Judgment Common Order 1. By a notification published in the District Gazette, dated 112. 2002, the District Collector, Kancheepuram, invited applications for the grant of lease to quarry stones, through tender/auction in the lands comprised in various Survey Numbers in several villages of Kancheepuram District. The notification contained three schedules, with (i) Schedule-A comprising of quarries in four different villages in Tambaram and Chinglepet Taluk, which were described to be old stone quarries, (ii) Schedule-B comprising of quarries in nine villages in Chinglepet, Uthiramerur, Maduranthakam and Cheyyur Taluks, which were described to be new stone quarries and (iii) Schedule-C comprising of quarries in Chinglepet, Maduranthakam and Sriperumbudur Taluks, described as Gravel Quarries. 2. One Mr. K. Kathir Kamaraj, the petitioner in W.P.No.551 of 2009 applied for the quarry at Serial No.4 under Schedule-A to the notification, in respect of Quarry No.4 in Survey No.25/2B, Tirusoolam Village, of the extent of 32. 0 hectares, described as Hill Poromboke. In the tender-cum-auction held on 1. 2003, his offer was found to be the highest and accepted. Therefore he paid the security deposit of Rs.5 lakhs and also paid the lease amounts in terms of Rule 8(6)(c) of The Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959. 3. A deed of lease in the prescribed format (Appendix-I) was executed by the District Collector in favour of the said K. Kathir Kamaraj on 19. 2003, granting lease of quarrying rights in respect of the aforesaid quarry for a period of 5 years and the lease deed was also registered in the Office of the Sub Registrar, Tambaram. The period of lease was to expire on 19. 2008. 4. Towards the end of the period of lease, the Lessee K. Kathir Kamaraj, made a request to the District Collector on 15. 2008, seeking extension of the lease for a further period of 5 years on the ground that the quarry granted to him on lease was a virgin quarry and that therefore by virtue of Rule 8(8) of The Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, the lease ought to have been for a period of 10 years in the case of virgin quarries. After more than two months of making the said representation, the petitioner filed a writ petition in W.P.No.22068 of 2008, claiming that the application for renewal is pending and seeking a Writ of Mandamus to forbear the respondent from interfering with his right to continue quarrying operations till the expiry of another 5 years from the date of expiry of the original lease. Pending disposal of the writ petition, an interim order of injunction was granted in favour of K. Kathir Kamaraj, in M.P.No.1 of 2008 on 9. 2008. 5. But by the time the interim order was granted in the said writ petition, the District Collector had already passed an order dated 9. 2008, rejecting the request for extension of the period of lease on the ground that the quarry in question was not a virgin quarry. Therefore, challenging the order of rejection dated 9. 2008, the Lessee K. Kathir Kamaraj has come up with the writ petition W.P.No.551 of 2009, praying for a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, to quash the order of rejection dated 9. 2008 and to direct the respondent to permit the petitioner to continue the quarrying operations for a further period of 5 years in terms of Rule 8(8) of The Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959. 6. In view of the order of rejection dated 9. 2008, the first writ petition filed by the petitioner W.P.No.22068 of 2008 was dismissed and the interim order granted therein also perished along with the said order. Therefore the Lessee K. Kathir Kamaraj filed along with the main writ petition W.P.No.551 of 2009, two miscellaneous petitions in M.P.Nos.1 and 2 of 2009, seeking (i) an interim stay of the order of rejection and (ii) an interim injunction restraining the respondent from interfering with his rights to continue to quarry. 7. On 11. 2009, when W.P.No.551 of 2009 came up for admission along with the two miscellaneous petitions, the learned Additional Government Pleader took notice and requested time to get instructions. Therefore the writ petition was adjourned without granting any interim order. Subsequently, the respondent filed a counter affidavit and the writ petition itself was requested to be taken up for disposal. 8. 2009, when W.P.No.551 of 2009 came up for admission along with the two miscellaneous petitions, the learned Additional Government Pleader took notice and requested time to get instructions. Therefore the writ petition was adjourned without granting any interim order. Subsequently, the respondent filed a counter affidavit and the writ petition itself was requested to be taken up for disposal. 8. In the meantime, it was brought to my notice that a resident of the locality where the quarry is situate, had also filed a writ petition in W.P.No.29185 of 2008, seeking the issue of a Writ of Mandamus, to direct the respondents to consider his representation dated 12. 2008 for the conduct of an auction in respect of the very same quarry, which is the subject matter of the other writ petition. Therefore this writ petition W.P.No.29185 of 2008 was also directed to be tagged along with W.P.No.551 of 2009. 