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2009 DIGILAW 1517 (PNJ)

Amarjit Kaurs v. Surinderjit Singh

2009-08-27

VINOD K.SHARMA

body2009
Judgment Vinod K.Sharma, J. 1. The appellant-wife by way of this appeal has challenged the judgment and decree dated 18.11.2002, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Patiala, allowing a petition filed by the respondent husband under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act (herein after referred to as -the Act-) on the pleadings, that the marriage between the parties was solemnised on 4.12.1994 at Shiv Ashram, Tej Bagh Colony, Patiala, according to Hindu rites by way of Anand Karaj. After marriage, the parties lived together and cohabited as husband and wife till 28.4.1997. During this period, the appellant conceived pregnancy, for two times, but she got aborted the child, without the consent of the respondent. The appellant thereafter conceived for third time and delivered the male child, who died later on. The case of the respondent husband was, that this fact was kept concealed by the appellant and her parents from the respondent. 2. It was also pleaded, that the marriage between the parties was simple and no dowry articles or gift were given in the marriage. It was the case of the respondent-husband that after the marriage, the behaviour of the appellant was cruel towards respondent as well as his family members. The allegations levelled were, that the appellant-wife on many occasions refused to prepare meals for the respondent and his family members and even did not serve a cup of tea to any guest or relative of the respondent, whenever they came to meet him. It was also the case of the respondent-husband that the appellant used to claim that she was in service and she did not like the atmosphere of the village, and that she did not like to live in the village. She compelled him to live in the city. On refusal of the respondent to leave his parents, the appellant used to quarrel with the respondent and his parents and often left the matrimonial home to live with her parents for couple of days. It was also the case of the respondent that the appellant used to leave the matrimonial home without permission or consent of the respondent, who brought her back on number of occasions from her parental home. It was also the case of the respondent that the appellant used to leave the matrimonial home without permission or consent of the respondent, who brought her back on number of occasions from her parental home. It was also the pleaded case of the respondent that the appellant used to compel him to get his share transferred in her name directly, but on inability having been shown by him, the respondent used to create trouble for the respondent and raise dispute in the family. It was also alleged that the appellant used to abuse the family members of the respondent and used filthy language against them. The request of the respondent to mend her behaviour and live in the family peacefully and like a good educated lady was not paid any heed. It was the case of the respondent that the father of the appellant was the main hindrance, as he did not want her to live in the joint family in the village. The appellant was also said to be rude towards the respondent and his family members. It was further pleaded case that after marriage, the appellant disclosed that she did not want child at an early stage and it was due to this reason that she got aborted the child, without the consent of the respondent. It was also alleged, that father of the appellant openly declared that he did not like the respondent, as he was not acting according to his wishes and wishes of the appellant. It was also alleged that she was playing in the hands of her father. It was claimed that younger sister of the appellant was also staying in her parental home because of the interference of the parents of the appellant. He further alleged that he was not invited to the marriage of her sister. 3. The respondent-husband also pleaded that on 28.4.1997, the appellant left the house of the respondent without his and his family members consent. While leaving the house, the appellant took with her all her Istridhan, including clothes, video cassette of the marriage and other jewellery given by the parents of the respondent, and since then she was living with her parents. It was pleaded that she was living separately against the wishes of the respondent. While leaving the house, the appellant took with her all her Istridhan, including clothes, video cassette of the marriage and other jewellery given by the parents of the respondent, and since then she was living with her parents. It was pleaded that she was living separately against the wishes of the respondent. The respondent further alleged that with the help of respectables and panchayat members consisting of Harnam Singh, Harnek Singh Lamberdar, Palwinder Singh Sarpanch along with other respectables approached the appellant in the month of January, 1998 and then in June, 1998 and requested the appellant and her parents to send the appellant with the respondent, but this request was not accepted. It was pleaded, that the respondent as well as panchayat members were insulted. It was also pleaded that, lastly, in October, 1998 the appellant was again approached through her parents, but this time too she flatly refused to come to her matrimonial home. The father of the appellant was said to have threatened the respondent with dire consequences, in case, the respondent or his family members came to his house. It was also the case of the respondent that he was given threat of involvement in criminal cases. Lastly, it was alleged, that the appellant was serving as a Clerk in Welfare Department and her father was a greedy person who wanted that the appellant should hand over her entire salary to him, and not spend any amount on the joint family of the respondent. This was said to be the main reason for trouble. The divorce was sought on the ground of cruelty. 