JUDGMENT J. Chelameswar, C.J. 1. Heard Mr. N. Dhar, learned Counsel for the Appellant and Mrs. M. Hazarika, learned senior counsel for the Respondent. 2. This appeal is preferred by the 2nd Respondent in WP(C) No. 4206/02 aggrieved by the judgment dated 11.3.2008. 3. The Respondent, a limited company, is the employer of the Appellant herein. The Respondent filed an application in Misc. Case No. 6/2000 before the Presiding Officer Industrial Tribunal, Silchar purportedly under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 seeking approval of the Industrial Tribunal on the decision of the Respondent to remove the Appellant herein from service. Obviously the Respondent’s application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act necessarily implies that there was another industrial dispute pending which attracts the provision of Section 33(2)(b) in the case of the Appellant herein. The above mentioned application under Section 33(2)(b) is a consequence of a decision of the Respondent to remove the Appellant from service on the ground of misconduct. The misconduct alleged is that the Appellant was absent from duties for a period of 48 days between 16.7.1999 to 7.10.1999. The further charge against the Appellant is that the Appellant made dishonest entry and committed fraud by recording his attendance on the electronic attendance system though he was not physically present for duty on those days when so registered his attendance. The charge-sheet was furnished to the Appellant on 10.11.1999. On 6.12.1999 an enquiry officer was appointed by the Respondent. The said enquiry officer issued a notice of enquiry to the Appellant on 15.12.1999. The Appellant did not respond to the notice and did not participate in the enquiry. The enquiry was conducted ex parte. Eventually the enquiry officer submitted his report dated 19.1.2000 finding the Appellant guilty of the misconduct alleged against him. 4. On receipt of the enquiry report the Respondent by an order dated 28.3.2000 removed the Appellant from service and handed over a cheque for an amount of Rs. 5030.30/- dated 28.3.2000 drawn in Central Bank of India in favour of the Appellant representing one month's salary of the Appellant. Admittedly the management also informed the Appellant that an application under Section33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act was filed seeking the approval of the Industrial Tribunal. 5. 5030.30/- dated 28.3.2000 drawn in Central Bank of India in favour of the Appellant representing one month's salary of the Appellant. Admittedly the management also informed the Appellant that an application under Section33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act was filed seeking the approval of the Industrial Tribunal. 5. The Industrial Tribunal, Silchar by an order dated 5.12.2001 rejected the application filed by the Respondent and ordered as follows: In this instant case, I hereby order that the management considering the illness of the workman will reinstate him in his service after giving all back wages. The management will also scrutinize the attendance register and grant leave for those absence days if workman had leave without credit or in the alternative he would be granted leave without pay. 6. Aggrieved by the said order the Respondent approached this Court by way of WP(C) No. 4206/02 which was allowed by a learned Judge of this Court by the judgment under appeal. 7. Mr. N. Dhar, learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant made the following submissions: (1) The learned Judge erred in setting aside the order of the Industrial Tribunal, referred to earlier, as the said order was a well-considered order which ought not to have been interfered with by the learned Judge. (2) That assuming for the sake of argument but without conceding, that the learned Judge was justified in interfering with the order of the Industrial Tribunal the learned Judge ought to have remitted the matter to the Industrial Tribunal, Silchar for a further consideration of the matter and for passing of an appropriate order in accordance with law. Elaborating on his first submission the learned Counsel for the Appellant that apart from the reasons given by the Industrial Tribunal in its order for rejecting the application of the management the Tribunal ought to have rejected the application of the management on a preliminary ground that the approval such as the one contemplated under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act is required to be taken by the management before a final decision to remove an employee from service who falls within the scope of Section 33(2)(b) is taken but not after such a decision is taken. To examine the correctness of the submission it is necessary to examine the language of Section33(2)(b). To examine the correctness of the submission it is necessary to examine the language of Section33(2)(b). Section 33(2) reads as follows: 33(2) During the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, the employer may, in accordance with the standing orders applicable to a workman concerned in such dispute or, where there are no such standing orders, in accordance with the terms of the contract, whether express or implied, between him and the workman,- (a) alter, in