9. Meanwhile, an elected member of the local body (Tirusoolam Panchayat) filed a miscellaneous petition in M.P.No.3 of 2009, seeking to implead himself as a party to the writ petition W.P.No.551 of 2009, for the purpose of opposing the prayer of the Lessee K. Kathir Kamaraj for extension of the period of lease. Therefore this miscellaneous petition was also taken up. 10. I have heard Mr. V.T. Gopalan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Lessee, who is the petitioner in W.P.No.551 of 2009, Mr. P.S. Raman, learned Additional Advocate General for the official respondent, Mr. P.V.S. Giridhar, learned counsel appearing for the person seeking to implead himself (petitioner in M.P.No.3 of 2009 in W.P.No.551 of 2009) and Ms. Aruna, learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.No. 29185 of 2008. 11. Since the prayer made in W.P.No.29185 of 2008 depends upon the outcome of the other writ petition, viz., W.P.No.551 of 2009, let me take it up first. W.P.No.551 of 2009: 12. The main grievance of the petitioner in W.P.No.551 of 2009 is that the quarry in question is a virgin quarry and that therefore in terms of Rule 8(8) of The Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959, the period of lease ought to be 10 years. According to the petitioner, though the notification for the grant of quarrying lease described the quarry in question as an old quarry, it was not covered by any prior lease. According to the petitioner, though the notification for the grant of quarrying lease described the quarry in question as an old quarry, it was not covered by any prior lease. The petitioner claims that he came to know of its virginity, only after he started operating the quarry and that immediately he made a representation dated 13. 2004, seeking extension of the lease. 13. In support of the above contentions, Mr. V.T. Gopalan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, placed strong reliance upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in A. Srinivasan vs. District Collector { 2008 (3) CTC 800 } and an unreported decision dated 19. 2008, passed in W.P.(MD) No.6140 of 2008 by K. Suguna, J. 14. Sub Rule (8) of Rule 8 of The Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959, as amended by G.O.Ms.No.391, Industries (MMC-I) Department, dated 111. 2000, reads as follows:- "(8) The period of lease for quarrying stone in respect of the virgin areas, which have not been subjected to quarrying so far, shall be ten years. The period of lease for quarrying stone in respect of other areas shall be five years. The period of lease for quarrying sand and other minor minerals, other than the minerals covered under Rules 8-A and 8-C of the said Rules, shall not exceed three years and shall not be less than one year and shall be subject to the following conditions, namely: (i) The date of commencement of the period of lease granted under this Rule shall be the date on which the lease deed is executed. (ii) The lease shall expire on the date specified in the lease deed and in no case extension of the period of lease shall be made." 15. Prior to the above amendment, the District Collector was empowered to grant lease for quarrying stones, only for a period of 5 years. The Amendment to Sub Rule (8) was introduced in the year 2000 and hence a question arose as to whether persons who were granted leases for 5 years before the amendment, were entitled to take the benefit of the amendment. The issue went before the Division Bench of this Court in A. Srinivasans case. 16. The Amendment to Sub Rule (8) was introduced in the year 2000 and hence a question arose as to whether persons who were granted leases for 5 years before the amendment, were entitled to take the benefit of the amendment. The issue went before the Division Bench of this Court in A. Srinivasans case. 16. Construing the words "which have not been subjected to quarrying so far", appearing in the amended Rule 8(8), the Division Bench held in paragraph-13 of its judgment as follows:- "A lease is known to be virgin by the fact whether it was virgin at the time when it was granted for quarrying. So long as the lease period is in force, the area would be only known to be virgin till such time the lease is over. The words "which have not been subjected to quarrying so far" in the amended Rule shall relate only to date on which the lease was granted and not subsequently. The intention of the legislature is clear in granting ten years for virgin quarries and only for five years in respect of other quarries. The decision to grant ten years is with reference to virgin quarries. We do find any intention of the legislature to restrict the period to existing virgin quarries and in fact by that rule, there is no such restriction. This would be the correct interpretation as the Government had duly taken into consideration of the representations of the lessees who could not exploit the mineral for the entire full period of five years. As the area being virgin, they had to develop the area before commencement of the quarrying operation and in that process, they would lose a substantial portion of the lease period. Keeping the above grievance of the lessees only, the Government had extended the period of lease to ten years in respect of virgin areas. Hence, the lessees are entitled to the lease for a period of ten years provided the areas that were leased to them were virgin and there were no prior leases granted and the said quarries were not put into operation earlier." 