Judgment : These appeals, filed by the claimants, involve the common question of fact and law and hence all the appeals were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. Few facts, that are necessary to decide the question raised in these appeals, are narrated hereinbelow: 3. The lands of the appellants from village Sherwal/Kanchangaon, Taluka Igatpuri, District Nashik were acquired for Minor Irrigation Project under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. Section 4 notification was issued on 27.01.1993 and the award came to be declared on 21.10.2005. The appellants who received the amount of compensation under protest filed the applications under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act for making reference to the Civil Court. The Collector made the references. One of the main questions raised before the Reference Court was touching the bar of limitation. The Reference Court accepted the objection raised by the respondent/State that filing of the applications under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act were barred by limitation. While dealing with the question of limitation following observations are made:- “In this case, if we read the contention of the reference/Exh.1, para 3, it makes clear that the Award was declared on 21.10.1995 but the notices u/s 12(2) of the Act were issued on 29.07.1996 onwards requiring the claimants to appear on 29.07.1996 and the claimants have accepted the amounts under protest. Further, if we go through the evidence on record i.e. the Statement Exh.4, it shows that some of the claimants have received the compensation much earlier then 29.07.1996 i.e. On 05.07.1996 and some claimants have received the amounts on 30.08.1996, 31.08.1996. But the fact remains that the claimants had constructive knowledge that they should appear for accepting the amounts on 29.07.1996 and therefore, the claimants ought to have filed their claims on or before 09.09.1996, but all these claims are filed on 14.10.1996. The claimant namely Vithoba Savaliram Gawane has stated that though the notices were issued on 29.07.1996, but such notices were served on them in the month of September 1996. Therefore, the burden lies on the claimants to prove that the notices were served on them in the month of September to show that thereafter, the claims are filed and they are within limitation. Therefore, the burden lies on the claimants to prove that the notices were served on them in the month of September to show that thereafter, the claims are filed and they are within limitation. But except the bare words of the claimants, there is no iota of evidence on record to show that the notices were served on the claimants in the month of September 1996. On the contrary, the evidence on record i.e. Statement Exh.4 is sufficient to hold that the claimants have received the amounts in the month of July 1996 and thus, looking to the legal provisions, I have come to the conclusion that all these references are time barred and therefore, the claimants are not entitled to get the compensation as prayed for and in the result, I pass the following order:” 4. Thus, what has been held is that the appellants had “constructive knowledge” that they should appear for accepting the amounts on 29.07.1996. The question, thus, arises is as to what would be the limitation for filing the reference applications under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Reference Court has held that the limitation would be 42 days and thus, dismissed the references. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that if the basis for adjudicating the issue is “constructive knowledge” then the limitation would be six months from the date of the “constructive knowledge” and not 42 days as held by the Reference Court. It is undisputed that the present appeals are not covered by Section 18(2) (a) or the first part of sec. 18(2)(b), but squarely fall within the later part of sub-section (2)(b) of Section 18. For proper appreciation of Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, it is reproduced below :- “18. Reference to Court:( 1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. (2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken: Provided that every such application shall be made:- (a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award; (b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under Section 12, sub-section (2), or within six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire.” 6. Learned counsel for the appellants in support of their contentions have placed reliance on the judgment in case of Parsottambhai Maganbhai Patel and another vs. State of Gujarat, 2005(7)SCC 431 and to be more precise on paragraph Nos.6 and 7, wherein it is observed thus :- “6. Learned counsel for the appellants rightly placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Dy. Land Acquisition Officer and submitted that since the appellants were not present when the award was made, and no notice was given to them under Section 12(2) of the Act, the application for making a reference under Section 18 of the Act must be held to be within time if it is filed within six months of the date of knowledge of the declaration of the award. In our view, the submission is sound and must be accepted. This Court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh was dealing with a case in which an award was declared under the Act on 25.03.1951. No notice under Section 12(2) of the Act was given to the claimants. It was only on 12.01.1953 that the claimants came to know about the declaration of the award whereafter they filed an application claiming a reference under Section 18 of the Act on 24.02.1953. The High Court of Allahabad held that the case fell under the latter part of clause (b) of the proviso to Section 18 and since the application made by the appellants before the Land Acquisition Officer for claiming a reference under Section 18 was made beyond six months from the date of the award in question, it was beyond time. The High Court of Allahabad held that the case fell under the latter part of clause (b) of the proviso to Section 18 and since the application made by the appellants before the Land Acquisition Officer for claiming a reference under Section 18 was made beyond six months from the date of the award in question, it was beyond time. This