Judgment M.M. Sundresh, J. 1. Challenge in the writ petition is the order passed by the respondent No.2 as confirmed by the respondent No.1 wherein Central Excise Duty penalty and confiscation have been ordered. 2. Heard Mr. C. Saravanan, learned counsel for the petitioner as well Mr. T.R. Senthilkumar, Senior Central Government Standing Counsel, learned counsel for the respondents. 3. The brief factors of the case are as follows: The writ petitioner is a manufacturer of Coated Cotton Fabrics (rexin cloth) falling under Tariff Item No.19(111) of Central Excise Tariff. The Directors of the writ petitioner company are Shri. N.S. Anjaiah Shetty and his family members consisting of his sons and others. They are also two partnership firms in the vary same premises by name M/s. Subramaniam and Company and M/s. Ramkumar Enterprises owned and controlled by the sons of Shri. N.S. Anjaiah Sherty. Similarly, M/s. Meenakshi Enterprises, Madurai and M/s. International Traders are Proprietors concerned in the name of Shri. N.A Venkatesh who is also a son of Shri. N.S. Anjaiah Shetty. It is to be noted that most of the directors of the petitioner company and the proprietors/partners of the firms referred above are living under the same roof at No.6, Puttanna Road, Basavanagudi, Bangalore-4. Based on the intelligence received, the petitioner company was searched on 21 2.1985 and on 26.1 1985 and materials and records have been seized. Thereafter, as a follow up the premises of M/s. Subramaniam and Company was also searched and materials have been seized. During the investigation it was found that the petitioner company was involved in clandestine removal of goods to other firms which are infact run and controlled by the family members of Shri. N.S. Anjaiah Shetty. Hence, investigation has been made on those companies and materials, records and statements have been obtained. Based upon the documents and materials seized from the petitioner company and the marketing concerns, corroborated by the statements obtained from some of the directors of the petitioner company and 4 the persons in charge of the marketing concerns, a show cause notice has been issued by the Collector of Central Excise, the second respondent herein in and by his proceedings dated 25. 1986 calling upon the petitioner to show cause as to why the excise duty along with penalty and confiscation should not be ordered, for the alleged violation stated in the show cause notice and for the contravention of Rule 9, 52-A, 173-B, 173-C, 173-F, 173-G and 226 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. The petitioner was also given number of opportunities from 28. 1986 onwards. Thereafter, after hearing the petitioner a final order No.63/86 dated 30.12.1986 was passed by the second respondent imposing Central Excise Duty with penalty and confiscation. Being aggrieved by the same an appeal was preferred by the writ petitioner before the first respondent herein in Appeal No.E/SB/852/87-A. The first respondent in turn after considering the entire materials on record was pleased to dismiss the appeal, thereby confirming the order of the second respondent passed under Section 11-A of the Central Excise Act, 1944. The present writ petition has been filed challenging the above said orders of the respondents herein. 4. Submissions of the petitioner Shri. C. Saravanan, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the orders passed by the respondents will have to be set aside solely on the ground that the principles of natural justice have been violated since in spite of the specific request the petitioner was not permitted to cross-examine the persons who have given statements during investigation. According to Shri. C. Saravanan, that when a request has been made for cross-examination such a request ought to have been conceded to by the respondents before proceeding further. Hs further contended that a statements obtained behind the back of the petitioner cannot be relied upon. Moreover, the said statements have been obtained by force and coercion by the investigating officers, they cannot be relied upon without affording an opportunity to the petitioner to cross-examination the persons concerned. Therefore, the orders passed by the respondents have to be set aside and matter will have to be remanded to the second respondent for fresh consideration after permitting the petitioner to cross-examine the persons who have given statements which were relied upon by the respondents while passing the impugned orders. Shri. C. Saravanan has also submitted that the non-availing of the alternative remedy is not for filing the writ petition. Shri. C. Saravanan has also submitted that the non-availing of the alternative remedy is not for filing the writ petition. According to him, inasmuch as an appeal would lie to a Division Bench of the Honble High Court against the order of the first respondent any objection in this regard is only academic and technical in nature. Moreover, the writ petition has been filed and argued only on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice in refusing to grant permission to cross-examine. It cannot be dismissed on the ground of not availing the alterative remedy. Therefore, Shri C. Saravanan further submitted that in view of the fact that the writ petition has been admitted in the year 1999, the plea of not availing the alternative remedy at the time of final hearing after a period of ten years is impermissible in law. 5. Submissions of the respondents Per contra, Shri. T.R. Senthilkumar, learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed in view of the availability of the alternative remedy provided under the Act. He further contended that the issue being one of question of fact, the same cannot be gone into under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. His further submissions is that on the facts of the present case, there is no violation of principles of natural justice since cross-examination in any case will not help the case of the petitioner. 