JUDGMENT C.R. Sarma, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 25.05.2005 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Hailakandi in Sessions Case No. 71/02 convicting the accused Appellants, under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter called IPC) and thereby sentencing them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and also to pay a fine of Rs.2000/- each, in default, to suffer further period of rigorous imprisonment for two months. 2. Heard Mr. A.M. Mazumdar, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. A. Choudhury, Advocate appearing for the Appellants and Mr. K.A. Mazumdar, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, Assam for the State Respondent. 3. The prosecution case, in a nutshell, is as follows: On 22.11.2001 at around 7 P.M. when Md. Jiabuddin, a son of Md Moin Uddin (P.W.-1) was on his way to the Mosque to attend "Namaz", the accused persons, being armed with various weapons, assaulted him and he succumbed to the injuries. An FIR (Ext. 1) being lodged by Md Moinuddin (P.W.-1), police registered a case and launched investigation into the matter. At the close of the investigation, charge sheet was submitted against the accused persons for the offences under Sections 147/148/149/302 IPC. The learned Sessions Judge framed charges under Section 148/149/302/149 IPC, to which the accused persons pleaded not guilty. 4. The prosecution examined as many as 7(seven) witnesses including the Medical Officer, who conducted post-mortem examination, and the Investigating Police Officer. 5. At the close of the examination of the witnesses for the prosecution, the accused persons were examined under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short 'Cr.P.C.'). Denying the allegations, the accused persons pleaded that they were falsely implicated due to certain previous grudge. They declined to adduce defence evidence. There being no eye witnesses, the case of the prosecution rested on circumstantial evidence. 6. Mr. A.M. Majumdar, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the Appellants, taking us through the evidence on record, strenuously argued that there was no cogent and reliable evidence to believe that the accused persons committed the alleged offence. He submitted that none of the witnesses saw the accused/Appellants assaulting the deceased and that the prosecution miserably failed to establish its case. The learned Senior Counsel, further submitted that the learned trial Judge committed illegality by convicting and sentencing the accused Appellants without properly appreciating the evidence on record 7. He submitted that none of the witnesses saw the accused/Appellants assaulting the deceased and that the prosecution miserably failed to establish its case. The learned Senior Counsel, further submitted that the learned trial Judge committed illegality by convicting and sentencing the accused Appellants without properly appreciating the evidence on record 7. Supporting the impugned judgment and order of conviction, Mr. K.A. Mazumdar, learned Addl. P.P. submitted, that the evidence of the P.Ws clearly revealed undisputable and reliable circumstantial evidence leading to believe, within all human possibility, that the accused Appellants committed the alleged offences and as such the learned Sessions Judge committed no error in passing the impugned judgment. 8. We have carefully scrutinized the evidence on record. There being no eye witness, the prosecution case is based on circumstantial evidence. The learned Sessions Judge has also taken into consideration the extra-judicial confession, alleged to be made by the accused Appellants. 9. Mr.A.M. Mazumar, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the Appellants, relying on the decisions, held in State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram reported in (2006) 12 SCC 254 , Gogan Konojia and Anr. v. State of Punjab reported in (2006) 13 SCC 516, and Ram Singh v. Sonia and Ors. reported in (2000) 3 SCC 1 , submitted that in view of the principle of appreciation of evidence laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court there was no sufficient circumstantial evidence as well as reliable extra judicial confession to base the conviction. 10. In the case of State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram (supra) the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the incriminating circumstances should form a complete chain without any other hypothesis except the guilt of the accused and that the extra judicial confession must be proved like any other facts and the value thereof depended upon the veracity of the witness to whom it is made. 11. In the case of Gogan Kanojia (supra) the Apex Court held as follows- ...Indisputably, charges can be proved on the basis of the circumstantial evidence, when direct evidence is not available. It is well settled that in a case based on a circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must prove that within all human probabilities, the act must have been done by the accused. It