view of the High Court was overruled by this Court and in doing so the Court made the following pertinent observations: “Therefore, if the award made by the Collector is in law no more than an offer made on behalf of the Government to the owner of the property then the making of the award as properly understood must involve the communication of the offer to the party concerned. That is the normal requirement under the contract law and its applicability to cases of award made under the Act cannot be reasonably excluded. Thus considered the date of the award cannot be determined solely by reference to the time when the award is signed by the Collector or delivered by him in his office; it must involve the consideration of the question as to when it was known to the party concerned either actually or constructively. If that be the true position then the literal and mechanical construction of the words 'the date of the award' occurring in the relevant section would not be appropriate. There is yet another point which leads to the same conclusion. If the award is treated as an administrative decision taken by the Collector in the matter of the valuation of the property sought to be acquired it is clear that the said decision ultimately affects the rights of the owner of the property and in that sense, like all decision which affect persons, it is essentially fair and just that the said decision should be communicated to the said party. The knowledge of the party affected by such a decision, either actual or constructive, is an essential element which must be satisfied before the decision can be brought into force. Thus considered the making of the award cannot consist merely in the physical act of writing the award or signing it or even filing it in the office of the Collector; it must involve the communication of the said award to the party concerned either actually or constructively. Thus considered the making of the award cannot consist merely in the physical act of writing the award or signing it or even filing it in the office of the Collector; it must involve the communication of the said award to the party concerned either actually or constructively. If the award is pronounced in the presence of the party whose rights are affected by it, it can be said to be made when pronounced. If the date for the pronouncement of the award is communicated to the party and it is accordingly pronounced on the date previously announced the award is said to be communicated to the said party even if the said party is not actually present on the date of its pronouncement. Similarly if without notice of the date of its pronouncement an award is pronounced and a party is not present the award can be said to be made when it is communicated to the party later. The knowledge of the party affected by the award, either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression 'the date of the award' used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words 'from the date of the Collector's award' used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.” 7. This Court, therefore, held that the limitation under the latter part of Section 18(2)(b) of the Act has to be computed having regard to the date on which the claimants got knowledge of the declaration of the award either actual or constructive. This principle, however, will apply only to cases where the applicant was not present or represented when the award was made, or where no notice under Section 12(2) was served upon him. It will also apply to a case where the date for the pronouncement of the award is communicated to the parties and it is accordingly pronounced on the date previously announced by the Court, even if, the parties are not actually present on the date of its pronouncement. It will also apply to a case where the date for the pronouncement of the award is communicated to the parties and it is accordingly pronounced on the date previously announced by the Court, even if, the parties are not actually present on the date of its pronouncement. Coming to the facts of the instant case the High Court has not rejected the plea of the appellants that they came to know of the award only when compensation was being paid to them in July 1988. They had admittedly no notice under Section 12(2) of the Act. They had therefore filed the application under Section 18 of the Act on 22.09.1988 well within the period of limitation. The Reference Court recorded a finding in favour of the appellants but the High Court has reversed that finding without applying the principle laid down in Raja Harish Chandra. Moreover, we find from the grounds of appeal filed before the High Court that the assertion of the claimants that they came to know of the declaration of the award only when compensation was being paid to them in July 1988 has not even been challenged.” 7. From the above observations, it is amply clear that if the case falls within the later part of Section 18(2)(b), the limitation would six months. Section 18(2)(b) clearly reveals that when it is a case of “constructive knowledge”, the limitation would be six months. Thus, the Trial Court has committed an illegality in dismissing the references on the ground that the same are barred by limitation. 8. Both the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties contended that as the issue of limitation has not been properly considered and as the references are decided mainly on the point of limitation, the matters need to be remanded back. 9. Hence, the impugned awards are quashed and set aside. The cases are remanded back to the Reference Court for retrial. It is made clear that the parties shall be entitled to lead the further evidence if any touching the question of limitation. The reference Court shall decide the Land References Nos. 404, 405, 407, 408, 409, 410, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429 & 430 all of 1996 as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of six months from today. The reference Court shall decide the Land References Nos. 404, 405, 407, 408, 409, 410, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429 & 430 all of 1996 as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of six months from today. There shall be no order as to costs. 10. In view of the disposal of the appeals Civil Application does not survive and the same is also disposed of.