Judgment Per DEBIPRASAD SENGUPTA, J. The appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated July 8, 2004 passed by the learned single Judge in W. P. No. 17180 (W)/2004. 2. The subject matter of challenge in the writ petition was an advertisement in the newspaper on August 24, 1998 inviting applications for appointment of drivers in the Bank ignoring the Government order dated June 22, 1992 fixing the guidelines regarding absorption of personal drivers of the bank's executives in the bank's service. 3. Mr. Kalyan Bandopadhyay, learned advocate appearing for the writ petitioners appellants submits that the members of Association are all drivers of the bank's executives in different places. The duties of these drivers are regular and the job so performed as drivers is permanent and o perennial in nature. Considering these aspects, Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs (Banking Division) issued a circular dated June 22, 1992, in which it was made clear that the bank might consider absorption of personal drivers subject to the condition that such candidate must be eligible having completed minimum 5 years uninterrupted service in that capacity and should be otherwise eligible for appointment in the sub-staff cadre in terms of the qualifications. It is the contention of the learned advocate of the writ petitioners/appellants that by such circular a right was accrued in favour of the writ petitioners/appellants and some drivers, who were found eligible, were also given appointments in the bank as employees. 4. Mr. Bandyopadhyay refers to a Memorandum of Settlement dated March 13, p 1993 between the Management of Allahabad Bank and their workmen represented by the All India Allahabad Bank Employees Coordination Committee in the matter of permanent appointment of personal drivers of the bank's executives. In the terms of settlement, it was specifically mentioned that all the personal drivers already engaged by the bank's executives on full time basis for driving cars owned by the bank and who have completed a minimum of 5 years uninterrupted service as personal drivers, will be considered for appointment in the bank as peon - cum - driver in subordinate cadre subject to the fulfilment of other terms and could it ions laid down in the said memorandum. 5. It is submitted by Mr. 5. It is submitted by Mr. Bandyopadhyay that in view of the Government guidelines dated June 22, 1992 and the Memorandum of Settlement dated March 13, 1993, the writ petitioners/appellants acquired a right to be considered for absorption In banks' service and some personal drivers of bank's executives were also absorbed and given appointments as peon-cum-driver in the respective branches. The learned advocate submits that thereafter by a letter being no. F- 9/5/92-IR dated June 23, 1997 issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs (Banking Division), it was communicated to all the Chief Executives of all Public Sector Banks that since there was no relationship between the personal drivers engaged by the executives and the Public Sector Banks, the question of their absorption in regular establishment of the banks does not arise as there was no employer employee relationship between the bank and the drivers engaged by the Executives. This was also against the policy of public employment and any such recruitment in the bank could be made through the regular recruitment channels. Extract from the said letter dated June 23, 1997 is quoted below: “You are, therefore, requested not to send any such proposals to the Govt. for their absorption and to advise that no personal driver hereafter be absorbed on regular establishment. Cases where appointments have already been done may not be re-opened. These orders shall come into, effect immediately and supercede all orders issued in this regard so far. The concerned General Manager shall be personally responsible to ensure compliance of this order." 6. It may be mentioned here that the Government order dated June 23, 1997 was not mentioned in the writ petition and it was brought on record for the first time in the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondents. 7. It is the main contention of the learned advocate of the writ petitioners/appellants that once a right is accrued in favour of the writ petitioners/appellants by the circular dated June 22, 1992 and Memorandum of Settlement dated March 13, 1993, the same cannot be taken away by the subsequent order dated June 23, 1997. 8. It is submitted by the learned advocate of the writ petitioners/appellants that the cars provided to the Bank Executives were owned by the bank. The salaries of these drivers are paid by the Executives, which are reimbursed by the bank. 8. It is submitted by the learned advocate of the writ petitioners/appellants that the cars provided to the Bank Executives were owned by the bank. The salaries of these drivers are paid by the Executives, which are reimbursed by the bank. Such cars are allotted to the Officers by the bank. Papers relating to registration, tax, insurance etc. of the cars also indicate that the cars are owned by the bank. Mr. Bandyopadhyay also submits that such personal drivers can only be removed after obtaining permission from the bank, as it is evident from the letter of communication of the bank appearing at page 195 of the paper book. According to Mr. Bandyopadhyay all these things indicate that there is a clear master and servant relationship between the bank and the drivers engaged by the bank executives. Relying upon certain documents, it is submitted by the learned advocate of the appellants that in determining the relationship of employer and employee, "control" is one of the important tests and the documents clearly indicate that the entire control over the drivers of the Executives is in the hand of the bank authority. 