is, however, necessary for the courts to remember that there is a long gap between "may be true" and "must be true". It is well settled that in a case based on a circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must prove that within all human probabilities, the act must have been done by the accused. It is, however, necessary for the courts to remember that there is a long gap between "may be true" and "must be true". Prosecution case is required to be covered by leading cogent, believable and credible evidence. Whereas the court must raise a presumption that the accused is innocent and in the event two views are possible, one indicating to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the defence available to the accused should be accepted, but at the same time, the court must not reject the evidence of the prosecution proceeding on the basis that they are false, not trust worthy, unreliable and made on flimsy grounds or only on the basis of the surmises and conjectures. The prosecution case, thus, must be judged in its entirety having regard to the totality of the circumstances. The approach of the court be an integrated one and not truncated or isolated. The court should use the yardstick of probability and appreciate the intrinsic value of the evidence brought on record and analyse and assess the same objectively. 12. The Hon'ble Apex Court reiterated the following well settled principles in regard to appreciation of circumstantial evidence: 1) There must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 2) Circumstantial evidence can be reasonably made the basis of an accused person's conviction if it is of such character that it is wholly inconsistent with the innocence of the accused and is consistent only with his guilt. 3) There should be no missing links but it is not that everyone of the links must appear on the surface of the evidence, since some of these links may only be inferred from the proven facts. 4) On the availability of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. 5) It cannot be said that prosecution must meet any and every hypothesis put forwarded by the accused however far-fetched and fanciful it might be. 4) On the availability of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. 5) It cannot be said that prosecution must meet any and every hypothesis put forwarded by the accused however far-fetched and fanciful it might be. Nor does it mean that prosecution evidence must be rejected on the slightest doubt because the law permits rejection if the doubt is reasonable and not otherwise. 13. In the case of Ram Singh (supra) the Hon'ble Apex Court, reiterating its earlier decisions was pleased to hold that in a case depending largely upon the circumstantial evidence, there is always a danger that conjecture or suspicion may take place of legal proof and, therefore court must satisfy itself that various circumstances in the chain of events have been established clearly and the completed chain of events must be such as to rule out a reasonable likelihood of the innocence of the accused. It was also observed that when the important link goes, the chain of circumstances gets snapped and the other circumstances cannot in any manner, establish the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubts. It is well settled that in a criminal case it is the bounden duty of the prosecution to prove the allegation/charge brought against accused persons beyond all reasonable doubt. No amount of suspicion can be sufficient to presume the guilt of the accused and suspicion cannot fill up the gap between "may be true" and "must be true". In the case of Ram Singh (supra) the Hon'ble Apex Court, referring to the case of Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan reported in (2001) 2 SCC 205 , held that an extra judicial confession could be a basis for conviction if the same was found to be truthful and voluntarily made before a person who had no reason to state falsely. It has also been held that corroboration of such evidence is required by way of abundant caution and if the court behaves that the witness before whom the confession is made and is satisfied that the confession was true and voluntarily made, then the conviction can be founded on such evidence alone. 14. It has also been held that corroboration of such evidence is required by way of abundant caution and if the court behaves that the witness before whom the confession is made and is satisfied that the confession was true and voluntarily made, then the conviction can be founded on such evidence alone. 14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further observed that the court must raise presumption that the accused is innocent and in the event two views are possible, one indicating the guilt of the accused and the other his innocence, the defence available to the accused should be accepted, but at the same time, court must not reject evidence of prosecution proceeding on the basis that they are false, not trustworthy, unreliable and made on the basis of surmises and conjectures. The prosecution case, thus must be judged in its entirety having regard to the totality of the circumstances. The approach of the court should be intricate and not truncated or isolated. 