4. On notice, the appellant contested the petition and repudiated the allegations in toto. The appellant-wife admitted the marriage between the parties, and it was asserted that the parties lived and cohabited upto 10.6.1997 and not 28.4.1997. The appellant claimed, that she was turned out of the house by the respondent in wearing clothes, after giving beating to her. It was denied that the appellant herself got aborted two times. It was pleaded that the appellant got premature delivery of male child on 28.4.1995 at Roop Rai Nursing Home and Clinical Laboratory, Sanaur. The child died after 24 hours due to premature delivery, as it was only six months old. It was denied that the appellant herself got aborted two times. It was pleaded that the appellant got premature delivery of male child on 28.4.1995 at Roop Rai Nursing Home and Clinical Laboratory, Sanaur. The child died after 24 hours due to premature delivery, as it was only six months old. Second time the appellant was admitted in Rajindra Hospital, Patiala, on 13.5.1996 due to the pregnancy and she got treatment and was discharged on 8.6.1996. She was again admitted on 20.6.1996 and on that day, there was abortion of child due to heavy bleeding. The said foetus was only four months and twenty days old and female. It was pleaded case of the appellant that in spite of message having been sent to the respondent, he did not come to enquire about the health of the appellant The appellant herself bore all the medical expenses, and respondent never gave or spent any penny on her. On the third occasion, the appellant was admitted in pregnant condition on 3.8.1997 in Rajindra Hospital, Patiala, and she was discharged on 6.9.1997, after treatment. She was again admitted in Rajindra Hospital, Patiala, and male child was born to her on 26.10.1997, who died after two months due to infection and fever. It was denied, that the fact regarding delivery and death of the child was concealed by the appellant or her parents. It was asserted that the respondent and his parents were duly informed, but they failed to turn up. It was also alleged that at the time of marriage, various dowry articles were given and a good marriage was performed. The allegations of cruelty were denied. It was also denied that she ever refused to prepare meals or serve tea, as alleged. It was pleaded by the appellant wife that the behaviour of the respondent was cruel towards her. It was the case of the appellant that the respondent was man of bad habits and wasteful nature. He used to consume liquor daily and beat her in drunken state, whenever the appellant stopped him from taking liquor. He was also said to use filthy language. It was the case of the appellant wife that she was in service from the very beginning and had never asked the respondent-husband to live in the city. The allegations that the appellant used to quarrel with the respondent and his parents was also denied. He was also said to use filthy language. It was the case of the appellant wife that she was in service from the very beginning and had never asked the respondent-husband to live in the city. The allegations that the appellant used to quarrel with the respondent and his parents was also denied. She also denied the allegations that she used to leave her matrimonial home without the consent of the respondent. It was the case of the appellant, that it was the respondent, who used to leave the house for many days without informing the appellant. The allegation that the appellant had sought transfer of his share in land, was also denied. She also denied having abused the respondent or his family members. The allegations levelled against the father of the appellant were also denied. It was also denied that she did not want child at early stage. It was averred that the younger sister of the appellant, namely, Paramjit Kaur was married to Baljinder Singh of Miranpur. He and his parents were said to be greedy persons, and not satisfied with the dowry articles and demanded more dowry. It was also alleged, that Paramjit Kaur used to be given beating and that she was turned out of the house. It was denied that the father of the appellant was interfering in the matrimonial,home of Paramjit Kaur on which account the matrimonial life of Paramjit Kaur was disturbed. The appellant denied having left the house on 28.4.1997. It was pleaded that she was turned out of the house by respondent on 10.6.1997 in three wearing clothes, after giving her beating. She denied having taken her dowry articles, jewellery etc. She also denied the visit of the respondent with the panchayat in January, June and October, 1998. The allegation of threats by father of the appellant was also denied. It was further denied that the appellant caused mental agony or cruelty to the respondent. It was pleaded that behaviour of the respondent was cruel towards the appellant, therefore, he was not entitled to decree of divorce. Objection was also raised that the petition was not signed and verified by the respondent. 5. In the rejoinder, the allegations made in the written statement were denied and those made in the petition were reiterated. 6. It was pleaded that behaviour of the respondent was cruel towards the appellant, therefore, he was not entitled to decree of divorce. Objection was also raised that the petition was not signed and verified by the respondent. 