Barin Ghosh, CJ. 1. In a writ petition, petitioner-respondent challenged the Summary Court-martial verdict sentencing him to undergo 6 months rigorous imprisonment in civil prison and also terminating his service on this count. Petitioner-respondent also prayed for quashing of the order by which the appeal filed by him was rejected. By the judgment and order under appeal, the order terminating the service of petitioner-respondent was not interfered with, but a direction was given that petitioner-respondent shall appear before the Commanding Officer of the Unit when he shall be at liberty to prove his defence, with a further direction upon the Commanding Officer to conduct an enquiry after affording a prospective hearing. The Writ Court directed that the relief to which petitioner-respondent is entitled, would depend upon the outcome of the enquiry. The Writ Court further fixed a date for appearing of petitioner-respondent before the concerned officer and directed completion of the enquiry within three months from the date thereof. This was done proceeding on the basis that petitioner-respondent was not given a reasonable opportunity of hearing since the proceedings were concluded in one day. Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeal has been filed by the appellants herein. 2. The principal contention of the appellants in the appeal is that they have acted strictly in accordance with rules governing the field and there was, and is, no scope for directing a further enquiry in respect of matters which have been enquired into in accordance with rules and concluded strictly in accordance therewith. 3. The undisputed facts of this case are that, on October 5, 1982, petitioner-respondent joined the Army. In the month of December, 1991, he was a Gunner in the Army, attached to 18/12 Field Regiment. He was then, thus, not an officer in the Army. Petitioner-respondent approached for leave for the purpose of attending his sisters marriage to be performed on December 11, 1991. Accordingly, casual leave with effect from December 9, 1991 was accorded to him. By telegram sent by petitioner-respondent and received by the appropriate authority on December 10, 1991, petitioner-respondent held out that the marriage has been shifted to December 15, 1991 with a request to extend the leave. Accordingly, his leave was extended till December 26, 1991. Accordingly, casual leave with effect from December 9, 1991 was accorded to him. By telegram sent by petitioner-respondent and received by the appropriate authority on December 10, 1991, petitioner-respondent held out that the marriage has been shifted to December 15, 1991 with a request to extend the leave. Accordingly, his leave was extended till December 26, 1991. By another telegram received by the appropriate authority on December 18, 1991, petitioner-respondent purported to hold out that his wife was serious and, accordingly, sought extension of leave by 20 days. By a telegram, the date of which is not on record of this case, petitioner-respondent was purportedly informed that he has not been sanctioned leave as was requested for. Petitioner-respondent on January 6, 1992 rejoined duty. In the meantime, since petitioner-respondent did not join on December 27, 1991, apprehension warrant was issued on December 28, 1991 which was cancelled on January 9, 1992. 4. As it appears from the records produced by the appellants, on January 21, 1992, proceedings under Army Rule 22 were initiated by the Commanding Officer, Col. Arun. On that date, two witnesses were allegedly examined in the presence of petitioner-respondent who, allegedly, declined to cross-examine them. Allegedly, in course of such proceedings, petitioner-respondent made no statement but pleaded guilty. He also did not produce any witness. 5. The proceedings under Army Rule 22 pertained to the following charge: "He is charged for without sufficient cause overstaying leave granted to him, in that he having been granted leave from 09 Dec. 91 to 26 Dec. 91 to proceed to his home, failed without sufficient cause to report on duty on expiry of the said leave till rejoined voluntarily on 06 Jan 92 at 20.30h. (Total period of absence 11 days) [(Army Act 39(b)]". 6. Petitioner-respondent signed annexure II of the proceedings conducted under Army Rule 22. The contents of annexure II is as follows: "A brief of the statement made by the accused No.14480997P Rank Gunner (General Duties) Name Ayodhya Nath of 12 Field Regiment:- `I am guilty of the above charge as mentioned in Annexure I." The entire body of annexure II is type-written, except the signature appended thereto by petitioner-respondent. 7. The contents of annexure II is as follows: "A brief of the statement made by the accused No.14480997P Rank Gunner (General Duties) Name Ayodhya Nath of 12 Field Regiment:- `I am guilty of the above charge as mentioned in Annexure I." The entire body of annexure II is type-written, except the signature appended thereto by petitioner-respondent. 7. On conclusion of the hearing, in course of the proceedings before the Commanding Officer under Army Rule 22, an order was passed on January 21, 1992 to the effect as follows: "Evidence to be reduced to writing" 8. Thereupon, on January 22, 1992 evidence of Major Ranbir Singh; Subedar Govind Singh and Havildar Vijay Kumar was recorded before Capt. Jaya Kumar in the presence of Naib Subedar Brij Gopal Singh, when it was recorded that petitioner-respondent declined to cross-examine the witnesses and that the summary evidence was recorded in the presence of the accused and independent witness. 