15. Keeping in mind the said well settled principles regarding appreciation of circumstantial evidence and extrajudicial confession we decide to proceed to scrutinize the evidence on record. The P.W.-1 Md Moinuddin i.e. the father of the deceased in his evidence stated, that on 22.11.2001 at about 7 p.m. when he was proceeding to the Mosque to attend "Namaz" he saw the accused Majaraf Miyan, Miraj Ali and Kuti Ali coming along the road, being armed with Dao, lathi, torch etc. and the said accused persons told him that they would kill his son and after committing the alleged offence also they again told him that they had finished his son. On being so threatened, this witness had immediately informed two persons namely Perai, and Hasis Ali and others and they went to the place of occurrence, where his son was found in unconscious state. But, none of the said two witnesses, to whom P.W.-1 disclosed that the accused persons had made extra judicial confession to the effect that they had killed his son, were examined in this case. In our considered view, the said two persons namely, Perai and Hasis, were most important witnesses to corroborate the statement of P.W.- 1, regarding the extra judicial confession. Withholding of such vital witnesses raises doubt about the veracity of the prosecution story. In our considered view, the said two persons namely, Perai and Hasis, were most important witnesses to corroborate the statement of P.W.- 1, regarding the extra judicial confession. Withholding of such vital witnesses raises doubt about the veracity of the prosecution story. That apart, from the evidence of P.W.-1 it appears that some of the relatives of P.W.-1 were undergoing imprisonment due to murder of the son of the accused Majaraf. Therefore, the informant was not in good terms with the accused Appellants. Hence, we find no corroboration in the evidence of the P.W.-1 to believe that the extra judicial confession was true and voluntary, In view of the above, it cannot be safely held that the accused persons had made the statement, if any, before a reliable and dis-interested person. In view of the above, the alleged extra judicial confession cannot be safely relied upon. 16. Further, in the FIR (Ext. 1) it was mentioned that the Appellants attacked the son of P.W.-1 due to previous grudge. P.W.-1 stated that three persons namely, Mujaraf Miyan, Miraj Ali and Kuti Ali were armed with weapons and few other persons also accompanied them. He did not state the names of the said other persons and as to whether they were also armed with any weapon or not. P.W.-1 did not specifically state as to who of the accused persons had told him that they had killed his son. Hence we find it hard to find sufficient force in his evidence to believe that he had witnessed the said occurrence. 17. P.W.-2 Joynal Hussain (son-in-law of P.W.-1) stated that he saw Mujaraf, Miraj, Butimiya, Budula and Alim chasing a man towards the north of the 'pool' and that staying at distance, he noticed that Alim, Miraj and Budula were armed with a dao, a 'balchira' and a lathi respectively. This witness further stated that he had heard scream of Jiabuddin and Alim saying that he had finished him. According to this witness, the accused persons left the place of occurrence, where the deceased was found with bleeding injury and alarm being raised, Md Nizam, Md Abdul Malik, Salamoni, Altab Hussain and Giasuddin followed by the P.W.-1 arrived at the place of occurrence and they all carried the injured. In his cross-examination this witness again stated that he had seen the accused chasing a man towards the east of the pool. In his cross-examination this witness again stated that he had seen the accused chasing a man towards the east of the pool. Thus, he contradicted his own statement with regard to the direction of chasing. In our considered view, this contradiction, regarding the direction of chasing, is a major one raising sufficient doubt about the veracity of the evidence of P.W.-2. Further, according to P.W.- 2, Md Nizam, Md Abdul Malik, Salamoni, Altab Hussain and Giasuddin followed by the P.W.-1 arrived at the place of occurrence and they all carried the injured. But, according to the P.W.-1, he saw Jaynal (P.W.-2), Giasuddin (P.W.-4) and Moina Mia (not examined) carrying Jiabuddin in injured condition from under the culvert. If the evidence of the P.W.-1 is believed, then only Jaynal, Giasuddin and Moina Miyan took part in carrying the injured, but, according to P.W.-2, he himself, Nizam, Abdul Malik Salamoni, Altab Hussain and Giasuddin carried the injured and they were joined by the P.W.-1. 18. P.W.-4, Md Giasuddin, a son of the P.W.-1 and brother of the deceased, stated that, after the occurrences, he went near the 'pool' where he found Joinal (P.W.-2), Nizam (P.W.-5) and 3 other persons, were lifting a person's body from a ditch situated in the north of the 'pool'. The injured was identified as Jiabuddin, his younger brother, who sustained severe head injury. According to the P.W.-4, they all carried the injured to the road. Therefore, according to this witness, he along with Joinal, Nizam and 3/4 others had carried the injured from the ditch situated towards the north of the 'pool'. But, according to P.W.-1, he found Joinal, Giashuddin and Moina Mia carrying the injured from under the culvert into the road. P.W.-2 in his cross-examination denied the suggestion that he did not tell the police that the dead body of the injured was found in a ditch. Therefore, according to P W-2 and P.W.-4, the injured was found in a ditch and the ditch was situated in the north of the 'pool', but according to P.W.-1, the injured was brought from under the culvert. Hence, there is major contradiction regarding the place where the injured was found. This contradiction indicates that either P.W.-1 gave false evidence regarding the place, in which the injured was found, or the P.W.-2 and 4 falsely stated that the injured was found in a ditch. Hence, there is major contradiction regarding the place where the injured was found. This contradiction indicates that either P.W.-1 gave false evidence regarding the place, in which the injured was found, or the P.W.-2 and 4 falsely stated that the injured was found in a ditch. Further, according to P.W.-1 the injured was already carried from the place of occurrence by Joinal (P.W.-2), Giashuddin (P.W.-4) and Moina Mia, but according to P.W.-2, he along with Nizam (P.W.-5), Abdul Malik, Salamoni, Altab Hussain, Giasuddin (P.W.-4) and the P.W.-1 had carried the injured from the place of occurrence to the road. On the other hand, according to P.W.-4, he along with P.W.-2, P.W.-5 and three others had carried the injured from the ditch. But, P.W.-5 Nizam, in his cross-examination, stated that Joinal, Mona and few others had carried the injured from the ditch like land and that he did not participate in carrying the injured. P.W.-1 also did not state regarding participation of P.W.-5, but P.W.-2 and P.W.-4 stated that P.W.-5 also participated in carrying the injured. Thus, if the version of the P.W.-5 is believed, then it leads to believe that P.W.-2 and P.W.-4 exaggerated by saying that the injured was carried by P.W.-5 also. The evidence of P.W.-5 further indicates that the injured was found in a ditch like land i.e. not under the 'pool'. Therefore, the contradictory evidence given by P.W.-1, P.W.-2, P.W.-4 and P.W.-5 regarding the place where the injured was found and the participation of the witnesses raises doubt about the veracity of the evidence of the said witnesses. In our considered view it is doubtful as to whether the witness aforesaid had actually witnessed the occurrence. 19. According to P.W.-1, accused Majaraf Ali, Miraj Ali, Kuti Ali and few others were returning home after committing the crime. P.W.-2 stated that Majaraf Ali, Butimiya, Budula and Alim had left the place of occurrence after committing the offence. According to P.W.-4 Majaraf, Miraj, Alim, and Kutimiya and others were involved in committing the alleged offence and they went away after committing the offence. But, according to P.W.-5, who came out from the Mosque after hearing the commotion, saw Alimuddin, Budula and two/three other persons coming from the paddy land to the road. The said witnesses, more particularly, the P.W.-4 and 5 did not mention the names of the other persons alleged to be involved in committing the offence. But, according to P.W.-5, who came out from the Mosque after hearing the commotion, saw Alimuddin, Budula and two/three other persons coming from the paddy land to the road. The said witnesses, more particularly, the P.W.-4 and 5 did not mention the names of the other persons alleged to be involved in committing the offence. According to P.W.-4, Alimuddin had hacked the person, whom they were chasing and Alimuddin said "Today I have finished him". Therefore, according to P.W.-2 and P.W.-4 it was Alimuddin, who hacked the injured and uttered that he had finished the man. But, according to P.W.-5, Budula said "I have finished the job". This contradiction as to whether Budula had uttered that he had finished the job or Alimuddin had uttered that he had finished the man, gives raise to serious doubt about the truthfulness of the said witnesses. It is not the case of the prosecution that both accused Alimuddin and Budula had made the statement at a different points of time. 20. Further, another major contradiction is noticed regarding weapons used. According to P.W.-2 Alimuddin had a dao in his hand and he hacked the deceased; Miraj had a 'balsira' while Budula had a lathi. The P.W.-4 in his cross-examination denied the suggestion that he did not tell the I.O. that Alimuddin had hacked Jiaruddin on his head with a dao. By this denial he indicated that Alimuddin had a Dao in his hand. But, contradicting the statement of P.W.-2 and P.W.-4, the P.W.-5 stated that Alimuddin was armed with a 'Ralchira/balsira'. If P.W.