JUDGMENT:- This is an appeal preferred by the original accused in Sessions Case No. 247 of 1994, decided by the II Additional Sessions Judge, Jalgaon, on 05.12.1997, whereby the appellant was convicted of offences punishable under Sections 306 and 498-A of the I.P.C. For offence punishable under Section 306 of the I.P.C., the appellant was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for seven years and to pay fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months. For offence punishable under Section 498-A of the I.P.C., the appellant was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month. 2. Briefly stated, it is case of the prosecution that deceased Nirmala was daughter of P.W.1-Chindhu Narayan Bari (Warade) resident of Pahur. He was clerk in M.S.E.B. Nirmala married present appellant on 14.05.1993 and went to reside at the house of the appellant Shirsoli. Nirmala came to the house of her parents at the time of Diwali and stayed for 15 days and went back to her matrimonial house. One month thereafter P.W.1-Chindhu went to meet Nirmala and Nirmala started crying. On asking, she said that appellant -her husband was saying that he did not like food cooked by her, she was lazy. On these and other petty matters the appellant was quarreling with her and beating her. At that time P.W.1-Chindhu pacified deceased Nirmala and returned back. He told about what had happened to his wife Devkabai. One and half month before 09.03.1994, P.W. 1 Chindhu along with his uncle P.W.4 -Baburao had gone to Shirsoli to meet Nirmala. At that time, Nirmala again started crying on seeing them. She again made same complaint and said that since previous visit of P. W.1-Chindhu, her husband had beaten her on every alternate day, telling her that he did not like her; she was not able to cook and therefore he wanted to give her divorce. At that time, P.W.1-Chindu and P.WA-Baburao tried to calm her down and went back. 3. On 09.03.1994 at about 2.00 p.m. when P.W.1-Chindu was in his office at Pahur. one Tukaram came and gave him information that Nirmala had sustained burn injuries and she was admitted in Civil Hospital at Jalgaon. Therefore, immediately P.W.1-Chindhu along with P.W.4-Baburao and other relatives went to the Hospital at Jalgaon. 3. On 09.03.1994 at about 2.00 p.m. when P.W.1-Chindu was in his office at Pahur. one Tukaram came and gave him information that Nirmala had sustained burn injuries and she was admitted in Civil Hospital at Jalgaon. Therefore, immediately P.W.1-Chindhu along with P.W.4-Baburao and other relatives went to the Hospital at Jalgaon. There they met Nirmala, who had sustained burn injuries. On enquiry Nirmala told them that on earlier day i.e. 08.03.1994, the appellant had beaten her on the ground that she had not been able to cook; and on 09.03.1994 at about 10.00 a.m. the appellant again raised quarrel on same count and beat her with kicks and fists blows and hit steel tiffin on her and further said that he did not like her and he would give her divorce. Due to repeated beating and harassment, Nirmala set herself on fire after pouring kerosene at about 11.30 a.m. On same day at about 5.20 p.m. Nirmala expired. P.W.1-Chindhu lodged complaint on same day. It was registered at 6.10 p.m., 4. Thereafter, police drew inquest panchanama on the dead body. The dead body was sent for post-mortem. Spot-panchanama was also drawn. Statements of various witnesses were recorded. It is also prosecution case that when Nirmala was admitted in hospital, her statements were recorded by P.W.2- Vitthal Patil, who was Executive Magistrate and P.W.7 P.S.I. Patil and those dying declarations corroborated the prosecution case. 5. The prosecution examined in all seven witnesses. Relying on their evidence, the order of conviction and sentence is passed. It is this order which is challenged in this appeal. 6. In order to prove prosecution case, the prosecution examined P.W.1-Chindhu and P.W.4-Baburao at Exhs.18 and 25 respectively. P.W.1-Chindha, father of Nirmala, deposed mainly as per his complaint, which is reproduced above and which is proved at Exh.19. He spoke about his visit to the house of Nirmala at Shirsoli after Diwali when Nirmala complained about the ill-treatment and beating. He also spoke about visit with P.WA-Baburao before 1-1/2 months before the incident when Nirmala again complained about beating and harassment. He also stated that on 09.03.1994, when he was in office, he received message that Nirmala was admitted in Civil Hospital, Jalgaon and that she received burn injuries. He also spoke about visit with P.WA-Baburao before 1-1/2 months before the incident when Nirmala again complained about beating and harassment. He also stated