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2009 DIGILAW 154 (SC)

MOHINDER SINGH v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE PORT OF BOMBAY.

2009-01-27

H.L.DATTU, TARUN CHATTERJEE

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ORDER Leave granted. This appeal is directed against the final order dated 20.12.2007 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Appeal No. 1215 of 1998, which arose out of Arbitration Petition No. 30 of 1995, by which the Division Bench had refused to grant interest to the appellant on a sum of Rs. 30,00,000 (Rupees Thirty lakhs only) awarded by the learned arbitrator from the date of decree, i.e. 10.06.1998 till payment or realisation. The impugned order of the Division Bench of the High Court runs as under : "No order on application." It is the aforesaid order, which is under challenge before us. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and after going through the impugned order, we are of the view that the order of the High Court is liable to be set aside on the ground that it was not a speaking or a reasoned order and the impugned order was passed without applying its mind. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, however, draws our attention to the merits of the prayer of the appellant and then contended that the appellant was not entitled to raise the said prayer as the award that was passed by the arbitrator was not challenged by the appellant. We are not inclined to go into this question as the said question can be gone into by the High Court while deciding the prayer for grant of interest from the date of the decree till payment or realisation. Accordingly, only on the ground that the order was not a speaking and a reasoned order and the same was passed without applying its mind, the impugned order is set aside. The High Court is requested to decide the prayer made by the appellant in accordance with law after giving hearing to the parties and dispose of the same after passing a speaking and reasoned order. Such exercise shall be made by the High Court within four months from the date of supply of a copy of this order to it. The appeal is thus allowed to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs.