Judgment : The judgment and decree dated 26th December, 1990 in O.S.No.17 of 1984 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Nandyal, are under appeal. The defendant in the said suit, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Nandyal, is the appellant. By the said judgment and decree, the Court below held that the plaintiff, Kalva Subhadramma, the respondent herein, was entitled to a sum of Rs.51,000/-with interest thereon at 6% per annum from the date of the suit till realization along with costs of Rs.5,365=75 Ps. For the sake of convenience, the parties hereto shall be referred to as per their array before the Court below. The plaintiff instituted the suit stating to the following effect. Her husband, late Kalva Venkataswamy, a businessman and agriculturist, insured his life with the defendant Corporation under two policies. Policy No.45503911, for a sum of Rs.45,000/-, was taken out by him in September, 1978 and thereafter, during December, 1981 he took out another policy bearing No.71763188 for a sum of Rs.50,000/-. He died on 10.10.1982 at the Government General Hospital, Kurnool, due to a paralytic stroke. The plaintiff claimed the amounts due under the above two policies from the defendant Corporation. The defendant Corporation, having paid the sum due under Policy No.45503911, repudiated the claim in respect of Policy No.71763188. This repudiation was embodied in letter dated 10.11.1983, wherein the defendant Corporation alleged that the deceased had withheld correct information as to his health at the time of taking out the policy. The defendant Corporation further stated that the answers given by him in the proposal form in this regard were false as it held indisputable proof that he had been suffering from diabetes for about four years prior to the policy and had been treated therefor. The plaintiff denied these contentions and pointed out that her husband had been subjected to medical examination by the medical expert of the defendant Corporation at the time of the policy proposal. She asserted that her husband was hale and healthy at that time and prayed for a decree for Rs.50,000/-due under the said policy, bonus of Rs.1,000/- and for future interest and costs. The defendant Corporation filed its written statement stating as follows: It had issued Life Insurance Policy bearing No.71763188 for a sum of Rs.50,000/-commencing from 28.12.1981 to late Kalva Venkataswamy and his wife, Kalva Subhadramma, the plaintiff, was the nominee therein. The defendant Corporation filed its written statement stating as follows: It had issued Life Insurance Policy bearing No.71763188 for a sum of Rs.50,000/-commencing from 28.12.1981 to late Kalva Venkataswamy and his wife, Kalva Subhadramma, the plaintiff, was the nominee therein. It was informed of the death of the life assured on 10.10.1982 by the plaintiff under her letter dated 16.12.1982. Thereupon, after the filing of the necessary claim forms by the plaintiff for the said policy, a thorough investigation was instituted into the case and it came to light that the deceased had been suffering from diabetes since five years prior to the policy, which he had not disclosed in his proposal form. The defendant Corporation alleged that he had given false answers to the questions relating to his health and more specifically the question as to whether he was suffering from diabetes. According to the defendant Corporation, the deceased signed a declaration in the proposal form dated 16.12.1981 stating to the effect that if any of the answers given by him were not true and complete, the contract of insurance would be absolutely null and void and the monies paid in respect thereof would stand forfeited to the Corporation. Accordingly, the defendant Corporation repudiated the claim under the said policy by its letter dated 10.11.1983. It is stated that the medical examination by the defendant Corporation’s doctor was a routine check-up and such examination would reveal only patent defects and not latent ones. Latent diseases could only be detected by a series of special tests and therefore it was the duty of the proposer to reveal all material information. As per the information available with the defendant Corporation, the deceased had been suffering from hypertension and hemiplegia for more than five years prior to the date of the proposal. Further, when the deceased was admitted in Government General Hospital, Kurnool, on 05.10.1982, the doctors there were informed that he suffered from diabetes since five years and that he had been taking treatment for the same. It is further stated that the defendant Corporation would not have issued the suit policy had correct information as to the health of the deceased been available with it. The willful suppression of material facts vitiated the policy contract and fully justified the repudiation of the same. It is further stated that the defendant Corporation would not have issued the suit policy had correct information as to the health of the deceased been available with it. The willful suppression of material facts vitiated the policy contract and fully justified the repudiation of the same. It is stated that the contract of insurance being one based on the principle of ‘Uberrima fides’ i.e. mutual good faith, imposed upon the parties thereto a strict duty to disclose all necessary facts. Any failure in this regard rendered such contract null, void and unenforceable. The defendant Corporation pointed out that it had honoured its commitment under the other policy bearing No.45503911 which clearly demonstrated its bonafides in settling genuine claims. The defendant Corporation therefore prayed for the dismissal of the suit. Basing upon the above pleadings, the Court below framed the following issues: (1) Has the suit policy become unenforceable for the reasons pleaded in the written statement? (2) To what relief? The plaintiff examined two witnesses in support of her case and marked three documents in evidence. The defendant Corporation examined as many as eight witnesses and exhibited five documents in support of its case. It appears that the defendant Corporation led evidence first and thereafter the plaintiff took her turn. Accordingly, the evidence adduced by the defendant Corporation is dealt with first. DW-1 was the Life Insurance Corporation Agent who was responsible for the issuance of the suit policy. He stated that Kalva Venkataswamy had taken the suit policy from him and that he was known to him. He also stated that before filling up the answers in response to the questions contained in the policy proposal form (Ex.A-1), he had informed Kalva Venkataswamy that he must give only correct answers to the questions and he also informed him that if the truth was not revealed, the policy would be rejected and the premia, if any, would be forfeited. He spoke about the fact that Kalva Venkataswamy responded in the negative to the questions pertaining to blood pressure and diabetes. He asserted that the answers found in the proposal form were filled up as per the answers given by Kalva Venkataswamy. The proposal form was said to have been filled up at the LIC Office, Nandyal. The Branch Manager and the Assistant Branch Manager of the said Office were present at that time. He asserted that the answers found in the proposal form were filled up as per the answers given by Kalva Venkataswamy. The proposal form was said to have been filled up at the LIC Office, Nandyal. The Branch Manager and the Assistant Branch Manager of the said Office were present at that time. DW-1 also admitted that he signed in the proposal form along with Kalva Venkataswamy. In his cross-examination, DW-1 stated that the writing in Telugu in the proposal form was not his. He also denied the suggestion that the endorsement in Telugu was made subsequent to the institution of the claim, so as to avoid it. He admitted that he had discontinued Second Form and that he could not read and explain all the columns in the proposal form (Ex. A1). He stated that the other officers of the defendant Corporation, who were present there, did not sign in the proposal form. After filling up the proposal form, he stated that he gave it in the office. DW-2 was a partner of late Kalva Venkataswamy in his business enterprise – SV Metal Unit. He stated that his father and brother were Ayurveda doctors and that after the death of his brother, he also practiced the same profession. He claimed that he was an Ayurvedic Vaidya Vidwan. He stated that late Kalva Venkataswamy had taken treatment from his father and his brother for blood pressure and diabetes for about seven or eight years prior to his death. He also stated that he had treated Kalva Venkataswamy after the death of his brother for the said ailments. In his cross-examination, DW-2 accepted that he had no proof to show that he or his family members had treated Kalva Venkataswamy. He also accepted that the business enterprise – SV Metal Unit was bogged down with debts and litigation and was closed during the lifetime of Kalva Venkataswamy. He, however, denied that there were any business disputes between his family and late Kalva Venkataswamy and that he had given a false statement owing to his enmity with him. DW-3 was the Assistant Professor of Medicine in the Government General Hospital, Kurnool. He spoke of the admission of Kalva Venkataswamy in the hospital on 5.10.1982 at 1.35 p.m. According to him, Kalva Venkataswamy was suffering from hypertension with cerebral haemorrhage, hemiplegia on the right side with uremia and diabetes mellitus. DW-3 was the Assistant Professor of Medicine in the Government General Hospital, Kurnool. He spoke of the admission of Kalva Venkataswamy in the hospital on 5.10.1982 at 1.35 p.m. According to him, Kalva Venkataswamy was suffering from hypertension with cerebral haemorrhage, hemiplegia on the right side with uremia and diabetes mellitus. He stated that it was informed to them that Kalva Venkataswamy was suffering with diabetes for about five years and was taking treatment therefor. He further stated that the laboratory test indicated that Kalva Venkataswamy suffered from uncontrolled diabetes and stated that he was also suffering from high blood pressure. He died on 10.10.1982 at the hospital. In his cross-examination, he admitted that he had not treated Kalva Venkataswamy earlier and that he did not know as to who had reported that he was suffering from diabetes for five years and was being treated for the same. Speaking of the certificate issued by him with regard to the hospital treatment undergone by Kalva Venkataswamy, marked as Ex. B-2, DW-3 admitted that the entries made therein showed that the attendant was not known and the history of the patient was given by some one whose relationship to the patient was not known. He also stated that this information in Ex.B-2 was not given to him and was given to one Dr.Bhavani Prasad. He also admitted that high blood pressure to the extent of 210/130 could shoot up suddenly. DW-4 is Dr. Bhavani Prasad, a Post Graduate in Medicine. He admitted to attending on Kalva Venkataswamy on 05.10.1982 in the Government General Hospital, Kurnool. He stated that when he was admitted, Kalva Venkataswamy was unconscious and accordingly, he asked his attendants to narrate the history of the case. The history so revealed was noted by him in the O.P. ticket, marked as Ex.B-3. He stated that he was told that the patient had suffered from diabetes for five years and was on medication for the same. The patient’s blood pressure was above normal and in spite of the treatment given to him, he died on 10.10.1982. In his cross-examination, he stated that he had not mentioned in Ex.B-3 that the information was given to him by the attendant of the patient. He could not recall whether the attendant was a male or a female or the relationship of such attendant with the patient. In his cross-examination, he stated that he had not mentioned in Ex.B-3 that the information was given to him by the attendant of the patient. He could not recall whether the attendant was a male or a female or the relationship of such attendant with the patient. He stated that this information was the only basis for his statement that the patient suffered from diabetes for the past five years and admitted that he would not have been in a position to say as to how long the patient suffered from this disease, but for such information. DW-4 also stated that the blood pressure can shoot up at any time. DW-5, a Pharmacist working in the Primary Health Centre at Rudravaram, had previously worked at the Primary Health Centre at Thimmapuram. He stated that he knew Kalva Venkataswamy who belonged to Thimmapuram. According to him, Kalva Venkataswamy was taking treatment in their dispensary for diabetes. He stated that he had given this information to the officer of the defendant Corporation in the course of their investigation of the case. His statement in this regard is marked as Ex.B-4. According to him, Kalva Venkataswamy, had told him that he had an attack of paralysis in 1979 and was treated therefor at Kurnool Hospital. DW-5 stated that to his knowledge Kalva Venkataswamy was suffering with diabetes and blood pressure even prior to 1979. In his cross-examination, DW-5 admitted that he did not examine the patient and that there was no record in the Primary Health Centre with regard to dispensation of the medicines to outpatients. He asserted that he was speaking from memory. He also stated that a patient coming for treatment to the Primary Health Centre, would have to get his name entered in the outpatient register, maintained by the Centre. He denied the suggestion that Kalva Venkataswamy had never come to the Centre and that he had never dispensed drugs to him. DW-6 is a Registered Medical Practitioner who worked at Nandyal. He claimed acquaintance with Kalva Venkataswamy and was examined by the officers of the defendant Corporation about the health condition of Kalva Venkataswamy during his lifetime. He stated that he treated Kalva Venkataswamy for diabetes for three years. He stated that before his death, he was brought to him in a state of unconsciousness, indicating signs of hemiplegia. He claimed acquaintance with Kalva Venkataswamy and was examined by the officers of the defendant Corporation about the health condition of Kalva Venkataswamy during his lifetime. He stated that he treated Kalva Venkataswamy for diabetes for three years. He stated that before his death, he was brought to him in a state of unconsciousness, indicating signs of hemiplegia. Accordingly, he advised that Kalva Venkataswamy be taken to the General Hospital, Kurnool. In his cross-examination DW-6 admitted that he had no record to show that he had treated Kalva Venkataswamy. He denied the suggestion that Kalva Venkataswamy was never treated by him and that he had given false information to the officers of the defendant Corporation. DW-7 worked as the Branch Manager of the defendant Corporation at Nandyal from 1982 to 1985. He claimed knowledge of the suit policy transaction. He spoke about the proposal form given by Kalva Venkataswamy (Ex.A-1) and stated that the same contained a number of questions in respect of the health of the insured and the proposed insured was expected to give correct and honest information to such questions. He also spoke of the declaration in Ex.A-1 with regard to the information given therein being true and correct. He stated that Kalva Venkataswamy answered therein that he was not suffering from diabetes or blood pressure. He stated that the proposal form (Ex.A-1) also referred to the earlier policy taken by Kalva Venkataswamy for a sum of Rs.45,000/- in the year 1978. He stated that if the policyholder died after two years from the date of obtaining the policy, the defendant Corporation generally did not investigate the case unless there was a complaint. Accordingly, the sum due under the earlier policy for Rs.45,000/- had been paid to the plaintiff. However, the suit policy, which was with effect from 28.12.1981 required investigation, as the insured had died within the two years period. Accordingly, investigation was made into the case and it came to light that Kalva Venkataswamy suffered from hypertension and diabetes for more than five years and had been treated therefor, contrary to what had been stated by him in the proposal form. He admitted that Kalva Venkataswamy was examined by a Panel Doctor of the defendant Corporation, but stated that the same was a routine check-up, which would reflect only patent defects. He admitted that Kalva Venkataswamy was examined by a Panel Doctor of the defendant Corporation, but stated that the same was a routine check-up, which would reflect only patent defects. He stated that the incorrect information given by Kalva Venkataswamy rendered the policy void and accordingly, the plaintiff was not entitled to claim the amount there under. In his cross-examination, he stated that the questionnaire in the proposal form (Ex.A-1) was in English and the answers had also been recorded in English. However, Kalva Venkataswamy had signed in Telugu. He admitted that the defendant-Corporation repudiated the suit policy by its letter dated 10.11.1983 (Ex.A.2), which was signed by him. A proforma of the proposal form (Ex.A.1) was sent along with Ex.A.2 and was marked as Ex.A.3. It is admitted by him that the proforma did not contain an endorsement in Telugu stating to the effect that the executant had signed after understanding the contents thereof. Such a handwritten endorsement in Telugu is found only in Ex.A.1. D.W.7 denied the suggestion that the said endorsement was incorporated during the investigation of the claim. He stated that the proposal would not be complete unless there was such verification. D.W.7 admitted that one Dr.P.Prabhakar, the defendant Corporation’s panel Doctor, examined Kalva Venkataswamy at the time of the submission of Ex.A.1-proposal. He admitted that he did not record the statement of the said Doctor during the course of his investigation. He asserted that the repudiation of the suit policy was on the ground that Kalva Venkataswamy was suffering from diabetes and failed to disclose the same at the time of the proposal. D.W.8 is Dr.P.Prabhakar, the medical practitioner who examined Kalva Venkataswamy at the time of submission of Ex.A.1-proposal. He stated that his examination was not intensive. He had only taken measurements of height, weight, chest, blood pressure and tested urine for sugar. He stated that he found them to be normal. He also stated that if a person having diabetes and blood pressure was regularly taking drugs, such defects could not be found out in the examination. In his cross-examination, D.W.8 stated that the record of his examination of Kalva Venkataswamy was misplaced and he was speaking from memory. He also stated that once the blood pressure and sugar levels were normal, he did not probe into it as per the instructions of the defendant-Corporation. In his cross-examination, D.W.8 stated that the record of his examination of Kalva Venkataswamy was misplaced and he was speaking from memory. He also stated that once the blood pressure and sugar levels were normal, he did not probe into it as per the instructions of the defendant-Corporation. He conceded that the defendant-Corporation was dependent upon his report for accepting or rejecting a proposal. He admitted that he had signed in Ex.A.1-proposal form and that the answers to the questions were filled up in his presence. Insofar as the plaintiff’s evidence is concerned, she examined herself as P.W.1. She stated that her husband-Kalva Venkataswamy was hale and healthy. According to her, Kalva Venkataswamy, after returning from the Chicory factory, lost his speech and exhibited symptoms of paralysis in the right limbs. He was taken to the Kurnool General Hospital and died there about four or five days thereafter. She asserted that he never had sugar, blood pressure or paralysis prior to his death or took treatment for the same. She spoke of the fact that he had obtained two LIC policies during his lifetime and she was the nominee in both. She stated that the defendant-Corporation had paid the sum due under one policy and repudiated the other alleging that her husband suffered from ill-health at the time of the proposal. She also stated that her husband did not know English. According to her, her husband never got any medical treatment from D.W.2 or his family members or from D.W.6. In her cross-examination, she admitted that her husband had died ten months after the suit policy was taken. She stated that her husband never went to the Doctor and used to get medicines for himself whenever he had an attack of cold, cough or fever. She denied the suggestion that her husband had suffered from blood pressure and diabetes and was treated by D.Ws.2, 5 and 6. She stated that her son-in-law, Ramachandraiah, accompanied her to the hospital at Kurnool. She denied the suggestion that her husband had suppressed his ill-health while submitting the policy proposal and she was therefore not entitled to the suit claim. P.W.2 claimed to be a neighbour of Kalva Venkataswamy at Nandyal. He stated that Kalva Venkataswamy resided next to his house for about 20 years. According to him, Kalva Venkataswamy did not suffer from any diseases like sugar, blood pressure, etc. P.W.2 claimed to be a neighbour of Kalva Venkataswamy at Nandyal. He stated that Kalva Venkataswamy resided next to his house for about 20 years. According to him, Kalva Venkataswamy did not suffer from any diseases like sugar, blood pressure, etc. He stated that Venkataswamy never had paralysis. He reiterated P.W.1’s version as to how Venkataswamy returned from the Chicory factory in a rickshaw in an unconscious state with one leg paralysed. In his cross-examination, P.W.2 denied that Venkataswamy received medical treatment from D.Ws.2, 5 and 6. According to him, Venkataswamy never attended any Doctor and he had not seen him go to any Doctor. He denied the suggestion that Venkataswamy suffered from sugar and blood pressure and was treated for the same. On considering the above pleadings and evidence, oral and documentary, the Court below disbelieved the evidence of P.Ws.2, 5 and 6 and came to the conclusion that there was no proof of Kalva Venkataswamy having suffered from diabetes. Relying upon the evidence of D.W.1, the court below held that it could not be said that Venkataswamy had suppressed the truth. Accordingly, the Court below decreed the suit for a sum of Rs.51,000/- with future interest at six per cent per annum from the date of the suit to the date of payment. Sri M.V.S.Suresh Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant/ defendant-Corporation, stated that his client was justified in instituting an investigation insofar as the claim under the suit policy was concerned, as the deceased-insured had died within ten months of taking the suit policy. He submitted that such investigation had revealed that the deceased suffered from diabetes long prior to the taking of the suit policy and had in fact been treated therefor. He pointed out that the evidence of D.Ws.2, 5 and 6, who were independent and unconnected witnesses, clearly established the same. He contended that the failure of the deceased in disclosing this information in the proposal form (Ex.A.1) vitiated the contract of insurance and his client was entitled to repudiate the plaintiff’s claim under such a vitiated contract. Countering the above argument, Sri C.Sadasiva Reddy, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff, contended that the deceased-Kalva Venkataswamy did not know English and the proposal form (Ex.A.1) had been subsequently altered by inserting a Telugu endorsement stating to the effect that Kalva Venkataswamy had signed the said proposal form after knowing the contents thereof. Countering the above argument, Sri C.Sadasiva Reddy, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff, contended that the deceased-Kalva Venkataswamy did not know English and the proposal form (Ex.A.1) had been subsequently altered by inserting a Telugu endorsement stating to the effect that Kalva Venkataswamy had signed the said proposal form after knowing the contents thereof. He asserted that the evidence of D.W.1 clearly established that the questionnaire in Ex.A.1, which was in English could not have been made known by D.W.1 to the deceased and therefore the repudiation by the defendant on the sole ground that the deceased had withheld information regarding his health could not be sustained. He further contended that the deceased was hale and healthy and that the evidence adduced by the defendant- Corporation to the contrary was not reliable and trustworthy. He accordingly prayed for dismissal of the appeal, duly confirming the Judgment and Decree of the Court below. On an analysis of the material on record, the points that arise for consideration in this appeal are as follows: –– 1) Whether the deceased-Kalva Venkataswamy suppressed or withheld material facts regarding his health while submitting Ex.A.1-proposal form? 2) Whether the defendant-Corporation established that Kalva Venkataswamy suffered from diabetes prior to the submission of Ex.A.1-proposal form? And 3) Whether the defendant-Corporation is entitled to repudiate the suit policy? This case revolves around Ex.A.1, the suit policy proposal form. The defendant-Corporation alleges that the deceased, Kalva Venkataswamy, furnished incorrect information in the said form, thereby vitiating the contract of insurance. Reliance is placed upon the declaration stating to the effect that if any untrue averment is contained in the form, the contract shall be absolutely null and void. Reference is made to Question Nos.18, 19 and 20 and the answers said to have been furnished in response thereto by the deceased. The same are extracted hereunder: TABLE There is also an endorsement in Telugu stating to the effect that the deceased had affixed his signature in Ex.A.1 after being made aware of the contents of Ex.A.1. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the plaintiff contended that D.W.1 who filled the form, being the agent of the defendant Corporation, admitted in his deposition that he could not read and explain all the columns in Ex.A.1. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the plaintiff contended that D.W.1 who filled the form, being the agent of the defendant Corporation, admitted in his deposition that he could not read and explain all the columns in Ex.A.1. In the light of this statement by D.W.1, the endorsement in Ex.A.1 duly signed by him stating to the effect that he had fully explained the questions in Ex.A.1 to the proposer and had truthfully recorded the answers given by the proposer was attacked by the learned counsel as being without basis and substance. The learned counsel pointed out that the deceased did not know English as is evidenced by the fact that he signed in Telugu and the unrebutted deposition of the plaintiff to that effect, speaking as P.W.1. He pointed out that the endorsement in Telugu stating to the effect that the deceased had affixed his signature after being made aware of the contents of Ex.A.1 was in different writing and different ink as compared to the signature of the deceased. This, according to the learned counsel raised any amount of doubt as to when this endorsement was introduced in Ex.A.1. The case would therefore turn upon whether there was any withholding of information by the deceased while furnishing answers to the questions in Ex.A.1, thereby vitiating the contract of insurance. In the absence of the same, it would not be open to the defendant Corporation to repudiate the policy. The burden would therefore be upon the defendant Corporation to establish the concealment of material particulars by the deceased. Reference may be made to Section 45 of the Insurance Act, 1938 (for short, ‘the Act of 1938’) in this regard. Under the said provision of law, no policy of life insurance can be called in question by an insurer on the ground that the statement made in the proposal for insurance leading to the issue of the policy was inaccurate or false after the lapse of two years unless the insurer shows that such statement was on a material matter or suppressed facts which it was material to disclose and it was fraudulently made by the policy-holder and that the policy-holder knew at the time of making it that that the statement was false or that it suppressed facts which it was material to disclose. The latter part of the above provision pertaining to the fraudulent or willful nature of the alleged concealment has no application to the present case, as the period of two years did not elapse. However, it is for the defendant Corporation to establish that there was withholding or suppression of material facts by the deceased leading to the issuance of the suit policy, irrespective of the motive or intention behind such withholding or suppression. The learned counsel for the appellant/defendant Corporation placed before me the judgment of the Supreme Court in MITHOOLAL NAYAK V/s. LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA AIR 1962 SUPREME COURT 814 dealing with the second part of Section 45 of the Act of 1938. However, as stated supra, the fraudulent or willful nature of the suppression or withholding of facts, if any, is not an issue in the present case as the assured, Kalva Venkataswamy, expired before the lapse of two years. Therefore, it would be sufficient for the defendant Corporation to prove concealment or suppression of facts, be it by intention, ignorance or innocently. The said judgment therefore has no application to the facts of the present case. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff placed before me the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in THE LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA, SOUTH ZONE, MADRAS AND ANOTHER V/s. BHOGADI CHANDRAVATHAMMA AIR 1971 ANDHRA PRADESH 41, wherein the Court observed that contracts of insurance are ‘uberrimae fidei’ and that the insured must make a complete and true disclosure of all the facts known to him relating to his health. Reliance was placed by the Court upon the enunciation of the ‘uberrimae fidei’ doctrine by Lord Blackburn in Brownlie v. Campbell, (1880) 5 AC 925 at p.954: “In policies of insurance, whether marine insurance or life insurance, there is an understanding that the contract is ‘uberrimae fidei’, that, if you know any circumstance at all that may influence the underwriter’s opinion as to the risk he is incurring, and consequently as to whether he will take it, or what premium he will charge if he does take it, you will state what you know. There is an obligation there to disclose what you know, and the concealment of a material circumstance known to you, whether you thought it material or not avoids the policy”. There is an obligation there to disclose what you know, and the concealment of a material circumstance known to you, whether you thought it material or not avoids the policy”. Basing on the above principle, the Court held that what is to be seen ultimately is whether there was an honest and frank disclosure of material facts which were within the knowledge of the insured and whether he has made any fraudulent concealment of the material facts. Having stated so, the Court found in that case that the Insurance Corporation had not examined those who were responsible for recording the answers in the language not known to the insured and concluded that the Insurance Corporation had failed to discharge the onus resting on it notwithstanding the fact that the insured had signed the declarations contained in the proposal form. Reference was also made by the Court to the observations of Lord St.Leonards in Anderson v. Fitzgerald, (1853) 4 HLC 484 at 507, to the effect that provisions are introduced into policies of life assurance which, “unless they are fully explained to the parties, will lead a vast number of persons to suppose that they have made a provision for their families by the insurance on their lives, and by payment of perhaps a very considerable proportion of their income, when in point of fact, from the very commencement, the policy was not worth the paper upon which it was written.” The Court therefore held that the absence of evidence that the questionnaire had been fully explained to and was understood by the insured so as to establish concealment or suppression of a material fact within his knowledge, clearly disentitled the Insurance Corporation from repudiating the policy. Another judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff is that of the Supreme Court in LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA AND OTHERS V/s. SMT.ASHA GOEL AND ANOTHER AIR 2001 SUPREME COURT 549, wherein the Supreme Court held that mere inaccuracy or falsity in respect of some recitals or items in the proposal would not be sufficient to constitute mis-statement or suppression of a material fact. It was pointed out that the burden of proof was on the insurer to establish the circumstances entitling it to avoid the policy on the ground of mis-statement of facts. It was pointed out that the burden of proof was on the insurer to establish the circumstances entitling it to avoid the policy on the ground of mis-statement of facts. The Supreme Court observed that contracts of insurance were contracts of ‘uberrima fides’ and every fact of material must be disclosed, otherwise, there is good ground for rescission of the contract. The Court also observed that the approach of the Life Insurance Corporation in the matter of repudiation of a policy admittedly issued by it should be one of extreme care and caution and should not be dealt with in a mechanical and routine manner. The established/un-rebutted facts of the present case are that the deceased, Kalva Venkataswamy, did not know English and signed the proposal form-Ex.A.1 in Telugu. The agent who filled up the form was examined as D.W.1 and he stated to the effect that he himself, having discontinued second form, could not read and explain all the columns in Ex.A.1. This statement made by him runs contra to the declaration signed by him in Ex.A.1 stating that he had fully explained the questions to the deceased and had truthfully recorded the answers given by him. There is any amount of suspicion surrounding the Telugu endorsement stating to the effect that the deceased had signed Ex.A.1 after being made aware of its contents. The ink and the handwriting are different from that of the signature of the deceased. In any event, even this declaration is of no avail to the defendant Corporation in the light of the decision in BHOGADI CHANDRAVATHAMMA’s case (2 supra), wherein this Court held that such a declaration, by itself, does not discharge the onus resting on the defendant Corporation. Therefore, applying the principles culled out from the judgments aforestated and more specifically, the one in BHOGADI CHANDRAVATHAMMA’s case (2 supra), it is not established on evidence that the questionnaire and more specifically, Questions 18 to 20 in Ex.A.1 were fully explained to and were understood by the deceased so as to demonstrate any concealment of material facts on his part. Though there is sufficient evidence on record to doubt as to whether the deceased, Kalva Venkataswamy, was actually hale and healthy at the time of his obtaining the policy under Ex.A.1 proposal form, the failure on the part of the defendant Corporation to establish that the answers to the questions regarding his health in Ex.A.1 were obtained from him after the same were fully explained to him and were understood by him, clearly negates any enquiry into concealment, if any, be it fraudulent, willful or innocent. Unless the defendant Corporation establishes that there was suppression or withholding of a material fact by the deceased, it cannot repudiate the suit policy. The deposition of D.W.1 in this regard is clearly fatal to the defendant Corporation’s case. Once D.W.1 committed himself by stating that he had filled in the answers in Ex.A.1 without being able to read and explain all the columns in Ex.A.1, it cannot be inferred that the deceased was made aware of all the questions in Ex.A.1. The benefit of doubt would necessarily have to go to the assured as laid down in BHOGADI CHANDRAVATHAMMA’s case(2 supra). It has to be remembered that contracts of insurance being based on the principle of ‘uberrimae fidei’ require that the insurer make known to the insured what is required from him under the proposal form if he is incapable of understanding the language used therein. Only then would the burden shift to the insured to disclose all material facts relevant to the issuance of the policy. The evidence in the present case clearly demonstrates that there was a failure on the part of the defendant Corporation in discharging this obligation. Having failed in this regard, it is not open to the defendant Corporation to repudiate the suit policy. In the light of the failure of the defendant Corporation in discharging its obligation, the issue as to whether the deceased suffered from diabetes prior to the suit policy fades into insignificance. Had the defendant Corporation established that the deceased was made aware of the contents and questions in Ex.A.1, which were in English -a language unknown to him, the question would then have arisen as to whether he suppressed his health condition and furnished incorrect information. As the defendant Corporation failed to cross this stage, the second stage does not arise for consideration at all. As the defendant Corporation failed to cross this stage, the second stage does not arise for consideration at all. The judgment and decree of the trial Court therefore do not call for any interference in this appeal. The judgment and decree of the Court below directing the appellant/defendant to pay the respondent/plaintiff the sum of Rs.51,000/- with interest thereon at 6% per annum from the date of the suit to the date of payment along with the suit costs of Rs.5,365-75 Ps. stands confirmed. The appeal is accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.