that on 09.03.1994, when he was in office, he received message that Nirmala was admitted in Civil Hospital, Jalgaon and that she received burn injuries. P.W.4-Baburao in his deposition has also stated that he had accompanied P.W.1-Chindha 1-l/2 months before the incident and at that time Nirmala had complained about ill-treatment, repeated beating and quarrels on alternate day. He also stated that on 09.03.1994, he accompanied Chindha to Civil Hospital at Jalgaon. Both P.W.1 and P.W.4 stated that Nirmala had told them that on earlier day of the incident, for not cooking well her husband had beaten her and hit Nirmala with a steel box. So, she poured kerosene on herself and set herself on fire. Evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.4 are consistent with each other and the evidence is supported by the immediate complaint lodged by P.W.1-Chindhu within an hour of the death of Nirmala on same day. 7. The learned advocate for the appellant has taken me through the evidence of P.W.1-Chindhu and P.W.4-Baburao. Absolutely, no circumstance is brought on record to doubt veracity of either of the two. In-fact, the complaint was given so immediately that there was no time for concoction. It is true that in cross-examination of Chindha, he has admitted that when he visited Nirmala after Diwali and she complained about beating and harassment, he told her that such minor things do take place in every family. He also stated that when he accompanied P.W.4 - Baburao subsequently to the house of Nirmala, she complained. Both of them told Nirmala and her husband that they should not quarrel with each other. It is true that during lifetime of Nirmala, no complaint was lodged. However, Nirmala was residing with the appellant and the father was not expected to lodge complaint and precipitate the matter. So far as P.W.4 - Baburao is concerned, only one thing argued before him is that he was uncle of P.W.1-Chindhu. But, that alone is not enough to discard his evidence. 8. In this case, evidence of P.W. 1 Chindhu and P.WA-Baburao is supported by five dying declarations, out of which three dying declarations are oral and two are written. P.W.5-Lilabai, resident of Pahur, is the person to whom oral dying declaration was made by Nirmala. But, that alone is not enough to discard his evidence. 8. In this case, evidence of P.W. 1 Chindhu and P.WA-Baburao is supported by five dying declarations, out of which three dying declarations are oral and two are written. P.W.5-Lilabai, resident of Pahur, is the person to whom oral dying declaration was made by Nirmala. She had accompanied P.W.1-Chindhu and P.W.4-Baburao after Nirmala had sustained burn injuries. She also said that along with P.W.1-Chindhu and P.W.4 -Baburao, she went to the Civil Hospital at Jalgaon and there they enquired with Nirmala. Nirmala told her that appellant was assaulting her saying that she was not able to cook and he did not like her; and due to ill-treatment, she set herself on fire. Leelabai is the person who was mediator and who brought about marriage of Nirmala and the appellant. In that sense she was independent witness. She also stated that at the time of Diwali, she had visited the house of Nirmala and asked her about family life. Nirmala started crying saying that her husband used to assault her on minor grounds like not being able to cook properly. Cross-examination of Lilabai clearly shows that she is the person who can be said to be independent witness in as much as she had no reason to depose against the appellant. 9. P.W.2- Vithal Patil, Executive Magistrate, has stated that police gave him letter Exh.21 for recording dying declaration and therefore she went to the Civil Hospital and approached doctor. The doctor came with him and examined the patient. The doctor told him that the patient was in a position to give statement. Thereafter, he recorded statement of Nirmala, which is proved at Exh.22. He stated that Nirmala was able to speak, but she was taking pause while speaking. When he recorded statement, no one else was present. After recording the statement, he read out the statement to Nirmala and thereafter her thumb impression was taken. He also stated that while writing the dying declaration, carbon copy was also obtained, but the carbon copy was removed when thumb impression was taken. 10. P.W.7-Bhagwat Patil examined at Exh.29 was working as P.S.L of M.LD.C. Police Station. On 09.03.1994, he learnt from Head Constable Sahebrao Patil that one Nirmala had sustained burn injuries at her house. So, he went to Shirsoli, but found that Nirmala had already been taken to Civil Hospital. 