Judgment : 1. By this appeal, the appellant/original defendant no.1 has challenged judgment and decree dated 21.2.1997 passed by the 2nd Additional District Judge, Nagpur in Regular Civil Appeal No. 417 of 1993. Present appeal was admitted on 24th June 1998 and grounds set out in the memo of appeal are treated as substantial questions of law arising in the appeal. 2. Learned counsel for appellant submits that questions of law extracted from the grounds set out in the memo of appeal could be thus – (i). Whether Parvatibai wd/o Shankarrao Telrandhe could not have executed Will bequeathing suit house in favour of plaintiff Prabhakar Maniram Telrandhe? (ii). Whether Parvatibai had no right, title or interest in the suit house? 3. Heard learned counsel for appellant. None appears for respondents, though served. Having gone through the entire record; having heard learned counsel for appellant and examining legal position, questions of law have to be answered in the negative and appeal ought to be dismissed. 4. One Shankarrao Telrandhe was owner of suit house. He died on 30.12.1976 issueless, leaving behind his widow Parwatibai who became absolute owner of the suit house and by Will dated 22.11.1979, bequeathed suit house in favour of Prabhakar Maniram Telrandhe (plaintiff). It appears from record that Chhatrasal Anandrao Telrandhe (defendant no.1) was driven out of house in the year 1982 by his father Anandrao Jagannath Telrandhe (defendant no.2). Thus, Chhatrasal needed shelter which was provided by maniram (plaintiff’s father). Defendant no.1 Chhatrasal was allowed to reside in the suit house as licensee although he did not pay any licence fees for use and occupation of the suit house. 1st defendant Chhatrasal tried to get his name mutated in the Corporation record on the pretext that he had paid municipal taxes for the period from 1.4.1978 to 31.3.1981 and 1.4.1981 to 31.3.1984. That compelled Maniram (father of plaintiff) to issue notice (exhibit 36) terminating licence of defendant no.1 Chhatrasal. 5. Under these circumstances, plaintiff Prabhakar Maniram Telrandhe instituted Regular Civil Suit No. 426 of 1989 for declaration, possession and mesne profits. Learned trial Court dismissed suit vide judgment and order dated 21.4.1993, notwithstanding rendering certain findings in favour of the plaintiff. It was held in favour of the plaintiff that deceased Shankarrao had left behind immoveable property (suit house). 5. Under these circumstances, plaintiff Prabhakar Maniram Telrandhe instituted Regular Civil Suit No. 426 of 1989 for declaration, possession and mesne profits. Learned trial Court dismissed suit vide judgment and order dated 21.4.1993, notwithstanding rendering certain findings in favour of the plaintiff. It was held in favour of the plaintiff that deceased Shankarrao had left behind immoveable property (suit house). It was further held that suit property belonged to Shankarrao and that Parvatibai had executed Will dated 22.11.1979 in favour of plaintiff bequeathing suit property in his name. However, learned trial Court held that plaintiff had failed to prove that Parvatibai became exclusive owner of the suit house and further held in favour of defendant no.1 that the suit house was built on Nazul plot which was given on patta to defendant no.1 Chhatrasal and, therefore, defendant no.1 is owner of the suit house. 6. Aggrieved by dismissal of suit, plaintiff Prabhakar preferred appeal and the appeal came to be allowed by 2nd Additional District Judge by judgment and order dated 21.2.1997, as aforesaid. The 1st Appellate Court held in favour of plaintiff that he has become absolute owner of suit house on the strength of Will executed by Smt Parvatibai. The 1st Appellate Court further held that the trial Court erred in holding that Chhatrasal (defendant no.1) was not in possession of suit house as licensee and that his licence has not been terminated. The 1st Appellate Court directed defendants to deliver possession of suit house to plaintiff. 7. Learned counsel for appellant contended that transaction relating to transfer of immoveable property by way of gift, settlement or assignment requires compulsory registration in view of the provisions of Section 17 of the Registration Act. Learned counsel relied upon Full Bench judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Gandevalla Jayaram Reddy v. Mokkala and ors reported in AIR 2002 AP 75 . Learned counsel strenuously contends that evidently transaction as is involved in the present case would create right in immovable property in one and the right of the owner thereof shall be extinguished and thus, the same would attract the provisions of Section 17 (1) (b) of the Registration Act. Learned counsel strenuously contends that evidently transaction as is involved in the present case would create right in immovable property in one and the right of the owner thereof shall be extinguished and thus, the same would attract the provisions of Section 17 (1) (b) of the Registration Act. Learned counsel for appellant also placed reliance on Devendra Singh and ors v. State of Rajasthan reported in AIR 2002 Rajasthan 66 to argue that Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act requires compulsory registration of transfer of any immoveable property worth more than Rs. 100/-. 8. Learned trial Court arrived at a finding of fact that the suit house belonged to Shankarrao Telrandhe who expired issueless on 30.12.1976, leaving behind his widow Parvatibai who executed Will dated 22.11.1979. In view of this clear-cut finding of fact affirmed by the 1st Appellate Court, it must be observed that the document was a testamentary document executed as Will evidence thereof provided by attesting witnesses in the trial Court. Legal position is well-settled in view of the provisions of Sections 17 and 18 of the Registration Act, 1908 that Will is not compulsorily registrable document. It is optionally registrable. Registration of a Will is immaterial. It is equally efficacious whether it is registered or not. The 1st Appellate Court, under these circumstances, has rightly arrived at a finding that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to prove that he was adopted by Shankar and Parvatibai while he was minor. Execution of Will in favour of plaintiff by Parvatibai made it immaterial for the plaintiff to establish fact of alleged adoption. There was no question of any transfer of immovable property which would require compulsory registration. Thus, the principles from the rulings cited by learned counsel for appellant are not attracted in the present case although legal position cannot be disputed that any immovable property having worth of one hundred rupees or more if transferred by gift or conveyance, sale, lease, mortgage, settlement, assignment etc. would require compulsory registration. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant also argued that suit house is situated on nazul land and Nazul Authority had given the land on patta to defendant no.1 Chhatrasal. Therefore, Parvatibai had no legal right or authority to create Will in favour of plaintiff. would require compulsory registration. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant also argued that suit house is situated on nazul land and Nazul Authority had given the land on patta to defendant no.1 Chhatrasal. Therefore, Parvatibai had no legal right or authority to create Will in favour of plaintiff. This submission again cannot be accepted in view of concurrent findings of fact of two Courts below that suit house belonged to Shankar Telrandhe who died issueless on 30.12.1976, leaving behind him his widow Parbatibai who executed Will dated 22.11.1979 in favour of plaintiff when plaintiff was minor. Further more, there is a finding of fact that defendant no.1 Chhatrasal was driven out of house by his father Anandrao in the year 1982 and Chhatrasal needed accommodation which was provided by father of plaintiff. When Chhatrasal tried to get the property mutated in his name on the pretext that he had paid Corporation taxes for certain period, his licence was terminated by Maniram Telrandhe (father of plaintiff) by notice (exhibit 36). Thus, licence of defendant no.1 Chhatrasal was terminated by father of plaintiff. Under these circumstances, the present appellant had no legal right, title or interest to continue his occupation over the suit house. 10. In the second appeal, in view of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, findings and conclusions of the 1st Appellate Court can be interfered with only when they are contrary to law or contrary to settled legal position or when based on inadmissible evidence or recorded ignoring material evidence. The right of appeal is neither natural nor inherent right attached to the litigant. Being substantive statutory right, it has to be regulated according to law in force. The conditions must be strictly fulfilled before second appeal can be entertained and allowed. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that respondents were careless to participate in the proceedings of second appeal and, therefore, second appeal may be allowed at least on humanitarian ground, allowing the appellant to continue his occupation over the suit house. The submission cannot be accepted. Although respondents have remained absent, acceptability of submissions advanced on behalf of appellant needs to be considered on the basis of material borne out from record. The submission cannot be accepted. Although respondents have remained absent, acceptability of submissions advanced on behalf of appellant needs to be considered on the basis of material borne out from record. Submission canvassed by learned counsel for appellant cannot be accepted for another reason that no Court has power to add to or enlarge grounds stated in the memorandum of appeal although appellant can be permitted, in view of Section 100 (5) of the Code, to address the Court on any question of law not formulated by it and points raised during the course of argument may be taken into consideration on which substantial question of law was framed. 12. The High Court cannot be justified in interfering with the pure questions of facts in second appeal. Unless substantial questions of law are raised, there would be no justification in interfering with the findings of facts. The High Court cannot substitute its own finding on re-appreciation of evidence merely on the ground that another view is possible even if the 1st Appellate Court commits error in recording finding of fact, because there cannot be third trial of facts or one more dice in the gamble, as observed by the Apex Court in Koppisetty Venkatratnam v. Pamarti Venkayamma reported in (2009) 4 SCC 244. The Apex Court has referred to relevant portion from Fifty-fourth Report of the Law Commission of India submitted in 1973 and paragraph 70 reproduced therein, reads thus – “70. Now, after the 1976 Amendment, the scope of Section 100 has been drastically curtailed and narrowed down. The High Courts would have jurisdiction of interfering under Section 100 CPC only in a case where substantial questions of law are involved and those questions have been clearly formulated in the memorandum of appeal. At the time of admission of the second appeal, it is the bounden duty and obligation of the High Court to formulate substantial questions of law and then only the High Court is permitted to proceed with the case to decide those questions of law. The language used in the amended section specifically incorporates the words as `substantial question of law’ which is indicative of the legislative intention. It must be clearly understood that the legislative intention was very clear that legislature never wanted second appeal to become `third trial on facts’ or `one more dice in the gamble’. The language used in the amended section specifically incorporates the words as `substantial question of law’ which is indicative of the legislative intention. It must be clearly understood that the legislative intention was very clear that legislature never wanted second appeal to become `third trial on facts’ or `one more dice in the gamble’. The effect of the amendment mainly, according to the amended section was : ...” 13. For the reasons stated above, appeal has to be dismissed. It is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.