9. There is one more document produced by the appellants, dated February 10, 1992, which appears to be a certificate to the effect as follows: "Before recording plea of guilty offered by the accused No.14480997P Gunner (General Duties) Ayodhya Nath, the Court explained to the accused the hearing of charge to which he has pleaded guilty and ascertained that the accused understand the nature of the charge to which he has pleaded guilty. The Court also informed the accused the general effect of the plea of guilty and the difference in procedure which will be followed consequent to the same plea. The court having satisfied itself that the accused understand the charge and the effect of his plea of guilty, accepts and records the same. The provision of Army Rule 115(2) are complied with." 10. This certificate records that the accused refused to sign the certificate. It then records that friend of accused, Capt. Shivesh Tandon, has signed the certificate. 11. The documents produced by the appellants suggest that in course of Summary Court-martial conducted by the Commandant, Col. Arun, Commanding Officer, 12 Field Regiment, the accused pleaded guilty to the charge as mentioned above. It further appears that on February 10, 1992, sentence of the Court presided over by the Commanding Officer was pronounced whereby petitioner-respondent was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment in civil prison and was directed to be dismissed from service. Arun, Commanding Officer, 12 Field Regiment, the accused pleaded guilty to the charge as mentioned above. It further appears that on February 10, 1992, sentence of the Court presided over by the Commanding Officer was pronounced whereby petitioner-respondent was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment in civil prison and was directed to be dismissed from service. It appears that the said sentence was counter-signed by Brigadier L. K. Arora, Commandant, 24 Artillery Brigade, on March 4, 1992. 12. It appears that on August 19, 1992 discharge certificate was handed over to petitioner-respondent. The question is: In the facts and circumstances of the case, can it be said that the proceedings complained of in the writ petition are contrary to rules or procedure established by rules requiring interference by the Writ Court? 13. Clause (b) of Section 39 of the Army Act, 1950 provides that any person subject to the said Act, who, without sufficient cause, overstays leave granted to him shall, on conviction by Court-martial, be liable to suffer imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or such less punishment as is mentioned in the Act. There is no dispute that petitioner-respondent was subject to the said Act and he overstayed leave granted to him. The question as to whether or not such overstay was without sufficient cause, by the nature of the provisions contained in clause (b) of Section 39 of the Act, was required to be ascertained by the Court-martial, for, without ascertainment of the same, no conviction could be awarded. 14. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act provides that an officer having power not less than a Brigadier or equivalent Commander or any prescribed officer may dismiss or remove from the service any person serving under his command other than an officer or a junior commissioned officer. Rule 17 of the Army Rules, 1954 authorises dismissal or removal from service on the ground of conduct which has led to conviction of the person concerned by a Court-martial. Therefore, dismissal can be effected when the conduct of the person has led to his conviction by a Court-martial by an officer having power not less than a Brigadier. In the instant case, the sentence as well as the order of dismissal had been countersigned by the Brigadier, Shri L. K. Arora. 15. Therefore, dismissal can be effected when the conduct of the person has led to his conviction by a Court-martial by an officer having power not less than a Brigadier. In the instant case, the sentence as well as the order of dismissal had been countersigned by the Brigadier, Shri L. K. Arora. 15. Clause (d) of Section 108 of the Army Act recognizes Summary Court-martial; whereas section 116 of the Act provides that a Summary Court-martial may be held by the Commanding Officer of any corps, department or detachment of the regular army and he shall alone constitute the Court. It further provides that the proceedings shall be attended throughout by two other persons who shall be officers or junior commissioned officers or one of either, and who shall not as such be sworn or affirmed. There is no dispute that Lt. Col Arun was the Commanding Officer of the corps or the department or detachment of the regular army to which petitioner-respondent was attached. 