-5 is believed, then it must be held that Alimuddin had a 'balsira' in his hand and in that case the evidence of P.W.-2 and P.W.-4 that Alimuddin had a 'dao' and that he had hacked he deceased with dao cannot be believed. 21. We have already noticed the contradictions/discrepancies regarding the assault made by the accused persons. P.W.-2, who claims himself to be one of the eye-witnesses, in his examination-in-chief, stated that a man was being chased towards the north of the 'pool' by Majaraf, Miraj, Budimiya, Budula and Alimuddin. He again contradicted his statement by saying in his cross-examination that the accused were chasing a man towards the "east' of the 'pool'. P.W. 4 contradicted the evidence of P.W.-2 by saying that the man was chased to the north-west. He again contradicted his statement by saying in his cross-examination that the accused were chasing a man towards the "east' of the 'pool'. P.W. 4 contradicted the evidence of P.W.-2 by saying that the man was chased to the north-west. The said contradiction, regarding the direction towards which the injured was alleged to be chased by the accused, is a major one and this raises serious doubt about the truthfulness of the evidence of the said two witnesses and as such it is hard to believe their evidence. 22. The P.W.-2 denied the suggestions that he did not tell police that the accused persons had assaulted Jiabuddin, that accused Siraj had a dao in his hand, and that Majaraf had a 'balsira' in his hand. He also denied the suggestion that he did not tell the police that Alimuddin had hacked Jiabuddin with a dao. These material omissions were proved by the defence through the I.O. (P.W.-7), who clearly stated that the P.W.-2 did not specifically mention that those accused persons were armed with deadly weapon. According to the I.O. the P.W.-2 stated that a 'mar-pit' had taken place. So it appears that the P.W.-2, as stated by the I.O., told regarding a mar-pit. The P.W.-7 further stated that P.W.-2 did not tell him that Siraj had a dao and Mujaraf was armed with a balsira. Hence, it appears that this witness did not tell the I.O. that he saw Alimuddin had assaulted the injured with a dao. Therefore, the evidence of P.W.-2 that he saw Alimuddin hacking the injured with a dao appears to be improvement/developed version of the statement made before the I.O. under Section 161Code of Criminal Procedure These omissions on material points raises doubt about the prosecution version. 23. Mr. Majumdar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellant, taking us through the evidence of P.W.-3 submitted that P.W.-3 was a scribe, who had written the ejahar as per the version of P.W.-1 and that no suggestion was put to this witness requiring confrontation by the I.O. under Section 162 Code of criminal Procedure. The learned Senior Counsel also submitted that in the deposition of P.W.-7, witness No. 4 was wrongly written as witness No. 3 due to certain mistake. Therefore, he submitted that the term 'P.W.-3', appearing in the cross-examination of the P.W.-7, may be read as P.W.-4 for the ends of justice. 24. The learned Senior Counsel also submitted that in the deposition of P.W.-7, witness No. 4 was wrongly written as witness No. 3 due to certain mistake. Therefore, he submitted that the term 'P.W.-3', appearing in the cross-examination of the P.W.-7, may be read as P.W.-4 for the ends of justice. 24. We have carefully perused evidence of P.W.-3 and P.W.-4 and find sufficient force in the contention of the learned Senior Counsel. Hence it appears that P.W.-4 denied the suggestions that before the I.O. he did not tell, that he had seen occurrence by standing near the shop of Abdul Malik and that Alimuddin had hacked Jiabuddin with a dao. This omission has been proved through the I.O. (P.W.-7). The said omission on the part of the P.W.-4 appears to be a major one amounting to contradiction affecting the truthfulness of his version. His said evidence given on oath was either after thought or an improved version of the statement made under Section 161 Code of Criminal Procedure Therefore, it appears that the evidence of the P.W.-2 to the effect that he followed the accused persons and that he saw the accused Alimuddin hacking the injured, is not free from doubt. 25. P.W.-5 denied the suggestion that before police he did not state that he had seen Budula and Alimuddin, armed with weapon, coming up to the road from the place of occurrence, that Budula uttered that 'he had finished his job' and that Alimuddin had shown 'balsira'. The I.O. (P.W.-7) stated, that P.W.- 5 did not tell him that he rushed to the place of occurrence and saw Budula and Alimuddin leaving the place of occurrence being armed with weapons and that Budula had stated that 'he finished the job'. According to the I.O. this witness did not tell him that Alimuddin had shown 'Balsira'. 26. From the evidence of P.W.-7 it appears that the said omissions, which were put to the P.W.-5 as suggestions were duly proved through the I.O. Hence, it appears that the evidence of P.W.