5. In the rejoinder, the allegations made in the written statement were denied and those made in the petition were reiterated. 6. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned Matrimonial Court was pleased to frame the following issues -- "1. Whether the respondent has deserted the petitioner without reasonable or sufficient cause -OPP 2. Whether the respondent has treated the petitioner with cruelty - OPP 3. Whether the petitioner is entitled to a decree of divorce as prayed for - OPP 4. Whether the petition has not been signed and verified in accordance with law - OPR 5. Relief." 7. In support of the petition, the respondent himself stepped into the witness box as PW2 and also examined Harnam Singh as PW1, Sital Singh as PW3, Jit Singh as PW4 and Jarnail Singh as PW5. Whereas appellant appeared in the witness box as RW5 and also examined Karnail Singh as RW1, Dr. Anil Rooprai as RW2, Nirmal Kaur as RW3, Dr. Surinder Kumari as RW4, Dr. Ashi R. Sareen as RW6, Ram Lai as RW7 and also led documentary evidence. 8. Issues Nos. 1 and 2 were taken up together. 9. The learned Matrimonial Court, on appreciation of evidence, came to the conclusion that respondent pleaded cruelty on the following grounds -- "a) that the appellant got abortion twice without his previous consent and third time when she delivered a male child, who later on died, he was never informed about the birth and death of the said child; b) that the appellant-s behaviour towards the respondent and his family and guests was rude and cruel as well as abusive. She refused to prepare meals and also did not serve a cup of tea to the guests/relatives; c) that she compelled the respondent to live in the city and on his refusal, she often left the house and resided with her parents; d) that the appellant used to compel the respondent to get his share in the land transferred in her name; e) that the father of the appellant wanted the respondent to act in accordance with his wishes and wish of his daughter and also wanted that the appellant should not spend any amount of her salary in the joint family of the respondent. 10. The learned Matrimonial Court fourd, that the allegations levelled in clause b, c & d, in support of which four witnesses were examined, were only general about the conduct of the appellant and that the appellant wanted to stay in the city. None of the witnesses deposed about the appellant being rude or regarding her mis-behaviour in their presence, nor any specific instance was given by any of the witnesses. Evidence of PW1 Harnam Singh was said to be general in nature, except that he claimed to have accompanied the panchayat from the side of the respondent. Similarly PW3 Sital Singh deposed in general terms and stated about the mal adjustment of Paramjit Kaur in their family. The learned Court, therefore, held that it was the sole statement of the respondent qua cruelty. The learned Matrimonial Court also held, that in view of the allegations levelled by the respondent, most important witnesses were the family members, but none of the family members came forward to support his version. The respondent even failed to narrate any specific instance regarding rude and cruel behaviour of the respondent. It was held that he could not prove the fact that the appellant wanted him to live in city and get his share of land transferred in her name. The learned Court, therefore, did not find any force in these allegations to hold that the respondent was treated with cruelty. 11. The learned Matrimonial Court, however, held that there was evidence that the appellant had undergone abortion without the consent of the respondent two times, and that when third time she delivered a male child, he was not informed about the birth and death. 12. 11. The learned Matrimonial Court, however, held that there was evidence that the appellant had undergone abortion without the consent of the respondent two times, and that when third time she delivered a male child, he was not informed about the birth and death. 12. The respondent on the other hand led evidence to show that two children were aborted, whereas third child had died. The learned Court held, that RW1 Karnail Singh failed to prove the record regarding medical leave of the appellant, whereas RW2 Dr. Anil Rooprai deposed regarding admission of the appellant in his nursing home and regarding birth of the male child on the date of admission. He further deposed that the child was premature as such she was referred to Rajindra Hospital. He produced the documentary evidence i.e. discharge slip. Similarly Dr. Surinder Kumari also proved on record the medical record of the appellant. The factum of delivery of male child was also proved, and that it was also proved that she was discharged in satisfactory condition on 27.10.1997. Similar was the evidence of Dr. Ashi R. Sareen RW4. Learned Matrimonial Court held that complete description of the name of the husband and that of the patient was not given. The learned Court held, that the documentary record placed on record proved that it was of the appellant- wife. 13. The learned Matrimonial Court held, that it was for the appellant to prove that intimation/information of her being hospitalised was given to the respondent. Learned Matrimonial Court further held, that it was the specific case of the respondent, that abortions were undergone by the appellant without his consent, nor he was given any information regarding birth of the male child, who died later. The learned Matrimonial Court held that the respondent made categorical statement to this effect in the witness box, whereas the plea of the appellant with regard to message having been sent was vague, as she has fai led to depose the mode and manner of message. 