6. Alternative Remedy: When the writ petition came up for final hearing before the learned single Judge which was observed as follows: "This matter challenges the order passed by CEGAT. A preliminary objection s taken by Mr. T.S. Sivagnanam, Senior Central Government Standing counsel, that the writ petition is not maintainable. As per the provisions of law as they originally stood, the party aggrieved by the order of CEGAT could file an application to refer the case on a substantial question of law and then the matter will be placed before the Division Bench. Now, the party aggrieved has a right of appeal before the Division Bench. In either case, the matter is heard by a Division Bench and under Section 130(1) of the Customs Act, prior to the 2003 amendment, it is referred to the High Court on a question of law. Now, the party aggrieved has a right of appeal before the Division Bench. In either case, the matter is heard by a Division Bench and under Section 130(1) of the Customs Act, prior to the 2003 amendment, it is referred to the High Court on a question of law. By 2003 amendment, Section 130 provides for an appeal to the High Court, to be heard by a Division Bench, involving the substantial questions of law. In either case, the matter is heard by a Division Bench. 2. Therefore, the writ petition is adjourned by two weeks to enable the writ petitioner to tile an appropriate application for the matter to be posted before the appropriate Bench." Thereafter, the writ petition is posted before the Division Bench. 7. The issue regarding not availing the alternative remedy will have to be seen on the frets of each case. In the present case, an appeal would be as against the order passed by the first respondent to a Division Bench of this Honble High Court. No doubt, the said appeal can be agitated only on a substantial question of law. In the present case, the only argument of the writ petitioner is that he has not been permitted to cross-examine persons who gave the statement before the investigating officers resulting in the violation of principles of natural justice. 8. Further, a perusal of the prayer sought for in the writ petition itself will make it clear that the petitioner has challenged the impugned orders on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice with a further direction from the Honble High Court to remand the entire issue to the second respondent for reconsideration, after permitting cross-examination of the persons concerned. Even in paragraph 9 of the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, it has been stated that the reason for filing the writ petition is that there is a violation of principles of natural justice. 9. The question of alternative remedy cannot be raised at the time of final hearing of the case that too after a period of ten years. It is well settled principle of law that the question of alternative remedy cannot be raised at the time of final hearing when the parties have spent considerable amount of time. (See: Prasad Film Laboratories v. Cegat (1993) 68 ELT 747 ; Madura Coats Ltd. v. Asstt. It is well settled principle of law that the question of alternative remedy cannot be raised at the time of final hearing when the parties have spent considerable amount of time. (See: Prasad Film Laboratories v. Cegat (1993) 68 ELT 747 ; Madura Coats Ltd. v. Asstt. Collector of C. Excise (1990) 48 ELT 321 , Union of India v. Goodyear India Ltd. (1997) 89 ELT 321; Limenaph Chemicals v. Union of India (1993) 68 ELT 77 ; Carbonic Products v. Government of India (1992) 61 ELT 19 ; Bush Boake Island Ltd .v. Union of India (1995) 77 ELT 529 ; Sri Pillayar Soda Factory v. Union of India (1989) 20 ECC 93). We feel that on the facts of this case the plea that the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be maintained in view of the availability of the alternative remedy cannot he accepted, since an appeal in any case as against the order of the first respondent would lie before the Honble High Court, the issue raised in the writ petition being one of question of law regarding the alleged violation of principles of natural justice and the writ petition having been admitted in the year 1999 and taken up for final hearing after a period of ten years. Therefore, on the question of maintainability we hold that the writ petition is maintainable. 10. Violation of Principles of Natural Justice It is seen from the records that about 32 exhibits have been relied on in the show cause notice issued by the second respondent. These exhibits consists of vouchers, bills, payment made to various concerns, particulars of goods clandestinely taken outside without payment of excise duty, ledgers, stock and the statements given by various persons. The above said exhibits consists of documents and records seized from the petitioner company as well as the other concerns. It is an admitted fact that the copies of the said documents as requested by the petitioner have been given to the petitioner company. Further, the petitioner has been permitted to peruse the documents and the copies of the statements obtained were furnished to them. During investigation, statements have been obtained from various persons who are managing and in charge of marketing concerns. Apart from the statements obtained from them, statements have also been obtained from some of the directors of the petitioner company. Further, the petitioner has been