9. It is further submitted by the learned advocate of the appellants that the members of the appellant union are working for a long period even more than 10 years continuously and by virtue of the Government order dated June 22, 1992 and Memorandum of Settlement dated March 13, 1993, they have acquired a legal right to be absorbed permanently in the bank's service. 10. The learned advocate submits that although several points were taken in the writ petition, these were not taken into consideration by the learned Trial Judge. Relying upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court Narinder Singh v. State of Haryana and Others (2006) 8 SCC 33 , it is submitted by the learned advocate of the appellants that when various stands are taken by the writ petitioners/appellants, High Court cannot restrict consideration to only one of them without even referring to the other pleas. But we are unable to accept such contention as we find that all the points taken in the writ petition were taken into consideration by the learned single Judge, who finally dismissed the writ application relaying on the subsequent Government order dated June 23,1997. 11. But we are unable to accept such contention as we find that all the points taken in the writ petition were taken into consideration by the learned single Judge, who finally dismissed the writ application relaying on the subsequent Government order dated June 23,1997. 11. In support of his contention the learned advocate relies upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court P. Tulsi Das and Others v. Govt. of A.P. and Others AIR 2003 SC 43 : (2003) 1 SCC 364 . The learned advocate refers to paragraph 14 of the said judgment, which is as follows: "14. On a careful consideration of the principles laid down in the above decisions in the light of the fact situation In these appeals we are of the view that they squarely apply on all fours to the cases on hand in favour of the appellants. The submissions on behalf of the respondent State that the rights derived and claimed by the appellants must be under any statutory enactment or rules made under Article 309 of the Constitution of India and that in other aspects there could not be any acquisition of rights validly, so as to disentitle the State to enact the law of the nature under challenge to set right serious anomalies which had crept in and deserved to be undone, does not merit our acceptance. . . . .." 12. On perusal of the judgment referred to above, we find that the Hon'ble Supreme Court 10 dealt with the constitutional validity of the Andhra Pradesh Educational Service Untrained Teachers (Regulation of Services and Fixation of Pay) Act, 1991 and upheld the rights of the teachers, who were appointed as SGBT teachers to be entitled to the pay scales of school assistants for the period prior to the said Act. In our considered view, the said judgment does not have any manner of application in the present case as the facts and circumstances of the present case is totally different from the case referred to above. 13. The next judgment relied upon by the learned advocate of the appellants is Uday Pratap Singh and Others v. State of Bihar and Others (1994) Supp. 3 SCC 451. In the said case, the only point for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was seniority of employees of Bihar Finance Service, which originally consisted of senior Branch and Junior Branch. The next judgment relied upon by the learned advocate of the appellants is Uday Pratap Singh and Others v. State of Bihar and Others (1994) Supp. 3 SCC 451. In the said case, the only point for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was seniority of employees of Bihar Finance Service, which originally consisted of senior Branch and Junior Branch. As per Bihar Finance Services Rules, 1953 seniority was to be reckoned from the date of substantive appointment. Respondents were appointed as direct recruits to the senior Branch. State Government by issuing an order decided that both senior and Junior Branches be merged with effect from April 1, 1974. The appellants deemed seniority in the merged cadre with effect from the said date, which was accepted by the Government, but was rejected by the High Court. While o dismissing the appeal the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that by an executive order the statutory rules cannot be whittled down nor can any retrospective effect be given to such executive order. 14. The judgment Ram Singh and Others v. Union Territory, Chandigarh and Others AIR 2004 SC 969 : (2004) 1 SCC 126 : (2004) 1 MLJ 160 : 2004-I-LLJ-227, relied upon by the learned advocate of the appellants, is also not applicable in the present case. From a reading of the said judgment, it appears that the appellants, who were contract employees, claimed relief of regularisation of their services in the Engineering Department of Chandigarh Administration on the ground that work of maintaining supply of electricity being of permanent and perennial in nature, they should be directed to be absorbed. The claim was rejected by CAT and petition filed under Article 227 of the ConstitutIOn was dismissed by the High Court. While dismissing the appeal the Hon'ble Apex Court was of the view that none of the reliefs, as prayer for, could be granted to the employees without ascertaining through the industrial forum, factual aspects of inter se relationship between Chandigarh Administration, the contractor and the contract employees. 15. While dismissing the appeal the Hon'ble Apex Court was of the view that none of the reliefs, as prayer for, could be granted to the employees without ascertaining through the industrial forum, factual aspects of inter se relationship between Chandigarh Administration, the contractor and the contract employees. 15. In the case of State of Gujarat and Others v. Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni and Others, AIR 1984 SC 161 : (1983) 2 SCC 33 : 1983-I-LLJ-284, a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court considered the question as to whether the Panchayet Service constituted under Section 203 of Gujarat Panchayet Act was a civil service of the state and the members of the service were Government servants. While allowing the appeal, it was held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that Panchayet Service constituted under Section 203 of the Act was a civil service of the state and the members of the service are Government servants. In paragraph 27 of the judgment, it was held by the Hon'ble Court as follows at p. 291 of LLJ: "27. ...... Several factors may indicate the relationship of master and servant. None may be conclusive. On the other hand, no single factor may be considered absolutely essential. The presence of all or some of the factors, such as, the right to select for appointment, the right to appoint, the right to terminate the employment, the right to take other disciplinary action, the right to prescribe the conditions of service, the nature of the duties performed by the employee, the right to control the employee's manner and method of the work, the right to issue directions and the right to determine and the source from which wages or salary are paid and a host of such circumstances, may have to be considered to determine the existence of the relationship of master and servant. In each case, it is a question of fact whether a person is a servant of the State or not. . . . . . " 16. The question as to whether a person can be said to be holder of a civil post had been the subject matter of consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in number of cases. The next judgment relied upon by the learned advocate of the appellants is State of Assam and Others v. Kanak Chandra Dutta AIR 1967 SC 884 . The question as to whether a person can be said to be holder of a civil post had been the subject matter of consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in number of cases. The next judgment relied upon by the learned advocate of the appellants is State of Assam and Others v. Kanak Chandra Dutta AIR 1967 SC 884 . The point, which fell for consideration by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, was whether a Mauzadar in the Assam Valley held a civil post and was entitled to protection under Article 311(2) of the Constitution. A Mauzadar was appointed for collection of land revenue and his primary duty was to collect land revenue and other Government revenues. He was working as Revenue Officer and Ex-officio Assistant Settlement Officer exercising delegated powers of the Government and the state had the power and right to select and appoint him inasmuch as power to suspend and dismiss. The Court observed that there was master and servant relationship between the state and the employee. Judged in this light, it was held that Mauzadar of Assam Valley was holder of a civil post. 17. On the same point, the learned advocate of the appellants relies upon another judgment State of U.P. v. Chandra Prakash Pandey AIR 2001 SC 1298 : (2001) 4 SCC 78 . Having gone through the aforesaid two judgments, we are of the view that the said judgments do not have any manner of application in the present case since the facts and circumstances of the present case is totally different from the cases referred to above. 18. As regards the binding nature of the settlement arrived at by and between the parties, the learned advocate of the appellants relies upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court ITC Limited Workers Welfare Association and Another v. Management of ITC Limited and Others AIR 2002 SC 937 : (2002) 3 SCC 411 : 2002-I-LLJ-848. The learned advocate refers to paragraph 21 of the said judgment, which is as follows at p. 855 of LLJ: "21. What follows from a conspectus of these decisions is that a settlement which is a product of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration, more so when a settlement is arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding. The settlement can only be ignored in exceptional circumstances viz. What follows from a conspectus of these decisions is that a settlement which is a product of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration, more so when a settlement is arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding. The settlement can only be ignored in exceptional circumstances viz. if it is demonstrably unjust, unfair or the result of mala fides such as corrupt motives on the part of those who were instrumental in effecting the settlement. That apart, the settlement has to be judged as a whole, taking an overall view. The various terms and clauses of settlement cannot be examined in piecemeal and in vacuum." The next judgment IRCON Limited and Another v. Lal Mohammad and Others 1998-II- LLJ-214 (All) also does not have any application in the present case. On perusal of the judgment it appears that the writ petitioners, who