14. The learned Court held, that in her cross-examination, the appellant stated that message was sent, that the child born to her was cremated. 15. The learned Matrimonial Court held, that the appellant claimed that the message was sent through her brother, but she did not examine him. 14. The learned Court held, that in her cross-examination, the appellant stated that message was sent, that the child born to her was cremated. 15. The learned Matrimonial Court held, that the appellant claimed that the message was sent through her brother, but she did not examine him. The learned Court also noticed, that the appellant did not examine any of her family members to establish her good behaviour. The learned Court observed, that the father of the appellant chose not to appear in the witness box. On the evidence, the learned Matrimonial Court came to the conclusion, that undisputedly, third child was born at Sanaur and died after two months due to infection and fever, but there was no evidence to show, whether any steps were taken by appellant during these two months to contact the respondent, or whether any information of birth was given. 16. It was held, that no information of birth and death of male child was given to the respondent, act of appellant amounted to cruelty. 17. The learned Matrimonial Court held, that as per version of the respondent, the appellant left matrimonial home on 28.4.1997, and since then in spite of efforts made by the respondent, including that of panchayat, the appellant failed to come back to her matrimonial home. It was held that the respondent and the panchayat members were insulted. The learned Court further held, that the appellant had not taken any steps to file any restitution petition in any Court, nor she complained about the conduct of the respondent to anybody or his higher authority, therefore, the inaction and silence on the part of the appellant proved, that she had no inclination to save her marriage. The respondent made statement in the Court that he was ready to rehabilitate the appellant but the appellant had no inclination to live with the respondent, therefore, the plea of desertion also stood proved. 18. Both the issues were decided in favour of the respondent husband. 19. In view of the finding on issues Nos. 1 and 2, issue No. 3 was decided in favour of the respondent-husband. Issue No. 4 was also decided in favour of the respondent-husband, and the petition filed under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act allowed. 20. Mr. 18. Both the issues were decided in favour of the respondent husband. 19. In view of the finding on issues Nos. 1 and 2, issue No. 3 was decided in favour of the respondent-husband. Issue No. 4 was also decided in favour of the respondent-husband, and the petition filed under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act allowed. 20. Mr. R.N. Singal, learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the appellant, vehemently contended, that the finding recorded by the learned Matrimonial Court on the face of it is perverse and not sustainable in law. The learned counsel for the appellant contended, that no notice of appellant having got aborted twice without the consent of the respondent could be taken, as the said act even if taken to be correct, stood condoned as admittedly the third child was born to the appellant. 21. In support of the contention, the learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Susheel Kumari v. Vijay Kumar, 2005(2) RCR(Civil) 17, wherein this Court was pleased to lay down, that when after the death of child, party started living together and there was conception, and after the abortion they started living together, then the acts of cruelty upto that stage would be deemed to have been condoned, and cannot be made a ground for divorce. The law laid down by this Court in Susheel Kumari v. Vijay Kumar (supra) reads as under -- "9. The act of cruelty pleaded in the petition against the appellant may be divided into two parts viz (i) acts committed prior to 1.12.1990 and (ii) those committed after 1.12.1990. In so far as the acts falling in the first category are concerned, those have to be just ignored, because the same, even if assumed to be true, stood condoned after the parties had reunited on 1.12.1990 and starte 1iving together, on the basis of compromise between them, leading to withdrawal of petition for judicial separation under Section 10 of the Act. Regarding acts falling in the secondary category, it may be stated that after 1.12.1990, parties had 1 ived together for a very short period viz for about 8-9 months i.e. with effect from 1.12.1990 to 15.9.1991. During the first 10-12 days, they lived in this house of respondent-s parents. Regarding acts falling in the secondary category, it may be stated that after 1.12.1990, parties had 1 ived together for a very short period viz for about 8-9 months i.e. with effect from 1.12.1990 to 15.9.1991. During the first 10-12 days, they lived in this house of respondent-s parents. Thereafter, the respondent took the house of PW-3 Nanu Ram on rent and the parties, then shifted to that house where they lived together right upto 15.9.1991 i.e. the day on which appellant left the house for the last time, in the company of her brother." 22. The learned counsel for the appellant also contended, that the finding of the learned Matrimonial Court that statement of the appellant could not be relied upon in support of cruelty for want of any complaint, cannot be sustained in view of the law laid down by this Court in Smt. Santosh v. Vinod, 2006(4) RCR (Civil) 548, wherein this Court was pleased to lay down as under -- "23. We do not find the reasoning given by the trial Court to be sustainable. Relying upon the own observations of the trial Court that "ours is a patriarchal society", it may be noticed that in our Indian Society, the bride and members of her natal family would not like to do an act which may make the future resumption of matrimonial ties impossible. Except when things become intolerable or reach a flash point, the bride family would by and large exhibit tolerant attitude. Further, it is not the plea of the appellant that she had sustained any noticeable/grievous injury qua which she may have obtained medico-legal evidence. In the male dominated society scenario, it is illogical for the trial Court to have made a sweeping observation that the appellant being an employed wife was in a dominating position vis-a-vis unemployed husband "at all relevant time". Further, the mere fact that she was under treatment during the period of pregnancy would not, per se, disprove her allegation of having been belaboured at a different point of time. It may be noted in the context that, on the own showing of the respondent-husband "the charges of the hospital for delivery of the child was borne by the parents of the respondent." 23. It may be noted in the context that, on the own showing of the respondent-husband "the charges of the hospital for delivery of the child was borne by the parents of the respondent." 23. Learned counsel for the appellant contended, that appellant while appearing as RW5 had categorically stated that she informed the respondent and his parents about the birth and death of third child, but she was not cross- examined on this point. In this eventuality, it is to be held, that opposite party accepted the truth of the statement. In support of this contention, the learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon-ble Delhi High Court in Satyendra Kumar Sharma v. Jitender Kudsia, 2006(1) RCR(Rent) 206, wherein the Hon-ble Delhi High Court was pleased to lay down as under -- "5. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that the petitioner stated on oath about the loss of original rent deed dated 20.8.1956 and he was not at all cross-examined on that point. Therefore the petitioner must be deemed to have proved loss of the original and was therefore entitled to lead secondary evidence by producing photocopy of the rent deed marked -A-. Reliance was placed on 28(1985) DLT 360; 93 (2001) DLT 1; and 1998(46) DRJ 7. There is no dispute with the provision of law that if a witness is not cross- examined on a particular point, the opposite party must be deemed to have accepted truth of that statement and therefore when the petitioner was not cross-examined regarding the loss of original rent deed dated 20.8.1956, he becomes entitled to lead secondary evidence in the form of photocopy mark -A- but mere production of the photocopy by itself does not prove its execution. In the written statement tenant has specifically denied the execution of any rent note dated 20.8.1956. It was, therefore, for the petitioner to prove its execution but in his statement on oath he has no where identified the signatures of the respondent on marked -A- nor the petitioner has produced any attesting witness named in marked - A-. On the contrary respondent has secifically denied his signatures on the said document. Thus the photocopy marked -A- has not been formally proved. Learned ARC, therefore, rightly concluded that for ascertaining the purpose of letting the photo copy mark- A- is of no help. On the contrary respondent has secifically denied his signatures on the said document. Thus the photocopy marked -A- has not been formally proved. Learned ARC, therefore, rightly concluded that for ascertaining the purpose of letting the photo copy mark- A- is of no help. But that is not the end of the matter." 24. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, therefore, was that finding of the learned Court below holding that respondent was treated with cruelty, cannot be sustained. 25. On consideration, I find force in this contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. It may be noticed, that the learned Matrimonial Court has merely accepted the allegation of cruelty on the pleadings and statement of respondent, that he was not informed about the birth and death of the child. This statement on the face of it cannot be accepted, firstly for the reason that the appellant was not cross-examined on this point. Even otherwise, once it was proved on record, that the appellant had left the matrimonial home when she was pregnant, it was for the respondent to have proved the steps taken to contact the respondent, to know about her welfare and the medical treatment being taken by her at the advance stage of pregnancy, in view of the fact that earlier two children were born premature. There was total neglect on the part of the respondent to perform his matrimonial and parental obligations. His bald statement that he was not informed about the birth and death of the child, could not be taken to be gospel truth, nor could this act be said to constitute cruelty to the respondent, as his conduct at the time of previous abortion showed that he could not have suffered any pain or suffering on the allegation that he was not informed about the birth and death of child. 26. It is settled law, that cruelty is to be proved on facts and circumstances of each case. Whether a peculiar act constitutes cruelty depends upon the behaviour and status of the parties. The findings of learned Matrimonial Court on cruelty are, thus, reversed. 27. The finding of the learned Matrimonial Court on desertion, also cannot be sustained. 