-5, that he saw Budula and Alimuddin coming from the place of occurrence being armed with weapon and that Alimuddin had a 'balsira' in his hand was an improved version of the statement made before the I.O. under Section 161 Code of Criminal Procedure Therefore, we do not find it safe to rely on such doubtful evidence. 27. 27. As laid down by the Apex Court, in a catena of decisions, charges can be proved only on the basis of circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct evidence. In the present case, as discussed above, there is no direct evidence and the case hinges on the circumstantial evidence only. To base conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence, the events of the circumstances should form a complete chain without any missing link, thereby conclusively indicating the guilt of the accused. To hold the accused guilty on the basis of such circumstantial evidence, it must be wholly inconsistent with the innocence of the accused and consistent only with his guilt. All the links in the chain must appear from the evidence on record. If two inferences are available, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. In the case at hand, the learned Sessions Judge while passing the conviction relied on the following circumstances: (1) the witnesses - Jaynul and Gias saw the accused persons armed with deadly weapons proceeding towards wooden bridge No. 9 from a paddy field; (2) P.Ws 2, 4 and 5 saw Majaraf Ali, Siraj Uddin, Alim and Budula coming out from the paddy field where the dead body of the deceased was found towards wooden bridge; (3) These witnesses heard Budula reporting Majaraf Ali that they have finished Jiab Uddin; and (4) The accused persons left the place of occurrence immediately thereafter and while returning, they found P.W. 1 on the road and reported that they have finished Jiab Uddin. 28. While appreciating the evidence on record, the learned Sessions Judge failed to notice the contradictions and discrepancies in the evidence of the witnesses. There being no eye-witness, the learned Sessions Judge should have been extra careful to examine the statement of the witnesses. Learned Sessions Judge held that both the witnesses Jaynal (P.W.-2) and Gias (P.W.-4) saw the accused persons proceeding towards the wooden bridge from the paddy field being armed with deadly weapons, but the learned Sessions Judge failed to notice the contradictions and the omissions in the evidence of the said witnesses. P.W.-4 Giasuddin simply stated that when he went near the 'pool' to find the injured, the accused persons went away. P.W.-4 nowhere stated that he saw accused the persons leaving the place of occurrence armed with deadly weapons. 29(i). P.W.-4 Giasuddin simply stated that when he went near the 'pool' to find the injured, the accused persons went away. P.W.-4 nowhere stated that he saw accused the persons leaving the place of occurrence armed with deadly weapons. 29(i). P.W.-2 Jaynal also stated that after committing offence the accused persons left towards Bethcherra. He also did not made any such statement that he saw the accused persons leaving the place of occurrence being armed with deadly weapon and proceeding towards the wooden bridge. Learned Sessions Judge observed that P.W.-2, P.W.-4 and P.W.-5 saw Mujaraf, Siraj, Alimuddin and Budula coming from the paddy field, where the dead body was found towards the wooden bridge. P.W.-2 stated that he saw Mujaraf, Miraj, Budula, Kuti Ali and Alimuddin chasing a man. Again he stated that he saw accused persons leaving towards Bethcherra after committing the offence. 29(ii). P.W.-4 also stated that he saw Miraj, Mujaraf, Alimuddin and Kuti Ali chasing a man to the north-west of the pool. He further stated that after the occurrence the accused persons went away. 29(iii). P.W.-5 stated that he saw Alimuddin, Budula and 2/3 others coming from the paddy field towards the road and that Alimuddin had a 'balsira' in his hand. He did not state what weapon was there in the hands of Budula. This witness did not state that he saw Mijaraf, Siraj, Alim and Budula coming from the paddy field, where the dead body of the deceased was found towards the wooden bridge. 30. The learned Sessions Judge failed to notice the said contradictions which was potential enough to raise doubt about the veracity of the evidence of the witnesses. Further, the learned Sessions Judge missed the contradictions regarding the weapons used by Alimuddin and Budula. The learned Sessions Judge observed, at page-22 of the impugned judgment, that "these witnesses heard Budula reporting Majaraf Ali that they have finished Jiab Uddin.". This finding of the learned Sessions is not based on record as none of the witnesses, except P.W.-5, stated about the utterance made by Budula. Budula had simply stated, as deposed by P.W.-5,"I have finished the job". He no where stated that he had finished Jiab Uddin. Both P.W.-2 and P.W.- 4 stated that they heard Alimuddin saying "I have finished him". Budula had simply stated, as deposed by P.W.-5,"I have finished the job". He no where stated that he had finished Jiab Uddin. Both P.W.