were employees of a company carrying on business of construction work, claimed regularisation. It was held that concept of a regular employee does not exist under the Industrial Law and that retrenchment of the writ petitioners after completion of project work, was valid and the question of regularising their services could not arise. Our attention is also drawn to the Constitution Bench Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others v. Uma Devi (3) and Others AIR 2006 SC 1806 : (2006) 4 SCC 1 : (2006) 2 MLJ 326: 2006-II-LLJ-722. The said case deals with the public employment, absorption, regularization or permanent continuance of temporary, contractual, casual or ad hoc employees appointed/recruited and continued for long in public employment de hors the Constitutional Scheme of Public Employment. Our attention is specifically drawn to paragraph 53 of the said judgment, which is quoted below 40 at p. 742 of LLJ: "44. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained in S.Y. Narayanappa R.N. Nanjundappa and B.N. Nagarajan and referred to in para 15 above, of duly qualified persons In duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been, made and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of the Courts or of Tribunals. The question of regular is at ion of the services of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court in the cases above referred to and in the light of this judgment. In that context the Union of India, the State Governments and their instrumentalities should take steps to regularise as a one-time measure, the services of such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of the Courts or of Tribunals and should further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases where temporary employees or daily wagers are being now employed. The process must be set in motion within six months from this date. We also clarify that regularisation, if any already made, but not sub judice, need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there should be no further bypassing of the constitutional requirement and regularising or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme." 19. Placing strong reliance on the above passage, the learned advocate of the appellants submits that the respondent authorities should be directed to take steps to regularise the services of the members of the appellant union. In view of the verdict of the Constitutional Bench judgment, the respondent authorities are duty bound to consider the case of the members of the appellant union. 20. In our considered view, paragraph 53 in the judgment of the Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others v. Uma Devi (3) and Others (supra) case does not have any application in the present case where facts and circumstances are totally different. From paragraph 53, it is clear that the Hon'ble Supreme Court directed the respondent authorities to regularise as onetime measure the services of the workmen, who worked for a long period in duly sanctioned post. In the present case, the writ petitioners/appellants never worked in duly sanctioned post. 21. Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee, learned advocate appearing for the respondent/bank submits that the writ petitioners cannot claim absorption of personal drivers of the bank's executives when admittedly they are not engaged or appointed by the bank. In the present case, the writ petitioners/appellants never worked in duly sanctioned post. 21. Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee, learned advocate appearing for the respondent/bank submits that the writ petitioners cannot claim absorption of personal drivers of the bank's executives when admittedly they are not engaged or appointed by the bank. It is submitted that the bank's executives are provided with cars by the bank and the drivers of those cars are engaged and paid by the executives from the allowance, which they receive from the bank. These personal drivers are never appointed by the bank. Mr. Mukherjee points out that by a letter dated January 6, 1992 bank approached the Government for absorption of those personal drivers and in response to such letter the Government gave its consent for absorption subject to certain terms and conditions mentioned in the letter dated June 22, 1992. On the basis of guidelines as prescribed by the Government, a Memorandum of Settlement dated March 13, 1993 was arrived at by and between the bank management and recognized union of workmen staff of the bank in full and final settlement of the issue as on one time exercise. Mr. Mukherjee further points out that in guidelines of the Government in its letter dated June 22, 1992, it was specifically mentioned that such relaxation would be purely an one time exercise and would cease as soon as the eligible personal drivers were absorbed. It was also made clear that bank would stop forthwith the system of recruitment of personal drivers to avoid any such complaints. Mr. Mukherjee, learned advocate submits that in terms of the said Memorandum of Settlement dated March 13, 1993 some personal drivers, who were found eligible, were absorbed in the bank's service subject to accrual of vacancies. 