17. After holding that the amendment to Rule 8(8) would have retrospective operation so as to confer a benefit upon the existing holders of leasehold rights, the Division Bench also took up the case of those whose leases came into existence after the amendment was introduced. After holding that the amendment to Rule 8(8) would have retrospective operation so as to confer a benefit upon the existing holders of leasehold rights, the Division Bench also took up the case of those whose leases came into existence after the amendment was introduced. In so far as their cases are concerned, the Division Bench held in paragraph-17 that the terms of the contract should be in accordance with statutory rules and that when the Rule prescribes a period of 10 years in respect of virgin quarries, it cannot be abridged to 5 years by contract. 18. In M. Joseph Rathinasamy vs. The District Collector, Madurai {WP(MD) No.6140 of 2008, dated 19. 2008}, the petitioner was granted a lease quarry stones in S.F.No.83, Part-8 in Kodayampatti Village, Vadipatti Taluk, Madurai District. On the ground that various portions of S.F.No.83 had already been leased out for quarrying operations and that therefore the quarry leased out to the petitioner cannot be construed as a virgin quarry, his application for extension was rejected. But the learned Judge held that though the other parts of the same survey number S.F.No.83 had been leased out earlier, Part-8 of S.F.No.83 had not been leased out earlier and that therefore Part-8 of S.F.No.83 was only a virgin quarry. While holding so, the learned Judge observed as follows:- "As per Rule 8(8) of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959, the period of lease for quarrying stone in respect of the virgin areas, which have not been subjected to quarrying so far, shall be ten years. So even as per the Rule 8(8) of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959, is concerned, the virginity has to be decided only in respect of area only which has been leased out and not with reference to S.F. Number. Consequently, the arguments of the learned Government Advocate that if the portion of the area in S.F. Number is leased out, the area comprised in the entire S.F. Number has to be treated as non virgin area will not hold good." 19. Therefore based upon the above two judgments, it was vehemently contended on behalf of the petitioner in W.P.No.551 of 2009 that the petitioner was entitled to extension of the period of lease by 5 years so as to make the lease in tune with Rule 8 (8). Therefore based upon the above two judgments, it was vehemently contended on behalf of the petitioner in W.P.No.551 of 2009 that the petitioner was entitled to extension of the period of lease by 5 years so as to make the lease in tune with Rule 8 (8). To substantiate the contention that the quarry in question viz., Quarry No.4 in Survey No.25/2B of Tirusoolam Village, was not the subject matter of any prior lease and that quarrying operations started for the first time thereon, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also invited my attention to the following:- (a) Under Clause 6(3) of the lease deed dated 19. 2003, the Lessee is obliged to remove the surface soil, before digging and opening any part of the demised pieces of land, so that the land can be restored, after the period of lease, to be fit for cultivation. Under Clause 6(7), the Lessee is obliged to keep correct accounts, showing the quantity and other particulars of the mineral obtained from the land. The accounts maintained by the petitioner would show that from the date of grant of lease, the petitioner was able to remove only the earth and the surface soil, for a full period of 2 years, which itself established that the quarry in question was a virgin, first time quarry. The petitioner has also produced, in the typed set of papers, the details of transport permits issued by the Deputy Director (Mines) from 29. 2003 upto 30.12.2005. These transport permits indicate that what the petitioner could do for a full period of 2 years (even a little more than that), was only the preparatory work of removing the surface soil. Therefore, according to the petitioner, the quarry in question could not have been an old quarry at all, in the light of the fact that the petitioner could not get anything out of the quarry except surface soil and earth for the initial period of 2 years out of the total period of lease of 5 years. (b) The petitioner also engaged the services of one Dr. S. Rajendran, a Geologist, from the Department of Earth Sciences, Annamalai University, to make Geophysical Studies on the land in question and he filed a report, after inspection, that the area is a plain virgin land. (c) The petitioner had also made a representation dated 13. (b) The petitioner also engaged the services of one Dr. S. Rajendran, a Geologist, from the Department of Earth Sciences, Annamalai University, to make Geophysical Studies on the land in question and he filed a report, after inspection, that the area is a plain virgin land. (c) The petitioner had also made a representation dated 13. 