regard to any matter not connected with the dispute, the conditions of service applicable to that workman immediately before the commencement of such proceeding; or (b) for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, or discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, that workman: Provided that, no such workman shall be discharged or dismissed, unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer. 8. The obligation to make an application by the employer is stipulated in the proviso to Sub-section (2) extracted earlier. The last six words, of the proviso, in our view, are very clear and leaves no scope for ambiguity as to the point on which an application under the said Section is required to be made by the employer. In the sentence "...the action taken by the employer" the employment of the expression "taken" in our opinion admits of only one interpretation, i.e., the action on which approval is sought from the Tribunal is a matter of past coupled with the fact that if really the Parliament intended that such an application is required to be made even before an action is culminated the Parliament would definitely have employed different language. 9. However, the learned Counsel brought to the notice of this Court a judgment rendered in WP(C) No. 7738/2001 dated 31.1.2008. In the said case while dealing with a case falling under Section 33of the Industrial Disputes Act a learned Judge of this Court at para-10 held as follows: 10. 9. However, the learned Counsel brought to the notice of this Court a judgment rendered in WP(C) No. 7738/2001 dated 31.1.2008. In the said case while dealing with a case falling under Section 33of the Industrial Disputes Act a learned Judge of this Court at para-10 held as follows: 10. As the materials on record conclusively prove and establish that there was an earlier reference involving the workman and he was dismissed/removed in respect of a matter connected with the said dispute without obtaining prior approval of the learned Industrial Tribunal before which the earlier reference was pending, the dismissal/removal of the workman has to be understood by this Court to be null and void in view of the decision of the Apex Court in Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. (supra). If that be so, there will be no occasion for this Court to consider any of the weighty arguments that have been advanced on the merits of the impugned award dated 10.8.2001. It was a case where the Government by a notification under Section 102 of the Industrial Disputes Act dated 24.4.2002 referred two questions to the Industrial Tribunal regarding removal of an employee of the Cachar Paper Mills (incidentally the Respondent herein). The Tribunal answered the reference in favour of the workman and directed reinstatement of the workman with full back wages. Challenging the said decision the management approached this Court by way of the above mentioned writ petition. The issue which fell for consideration of the learned Single Judge was whether removal of an employee during pendency of an industrial dispute between the management and the employee of the said management was legally valid without complying with the provisions of Section 33(2)(b). In dealing with the said question the learned Judge referred to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in (2002) 2 SCC 244 Jaipur Zila Saliakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. v. Ram Gopal Sharma and Ors. and came to the conclusion that dismissal or removal in those cases, where the provisions of Section 33(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is attracted, without obtaining the approval of the Industrial Tribunal would be null and void. and came to the conclusion that dismissal or removal in those cases, where the provisions of Section 33(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is attracted, without obtaining the approval of the Industrial Tribunal would be null and void. The question whether such an approval is required prior to taking of the decision to terminate the employ or subsequent was not an issue before the learned Single Judge nor in the judgment of the Supreme Court relied upon by the learned Single Judge. In the above mentioned judgment of the Supreme Court a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court was dealing with the effect of a decision of dismissal/removal of an employee whose case attracts Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Supreme Court took note of divergent views taken by different Benches of the Supreme Court earlier. One of the Division Benches in (1978) 2 SCC 114 Punjab Beverages (P) Ltd. v. Suresh Chand took the view that the failure to make an application under Section 33(2)(b) would not render an order of dismissal inoperative but only render the employer liable to punishment under Section 31 of the Act, while contrary views were taken in AIR 1966 SC 380 Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. S.N. Modak and AIR 1962 SC 1500 Strazvboard Mfg. Co. v. Govind. The Constitution Bench in (1978) 2 SCC on a consideration of the various views on the issue held that- not making an application under Section 33(2)(b) seeking approval or withdrawing an application once made before any order is made thereon, is a clear case of contravention of the proviso to Section 33(2)(b). The Supreme Court further held that the conditions stipulated under Section 33(2)(b) being mandatory, an order of discharge or dismissal must comply with the same conditions to be operative and taking a view contrary would defeat the very purpose of the proviso and the same would be meaningless. 13. The proviso to Section 33(2)(b), as I can be seen from its very unambiguous and clear language, is mandatory. This apart, from the object of Section 33 and in the context of the proviso to Section 33(2)(b), it is obvious that the conditions contained in the said proviso are to be. essentially complied with. 13. The proviso to Section 33(2)(b), as I can be seen from its very unambiguous and clear language, is mandatory. This apart, from the object of Section 33 and in the context of the proviso to Section 33(2)(b), it is obvious that the conditions contained in the said proviso are to be. essentially complied with. Further any employer who contravenes the provisions of Section 33 invites a punishment under Section 31(1) with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to Rs. 1000/- or with both. This penal provision is again a pointer of the mandatory nature of the proviso to comply with the conditions stated therein. To put it in other way, the said conditions being mandatory, are to be satisfied if an order of discharge or dismissal passed under Section33(2)(b) is to be operative. If an employer desires to take benefit of the said provision for passing an order of discharge or dismissal of an employee, he has also to take the burden of discharging the statutory obligation placed on him in the said proviso. Taking a contrary view that an order of discharge or dismissal passed by an employer in contravention of the mandatory conditions contained in the proviso does not render such an order inoperative or void, defeats the very purpose of the proviso and it becomes meaningless. It is well-settled rule of interpretation that no part of statute shall be construed as unnecessary or superfluous. The proviso cannot be diluted or disobeyed by an employer. He cannot disobey the mandatory provision and then say that the order of discharge or dismissal made in contravention of Section 33(2)(b) is not void or inoperative. He cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. The interpretation of statute must be such that it should advance the legislative intent and serve the purpose for which it is made rather than to frustrate it. The proviso to Section 33(2)(b) affords protection to a workman to safeguards his interest and it is a shield against victimization and unfair labour practice by the employer during the pendency of industrial dispute when the relationship between them are already strained. The proviso to Section 33(2)(b) affords protection to a workman to safeguards his interest and it is a shield against victimization and unfair labour practice by the employer during the pendency of industrial dispute when the relationship between them are already strained. An employer cannot be permitted to use the provision of Section33(2)(b) to ease out a workman without complying with the conditions contained in the said proviso for any alleged misconduct said to be unconnected with the already pending industrial dispute. The protection afforded to a workman under the said provision cannot be taken away. If it is to be held that an order of discharge or dismissal passed by the employer without complying with the requirements of the said proviso is not void or inoperative, the employer may with impunity discharge or dismiss a workman. The Supreme Court was neither concerned with the issue whether such an application was required to be made prior to the action of termination of the service of the employee or subsequently. On the other hand an examination of the facts of the said case makes it abundantly clear that even in that case the employer approached the Tribunal, after dismissing the employee, for approval under Section 33(2)(b). The observation made in para 10 of the judgment in WP(C) No. 7738/01, extracted earlier, that a prior approval of the Industrial Tribunal is required, in our view is not only contrary to the language of Section 33(2)(b) but is also without any basis in the decision of the Supreme Court, referred to above. We, therefore, make it clear that such a casual observation is not to be treated as a ratio decidendi of the said judgment. 10. The learned Counsel for the Appellant argued that notwithstanding the fact that the decision in WP(C) No. 7738/01, which was brought to the notice of the learned Judge hearing the writ petition under appeal, the learned Judge ignored the submission. The learned Counsel submitted that the learned Judge either ought to have followed the above mentioned decision and held that prior approval under Section 33(2)(b) is required or if for any reason the learned Judge disagreed with the observation made in WP(C) No. 7738/01 ought to have referred the matter to a Bench of appropriate strength. In our view the said submission is not tenable. In our view the said submission is not tenable. It is settled law that what binds the Court is the ratio decidendi of a precedent but not the factual similarity or casual observation made in the earlier judgments. It is the principle laid down in the earlier judgments that binds the Court in the subsequent cases. As we have already noticed that it was neither the issue before the learned Single Judge in WP(C) No. 7738/01 nor was it the decision of the Supreme Court in (1978) 2 SCC 144 that an application under Section 33(2)(b) is required to be made prior to the action of termination of the employee. 