26. It is settled law, that cruelty is to be proved on facts and circumstances of each case. Whether a peculiar act constitutes cruelty depends upon the behaviour and status of the parties. The findings of learned Matrimonial Court on cruelty are, thus, reversed. 27. The finding of the learned Matrimonial Court on desertion, also cannot be sustained. In order to succeed on the ground of desertion, the respondent was not only to prove the separation, but also the animus deserendi, he was further required to prove that desertion continued during the entire statutory period of two years, immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. It may be noticed, that the only evidence led to prove this, was the statement of the respondent, and of the persons who were said to have accompanied him in panchayat. There is material contradictions in the statements of the witnesses. Harnam Singh in his statement categorically stated that rather of the appellant had replied to the panchayat, that if Surinderjit Singh came to Sanaur then the appellant will accompany him. The father of the appellant also told the panchayat that if the respondent would give the account of salary to him, then he would send his daughter to live with him. In the cross- examination, he denied whether any male child was born to the parties, nor he was aware of the second child. He did not speak even a word about insult meted out to the panchayat, as was the pleaded case of the respondent. 28. Whereas, the respondent while appearing as his witness stated, that the parents of the appellant had threatened to implicate him and his family members in criminal cases at the time of panchayat. In the cross-examination, he was not even aware as to who had borne the expenses for treatment of his wife. 29. PW3 Sital Singh another witness examined by the respondent also did not utter a word about the insult to the panchayat or threats given to the respondent of being implicated in the false criminal cases. He also merely stated, that appellant wanted to join the matrimonial home in case the respondent shifted to city. 30. Even if the statements are taken on its face value, the animus deserendi on the part of the " appellant to bring matrimonial ties to an end, is not proved. 31. He also merely stated, that appellant wanted to join the matrimonial home in case the respondent shifted to city. 30. Even if the statements are taken on its face value, the animus deserendi on the part of the " appellant to bring matrimonial ties to an end, is not proved. 31. PW5 Jarnail Singh also gave a statement, which was totally vague and not concerned with the pleadings. 32. This Court in the case of Smt. Manjit Kaur v. Mohan Singh, 2006(3) RCR(Civil) 617 has been pleased to lay down as under -- "7. The learned District Judge has primarily relied upon the evidence of the husband of convening Panchayt in July, 1994 to hold that the respondent has failed to join the society of the husband. However, I am unable to accept such finding. In fact, the witnesses produced by the husband are contradictory in their statements regarding the time and the manner of convening me Panchayat. PW-2 Ajaib Singh has stated that when the Panchayat has gone to the appellant-s house on 27.7.1994, the members were asked to come again on 29.7.1994. However. Jasbir Singh PW-1 has stated that on 27.7.1994, when the Panchayat was taken to the house of the parents of the appellant, the house was found locked. PW-4 Sarpat Singh has stated that he had gone to the house of the appellant in Panchayat in July, 1994. The parents of the appellant were not present on that day. Again he had gone on 29.7.1994. Meaning thereby that three witnesses produced by the respondent have given three different statements in respect of the visit of Panchayat on 27.7.1994. As per Ajaib Singh, the Panchayat was asked to come again on 29.7.1994 but as per Jasbir Singh, the house was found locked and as per Sarpat Singh, parents of the wife were not present. Such contradictory statements in fact show that the story of taking Panchayat is only a made up story and is in excuse to seek dissolution of marriage. Panchayat is alleged to have been taken in the month of July, 1994 although admittedly the wife is residing separately since 1986. No effort is even stated to have been made to bring and rehabilitate the wife to the matrimonial home prior to July, 1994 i.e.just prior to the filing of petition of dissolution of. marriage in September, 1994." 33. Panchayat is alleged to have been taken in the month of July, 1994 although admittedly the wife is residing separately since 1986. No effort is even stated to have been made to bring and rehabilitate the wife to the matrimonial home prior to July, 1994 i.e.just prior to the filing of petition of dissolution of. marriage in September, 1994." 33. In the present case also, the alleged panchayat members failed to prove the case set up by the respondent in his petition, therefore, the finding recorded by the learned Matrimonial Court on issue No. 2 is also reversed, as the respondent failed to prove the plea of desertion. 34. It may also be noticed here, that the conduct of the respondent has not been fair. In spite of the fact that the appeal was filed in this Court, the respondent in violation of the provisions of Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act has performed second marriage. 35. For the reasons stated above, this appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree passed by the learned Matrimonial Court is set aside and the petition filed by the respondent-husband, under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, is ordered to be dismissed with costs, which are assessed at Rs. 22,000/- (Rupees twenty two thousand only).