2004 at the earliest point of time, pointing out that it was not the virgin quarry and seeking the extension of the lease. (d) The petitioner, before coming to Court, approached the Deputy Director of Geology and Mining under The Right to Information Act, seeking certain documents, so as to find out the exact areas, which were leased out earlier. The Deputy Director has also furnished the copies of certain documents and sketches, showing the portions of land that were the subject matter of previous leases. These documents and sketches have now been produced by the petitioner. On the basis of one of the sketches signed by the Assistant Director of Geology and Mining, showing the residences within the 500 meter radius in Survey No.25/2B, it was pointed out that only a small portion of the larger extent in Survey No.25/2B had been granted by way of lease earlier to Anna Harijan Contract Labour Cooperative Society and that the land in entirety in Survey No.25/2B was not the subject matter of any prior lease. (e) The petitioner also drew my attention to another combined sketch which formed part of the lease deed. That sketch shows the quarry portions situate outside the 300 meter radius of the residential area. By inviting my attention to the sketch, it was contended that the portion of land leased out to the petitioner could never have been the subject matter of any prior lease, considering the restrictions earlier placed and later modified to 300 meters. (f) The petitioner also relies upon an Inspection Report submitted by the Assistant Director of Geology and Mining, on 30.1.1993, at the time of scrutinising the application of Tirusoolam Anna Harijan Blue Metal Works Labour Contract Cooperative Society Ltd., for the grant of lease to quarry blue metal in Survey No.25/2B. It was pointed out in the Inspection Report, that there were no permanent structures any where within the radius of 500 meters in the area under reference. The subsequent proceedings of the District Collector dated 13. It was pointed out in the Inspection Report, that there were no permanent structures any where within the radius of 500 meters in the area under reference. The subsequent proceedings of the District Collector dated 13. 1993, also contained a statement that there are still vacant spaces available for quarrying, out of the 20 acres of land in Survey No.25/2B. Therefore there are overwhelming materials according to the petitioner, to show that the particular quarry leased out to the petitioner was in fact a virgin quarry at the time of the grant and that therefore in view of Rule 8(8), as interpreted by the Division Bench, the petitioner was entitled to extension of the lease. 20. However, in response to the above contentions, Mr. P.S. Raman, learned Additional Advocate General, contended that once the very notification inviting applications described the quarry in question as an old quarry and the petitioner obtained lease only in pursuance of the said notification, the petitioner was estopped from claiming the contrary. The petitioner cannot request this Court to rewrite the tender conditions or the lease deed. The learned Additional Advocate General also distinguished the decision of the Division Bench and the decision of the learned single Judge, on the ground that in those cases, there was no finding of fact recorded, that the quarries in question were non-virgin quarries. Therefore, the learned Additional Advocate General justified the impugned order and submitted that it did not call for any interference. 21. I have carefully considered the rival submissions. Unlike the cases before the Division Bench in Srinivasan.A.s case and the case before Justice K. Suguna, a serious disputed question of fact has arisen in the present case, as to whether Quarry No.4 in Survey No.25/2B, Tirusoolam Village, was a virgin quarry or not, even at the time when the lease was granted in September 2003 in favour of the petitioner. This is borne out by the following facts:- (i) In the Kancheepuram District Gazette notification published on 112. 2002, inviting applications for tender/auction, the quarry in question was listed at Serial No.4 under Schedule-A, under the heading "old stone quarries eligible for the grant of lease for 5 years under Rule 8(8) of The Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959". It is in pursuance of this notification that the petitioner applied and obtained a lease. (ii) In the order of rejection dated 9. It is in pursuance of this notification that the petitioner applied and obtained a lease. (ii) In the order of rejection dated 9. 2008, the District Collector has taken a definite stand that the quarry in question is not a virgin quarry. He has stated that the Tirusoolam Anna Harijan Blue Metal Workers Labour Contract Cooperative Society Ltd., was originally granted a lease to quarry, in an extent of about 50.40 acres in S.No.25/2B for the period ending 111. 1984 and that such lease was subsequently extended from 111. 1984 to 111. 1987 and 12. 1988 to 12. 1991. It is further stated in the said letter that the same Society was granted lease over an extent of about 20 acres, after restricting the area and that another extent of 23.62 acres was also leased out from 1. 1996 to 1. 