permitted to peruse the documents and the copies of the statements obtained were furnished to them. During investigation, statements have been obtained from various persons who are managing and in charge of marketing concerns. Apart from the statements obtained from them, statements have also been obtained from some of the directors of the petitioner company. While deciding the case, the respondents did not rest their conclusion on the statement given by the directors alone but taking into consideration the materials such as ledger, bill, payment particulars, movement clandestine materials and stock etc., and corroborated the same, with the statements obtained. There after, the conclusion was arrived at by passing the impugned orders, therefore, it is seen that the records of the marketing concerns as well as the petitioner company along with the statements made by persons incharge of marketing concerns and the directors of the petitioner company have been taken into consideration. In this connection, it is to be noted that a finding of fact has been rendered by the respondents that the marketing concerns are either owned or controlled by the directors of the petitioner company thereby the violations have been made deliberately. Shri. C. Saravanan, has contended that the statements obtained behind the back of the petitioner cannot be used or relied on against the petitioner. His further case is that inspite of the specific request for cross-examination the same has been rejected. Hence, there is a serious violation of principles of natural justice. We are of the opinion that on the face of the materials on records that the refusal of permission to cross-examination would not vitiate the orders impugned on the facts of the case. A finding of fact has been arrived at by the respondents that all the other concerns were either owned or controlled by Shri S. Anjalah Shetty and other directors (since deceased) It is also to be noted that most of the detectors of the petitioner company and the proprietors/ partners of the other concerns have been living under the same roof and in fact two of the said concerns have been functioning in the same premises as that of the petitioner. Therefore, in view of the said finding of fact, we are of the opinion that no useful purpose would be served by sending the matter to the second respondent to be decided after affording an opportunity to cross-examine. We feel that the said plea is nothing but an attempt to prolong the issue. As seen from the facts, the impugned orders are passed after taking into consideration all the documents and materials belonging to the petitioners company and the other concerns. The said documents and other materials were compared with the statements of various persons including he directors of the petitioner company for coming to the final conclusion, in other words, the impugned orders have been passed not solely on the basis of he statements but on the basis of various documents and materials supported by the statements. An admission made by a party is a best form of evidence, however, the said admission can be explained by a party against whom such an admission is put against. Therefore, when documents and materials of the petitioners company were relied upon in the show cause notice, nothing prevents the petitioner to give evidence to contra in support of his case. There is no explanation by the petitioner on what basis its own directors gave statement in support of the other statements as well as the materials and documents seized. 11. Coercion: The word coercion has been defined in Blakes Dictionary as compulsion or constrained; where one party is constrained by subjugation on to other to do what his free will would refuse. Shri. C. Saravanan, has contended that the statements have been obtained by force and coercion and therefore, they cannot be relied upon against the petitioner company. We are not able to accept the said contention in the absence of retraction by the person concerned. When summons are issued in excise of the power under Section 14 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and statements are recorded, those statements have evidentiary value. We are not able to accept the said contention in the absence of retraction by the person concerned. When summons are issued in excise of the power under Section 14 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and statements are recorded, those statements have evidentiary value. We may also usefully refer the passages in Marriner v. Bishop of Bath and Wells (1893) Probate 146 wherein Lord Penzance observed: "The Court will require of him who makes the charge that he shall state that charge with as much definiteness and particularity as may be done, both as regards time and place." Further, in Bishundeo v. Seogeni Rao, (1951) SCJ 413 the Honble Supreme Court has observed thus: ‘Now if there is one rule which is better established than any other, it is that in cases of fraud, undue influence and coercion, the parties pleading it must set forth full particulars and the case can only be decided on the particulars as laid. There can be no departure from them in evidence. General allegations are insufficient even to amount to an averment of fraud of which any Court ought to take notice, however strong the language in which they are couched may be and the same applies to undue influence and coercion.’ In this case, there is no materials produced by the petitioner to show that the statements have been obtained out of coercion and force. There is nothing to show on record as to why a public authority has to act against a private person by misusing his power. Further, the action of mala fides and coercion will have to be proved by a party who alleges the same with clear records. In Surjeet Singh Chhabra v. Union of India and Others AIR 1997 SC 2560 : (1997) 1 SCC 508 , the Honble Supreme Court was pleased to observe that even the confession which was retracted subsequently is an admission and binding on the person concerned. It was further observed under those circumstances, the refusal to give permission for cross-examination would not amount to violations of principles of natural justice. Similarly, in K.T. Pavunny v. Assistant Collector (HQ) Central Excise Collectorate, Cochin (1997) 3 SCC 727 it is held that a confession statement recorded by an authority in pursuant appearance of a party to his summon cannot be said to have been obtained by threat, inducement or other wise. Similarly, in K.T. Pavunny v. Assistant Collector (HQ) Central Excise Collectorate, Cochin (1997) 3 SCC 727 it is held that a confession statement recorded by an authority in pursuant appearance of a party to his summon cannot be said to have been obtained by threat, inducement or other wise. It is further held that the subsequent retraction of the statement would not make the earlier statement inadmissible and the onus of the persons who alleged threat or inducement to prove the same. We also note that the person who gave the statements have not made any complaint about coercion which clearly Indicates that the request of the petitioner is only an after thought. The Honble Supreme Court in C.K. Gangadharan and Another v. CIT, Cochin, (2008) 8 SCC 739 : (2008) 7 MLJ 1355 (NOC) has held that if a party alleges mala fides against the authorities acting under a statute thus the onus on the person who alleges the same. Hence, in the absence of the materials the submission made by Shri. C. Saravanan that the statements have been obtained due to force and coercion cannot be accepted. 12. Cross-Examination Whether Mandatory or Not. Whether a cross-examination could be permitted or not will have to be decided by the authorities on the facts of each case. In the present case, we find that the authorities rightly held that cross-examination is not required after taking into consideration of the relation-ship of the persons who gave the statements with that of the petitioner as well as the materials available on record. In this connection, It is useful to refer the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Kerala v. K. T. Shaduli Rocery Dealer (1997) 2 SCC 777 wherein it has been held that the question whether opportunity of being heard includes a right to cross-examination depends upon the facts of each case. In Kanungo and Co. v. Collector of Customs, Calcutta AIR 1972 SC 2136 : (1973) 2 SCC 438 , the Honble Supreme Court has considered identical issue wherein the plea of violation of principles of natural justice was raised on the ground that right of cross-examination was declined to cross-examine the person who provided the information. The Honble Supreme Court was pleased to hold in paragraph 12 of the judgment as follows: "12. We may first dead with the question of breech of natural justice. The Honble Supreme Court was pleased to hold in paragraph 12 of the judgment as follows: "12. We may first dead with the question of breech of natural justice. On the material on record, in our opinion, there has been no such breach, in the show-cause notice issued on 28. 1961, all the material on which the Customs Authorities have relied was set out and it was then for the appellant to give a suitable explanation. The complaint of the appellant now is that all the persons from whom enquiries were alleged to have been made by the authorities should have been produced to enable it to cross-examine them. In our opinion, the principles of natural justice do not require that in matters like this the persons who have given information should be examined in the presence of tile appellant or should be allowed to be cross-examined by them on the statements made before the Customs Authorities. Accordingly, we hold that there is no force in the third contention of the appellant." We find that the ratio applied by the Supreme Court is applicable to the present case as well. 13. It is also well settled principle of law that all the official actions in discharge of a public duty are held to be valid unless proved or otherwise. In this connection, It is useful to refer the judgment in Backiam and Another v. Krishnan (2000) 1 TNLJ and Natarajan v. Veeran (2002) 2 MLJ III wherein it has been held that there is presumption favour of official acts that they are regularly perform and the onus to prove the contrary is on the person who alleges otherwise. 14. It is also seen from the records that a show cause notice was issued on 25. 1986 and the final order was passed on 30.12.1986. The appeal filed before the first respondent was disposed of on 29. 1998. Thereafter, the writ petition was filed on 23. 1999 and the same was taken up for final hearing after a period of ten years. Therefore, even if we take into consideration of the time factor we are not able to concede to the request of the petitioner for an order of remand, in any case, as we held already the overwhelming material available on record would clearly prove that Impugned orders are valid in law. 15. Therefore, even if we take into consideration of the time factor we are not able to concede to the request of the petitioner for an order of remand, in any case, as we held already the overwhelming material available on record would clearly prove that Impugned orders are valid in law. 15. For the reasons stated above, we therefore hold that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the same is dismissed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed. No costs.