-2 and P.W.- 4 stated that they heard Alimuddin saying "I have finished him". Therefore, the learned Sessions Judge committed error by failing to take note of the aforesaid contradictions in the evidence of the said witnesses. 31. Regarding the extra-judicial confession, the learned Sessions Judge relied on the statement alleged to be made before the P.W.- 1. We have already discussed this point and expressed our hesitation to rely on such extra judicial confession, for want of corroboration. 32. The learned Sessions Judge relying on the statement recorded by the I.O. under Section 161Code of Criminal Procedure and the case diary, held that P.W.-5 implicated all the accused persons. The learned Sessions Judge, on the basis of the case diary, further held that this witness fully corroborated the story narrated before the police. It is the settled law that the statement recorded under Section 161 Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be the basis for drawing presumption about the guilt of the accused. Under the provision of Section 162 Code of Criminal Procedure, if an witness is called on for the prosecution in any enquiry or trial, whose statement was reduced into writing, if duly proved, may be used by the accused and with the permission of the court, by the prosecution to contradict such witness in the manner as provided under Section 145 of the Evidence Act, 1872. The learned Sessions Judge committed error by directly utilizing the statement recorded under Section161 Code of Criminal Procedure and thus holding that the witnesses had implicated the accused persons. Relying on the decision held in (2000) SCC 222, the learned Sessions Judge held that minor embellishments and trivial discrepancies were not sufficient to discard the evidence of eye witnesses. In the case relied upon, the Apex Court held that minor embellishments and trivial discrepancies do not by themselves render the evidence of eye witness unbelievable. There can be no dispute regarding the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 33. In the present, case, as discussed above, there are major discrepancies and omissions on material points raising sufficient doubt about the veracity of the evidence given by the prosecution witnesses. None of the witnesses could identify, who was the person being chased by the accused. 33. In the present, case, as discussed above, there are major discrepancies and omissions on material points raising sufficient doubt about the veracity of the evidence given by the prosecution witnesses. None of the witnesses could identify, who was the person being chased by the accused. Of course, there is no doubt that the injured i.e. the son of P.W.-1 was found in injured condition at a place, either under the 'pool' or in a ditch near the 'pool' This does not exclusively indicate that the injured was chased by the accused persons. Learned Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that the accused Alimuddin assaulted the person who was chased by means of a dao. As discussed above, there is major contradiction in the evidence of P.W.-5, P.W.-1. and P.W.-4 regarding the weapons available with Alimuddin. That apart, P.W.-2 and P.W.-4 stated that they saw accused Alimuddin hacking a person, but the I.O. belied their statement by saying that the said witnesses did not tell him that they saw Alimuddin giving dao blow or hacking the injured. The learned Sessions Judge also failed to properly appreciate the evidences of P.Ws-5, 2 and 3 while observing that if the evidence of P.Ws 2, 3 and 5 are read together, then it will appear that accused Majaraf, Siraj, Alimuddin and Budula took active role in the commission of the crime and that the evidence adduced by P.W.-5 remained unrebutted. P.W.-3 is the scribe of the FIR, who stated nothing against the accused persons. The evidence of P.W.-2 and P.W.-5 are contradictory. According to P.W.-2, Alimuddin said that he had finished a man, but according to the P.W.-5 it was Budula who said that he had finished the job. According to P.W.-2 Alimuddin had a dao in his hand, but according to P.W.-5 Alimuddin had a 'balasira' in his hand. The defence, through I.O. (P.W.-7) could contradict the evidence of the said witnesses. Therefore, it is not correct that the evidence of P.W.-5 remained unrebutted. 34. In view of the discussions aforesaid, there are sufficient contradictions regarding the involvement of the accused persons, use of weapons, utterances made by the accused (that the injured was finished), place from where the injured was carried to the road, direction to which the person was chased. Therefore, it is not correct that the evidence of P.W.-5 remained unrebutted. 34. In view of the discussions aforesaid, there are sufficient contradictions regarding the involvement of the accused persons, use of weapons, utterances made by the accused (that the injured was finished), place from where the injured was carried to the road, direction to which the person was chased. The said contradictions and the omissions do not inspire confidence to conclude that the circumstantial evidence, as revealed by the witnesses, was sufficient to hold beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused persons had committed the alleged offence. The accused persons, as stated by P.W.