2001 to the same Society, on the Western side of the quarry area. (iii) Even in the counter affidavit filed by the District Collector in the first writ petition W.P.No.22068 of 2008, the respondent has furnished elaborate details of the previous leases. 22. By inviting my attention to (i) the Inspection Report of the Assistant Director of Geology and Mining, dated 30.1.1993, (ii) the Report of the Private Geologist engaged by the petitioner, (iii) the transport permits over a period of 2 years from September 2003 to December 2005 and (iv) the sketches enclosed to the lease deed with particular reference to the prohibited distance changing from 500 meters to 300 meters, the petitioner seeks to establish in this writ petition that the quarry is actually a virgin quarry in fact. 23. In other words, the petitioner has invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court to decide a seriously disputed question of fact, with reference to the rival contentions and documents produced on either side. This, I am afraid, is not within the realm of the writ jurisdiction of this Court. The petitioner cannot now seek to disprove a fact, that was admitted by both parties at the time of entering into the lease, especially before a writ Court. 24. This, I am afraid, is not within the realm of the writ jurisdiction of this Court. The petitioner cannot now seek to disprove a fact, that was admitted by both parties at the time of entering into the lease, especially before a writ Court. 24. In the decision of the Division Bench in Srinivasan.A.s case, the Bench recorded in paragraph-12 the submission that there was no denial that the areas granted to the Lessees, which were the subject matter of the writ appeals and the writ petitions, were virgin on the date when they were granted. Again in paragraph-21 of its decision, the Division Bench observed that the respondent-authorities had not denied the fact that at the time when the leases were granted to the Lessees, the areas were virgin. In paragraph-26 of the judgment, the Division Bench pointed out that in so far as one writ appeal and a few writ petitions were concerned, the Bench was not in a position to find out as to whether at the time when the lease was granted, the areas were virgin or not. Therefore that one writ appeal and those few writ petitions were not allowed, but merely disposed of, giving liberty to the appellant/petitioners to approach the Government and establish the question of fact relating to the virginity of the quarry. 25. A careful reading of the judgment of the Division Bench shows that the Bench was dealing with two sets of cases viz., (i) cases where there was no dispute that the quarries were virgin at the time of the grant in favour of the petitioners/appellants before the Bench and (ii) cases where this question of fact was not borne out due to the absence of a counter affidavit from the respondents. It is only in the first set of cases that the Division Bench granted the relief. In respect of the second set of cases, the Division Bench merely directed the petitioners to go before the authorities and invite a finding on the question of fact. In other words, the Division Bench did not grant relief even to petitioners whose assertion in their respective affidavits, was not controverted by any counter affidavit by the respondents. In such circumstances, it is impossible to think that the Division Bench judgment is in favour of the petitioner. 26. In other words, the Division Bench did not grant relief even to petitioners whose assertion in their respective affidavits, was not controverted by any counter affidavit by the respondents. In such circumstances, it is impossible to think that the Division Bench judgment is in favour of the petitioner. 26. Similarly, in the case of M. Joseph Rathinasamy, it was an admitted fact that Survey No.83 comprised of several parts, one of which namely Part 8 alone was the subject matter of the writ petition. Even by the pleadings, it was established that only the other parts of Survey No.83 were leased out earlier. Therefore, the learned Judge had no difficulty in breaking the Da Vinci Code and recording a finding that the quarry in question was a virgin quarry. 27. But the case on hand poses serious disputes on the very essential question of fact. In so far as a writ Court is concerned, the area relating to disputed questions of fact, is a no fire zone, into which thou shall not enter. 28. Apart from the fact that there are disputed questions of fact, there is one more difficulty for the petitioner. The petitioner applied for the grant of lease, in response to a notification published in the Kancheepuram District Gazette, on 112. 