11. The further submission of the learned Counsel for the Appellant that the impugned order in the writ petition, that is the order of the Industrial Tribunal in Misc. Case No. 6/2000 does not call for interference, needs examination. The answer to the question depends on the scope of the Section33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Section 331prohibits the employer from altering the conditions of service applicable to the employee immediately before the commencement of such proceeding, to the prejudice of the workmen concerned, who is already concerned with an industrial dispute which is pending a conciliation proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act or any other proceeding before an arbitrator or a Labour Court or Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, Sub-section (2) of Section 31 is a logical extension of the principle laid down in Section 33(1). The Parliament while recognizing that there can be an occasion for the employer to institute disciplinary proceeding against any one of the workmen who is otherwise covered by the operation of Section 33(1) in connection with a misconduct j not connected with any one of the proceedings contemplated under Section 33(1)recognised the right of the employer to discharge or punish by way of dismissal or Otherwise. However, to prevent the abuse of such a right of the employer to initiate such disciplinary proceeding by way of victimisation the Parliament provided that any such proceeding, a decision either to discharge or dismiss the employee from service, is required to be approved by such authority before whom the earlier proceeding, such as the one contemplated under Section 33(1), was pending. (On the facts of the present case it happens to be the Industrial Tribunal before which a dispute was pending). (On the facts of the present case it happens to be the Industrial Tribunal before which a dispute was pending). Obviously the Parliament thought that such a requirement would adequately take care of the abuse, if any by the employers of the rights recognised under Section 33(2)(b) and such an examination by an impartial statutory body would expose the vindictiveness, if any, on the part of the employer in resorting to the termination of the employment. If that is the scope of Section 33(2)(b) and the proviso thereof necessarily the scope of enquiry by the authority to whom such an application is made, in our view, is limited to the aspect whether the decision to terminate the employment is a consequence of vindictiveness on the part of the employer. Whether the decision to terminate the employment in such a case is otherwise legally right or not is not within the scope of enquiry contemplated under the proviso to Section 33(2)(b). 12. The Supreme Court in (1978) 3 SCC 1 Lalla Ram v. DCM Chemical Works Ltd. and Anr., while dealing with the scope of an enquiry under Section 33(2)(b) held as follows: 12. In proceedings under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal is confined to the enquiry as to (i) whether a proper domestic enquiry in accordance with the relevant rules/Standing Orders and principles of natural justice has been held; (ii) whether a prima facie case for dismissal based on legal evidence adduced before the domestic tribunal is made out; (iii) whether the employer had come to a bona fide conclusion that the employee was guilty and the dismissal did not amount to unfair labour practice and was not intended to victimise the employee regard being had to the position settled by the decisions of this Court in Bengal Bhatdee Coal Co. v. Ram Probesh Singh (1), Titaghur Paper Mills Co., Ltd. v. Ram Naresh Kumar (2), Hind Construction and Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen (3), Workmen of Messrs Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd. v. Management and Ors. (4), and Eastern Electric and Trading Co. v. Ram Probesh Singh (1), Titaghur Paper Mills Co., Ltd. v. Ram Naresh Kumar (2), Hind Construction and Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen (3), Workmen of Messrs Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd. v. Management and Ors. (4), and Eastern Electric and Trading Co. v. Baldev Lal (5) that though generally speaking the award of punishment for misconduct under the Standing Orders is a matter for the management to decide and the Tribunal is not required to consider the propriety or adequacy of the punishment or whether it is excessive or too severe yet an inference of mala fides may in certain cases be drawn from the imposition of unduly harsh, severe, unconscionable or shockingly disproportionate punishment; (iv) whether the employer has paid or offered to pay wages for one month to the employee and (v) whether the employer has simultaneously or within such reasonably short time as to form part of the game transaction applied to the authority before which the main industrial dispute is pending for approval of the action taken by him. If these conditions are satisfied, the Industrial Tribunal would grant the approval which would relate back to the date from which the employer had ordered the dismissal. If however, the domestic enquiry suffers from any defect or infirmity, the labour authority will have to find out on its own assessment of the evidence adduced before it whether there was justification for dismissal and if it so finds it will grant approval of the order of dismissal which would also relate back to the date when the order was passed provided the employer had paid or offered to pay wages for one month to the employee and the employer had within the time indicated above applied to the authority before which the main industrial dispute is pending for approval of the action taken by him. 13. Once again the Supreme Court in (2005) 3 SCC 241 Cholan Roadways Ltd. v. Thirugnanasambandam at para 13 categorically held that the scope of the jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) is limited and cannot be equated with Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. 14. The Industrial Tribunal, Silchar, in our view, precisely committed the same error of equating the scope and jurisdiction of enquiry in Misc. 14. The Industrial Tribunal, Silchar, in our view, precisely committed the same error of equating the scope and jurisdiction of enquiry in Misc. Case No. 6/2000 presented under the proviso to Section33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act and equated the jurisdiction available to the Tribunal while exercising power under Section 10 of the Act. 15. The learned Judge by the judgment under appeal recorded at para 13 as follows: 13. The exercise undertaken by the learned Tribunal appears to be contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Lalla Ram (supra) and Cholan Roadways Ltd. (supra). Accordingly, I am of the considered opinion that the learned Industrial Tribunal acted beyond its jurisdiction in making such an examination since the scrutiny of the tribunal envisages under Section 33(2)(b)of the I.D. Act is a limited one. 16. We are also of the opinion that the learned Judge was right in reaching such a conclusion. 17. The case of the Appellant before the Industrial Tribunal was that he could not participate in the domestic enquiry in view of his mental illness and, therefore, there was a failure of the requirements of the Act on affording a reasonable opportunity to the Appellant. The Industrial Tribunal in this regard recorded a finding at para 6 of the order as follows: In my humble opinion the workman ought to have appeared before the domestic enquiry and ought to have explain everything before the authority but as he stated that he could not do so due to his domestic trouble. It is not the finding of the Tribunal that the Appellant could not participate in the domestic enquiry in view of his health condition. As a matter of fact such a finding could not have been recorded for the following reasons: It is a pleaded case of the Appellant before the Tribunal as well as this Court that he was suffering from schizophrenia from 1996 to 1999 and he underwent some treatment in the Silchar Medical College Hospital. In support of his plea the Appellant produced before the Industrial Tribunal in the above mentioned Misc. Case No. 6/2000 a certificate issued by the above mentioned Hospital dated 22.5.1999 to the effect that he was undergoing treatment in the said Hospital during the period commencing from 10th October, 1996 to 22nd May, 1999. The Tribunal recorded that On 5.5.1999 the corporation in its Ref. Case No. 6/2000 a certificate issued by the above mentioned Hospital dated 22.5.1999 to the effect that he was undergoing treatment in the said Hospital during the period commencing from 10th October, 1996 to 22nd May, 1999. The Tribunal recorded that On 5.5.1999 the corporation in its Ref. No. CPM/PER/EIV dated 5.5.1999 advised the workman to resume duty as he was absenting himself from duty with effect from 10.10.1996 to date. The workman resumed duty on 24.3.1999 with a leave application supported by the original medical certificate dated 22.5.1999 wherein the workman was declared to be fit in resuming duty. The authorities were kind enough to allow him to resume duty on 24.5.1999. So it is obvious from the above that on 22.5.1999 the Appellant was medically fit to join duty. The misconduct for which the disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the Appellant pertains to the period subsequent to 24.5.1999 as we have noticed earlier in this judgment. The charge against the Appellant was that he was absent from duties for a period of 48 days between 16.7.1999 to 17.10.1999. When the material on record establishes that he was medically certified to be in a fit mental condition to resume duties by 22.5.1999 it baffles the imagination of this Court as to how it can be argued that the Appellant could not participate in the domestic enquiry, which was conducted much later, in view of his mental illness. It is obviously a false plea unsupported by evidence and material and the Appellant intentionally remained absent in the domestic enquiry. Therefore, the Industrial Tribunal did not record a finding that he could not participate in the domestic enquiry in view of his mental illness but, however, came to the conclusion on the oral evidence given by the Appellant that he could not participate in the domestic enquiry in view of his domestic trouble, the relevant portion of the judgment is already extracted earlier. 