22. It is the contention of Mr. Mukherjee, learned advocate of the respondent/bank that personal drivers are exclusively engaged by the Executives themselves for driving the vehicles provided by the bank for their use and it has no bearing with the rules/guidelines laid down by the bank for recruitment of its subordinate staff including peon-cum-drivers. Mr. Mukherjee further points out that there is no employer-employee relationship between the bank and the personal drivers engaged by the executives. It is also pointed out by Mr. Mr. Mukherjee further points out that there is no employer-employee relationship between the bank and the personal drivers engaged by the executives. It is also pointed out by Mr. Mukherjee that on the basis of the guidelines dated June 22, 1992 issued by the Government and the Memorandum of Settlement dated March 13, 1993 a panel was prepared and process of absorption from the panel continued from December, 1993 till 1997. In both the aforesaid instruments i.e. the Guidelines of June, 1992 and the Memorandum of Settlement dated March 13, 1993, it was specifically made clear that such process of absorption was "one time exercise" subject to fulfilment of terms and conditions and availability of vacancies. In terms of Memorandum of Settlement some personal drivers, who could avail the opportunity and applied for that, were given appointments in the available vacancies. 23. It is submitted by Mr. Mukherjee, learned advocate that the Government by its letter dated June 23, 1997 clarified the position and it was made clear in the said letter that as there was no employer-employee relationship between the banks and the personal drivers engaged by the Executives, the question of absorption of such personal drivers did not arise. It was also made clear that absorption of such personal drivers in the regular establishment of the banks is against the policy of Public Sector employment and any such 's recruitment in the bank can only be made through regular recruitment channels. 24. It is further submitted by Mr. Mukherjee, learned advocate that the aforesaid Government order dated June 23, 1997 was never challenged by the writ petitioners or any member of their association. 25. It is pointed out by Mr. Mukherjee next referring to the prayer (b) of the writ petition, that no relief can be granted by any Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in terms of such prayer, which is quoted below: "(b) A writ of and/or in the nature of W Mandamus commanding the respondents to absorb all the personal drivers those who have appointed in the bank and completed five years of service in the post of personal drivers immediately and not to terminate the service of the personal drivers in any manner whatsoever till the absorption in the post permanently." 26. There is no averment in the writ petition as to whether any of the members of petitioner no. 1/association was in service on the date of Memorandum of Settlement, whether they had requisite qualification, whether they made any application for absorption in terms of Memorandum of a Settlement and in absence of such specific averment in the writ petition, the same was rightly rejected by the learned Trial Judge. 27. Mr. Mukherjee, learned advocate relies upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court National Engineering Industries Limited v. State of Rajasthan and Others AIR 2000 SC 469 : (2001) 1 SCC 371 : (1999) Supp MLJ 138 : 2000-I-LLJ-247. The learned advocate refers to paragraph 25 of the said judgment, which is quoted below at p. 264 of LLJ: "26. ...... A settlement which is sought to be impugned has to be scanned and scrutinized. Sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 18 divide settlements into two categories, namely, (1) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings and (2) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings. A settlement which belongs to the first category has limited application in that it merely binds the parties to the agreement but the settlement belonging to the second category has extended application since it is binding on all the parties to the industrial disputes, to all others who were summoned to appear in the conciliation proceedings and , to all persons employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute related on the date of the dispute and to all others who joined the establishment thereafter......" 28. Relying upon the aforesaid judgment, it is submitted by Mr. Mukherjee that there is no averment in the writ petition that any of the personal drivers was member of the Co-ordination Committee, who was party to the settlement and that on the date of Memorandum of Settlement those personal drivers were in the service of the bank. 29. Finally it is submitted by Mr. Mukherjee, learned advocate of the respondent/bank that since there was no employer-employee relation between the bank and the personal drivers of the bank's executives, question of their absorption in the bank's service does not arise at all. 30. In reply to the argument advanced by Mr. 29. Finally it is submitted by Mr. Mukherjee, learned advocate of the respondent/bank that since there was no employer-employee relation between the bank and the personal drivers of the bank's executives, question of their absorption in the bank's service does not arise at all. 30. In reply to the argument advanced by Mr. Mukherjee, the learned advocate of the writ petitioners/appellants made his submission on the point of locus standi of the writ petitioners/ appellants to move the writ petition. Mr. Bandyopadhyay, learned advocate submits that since the point of locus standi was not taken before the learned Trial Judge, the same cannot be taken up now at the appellate stage. The learned advocate also relies upon the judgments AIR 1981 SC 344 , 2006 (3) CHN 655 and (2000) 7 SCC 554. But we are of the view that we need not deal with such point of locus standi or with the judgments referred to above as the point of locus standi, as it is submitted by Mr. Mukherjee also, was never raised in course of hearing of the present appeal. 