2002. As stated earlier, Quarry No.4 in Survey No.25/2B, Tirusoolam Village, was listed at Serial No.4 in Schedule-A to the notification. The caption under Schedule-A made it clear that the quarries coming under Schedule-A are "old quarries". The quarries coming under Schedule-B were indicated to be "new quarries". The offer made by the petitioner for the grant of lease, was certainly with the impression that it was for an old quarry. All persons who applied and participated in the tender/auction, in response to the said notification, would have also quoted a lease amount, only with the impression that it is an old quarry. Among the persons who made offers, the petitioner happened to be the highest bidder. One of the main considerations that weighed in the minds of all the participants in the tender process, was the fact that it was an old quarry. Therefore, the prices quoted by all the offerors, were greatly influenced by this important fact, that it is an old quarry and that the duration of the lease would be 5 years. One of the main considerations that weighed in the minds of all the participants in the tender process, was the fact that it was an old quarry. Therefore, the prices quoted by all the offerors, were greatly influenced by this important fact, that it is an old quarry and that the duration of the lease would be 5 years. After having allowed all the players viz., the participants in the auction-cum-tender, a level playing field, with the rules of the game clearly enunciated in the Gazette notification, it is not permissible for the winner, to change the rules of the game, after his victory, so as to reap a larger benefit. To do so would amount to hoodwinking the other participants in the tender-cum-auction process. 29. Moreover, it is by now well settled that a person who participates in a tender process, is bound by the tender conditions. The duration of the lease stipulated in the tender, may be a procedural aspect of the grant, which should fall in line with the statutory rule {Rule 8(8)}, as held by the Division Bench in Srinivasan.A.s case. But the statement made in the Gazette notification that the quarry in question was an old quarry, is neither a procedural matter nor an empty statement, but a substantial issue, since the duration of the lease depends solely upon the same. On this issue of fact, admitted by both parties at the time of entering into the contract, neither of the parties should be allowed to go back, after a long time. In other words, the petitioner, who bid in the auction for a quarry which was stated to be an old quarry, is estopped from contending otherwise, after bagging the contract. 30. The present stand of the petitioner can be tested easily be applying an inverted situation. If the Government had notified the quarry to be a virgin quarry and granted a lease for 10 years and later on came up with a plea that it was wrongly notified as such, the very same petitioner would have pleaded estoppel against the Government. Therefore, what is sauce for the goose must be sauce for the gander also. 31. Despite the fact that the leases of quarries fall within the realm of Government largesse, they do not completely lose the trappings of contracts enforceable specifically on either side. Therefore, what is sauce for the goose must be sauce for the gander also. 31. Despite the fact that the leases of quarries fall within the realm of Government largesse, they do not completely lose the trappings of contracts enforceable specifically on either side. The grants made by the Government, are elevated by Courts, from the level of mere contracts, so as to test their validity on the touch stone of fundamental rights, principles of fairness, reasonableness and proportionality. But they are never reduced from being contracts in nature essentially. To put it differently, the Courts have never held that the fundamental principles of the law of contracts are never applicable to the grants made by the Government. 32. Viewed from the above perspective, it may be seen that the petitioner and the respondent were parties to a contract. The District Gazette notification, was the invitation to offer. The petitioner and many others made their offers, accepting the terms and conditions prescribed in the "invitation to offer", viz., the Gazette notification. We must note carefully that neither the petitioner nor any other offeror, made a conditional offer. Out of the many offers made in response to the Gazette notification, the respondent selected the petitioner and accepted his offer. This offer and acceptance gave birth to the lease deed dated 19. 2003. It is an elementary principle of the law of contracts that "consensus ad idem" forms the foundation of a contract. At the time when the petitioners offer was accepted, both parties to the contract, had an identity of mind that it was an old quarry. The invitation to offer, the offer and its acceptance were only on that basis. As a matter of fact, the Gazette notification dated 112. 2002, clearly stipulated in the preamble that all interested parties should make an inspection of the quarry sites and satisfy themselves both about the quality and about the availability of the minerals. Therefore the offers made by all parties, including the petitioner, should be presumed to have been made only after such inspection. It was the duty of the petitioner to have carried out the "virginity test" at that time, before ever making an offer. After having made the offer and after having dated with the bride, it is not open to the petitioner to turn round now and claim that it was a virgin quarry. 33. It was the duty of the petitioner to have carried out the "virginity test" at that time, before ever making an offer. After having made the offer and after having dated with the bride, it is not open to the petitioner to turn round now and claim that it was a virgin quarry. 