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2009 DIGILAW 149 (GAU)

Utpal Kanti Saha v. State of Tripura

2009-02-27

BIPLAB KUMAR SHARMA

body2009
JUDGMENT B.K. Sharma, J. 1. This writ petition was filed in the year 1999 with the following prayer: Issue rule calling upon the Respondents to show cause as to why a writ of in the nature of Mandamus be not issued commanding/directing the Respondent No. 2 to send the petition of references of the Petitioners in apportionment serial Nos. 12, 17(2), 17, 17(A)(i) and 18 and 13(i) to 13(iv) and 17(iii) to 17(vi) to the Land Acquisition Judge, South Tripura, Udaipur for adjudication of higher rate and value of compensation money of the acquired lands of the Petitioners Under Section 18 of the L.A. Act and to pay the same to the Petitioners; Land being acquired by the same and single notification Under Section 4 of the L.A. Act vide No. F.9(1)-Acq/Rev/VIII/89 dated 2.2.89 available in L.A. Case No. 4/Amp/89. 2. Following the due procedure as envisaged under Land Acquisition Act, some land of the Petitioners was acquired in the year 1989. In paragraph 2 of the writ petition, the Petitioners have averred that the authority issued notices under Section 9 of the Act to them. In paragraphs 3A, AB, 3C and 3D, of the writ petition, the Petitioners have indicated the area of the land and other particulars. The award was prepared by the L.A. Collector and the compensation money was calculated by his award dated 2.3.1991. According to the Petitioners, the award was passed in the name of Sri Jogendra Chandra Roy, who by the time the award was passed had expired (died on 4.2.1967). The Petitioners No. 7, 8 and 9 are his sons, while the Petitioner No. 10 is his wife. 3. According to the Petitioners, they were not informed of the award passed by the L.A. Collector for mote than three years. Further, no award was prepared in the name of the Petitioners No. 7 to 10. All of a sudden they were served notices as per Section 12(2) and 31(1) in form No. 15 under L.A. Act on 6.8.1994. In the notices the amounts of compensation were indicated. They received the compensation on 14.9.1994, but filed written objection for reference under Section 18 of the Act. They claimed higher rate of compensation and accordingly prayed for reference for adjudication by the L.A. Judge. In the notices the amounts of compensation were indicated. They received the compensation on 14.9.1994, but filed written objection for reference under Section 18 of the Act. They claimed higher rate of compensation and accordingly prayed for reference for adjudication by the L.A. Judge. According to the Petitioners there was no delay on their part and the L.A. Collector was duty bound to make the reference under Section 18n of the L.A. Act. 4. The Respondents have filed their counter affidavit raising the preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of delay and latches. It has been contended that the Petitioners although filed the objection under Section 18 of the Act on 9.9.1994, but approached the Writ Court nearly 5 years thereafter without any plausible explanation for the delay. They have denied that the Petitioners are entitled to compensation at higher rate. In paragraph 6 of the counter affidavit, it has been stated that the name of Jogendra Chandra Roy was corrected by incorporating the names of the Petitioners No. 7 to 10 and the said Petitioners filed objection under Section 18 of the L.A. Act on 21.8.1995. 5. I have heard Mr. S. Talapatra, learned Sr. Counsel, assisted by Mr. D. Bhattacharjee, learned Counsel for the Petitioners as well as Mr. N.C. Paul, learned State Counsel. Upon a reference to the limitation prescribed under Section 18 of the Act, Mr. Talapatra, learned Counsel for the Petitioners submitted that the said period of limitation is required to be counted from the date of substitution of the names of the Petitioners No. 7 to 10 and not from the date of the award. On the other hand, Mr. Paul, learned State Counsel submitted that the limitation prescribed cannot be condoned under any circumstances. 6. The L.A. Collector passed the award on 2.3.1991 and the Petitioners No. 1 to 6 filed their objections for reference under Section 18 of the Act on 9.9.1994 and the Petitioners No. 7 to 10 filed such objections on 21.8.1995, which was far beyond the limitation prescribed under Section 18of the Act and thus, there is no question of entertaining the same. 7. 7. The Apex Court in a catena of decisions has held that the statutory operation of limitation does not depend on the ministerial act and the limitation for filing application for reference begins to run from the moment the notice under Section 12(2) is received or as envisaged by Section 18. In this connection, I may gainfully refer to the decisions of the Apex Court reported in State of Punjab v. Satinder Bir Singh (1995) 3 SCC 330 ; Officer on Special Duty v. Shah Manilal Chandulal (1996) 9 SCC 414 ; Wardington Lingdoh v. Collector, Mawkyrwat (1995) 4 SCC 428 ; Mahadeo Bajirao Patil v. State of Maharastra (2005) 7 SCC 440 ; State of Karnataka v. Laxuman (2005) 8 SCC 709 and Poshetty v. State of A.P. (1996) 11 SCC 213 8. In all the aforesaid decisions, it has been categorically held that Section 18 prescribes the limitation, within which the application for reference under Section 18 is required to be made and the failure thereof puts an end to the right of the claimant to seek a reference under Section 18. It has further been held that the communication of the award is not a precondition. It has also been held that once the claimant without any protest receives the compensation money, he is not entitled to seek reference under Section 18 of the Act. 9. In the instant case, apart from the fact that all the Petitioners duly received their compensation without any protest, they also sought for the reference under Section 18 of the Act much after the expiry of the period of limitation. As noticed above, the Petitioners filed their objection for reference on 9.9.1994 and 21.8.1995, admittedly, after expiry of the period of limitation. Although, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners submitted that since the names of the Petitioners No. 6 to 10 were inserted in the award in place of Sri Jogendra Kumar Roy at a later point of time, the limitation will run from that day, I am not impressed with the said submission. Firstly because, the said plea even if accepted cannot help the case of the Petitioners No. 1 to 6 and secondly, such correction of names in the award did not change the award itself The award will have to be counted from the date of its publication 10. Firstly because, the said plea even if accepted cannot help the case of the Petitioners No. 1 to 6 and secondly, such correction of names in the award did not change the award itself The award will have to be counted from the date of its publication 10. Apart from the above, there is no explanation as to why there was delay of about 5 years in invoking the writ jurisdiction. By filing the writ petition at a much belated stage, the Petitioners only took a chance for favourable consideration, which under no circumstances can be acceded to. As has been observed by the Apex Court in P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N. reported in AIR 1974 SC 2271 , it is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226, nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passing of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extra-ordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allowed things to happen and than approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters. 11. For all the aforesaid reasons, there is no merit in the writ petition and accordingly the same is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed