JUDGMENT 1. :- This writ petition has been filed by petitioner Mahesh Chandra Singhania challenging condition No.6 of his appointment order dated 20/8/1981 and the order dated 22/7/1991 by which respondent pursuant to the aforesaid Condition No.6 and Clause 32 of the Service Rules of the Company, terminated his services without making payment of notice pay of three months and relieved him from service on 22/7/1991. 2. Petitioner was appointed as Retainer Sales Executive with the respondent Gujarat Fertilizers Company vide order dated 20/8/1981 and was posted at Jaipur vide order dated 11/9/1981. He joined services of the respondents on 19/9/1981. Appointment of the petitioner was made after due selection on his application in response to advertisement issued by the respondents and after subjecting him to interview. Initially, his appointment was made on probation but on successful completion of period of probation, he was confirmed on 1/8/1992. He was promoted on the post of Marketing Manager in the pay scale of Rs. 2200-4025 vide order dated 29/12/1984 in which post also he was confirmed vide order dated 31/12/1985. The post of Marketing Manager was subsequently re-designated as Senior Marketing Manager vide order dated 3/3/1987 in revised pay scale of Rs. 2700-4900 w.e.f. 7/10/1986. According to petitioner, he was promoted on the post of Chief Marketing Manager on 16/10/1990 w.e.f. 15/10/1990. Order of termination passed by the respondents by invoking Condition No.6 of the appointment order and Rule 32 of the Service Rules, according to the petitioner, is a punitive order for the reason that he applied for leave of one month from 15/1/1991 to 16/2/1991 vide his application dated 8/1/1991 to avail leave travel concession and visit his elder brother's family who expired in Sept., 1990. However, the management desired that he should postpone his visit and therefore cancelled the leave. Petitioner again applied from 25/2/1991 to 31/3/1991. Same was sanctioned by the competent authority on 9/2/1991 and then petitioner requested for sanction of ordinary leave upto 30/4/1991 which was also sanctioned. During that period, according to the petitioner, he became ill and therefore, he sent telex message on 30/4/1991 to the General Manager and Executive Director of Marketing of the respondents requesting for sanction of leave on the ground of sickness from 1/5/1991 to 30/6/1991 which too was sanctioned. The company however served upon the petitioner a registered letter dated 13/6/1991 asking for medical certificate for further extension. The company however served upon the petitioner a registered letter dated 13/6/1991 asking for medical certificate for further extension. Petitioner submitted medical certificate along with letter dated 27/6/1991. The management however vide letter dated 13/7/1991 conveyed to the petitioner that medical certificate issued by the Vaidhya was not acceptable. Soon thereafter respondents by invoking aforesaid condition No.6 of the appointment order and Rule 32 of the Rules of service dispensed with services of the petitioner. 3. Shri A.K. Bhandari, learned Senior counsel for the respondents has at the outset raised two preliminary objections; (i) that High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan does not have territorial jurisdiction over the matter in dispute and (ii) that the respondent Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizers Co. Ltd. is not a State or instrumentality of the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. It was argued that the writ petition is not maintainable and is therefore liable to be dismissed without adverting to the merits of the case. Shri A.K. Bhandari, learned Senior counsel argued that at the time of termination of his service, petitioner was posted at Bharuch. Head office of the company is situated at Bharuch in the State of Gujarat. Termination order was issued at Bharuch and it became immediately effective on 22/7/1991 at Bharuch itself. Termination order was dispatched to the petitioner at his Jaipur address from Bharuch. No part of cause of action has arisen at Jaipur or elsewhere in the State of Rajasthan. It was argued that petitioner stood relieved of his duties and relationship of master and servant got snapped the moment termination order was issued. Registrar of the Company is situated in the State of Gujarat. Appointment order was also issued to the petitioner on 20/8/1981 from Bharuch and sent to him at Anand also in the State of Gujarat. He was transferred to the head office of Bharuch vide order dated 23/5/1990 where he joined on 25/7/1990. It was for the reason of his absence from 1/5/1991 to 30/6/1991, that his services were terminated vide order dated 22/7/1991. Learned counsel in support of his argument, placed reliance on the judgments of Supreme Court in CBI, Anti-Corruption v. Narayan : 1994(4) SCC 656 , Alchemist Limited v. State : AIR 2007 SC 1812 , Mosaraf Hossain v. Bhagheratha & Ors. Learned counsel in support of his argument, placed reliance on the judgments of Supreme Court in CBI, Anti-Corruption v. Narayan : 1994(4) SCC 656 , Alchemist Limited v. State : AIR 2007 SC 1812 , Mosaraf Hossain v. Bhagheratha & Ors. : 2006(3) SCC 658 , S tate of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties : AIR 1985 SC 1289 , Aligarh Muslim University v. Vinay Engineering : (1994) 4 SCC 710 and Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal : (1994) 4 SCC 711 . 4. Shri A.K. Bhandari, learned Senior counsel submitted that Condition No.15 of the appointment order (Ann.3) also clearly stated that "in case of any dispute arising out of this offer, or pertaining to your appointment, the place of jurisdiction will be Bharuch only." Offer of appointment, which included the aforesaid condition, was unconditionally accepted by the petitioner and therefore he is bound by the aforesaid condition. Learned counsel in support of this argument, relied on the judgment of Supreme Court in A.B.C. v. A.P. Agencies : AIR 1989 SC 1239 , Globe Transport v. Triveni Engineering : (1983) 4 SCC 707 and Hakam Singh v. M/s.Gammon (India) Ltd. : AIR 1971 SC 740 . It is therefore submitted that the writ petition be dismissed. 5. Per contra, Shri Bajrang Lal Sharma, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Shri Ashok Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, has argued that since the order of termination has been served and communicated to the petitioner at Jaipur, therefore this Court would have territorial jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is contended that termination takes effect from the date on which the order of termination is actually communicated and cause of action arises at the place where order of termination is communicated. It is settled law that cause of action is deemed to have accrued in the territory where the employee suffers its consequences and where his rights are infringed. Learned counsel in support of his arguments placed reliance on the judgments of Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Amar Singh Harika : AIR 1966 SC 1313 , Secretary, Govt. It is settled law that cause of action is deemed to have accrued in the territory where the employee suffers its consequences and where his rights are infringed. Learned counsel in support of his arguments placed reliance on the judgments of Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Amar Singh Harika : AIR 1966 SC 1313 , Secretary, Govt. of Maharashtra v. Bansidhar : (1981) LAB.I.C. 833 (Allahabad), Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in Umasankar Chatterjee v. Union of India and others : 1982 LAB.I.C. 1361, Division Bench of Bombay High Court in S.V. Puranik v. Indian Airlines and others : 1991 LAB.I.C. 696, Division Bench of Kerala High Court in Union of India and others v. P.Kunhabdulla : 1985 (1) All India Service Law Journal (Kerala) 471, Division Bench judgment of this Court in Mohan Singh v. Union of India & Anr. : WLC (Raj.) 2001(4) 41, judgment of Supreme Court in Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association v. Union of India : (2001) 2 SCC 294 , another judgment of Supreme Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India : (2004) 6 SCC 254 . It is therefore prayed that preliminary objections raised by the respondents be over ruled and the matter be decided on merits. 6. Shri Bajrang Lal Sharma, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has heavily relied on the Constitution Bench judgment of Supreme Court in Amar Singh Harika supra. Their Lordships of Supreme Court in para 11 of the above judgment, observed as under:- "(11) The first question which has been raised before us by Mr. Bishan Narain is that though the respondent came to know about the order of his dismissal for the first time on the 28th May 1951, the said order may be deemed to have taken effect as from the 3rd June 1949 when it was actually passed. The High Court has rejected this contention; but Mr.Bishan Narain contends that the view taken by the High Court is erroneous in law. We are not impressed by Mr. Bishan Narain's argument. It is plain that the mere passing of an order of dismissal would not be effective unless it is published and communicated to the officer concerned. The High Court has rejected this contention; but Mr.Bishan Narain contends that the view taken by the High Court is erroneous in law. We are not impressed by Mr. Bishan Narain's argument. It is plain that the mere passing of an order of dismissal would not be effective unless it is published and communicated to the officer concerned. If the appointing authority passed an order of dismissal, but does not communicate it to the officer concerned, theoretically it is possible that unlike in the case of a judicial order pronounced in Court, the authority may change its mind and decide to modify its order. It may be that in some cases, the authority may feel that the ends of justice would be met by demoting the officer concerned rather than dismissing him. An order of dismissal passed by the appropriate authority and kept with itself, cannot be said to take effect unless the officer concerned knows about the said order and it is otherwise communicated to all the parties concerned. If it is held that the mere passing of the order of dismissal has the effect of terminating the services of the officer concerned, various complications may arise. If before receiving the order of dismissal, the officer has exercised his power and jurisdiction to take decisions or do acts within his authority and power, would those acts and decisions be rendered invalid after it is known that an order of dismissal had already been passed against him? Would the officer concerned be entitled to his salary for the period between the date when the order was passed and the date when it was communicated to him? These and other complications would inevitably arise if it is held that the order of dismissal takes effect as soon as it is passed, though it may be communicated to the officer concerned several days thereafter. It is true that in the present case, the respondent had been suspended during the material period; but that does not change the position that if the officer concerned is not suspended during the period of enquiry, complications of the kind already indicated would definitely arise. It is true that in the present case, the respondent had been suspended during the material period; but that does not change the position that if the officer concerned is not suspended during the period of enquiry, complications of the kind already indicated would definitely arise. We are, therefore, reluctant to hold that an order of dismissal passed by an appropriate authority and kept on its file without communicating it to the officer concerned or otherwise publishing it will take effect as from the date on which the order is actually written out by the said authority; such an order can only be effective after it is communicated to the officer concerned or is otherwise published. When a public officer is removed from service, his successor would have to take charge of the said office; and except in cases where the officer concerned has already been suspended, difficulties would arise if it is held that an officer who is actually working and holding charge of his office, can be said to be effectively removed from his office by the mere passing of an order by the appropriate authority. In our opinion, therefore, the High Curt was plainly right in holding that the order of dismissal passed against the respondent on the 3rd June 1949 could not be said to have taken effect until the respondent came to know about it on the 28th May 1951." 7. This line of reasoning has been adopted by the subsequent Division Bench judgments of Allahabad High Court in Bansidhar supra, Calcutta High Court in Umasankar Chatterjee supra, Bombay High Court in S.V. Puranik, Kerala High Court in P.Kunhabdulla supra and this Court in Mohan Singh supra. But there are certain subsequent judgments of Supreme Court cited by the learned counsel for the respondents which appear to have taken a view to the contrary. In Narayan Diwakar supra, Two Judge Bench of Supreme Court while dealing with the question of territorial jurisdiction where original writ petitioner, filed writ petition before that High Court on the premise that while he was posted in Arunachal Pradesh, he received a massage through Chief Secretary of the State to meet CBI Inspector at Bombay in connection with investigation of a corruption case. On receiving such message, he filed writ petition for quashing the action of the CBI. On receiving such message, he filed writ petition for quashing the action of the CBI. On that basis, it was held by the Guwahati High Court that it had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. The Supreme Court held that 'the Guwahati High Court was clearly in error in deciding the question of jurisdiction in favour of the respondent." The aforesaid observation was made by the Supreme Court despite original writ petitioner himself expressing no objection for the judgment of Guwahati High Court being set-aside and leaving it open to him to approach the court of competent jurisdiction. 8. Another Two Judge Bench of Supreme Court in Alchemist Limited supra confined judgment of Punjab & Haryana High Court which upheld the preliminary objections raised by the respondents and dismissed the writ petition on the ground of want of territorial jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that prior to Constitutional (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, concept of cause of action was totally irrelevant and alien for conferring jurisdiction on the High Courts. In that case, offers were invited by the Government of Sikkim for disinvesting its equity share capital in the State Bank of Sikkim. Negotiations took place between the parties at Chandigarh. Initially, letter of acceptance and subsequently letter of rejection, were both received by the original writ petitioner at Chandigarh. The writ petition was filed by the appellant-company before the Punjab & Haryana High Court challenging the decision on the premise that the appellant-company had its registered office at Chandigarh and negotiations took place at Chandigarh and also rejection thereof was communicated at Chandigarh. It was held by the Supreme Court that all these factors were not essential, integral or material facts so as to constitute a part of 'cause of action' within the meaning of Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India. 9. It was held by the Supreme Court that all these factors were not essential, integral or material facts so as to constitute a part of 'cause of action' within the meaning of Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India. 9. In Mosaraf Hossain Khan supra, Two-Judge Bench of Supreme Court approvingly noticed Full Bench decision of Kerala High Court in Nakul Deo Singh v. Dy.Commandant : (1999) 3 KLT 629 (FB), in which it was held as under:- "23.XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX The fact that a person who was dismissed from service while he was in service outside the State would have no suffer the consequence of that dismissal when he is in his native place by being rendered jobless, is not a fact which constitutes the bundle of facts giving rise to a cause of action in his favour to challenge his dismissal. That right accrued to him earlier when he was dismissed from service outside the State and he loss his employment." XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX "What a writ petitioner need plead as a part of his cause of action is the fact that his appeal was dismissed wholly or in part and not the fact that the order was communicated to him. That plea is relevant only to show when the right of action arose in his favour. The receipt of the order only gives him a meet a plea of latches or limitation raised in opposition. That the consequences of a proceeding in the larger sense are suffered by a person in his native place is not a ground to hold that the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the native place is situate is also competent to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. When a person is dismissed or reduced in rank, he suffers the consequences where he was employed at the relevant and not in his native place to which he might have retired on his dismissal." 10. On facts however, Mosaraf Hossain Khan, supra, was an altogether different matter wherein an order of Magistrate taking cognizance under Section 190 Cr.P.C. for offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate at Birbhum in the State of West Bengal was challenged by way of filing writ petition by the respondents before the Kerala High Court, who received summons at the registered office of the company at Ernakulam. The Supreme Court held that Kerala High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 11. In Eastern Coalfields Ltd. supra, challenge to termination of service was made by an employee of the said company. Company had its head office at West Bengal. Services of the employee were terminated at a place in the State of Jharkhand whose office was also located at the same place. Termination order was not subjected to sanction of the head office. In those circumstances, it was held that no part of cause of action having arisen within the State of West Bengal and that entire cause of action having arisen outside the State of West Bengal, mere location of head office of the company in West Bengal, would not confer jurisdiction upon the Calcutta High Court to entertain such a writ petition. In M/s.Swaika Properties supra, writ petition was filed before the Calcutta High Court on receiving notice of acquisition of land situated in the State of Rajasthan. It was held that mere service of notice at Calcutta, would not give rise to a cause of action within the territory of Calcutta High Court unless service of such summon is the integral part of cause of action. In Aligarh Muslim University supra, Three- Judge Bench of Supreme Court was dealing with a case wherein respondent-contractor entered into an agreement with the appellant for construction work to be carried out at Aligarh in Uttar Pradesh. Contract provided that in case of any dispute, Aligarh Court alone will have jurisdiction. Arbitrator appointed at Aligarh was to function thereat. Respondents initiated proceedings in Calcutta High Court merely because it was a Calcutta based firm. In those facts, the Supreme Court held that no part of the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of Calcutta High Court, therefore, exercise of jurisdiction by it amounted to abuse of jurisdiction. With this observation, appeal was allowed. Respondents initiated proceedings in Calcutta High Court merely because it was a Calcutta based firm. In those facts, the Supreme Court held that no part of the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of Calcutta High Court, therefore, exercise of jurisdiction by it amounted to abuse of jurisdiction. With this observation, appeal was allowed. In Oil and Natural Gas Commission supra also, it was held that mere fact that petitioner company had its registered office at Calcutta and that the advertisement was published in the newspaper by the ONGC at Calcutta inviting applications from Delhi for the work to be performed at Gujarat and that in response thereto it sent tenders to Delhi from Calcutta and which offers were rejected on the ground of eligibility because of its failure to fulfill the criteria, would not constitute integral part of cause of action. 12. Both the learned counsel made their submissions at length and canvassed arguments apart from preliminary objections also on merits of the case. If however writ petition is held to be not maintainable for the reason of lack of jurisdiction with this Court, there would be no necessity for deciding the other preliminary objection raised with reference to Article 12 of the Constitution and the main petition on its merits. 13. It may be significant to notice here that none of the aforesaid judgments cited by the learned counsel for the respondents, which are either of Two-Judge Bench strength or Three-Judge Bench strength, the Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in Amar Singh Harika supra was noticed, discussed or distinguished. But that would not make any difference because the context in which the dispute arose before the Supreme Court in Amar Singh Harika supra was somewhat different wherein it was held that order of dismissal is not effective unless it is published and communicated to the officer concerned. Order of dismissal passed by the appropriate authority and kept on its file without communicating it to the officer, without publishing it, does not take effect from the date on which order is actually rendered by the said authority. Such an order can be made effective only after its communication to the officer concerned or otherwise published. Order of dismissal passed by the appropriate authority and kept on its file without communicating it to the officer, without publishing it, does not take effect from the date on which order is actually rendered by the said authority. Such an order can be made effective only after its communication to the officer concerned or otherwise published. The decision of Supreme Court in Amar Singh Harika supra was not rendered in the context of cause of action on the basis of interpretation of Section 20(c) of the Civil Procedure Code Incidentally, it may also be important to notice that the cause of action or integral part thereof within the territory of the High Court concerned was made an additional ground to confer jurisdiction upon it under Article 226 of the Constitution by virtue of 42nd Constitutional Amendment Act of 1976, underling object of the Act of 1976 as stated in the statement or objects and reasons thereof reads as under:- "Under the existing Article 226 of the Constitution, the only High Court which has jurisdiction with respect in the Central Government is the Punjab High Court. This involves considerable hardship to litigants from distant places. It is, therefore, proposed to amend Article 226. So that when any relief is sought against any Government, authority or person for any action taken, the High Court within whose jurisdiction the cause of action arises may also have jurisdiction to issue appropriate directions, orders or writs". (emphasis supplied) 14. Supreme Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. supra while considering similarity between provisions of Section 20(c) of Civil Procedure Code and clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution held that two provisions being in para-materia, earlier decisions of the Supreme Court on 20(c) of Civil Procedure Code shall apply to the writ proceedings also and held that even if a small fraction of cause of action accrues within the jurisdiction of the High Court, the High Court will have jurisdiction in the matter. However, even if a small part of cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the same by itself may not be considered to be a determinative factor compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merit. Their Lordships in para 6 of the report, held as under:- "6. Cause of action implies a right to sue. Their Lordships in para 6 of the report, held as under:- "6. Cause of action implies a right to sue. The material facts which are imperative for the suitor to allege and prove constitute the cause of action. Cause of action is not defined in any statute. It has, however, been judicially interpreted inter alia to mean that every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Negatively put, it would mean that everything which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment, would be part of cause of action. Its importance is beyond any doubt. For every action, there has to be a cause of action, if not, the plaint or the writ petition, as the case may be, shall be rejected summarily." 15. In all the Division Bench judgments relied up on by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Allahabad High Court, Kerala High Court, Bombay High Court and Calcutta High Court, have followed the principle of law annunciated by the Supreme Court in Amar Singh Harika supra and decisions in those writ petitions filed before the respective High Courts were mainly rendered on the analogy of order of dismissal becoming effective from the date of its service. But the Division Bench of this Court in Mohan Singh supra was dealing with an altogether different case where claim was made for payment of pension by a retired officer of army force. Division Bench in para 33 of the judgment, made the following observations:- "33. A distinction has to be made between a case for seeking enforcement of rights while in service or for continuance in service where the effect of any adverse order directly falls at the place where the person is serving or the order is communicated in cases the order becomes effective only on communication, on establishing the right, the payment of emoluments also is receivable at the place where the person is serving and therefore the cause of action arises ordinarily at the place where the person is serving; from the case of claiming post retiral benefits. After retirement, a claim to pensionary benefits is not necessarily linked with the place of service because it arises on conclusion of the employment, the place where the pension is receivable also becomes the place where part of the cause of action arises, on the well established principle that Court within whose jurisdiction money is payable, it has jurisdiction to entertain suits to claim such money." 16. In the subsequent judgments of Supreme Court cited by the learned counsel for the respondents, it was held that mere receipt of communication at a particular place would not give rise to a cause of action to file a writ petition before the High Court. Nevertheless, argument may be raised that those judgments were not rendered in facts situation where an employee was dismissed/removed from service. As to if mere receipt of dismissal/removal order could be taken as integral part of cause of action, what is to be seen is whether the distinction of the facts would make any difference to the proposition of law laid down by those judgments in which it has been held that mere receipt of communication does not form an integral part of the cause of action. Before however I come to the ratio of the Supreme Court judgments cited by the learned counsel for the respondents, I would prefer to first deal with the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Mohan Singh supra. That was a case in which petitioner, who was a retired army personnel approached this Court by filing writ petition raising grievance of non payment of pension. Learned Single Bench of this Court held that in cases where a person retires from a different State but resides and receives pension in another State, High Court in the latter State would have the territorial jurisdiction. In view of however the conflict of opinion between two Judges of this Court, reference was made to the Larger Bench. Petitioner in that case approached this Court for enforcement of his rights to receive pension, which he claimed he was entitled to receive in the State of Rajasthan where he had his home and settled after his retirement. It was in that context that the reliance has been placed by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner on the above Division Bench judgment of this Court. It was in that context that the reliance has been placed by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner on the above Division Bench judgment of this Court. In the self-same judgment, reliance was placed by the respondents on the judgment of this Court in Kana Ram v. Union of India (WP No.6722/92) decided on 13/8/1998 wherein order of discharge of petitioner was challenged. In that case, the court held that where a discharge order is passed outside the State of Rajasthan, no cause of action has arisen within the State. This Court would have no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition and writ petition was dismissed. Judgment of Kana Ram was distinguished by the Division Bench in Mohan Singh's case observing that in the first place, it was distinguishable from that judgment as to where any cause of action or any part thereof had arisen and secondly writ petition was primarily challenging any order of discharge terminating services of the petitioner and claim to pension was only incidental. No claim has been made where pension was payable, if the petitioner was found entitled to. Thirdly, the effect of order made outside State also fell outside the State at a place wherefrom the services of petitioner was terminated and fourthly, discussion that was made was that in Kana Ram supra, reference was made to yet another judgment of Single Bench of this court in Maharaj Singh (WP No.209/95) decided on 26/2/1996 wherein, the court held that when discharge order was passed outside the State of Rajasthan, no cause of action had arisen within the State, this Court would have no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. Division Bench therefore distinguished these two judgments of Kana Ram and Maharaj Singh supra by observing that in those cases "effect of order made outside State also fell outside the State at a place wherefrom the services of petitioner was terminated". Division Bench therefore distinguished these two judgments of Kana Ram and Maharaj Singh supra by observing that in those cases "effect of order made outside State also fell outside the State at a place wherefrom the services of petitioner was terminated". It is in those facts that the Division Bench of this Court in Mohan Singh supra in para 33 of the judgment held so and the court was primarily concerned with a claim made for payment of pension by a person who although retired from outside the State of Rajasthan but it was held that since payment of emoluments is receivable at the place where the person is settled after retirement, a claim to pensionary benefits is not necessarily linked with the place of service because it arises on conclusion of the employment. The place where the pension is receivable also becomes the place where part of the cause of action arises. Judgment of Division Bench of this court in Mohan Singh supra does not in any manner help the petitioner. 17. Coming now to the Constitution Bench judgment of Supreme Court in Amar Singh Harika supra, I find that although that was a judgment rendered prior to 42nd Constitutional Amendment of 1976 by which sub-Article (2) was inserted in Article 226 of the Constitution but unfortunately for the petitioner, that judgment does not make any discussion in the context of Section 20 of Civil Procedure Code to say that receipt of a communication at a place other than the one wherefrom such order was dispatched, shall also form integral part of the cause of auction. All other judgments rendered by different High Courts, on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, were entirely based on the proposition of law annunciated by the Supreme Court in Amar Singh Harika supra therefore, it would have to be seen whether this judgment was ever later re-visited by the Supreme Court and explained. Four-Judge Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Khemi Ram, AIR 1970 SC 214 was considering a case wherein respondent, who was on leave, was placed under suspension and orders suspending him was communicated by the authority by sending telegram on his address before the date of his retirement. Four-Judge Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Khemi Ram, AIR 1970 SC 214 was considering a case wherein respondent, who was on leave, was placed under suspension and orders suspending him was communicated by the authority by sending telegram on his address before the date of his retirement. Question was as to on which date this order would become effective, whether from the date of its dispatch or when it is actually received by him. Telegram informing him that he has been suspended w.e.f. 2/8/1958 was dispatched to the respondent at the address given by him. His retirement was to take effect on 4/8/1958. Telegram was received much after the date of retirement. In those facts, when judgment of the Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in Amar Singh Harika supra cited, their Lordships clarified the said judgment in paras 15 and 16 of its judgment in Khemi Ram supra. It would be apposite to reproduce paras 15 & 16 of the report which reads as under:- "15. The last decision cited before us was that of State of Punjab v. Amar singh Harika, AIR 1966 SC 1313 where one of the questions canvassed was whether an order of dismissal can be said to be effective only from the date when it is made known or communicated to the concerned public servant. The facts of the case show that though the order of dismissal was passed on June 3, 1949, and a copy thereof was sent to other 6 persons noted thereunder, no copy was sent to the concerned public servant who came to know of it only on May 28, 1951 and that too only through another officer. On these facts, the Court held, rejecting the contention that the order became effective as soon as it was issued, that the mere passing of the order of dismissal would not make it effective unless it was published and communicated to the concerned officer. 16. The question then is whether communicating the order means its actual receipt by the concerned Government servant. The order of suspension in question was published in the Gazette though that was after the date when the respondent was to retire. But the point is whether t was communicated to him before that date. The ordinary meaning of the word 'communicate' is to impart, confer or transmit information. (of. The order of suspension in question was published in the Gazette though that was after the date when the respondent was to retire. But the point is whether t was communicated to him before that date. The ordinary meaning of the word 'communicate' is to impart, confer or transmit information. (of. Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Vol.1, p.352). As already stated, telegrams dated July 31, and August 2, 1958, were despatched to the respondent at the address given by him where communications by Government should be despatched. Both the telegrams transmitted or imparted information to the respondent that he was suspended from service with effect from August 2, 1958. It may be that he actually received them in or about the middle of August 1958 after the date of his retirement. But how can it be said that the information about his having been suspended was not imparted or transmitted to him o July 31, and August 2, 1958, i.e., before August 4, 1958 when he would have retired? It will be seen that in all the decisions cited before us it was the communication of the impugned order which was held to be essential and not its actual receipt by the officer concerned and such communication was held to be necessary because till the order is issued and actually sent out to the person concerned the authority making such order would be in a position to change its mind and modify it if it though fit. But once such an order is sent out, it goes out of the control of such an authority, and therefore, there would be no chance whatsoever of its changing its mind or modifying it. In our view, once an order is issued and it is sent out to the concerned Government servant, it must be held to have been communicated to him, no matter when he actually received it. We find it difficult to persuade ourselves to accept the view that it is only from the date of the actual receipt by him that the order becomes effective. If that be the true meaning of communication, it would be possible for a Government servant to effectively thwart an order by avoiding receipt of it by one method or the other till after the date of his retirement even though such an order is passed and despatched to him before such date. If that be the true meaning of communication, it would be possible for a Government servant to effectively thwart an order by avoiding receipt of it by one method or the other till after the date of his retirement even though such an order is passed and despatched to him before such date. An officer against whom action is sought to be taken, thus, may go away from the address given by him for service of such orders or may deliberately give a wrong address and thus prevent or delay its receipt and be able to defeat its service on him. Such a meaning of the word 'communication' ought not to be given unless the provision in question expressly so provides. Actually knowledge by him of an order where it is one of dismissal, may, perhaps, become necessary because of the consequences which the decision in AIR 1966 SC 1313 (supra) contemplates. But such consequences would not occur in the case of an officer who has proceeded on leave and against whom an order of suspension is passed because in his case there is no question of his doing any act or passing any order and such act or order being challenged as invalid." 18. Supreme Court judgment in Amar Singh Harika supra was explained in the same light by Three-Judge Bench of Supreme Court in E.Venkat v. Union of India : AIR 1973 SC 698 and another Three-Judge Bench judgment of Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh : AIR 1977 SC 629 . In the latter judgment, what was challenged was reversion order of a Government servant and considering similar arguments, it was held by their lordships that reversion order becomes effective as soon as it was sent out, no matter when exactly it was actually received. Relying on the judgment in Khemi Ram supra, yet another judgment of Supreme Court in B.J. Shelat v. State of Gujarat and others : AIR 1978 SC 1109 in the context of withholding persuasion to retire a Government servant, held that for exercising such power under relevant rules, it was necessary for the Government to not only take a decision but to communicate it to the Government servant. It is not necessary that the communication should reach to the Government servant. 19. It is not necessary that the communication should reach to the Government servant. 19. In the facts of the present case, petitioner himself does not dispute that the order dated 20/8/1988 by which he was appointed, Condition No.6, which is under challenge and order dated 22/7/1991 by which his services were terminated, both originated from Bharuch in the State of Gujarat. In the light of the abovemade discussion, it cannot be said those orders had not come into existence and did not acquire legal form at the place wherefrom they originated. On the same analogy, therefore, it cannot be held that the legal existence of the order of termination came into being only after they were actually served upon the petitioner at Jaipur in the State of Rajasthan. Service of the termination order cannot therefore held to be essential, necessary and integral part of the cause of action. In Alchemist Limited supra, the appellant company had its registered office at Chandigarh. Negotiations for the contract were took place at Chandigarh but the offers were invited by the Government for disinvestment of its equity capital in the State of Sikkim. Letter of acceptance and also rejection thereof were communicated to the appellant company at Chandigarh. It was held that all these factors were not essential, integral or material facts so as to constitute a part of 'cause of action' within the meaning of Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India. Reference to the discussion made by the Supreme Court in paras 41 and 42 of its judgment in Alchemist Limited supra be usefully be made, which are as under:- "41. From the aforesaid discussion and keeping in view the ratio laid down in catena of decisions by this Court, it is clear that for the purpose of deciding whether facts averred by the petitioner-appellant, would or would not constitute a part of cause of action, one has to consider whether such fact constitutes a material, essential, or integral part of the cause of action. It is no doubt true that even if a small fraction of the cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit/petition. Nevertheless it must be a 'part of cause of action', nothing less than that. 42. It is no doubt true that even if a small fraction of the cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit/petition. Nevertheless it must be a 'part of cause of action', nothing less than that. 42. In the present case, the facts which have been pleaded by the Appellant Company in our judgment, cannot be said to be essential, integral or material facts so as to constitute a part of 'cause of action' within the meaning of Article 226(2) of the Constitution. The High court, in our opinion, therefore, was not wrong in dismissing the petition." 20. In Eastern Coalfields Ltd. supra, Supreme Court was dealing with a case where termination of service of an employee of the company, having its head office in West Bengal. Services of its employee were terminated at a lace in Jharkhand State by his appointing authority whose office was also located at the same place. In those circumstances, it was held that the head office of the Company in West Bengal would not confer jurisdiction upon Calcutta High Court to entertain such a writ petition. It was held that entire cause of action arose in Mugma in the State of Jharkhand where order of termination was issued and mere fact that head office of the appellant company was situated in the State of West Bengal would not confer any jurisdiction upon Calcutta High Court. Supreme Court held in para 7 of its report as under:- "7. "Cause of action", for the purpose of Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India, for all intent and purport, must be assigned the same meaning as envisaged under Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. It means a bundle of facts which are required to be proved. The entire bundle of facts pleaded, however, need not constitute a cause of action as what is necessary to be proved is material facts whereupon a writ petition can be allowed." 21. In Om Prakash Srivastava v. Union of India and another : (2006) 6 SCC 207 , Supreme Court while relying on the judgment of Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association supra in para 12 of the report explained in judgment as to what was meant by expression of 'cause of action', which is reproduced as under:- "12. In Om Prakash Srivastava v. Union of India and another : (2006) 6 SCC 207 , Supreme Court while relying on the judgment of Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association supra in para 12 of the report explained in judgment as to what was meant by expression of 'cause of action', which is reproduced as under:- "12. The expression "cause of action" has acquired a judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense "cause of action" means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the reason. In the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the suit, including not only the infraction of the right, but also the infraction coupled with the right itself. Compendiously, as noted above, the expression means every fact, which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the court. Every fact, which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished fro every piece of fact, which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence, which is necessary to prove each fact, comprises in "cause of action". 22. For the aforestated reasons, in my considered view, no part of cause of action has arisen in the present matter within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Since this Court lacks territorial jurisdiction to entertain this writ petition, it is accordingly liable to be dismissed. 23. Before however closing the matter, I must deal with the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that since this writ petition has remained pending before this court for last 17 years and was admitted to hearing on 26/3/1993, therefore, it should be decided on merits rather than dismissing the same for lack of jurisdiction. It must be observed that if this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, does not wield territorial jurisdiction over the dispute involved in the petition when it was originally filed, it cannot derive such jurisdiction by mere reason of its prolonged pendency or because the petition was admitted long back or even with the consent of the parties. If this Court did not have territorial jurisdiction over the dispute, involved in the present writ petition when it was originally instituted in 1992, seventeen years that have gone by since then would not change that legal position. If this Court did not have territorial jurisdiction over the dispute, involved in the present writ petition when it was originally instituted in 1992, seventeen years that have gone by since then would not change that legal position. This may be a hard case and resultant situation may lead to inconvenience to petitioner but this has occasioned on account of his own choice of the forum by approaching this Court and not the Gujarat High Court, within whose territorial jurisdiction cause of action for presenting this writ petition arose. The writ petition is therefore dismissed with no order as to costs.Petition dismissed. *******