10. P.W.7-Bhagwat Patil examined at Exh.29 was working as P.S.L of M.LD.C. Police Station. On 09.03.1994, he learnt from Head Constable Sahebrao Patil that one Nirmala had sustained burn injuries at her house. So, he went to Shirsoli, but found that Nirmala had already been taken to Civil Hospital. Therefore, he visited the Civil Hospital and met her. He also met Medical Officer, asked him whether Nirmala was in a position to give statement and the doctor accompanied him and examined Nirmala and told him that she was in a position give statement. Thereafter, P.W.7-P.S.L Bhagwat Patil recorded statement of Nirmala, on which he took signature of the doctor. The statement is proved at Exh.30. According to the P.S.I., he reached the house of the accused at about 12 to 12.30 noon and immediately thereafter he went to the hospital and recorded statement. According to him, recording of statement of Nirmala started at 12.45 p.m., It may be noted that the dying declarations recorded by the Executive Magistrate and the P.S.I. are consistent with each other and they are consistent with the story which is disclosed by P.W.1-Chindhu in his F.I.R., 11. It may be noted that the Executive Magistrate has stated that he started recording dying declaration at about 1.40 p.m. and completed at 2.10 p.m. It is worth noting that P.W.1 has stated in his statement that he learnt about the incident and admission of Nirmala in Civil Hospital, Jalgaon, at about 2.00 p.m. at Pahur. So, there would not have been any relative from the parental side of Nirmala, when statements of Nirmala was recorded by P.S.I. Patil or P.W.2- Vithal Patil, Executive Magistrate. So, there was no possibility of tutoring Nirmala by any interested person. 12. In order to show that Nirmala was in a position to give statement, P.W.6-Dr. Sampat Wankhede is examined at Exh.28. Dr. Wankhede stated that he was Medical Officer on duty. The Executive Magistrate visited and asked him whether Nirmala was in a position to give statement. So, he examined the patient. Her general condition was good and she was physically and mentally fit to give statement. So, he said the Executive Magistrate that she was in a position to give statement. He was near the patient. He proved his signature which is marked as Exh.22-A on the dying declaration at Exh.22. The patient was having 100% burn injuries. 13. Her general condition was good and she was physically and mentally fit to give statement. So, he said the Executive Magistrate that she was in a position to give statement. He was near the patient. He proved his signature which is marked as Exh.22-A on the dying declaration at Exh.22. The patient was having 100% burn injuries. 13. It is suggested to the Doctor that when there are more than 90% burn injuries, possibility of there being any hallucination is there. The Doctor said that the physical and mental statement of mind of the burnt patient depends on the degree of the burns. He also volunteered that it also depends on the will power of the patient. He further said that no tranquilizer was given before recording statement of Nirmala. In cross-examination he stated that he has examined the patient, but endorsement was not given by him before recording the statement. He further states that he forgot to write endorsement about condition of the patient, but he made signature with date. 14. Several authorities are cited before this Court on behalf of both sides. Case of Hans Raj Vs. State of Haryana, AIR 2004 S.C. 2790 is cited for indicating law regarding presumption under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act. In that case though Their Lordships upheld conviction of the appellant under Section 498-A of the I.P.C., he was acquitted of offence punishable under Section 306 of the I.P.C. It is observed that the evidence regarding abetment of suicide was slender evidence. It is also observed that the prosecution was guilty of improving its case from stage to stage. So in that case the prosecution went on improving its original case and therefore it was felt that the presumption regarding abetment of suicide should not be drawn. 15. Second case cited is Girdhar Shankar Tawade Vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2002 S.C. 2078 : [2002 ALL MR (Cri) 1669 (S.C.)]. In that case, there was no cogent evidence to bring home charge under Section 498-A of the I.P.C., and therefore the accused was acquitted of both Sections 498-A and 306 of the I.P.C. In that case, in para 18 it is observed that there shall have to be a series of acts in order to be a harassment, within the meaning of explanation (b). It is observed that letter though depict a reprehensible conduct, would not, however bring home to charge of Section 498-A against the accused. 16. Third case cited is Sanagala Yagna Sree Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1996 CRI.L.J. 1249. In that case para 7 was referred. In the said case His Lordship considered Sections 498-A, 306 of the I.P.C. and presumption under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act. It is observed that presumption is rebuttable presumption and in certain circumstances presumption need not be drawn as in the case of State of West Bengal Vs. Orilal Jaiswal, 1994 Cri.L.J. 2104. After referring to definition of abetment in Section 107 of the I.P.C., is observed that presumption under Section 113-A must naturally refer to one of these three ingredients. In the case before His Lordship, there was no question of conspiracy of doing suicide and question that remained was whether there was instigation. In the facts of the case it is held that there was no instigation to commit suicide. 17. Another case cited is State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Nikku Ram, AIR 1996 S.C. 67 . In that case paras 15 to 17 were referred. In that case the accused persons alleged to have demanded dowry and treated the deceased with cruelty leading to suicide. There was no evidence to show that deceased was harassed within the meaning of explanation (b) of Section 498-A. However, in the facts of the case, it is held that offence under Section 324 of the I.P.C. was made out, but it was finding of facts of the case. 18. The learned A.P.P. relied upon case of Laxman V s. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2002 S.C. 2973 : [2002 ALL MR (Cri) 2259 (S.C.)]. In that case in paras 3 to 5, Their Lordships considered the requirements of the dying declaration. It is observed that normally, the Court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eye-witnesses state that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the declaration, the medical opinion will not prevail, nor can it be said that since there is no certification of the doctor as to the fitness of the mind of the declarant, the dying declaration is not acceptable. But where the eye-witnesses state that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the declaration, the medical opinion will not prevail, nor can it be said that since there is no certification of the doctor as to the fitness of the mind of the declarant, the dying declaration is not acceptable. In para 5 of the said case it is further observed that it is indeed a hyper-technical view that the certification of the doctor was to the effect that the patient is conscious and there was no certification that the patient was in a fit state of mind specially when the magistrate categorically stated in his evidence indicating the question he had put to the patient and from the answers elicited was satisfied that the patient was in a fit state of mind where after he recorded the dying declaration. 19. Another case cited on the same point is Koli Chunilal Savji and anr. Vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1999 S.C. 3695 . I may refer to para 8 of the said case. In that case neither doctor was examined nor he made any endorsement. However, it was found that the doctor had made endorsement on police yadi and relying on that it is held that the dying declaration was accepted. 20. In the present case it is vehemently argued that the doctor has not made any endorsement on either of the two dying declarations produced at Exhs.22 and 13. Simply, P.W.6-Dr. Wankhede has signed on them. P.W.6-Dr. Wankhede referred to dying declaration at Exh.22 and not to dying declaration at Exh.30 proved by P.W.7-P.S.I. Patil So far as, this part is concerned, though P.W.6-Dr. Wankhede has not made endorsement, he has entered into witness box and he has stated about state of mind of deceased, when dying declaration at Exh.22 was recorded by the Executive Magistrate. Absolutely, there is nothing in his evidence to doubt his veracity. 21. Moreover, after dying declarations were recorded by Executive Magistrate and P.S.I. Patil, P.W.1-Chindhu, P.W.4-Baburao and P.W.5-Lilabai met Nirmala and their evidence clearly indicates that deceased Nirmala was in good state of mind even thereafter to tell them what made her to put herself on fire. So, considering totality of the circumstances in my opinion, the Trial Court did not see any error in believing the dying declarations and other evidence of prosecution witnesses. 22. So, considering totality of the circumstances in my opinion, the Trial Court did not see any error in believing the dying declarations and other evidence of prosecution witnesses. 22. It is argued before me that the accused did not instigate Nirmala to commit suicide and he had no intention that she should commit suicide. If we consider Section 498-A of the I.P.C., it is as follows: "498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty. Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished within imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.- For the purpose of this section, "cruelty" means (a) any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her on any person related to her to meet such unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand." 23. In this case, it is not question of intention as can be seen from explanation (a), but it is question of willful conduct, which should be of such a nature as is likely to drive woman to commit suicide or cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health of woman. So, it is not mere question whether the accused intended that his wife should commit suicide, but question is whether the conduct was willful and whether it would cause a particular result i.e. it would drive woman to take extreme step of either committing suicide or causing grave injury to herself. Nirmala complained to her father and grand father when they met her 1-12 month prior to the incident, but there was no way that could help her and the beating continued on every alternate day. Beating was there on earlier night and also in the morning of the day of incident. Beating was accompanied by insults. Life was made unbearable. Nirmala complained to her father and grand father when they met her 1-12 month prior to the incident, but there was no way that could help her and the beating continued on every alternate day. Beating was there on earlier night and also in the morning of the day of incident. Beating was accompanied by insults. Life was made unbearable. Therefore, in the facts of the present case, in my opinion, the case clearly falls under Section 498-A and Section 306 of the I.P.C., in view of the presumption under Section 113 of the Evidence Act. 24. In this case, Section 113-A of the Evidence Act is squarely applicable. There is no dispute that within seven years of marriage Nirmala poured kerosene on herself and set herself on fire. She died as a result of the same. She did this due to cruelty at the hands of her husband. Various documents to that effect, such as post mortem notes at Exh.17, inquest panchanama at Exh. 15 and certificate of death at Exh.16 are admitted by the accused under Section 294 of the Cr.P.C. 25. So, in the facts and circumstances case, considering totality of the circumstances, in my opinion, this is a case where order of conviction and sentence is passed for good reasons. There is sufficient evidence on record. 26. At this stage, learned advocate Shri. K. C. Sant for the appellant requested that the Court should reduce sentence. He also referred to the case of Mohd. Hoshan and anr. Vs. State of A.P., AIR 2002 S.C. 3270 : [2003 ALLMR (Cri) 387 (S.C.)]. In that case, considering that the incident had taken place in 1988 and both accused husband and mother were in prison for two months and the mother was 60 years of age, the sentence was reduced to period already undergone. However, in my considered opinion, that ratio cannot be invoked in the present case. If we consider the social condition in the State of Maharashtra, considerable number of the sessions cases involve deaths of married women within seven years of their marriages. They die by burns or by consuming insecticide or by fall in well or by hanging. Male members or old ladies or unmarried girls hardly die of burns, poison, drawing or hanging. If we consider the social condition in the State of Maharashtra, considerable number of the sessions cases involve deaths of married women within seven years of their marriages. They die by burns or by consuming insecticide or by fall in well or by hanging. Male members or old ladies or unmarried girls hardly die of burns, poison, drawing or hanging. Instances of demands of dowry & resultant cruelty of married women at the hands of husband and in-laws are not reduced inspite of Dowry Prohibition Act and various other legislations. There is no respect for ladies and their lives. They are often beaten and treated inhumanly. In this case the appellant was beating his wife on every alternate day and heaping insults on her, making her life unbearable. It is necessary to have deterrence in the society and therefore it is not a case where prayer for reduction is sentence can be considered. 27. In the result, the following order is passed: i) The Criminal Appeal stands dismissed. The order passed by the IInd Additional Sessions Judge, Jalgaon, dated 05.12.1997, in Sessions Case No.247 of 1994, is hereby confirmed. ii) The Appellant shall surrender to his bail for undergoing remaining sentence. Appeal dismissed.