-1, who were armed with weapons, told him that they would kill his son. In such a situation, the normal reaction of a father would have been to take steps to rescue his son, but he did not take any action in this regard. This conduct on his part also raises doubt about his evidence. 35. In the light of the above discussion, we are inclined to hold that the prosecution failed to establish, by adducing cogent, reliable and convincing evidence, that none but the accused persons had committed the offence. There being two inferences, one going in favour of the accused persons, it will not be safe to hold the accused guilty on the basis of such doubtful evidence and as such the accused persons are entitled to get benefit of doubt. 36. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. A.M. Majumdar, drawing our attention to the statement of accused Sirajuddin, made under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure, submitted that Sirajuddin was a minor at the time of occurrence. Perusing the statement recorded under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure it is found that, at the time of his examination, the said accused clearly stated that he was reading in Class IX and was 15 years old at the time of incident. The learned Sessions Judge refused to accept the said plea on the ground that the said plea was not taken at the earliest point of time and that the school certificate was not authentic document to determine the age as the same was made on the basis of declaration made by the parent and that parent may not disclose the actual age of his child. 37. 37. Of course, the plea of minority was taken at the time of recording the statement under Section313 Code of Criminal Procedure Section 7A of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (hereinafter called 'the Act') provides the procedure to be followed when claim of juvenile is raised before any court. Section 7A of the Act provides that such plea can be taken before any court. There is no bar in taking such plea at any stage of the proceeding/trial. As and when such a plea is taken the court should make an enquiry, take such evidence as may be necessary to determine the age of such person and record finding whether the person is a juvenile or a child or not, stating his age as nearly as may be. 38. In the present case, the plea of juvenile was taken by the accused on the date of recording of statement under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure i.e. on 29.04.2005. The order sheet dated 29.04.2005 of Sessions Case No. 71/02 reveals the following order: Accused persons are present and statement under Section 313 have been recorded. Fixing 20.05.05 for argument. Sd/- Sessions Judge, Hailakandi Therefore, it is found that, in spite of taking the plea of juvenile/minority, the learned Sessions Judge did not proceed to make an enquiry as required by Section 7A of the Act. In view of the statutory provision prescribed by Section 7A of the Act, since the plea of minority was taken by the accused during the trial of the case, it was the duty of the learned Sessions Judge to stop further proceeding against the concerned person and to make enquiry and take such evidence as may be necessary so as to determine the age of the concerned accused and record his finding as to whether the accused was a juvenile or not. If it was found, after enquiry, that the accused was a juvenile on the date of commission of offence, he should have been forwarded to the Juvenile Justice Board for passing appropriate order. The learned Sessions Judge failed to make enquiry regarding the age of the said accused only on the ground that the plea was taken at a later stage of the trial. The learned Sessions Judge failed to make enquiry regarding the age of the said accused only on the ground that the plea was taken at a later stage of the trial. Therefore, the learned Sessions Judge, by failing to comply with the provisions of Section 7A of the Act, committed illegality in convicting the accused Sirajuddin and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and with fine of Rs. 2000/- in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for further period of two months. 39. The Appellants have been undergoing imprisonment. As we propose to allow this appeal, we do not feel that any purpose would be served by remanding the matter at this stage for making an enquiry under Section 7A of the Act. 40. In the light of the above, we are inclined to hold that the prosecution failed to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused/Appellants committed the alleged offence. In the result, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order of the learned Sessions Judge. The accused Appellants be set at liberty forthwith if not required in any other case. Send down the records. Appeal allowed