18. Having thus recording a finding that the Appellant did not participate in the domestic enquiry not because of his mental illness but because of his domestic trouble the Tribunal, in our view, clearly erred in going into the question whether the employer (the Respondent) was justified in terminating the employment of the Appellant herein. 18. Having thus recording a finding that the Appellant did not participate in the domestic enquiry not because of his mental illness but because of his domestic trouble the Tribunal, in our view, clearly erred in going into the question whether the employer (the Respondent) was justified in terminating the employment of the Appellant herein. The learned Judge by the judgment under appeal, therefore, held that the Industrial Tribunal acted in violation of the law declared by the Supreme Court in Lalla Ram (supra) and set aside the order of the Tribunal. 19. The question that remains is, if on such conclusion the decision of the Tribunal is not sustainable whether the learned Judge ought to have remitted the matter for an examination of the issue afresh by the Tribunal and if the learned Judge was so obliged whether we are bound in law to remit the matter to the Tribunal for an appropriate consideration of the matter again or take an appropriate decision whether the approval contemplated under Section (2)(b) proviso, is to be recorded or not. 20. Mr. N. Dhar, learned Counsel for the Appellant is right to the extent in saying that once the order of the Industrial Tribunal is set aside the question still remains whether, on appropriate consideration of the materials before the Tribunal in an application under Section 33(2)(b) the approval contemplated therein is to be granted or not. The fact remains that not granting such an approval, as held by the Supreme Court in Jaipur Zilla Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd., would render the order of dismissal or termination of the service of the employee inoperative. If that is the legal consequence of the absence of an approval under Section 33(2)(b) on the facts of the present case whether it would be profitable to remit the matter at this stage to the Industrial Tribunal for a fresh consideration of the matter or whether it is open to this Court to pass an appropriate order in this regard. 21. The allegations that the Appellant was absent from duty during the period specified in the charge stood unrebutted in the enquiry conducted by the management. The Appellant did not avail the opportunity given to him to rebut the evidence produced before the enquiry officer. 21. The allegations that the Appellant was absent from duty during the period specified in the charge stood unrebutted in the enquiry conducted by the management. The Appellant did not avail the opportunity given to him to rebut the evidence produced before the enquiry officer. Nor did the Appellant adduce any other evidence before the Tribunal to establish that the action of the management in terminating his service is not bona fide and that it was of victimisation. Such being the fact situation, as it emerges from the admitted documents on record, in our view the Tribunal exercising power under Section 33(2)(b) proviso, has no option but to accord approval for the action of the employer (the Respondent) in terminating the employment of the Appellant. The question whether such a finding is required to be recorded by the Tribunal or by this Court, in our view, is purely in the realm of procedure. Remittance of the matter to the Industrial' Tribunal at this stage would not advance the cause of justice as it would only lead to protraction of the litigation. We are, therefore, of the opinion that in the facts of the case the Tribunal ought to have accorded the necessary approval on the application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 22. For all the above mentioned reasons we do not see any merit in the appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. Goes without saying costs follow the event. 133. Conditions of service, etc., to remain unchanged under certain circumstances during pendency of proceedings.-(1) During the pendency of any conciliation proceeding before a conciliation officer or a Board or of any proceeding before an arbitrator or a Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal In respect of an industrial dispute, no employer shall (a) in regard to any matter connected with the dispute, alter, to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute, the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the commencement of such proceeding; or (b) for any misconduct connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, any workmen concerned In such dispute, save with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending. Appeal dismissed