33. In Har Shankar vs. Dy. Excise and Taxation Commissioner { 1975 (1) SCC 737 }, the Supreme Court held that those who offered their bids in the auctions, with full knowledge of the terms and conditions, cannot be allowed to wriggle out of their contractual obligations arising out of the acceptance of their bids. In paragraph-16 of its decision, the Supreme Court held that "those who contract with open eyes must accept the burdens of the contract along with its benefits". 34. In New Bihar Biri Leaves Co. vs. State of Bihar { 1981 (1) SCC 537 }, the Supreme Court applied the maxim "qui approbat non reprobat" {one who approbates cannot reprobate} and held that if a person, of his own accord, accepts a contract on certain terms and works out the contract, he cannot be allowed to adhere to and abide by some of the terms of the contract which proved advantageous to him and repudiate the other terms of the contract which might be disadvantageous to him. 35. In Tata Cellular vs. Union of India { 1994 (6) SCC 651 }, the Supreme Court held in paragraph-94(4) that "the terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract". Again in Air India Ltd vs. Cochin International Airport Ltd { 2000 (2) SCC 617 }, the Supreme Court pointed out as follows:- "The award of a contract whether it is by a private party or by a public body or the State, is essentially a commercial transaction. In arriving at a commercial decision, considerations which are paramount are commercial considerations." 36. In Puravankara Projects Ltd vs. Hotel Venus International and Others {2010 SCC 33}, the Supreme Court, while noting that there is a vital distinction between the administrative and contractual law decisions, cited the above cases with approval and held in paragraph-33 as follows:- "33. In arriving at a commercial decision, considerations which are paramount are commercial considerations." 36. In Puravankara Projects Ltd vs. Hotel Venus International and Others {2010 SCC 33}, the Supreme Court, while noting that there is a vital distinction between the administrative and contractual law decisions, cited the above cases with approval and held in paragraph-33 as follows:- "33. Just as the principles of natural justice ensure fair decision where function is quasi-judicial, the doctrine of fairness is evolved to ensure fair action when the function is administrative. But the said principle cannot be invoked to amend, alter or vary the expressed terms of the contract between the parties." 37. Therefore, while it may be open to the petitioner, in view of the judgment of the Division Bench in Srinivasan.A.s case, to assail the duration of the lease, on the strength of the statutory Rule 8(8), if on facts it is a virgin quarry, it may not certainly be open to the petitioner to challenge the categorical statement contained in the tender notification that the quarry in question was an "old quarry". To permit him to do so would amount to allowing him to rewrite the tender condition. Unfortunately for the petitioner, it is not permissible in law. 38. Therefore in brief, the petitioner is not entitled to the relief prayed for, on account of the fact (i) that a writ petition raises a seriously disputed question of fact (ii) that the petitioner cannot be permitted to rewrite the tender condition which described the quarry in question as an old quarry and (iii) that the petitioner is estopped from challenging the very tender condition, in respect of which he became a beneficiary and enjoyed the fruits of the contract for five full years. Hence the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly, it is dismissed. Consequently, M.P.Nos.1 and 2 of 2009 for stay and injunction are also dismissed. No costs. 39. The petition for impleading, M.P.No.3 of 2009 is by an elected member of the Panchayat. Though I permitted the learned counsel for the impleading petitioner to make submissions, I am of the considered view that he is not a necessary party to the writ petition, in view of the fact that the respondent had chosen to defend himself on facts and on law. Therefore M.P.No.3 of 2009 is dismissed. W.P.No.29185 of 2008: 40. Though I permitted the learned counsel for the impleading petitioner to make submissions, I am of the considered view that he is not a necessary party to the writ petition, in view of the fact that the respondent had chosen to defend himself on facts and on law. Therefore M.P.No.3 of 2009 is dismissed. W.P.No.29185 of 2008: 40. The prayer in this writ petition, as observed in the first part of this order, is to direct the respondent to consider the application of the petitioner for the grant of lease to quarry. Now that the writ petition filed by the former Lessee W.P.No.551 of 2009 is dismissed, the respondent is duty bound to issue a Gazette notification inviting applications for tender-cum-auction. At that stage, the petitioner in this writ petition can always participate, if he is qualified and if he fulfils the eligibility criteria for participating in the tender. 41. Therefore W.P.No.29185 of 2008 is merely disposed of, with a direction to the District Collector, Kancheepuram (2nd respondent) to go ahead with the process of notifying the quarry in question for the purpose of grant of lease and act in accordance with law. Consequently connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.