to be cleaned with water and should be dry before used. 29. The using of dry stones in the masonry work would imply when read along with "clean" and "free from dust" that the stones were required to be cleaned with water and should be dry before used. 29. This being a jurisdictional issue giving rise to the claim, it was necessary for the learned Arbitrator to have adjudicated and decided the same and he could not have, without giving any reasons, merely passed a non-speaking award. At the same time, I am of the view that the claim of the respondent-Company based upon the washing of stones as an extra item could not have been allowed by the learned Arbitrator particularly in items of the agreement and the nature of the construction and the award passed by the learned Arbitrator in this regard was without jurisdiction and accordingly the award for case No. 4 is liable to be set aside on the ground of misconduct as the learned Arbitrator allowed the same without assigning any reasons or deciding the objection of the State. 30. The appeal filed by the appellant-State with regard to the case No. 4 which has been contested in this appeal accordingly deserves to be allowed and the same is hereby allowed. 31. This takes us to the cross objections filed by the respondent-Company. The cross objections relate to the award of future interest. 32. The submission of the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-Company is that the learned Arbitrator has erred in not awarding interest from the date of award till its realization. 33. So far as the above cross objections are concerned, suffice it to say that the respondents did not raise any such objection or claim before the learned District Judge. In that view of the matter, the respondent-Company not having raised any claim or objection with regard to the non-awarding of interest from the date of award till the date of award till the date of realization is concerned, the respondent-Company cannot be allowed to raise the aforesaid objection for the first time in the appeal filed by the State against the judgment of the learned District Judge dismissing the objections filed by the appellant-State notwithstanding Section 29 of the Act. 34. 34. In this regard reference may be made to the Division Bench judgment of State of Punjab vs. Surrinder Nath Goel reported in AIR 1960 Punjab 623 where the Division Bench of the Punjab High Court disallowed the claim while holding as follows:- "......Secondly, as the judgment of the court below shows, this question does not seem to have been raised before it and the court does not appear to have been asked to exercise the power under Section 29 and itself determine the question of future interest. The controversy seems merely to have centred round the power of the arbitrator to grant future interest. It is therefore, a question for consideration whether in these circumstances we should allow the appellant to raise this new point..." 35. Thus, the respondent not having raised this objection or claim under Section 29 before the learned District Judge cannot be allowed to raise this claim before this Court for the first time in the appeal filed by the State. The cross objections are accordingly dismissed. 36. In the result, the appeal filed by the State is allowed to the extent indicated above. The cross objections are dismissed. 37. The parties shall bear their own costs.