31. We have heard the learned advocates of the respective parties. We have also perused the papers and documents referred to by the learned advocates of the respective parties. It is very much clear that the personal drivers of the bank's executives are never engaged/appointed by the bank. They are engaged by the bank's executives and they are paid their salaries by the executives from the car allowance received from the bank. There is no doubt that cars are provided by the bank for use of the executives and all the papers relating to registration, tax and insurance stand in the name of the bank as the cars are owned by the bank. But it is the admitted position that these personal drivers are never appointed by the bank. It is true that on being approached by the bank, the Government issued guidelines in the letter dated June 22, 1992 giving consent for absorption of these personal drivers on certain terms and conditions. It is also true that a Memorandum of Settlement was arrived at by and between the bank management and the Bank Employees Co-ordination Committee. It is true that on being approached by the bank, the Government issued guidelines in the letter dated June 22, 1992 giving consent for absorption of these personal drivers on certain terms and conditions. It is also true that a Memorandum of Settlement was arrived at by and between the bank management and the Bank Employees Co-ordination Committee. But it is clear from these two documents that such relaxation in Government guidelines dated June 22, 1992 and settlement arrived at in the, Memorandum dated March 13, 1993 were done as one-time : exercise without creating any precedence. It is also on record that some personal drivers, who availed that opportunity, were given regular appointments in terms of the aforesaid two documents. That apart, there is no specific averment in the writ petition itself that these personal drivers were members of the Co-ordination Committee, who was a party to the settlement. It is also on record that in the Government order dated June 23, 1997, although it was not disclosed in the writ petition, it is made clear that absorption of such personal drivers in regular establishment of banks is against the policy of Public Sector employment and any such recruitment in the bank can only be made through the regular recruitment channels. In the said order dated June 23, 1997 the Government has directed not to send any proposal for absorption of personal drivers in regular establishment. 32. In deciding the present appeal we rely upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others v. Uma Devi (3) and Others AIR 2000 SC 1806 : (2006) 4 SCC 1 : (2006) 2 MLJ 326 : 2006-II-LJ-722. In paragraph 36 of the said judgment, it was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court as follows at p. 738 of LLJ: "36. While directing that appointments, temporary or casual, be regularized or made permanent, the Courts are swayed by the fact that the person concerned has worked for some time and in some cases for a considerable length of time. It is not as if the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature, is not aware of the nature of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It is not as if the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature, is not aware of the nature of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain not at arm's length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible......" 33. In the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others v. Uma Devi (3) and Others (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court having considered various judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court as also of other High Courts observed that appointments made without following due process or the rules for appointment, do not confer any right on the appointees and the Court cannot direct their absorption, regularisation or making them permanent. 34. Paragraph 53 in the judgment of Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others v. Uma Devi (3) and Others (supra), relied upon by the learned advocate of the appellants, is not at all applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the said paragraph directed the Union of India, the State Governments and their instrumentalities to take steps to regularise as one-time measure the services of such, employees, who had worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts. In the present case, the personal drivers of the bank's executives never worked in any duly sanctioned post. 35. In view of the discussions made above, we find sufficient merit in the submission made by Mr. Mukherjee, learned advocate appearing for the respondent/bank. After going through the impugned judgment and order of the learned Trial Judge, we do not find anything wrong and we are not inclined to interfere with the same. 36. The present appeal, having no merit, is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Urgent Xerox certified copy of this judgment and order may be supplied to the learned advocates of the respective parties, if the same is applied for. 36. The present appeal, having no merit, is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Urgent Xerox certified copy of this judgment and order may be supplied to the learned advocates of the respective parties, if the same is applied for. Per DEBASISH KAR GUPTA, J.: 37. I agree, Appeal dismissed.