16. Section 120 of the Act provides that a Summary Court-martial may try any offence punishable under the Act, subject to certain exceptions with which we are not concerned. It further provides that the Summary Court-martial may try any person subject to the Act and under the command of the officer holding the Court, except an officer, junior commissioned officer or warrant officer. Therefore, Lt. Col Arun was duly authorized to hold Summary Court-martial to try petitioner-respondent for the offence for which he was tried. There is no dispute that the sentence which the Summary Court-martial could award has been awarded in the instant case. 17. Section 191 of the Act has authorized the Central Government to make rules, including those pertaining to assembly and procedure of the Courts of Inquiry, recording of summaries of evidence, administration of oaths or affirmations by such Courts, convening and constituting Courts-martial and appointment of prosecutors at trials by Courts-martial. In terms of the power so conferred, the Central Government has made the said Rules. Chapter V thereof deals with investigation of charges and trial by Court-martial. In terms of the power so conferred, the Central Government has made the said Rules. Chapter V thereof deals with investigation of charges and trial by Court-martial. Rule 22(1) contained in the said Chapter says that every charge against a person subject to the Act shall be heard by the Commanding Officer in presence of the accused and that the accused shall have enough opportunity to cross-examine any witness against him and to call such witness and make such statement as may be necessary for his defence. In the instant case, as it appears from the records referred to above, the charge against petitioner-respondent was heard by the Commanding Officer when he heard witnesses against petitioner-respondent, but the petitioner declined to cross-examine such witnesses and instead admitted his guilt. Rule 22(3)(c) provides that after hearing the charge, if the Commanding Officer is of the opinion that the charge ought to be proceeded with, he shall adjourn the case for the purpose of having the evidence reduced to writing. In the instant case, inasmuch as petitioner-respondent pleaded guilty, as it appears from the records referred to above, the Commanding Officer adjourned the case for the purpose of having the evidence reduced to writing. 18. Rule 23(1) of the Rules provides that where the case is adjourned for having the evidence reduced to writing, at the adjourned hearing evidence of witnesses, who were present and gave evidence before the Commanding Officer, whether against or for the accused, and of any other person, whose evidence appears to be relevant, shall be taken down in writing in the presence and hearing of the accused before the Commanding Officer or such officer as he directs. In the instant case, evidence was not recorded before the Commanding Officer, but before Capt. Jaya Kumar and there is nothing on record to suggest that Capt. Jaya Kumar was not directed by the Commanding Officer to record such evidence. No such plea has also been taken. 19. In the instant case, evidence was not recorded before the Commanding Officer, but before Capt. Jaya Kumar and there is nothing on record to suggest that Capt. Jaya Kumar was not directed by the Commanding Officer to record such evidence. No such plea has also been taken. 19. Rule 23(3) of the Rules provides that the evidence of each witness, after it has been recorded, as provided in the rule, when taken down, shall be read over to him and shall be signed by him or, if he cannot write his name, shall be attested by his mark and witnessed as a token of the correctness of the evidence recorded, which means that the evidence recorded should be acknowledged by the witness whose evidence is recorded and such acknowledgement should be made by signing or by putting the mark of the witness. It further provides that after the evidence against the accused has been recorded, the accused will be asked, "Do you wish to make any statement? You are not obliged to say anything unless you wish to do so, but whatever you say will be taken down in writing and may be given in evidence". It further provides that any statement thereupon made by the accused shall be taken down and read over to him, but he will not be cross-examined upon it and that the accused may then call his witnesses, including, if he so desires, any witness as to character. In the instant case, the evidence of witnesses, as recorded, has been acknowledged by the witnesses as evidence given by them. 20. It is the contention of petitioner-respondent that recording of such evidence is required to be countersigned by the person charged. But Rule 23(3) does not say so. In the instant case, the evidence of witnesses, as recorded, has been acknowledged by the witnesses as evidence given by them. 20. It is the contention of petitioner-respondent that recording of such evidence is required to be countersigned by the person charged. But Rule 23(3) does not say so. Reliance of petitioner-respondent on the case of Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 2386, for the preposition that procedure prescribed must be scrupulously observed and non-compliance thereof is such an infirmity which goes to the root of the jurisdiction and vitiates the proceedings, particularly in view of the nature of the provisions of the Act and the Rules which curtail, to a large extent, the protections contained in Article 21 of the Constitution on the strength of Article 33 of the Constitution of India, appears to be not applicable to the instant case, for, rule 23(3) does not suggest that the evidence of witnesses recorded must be countersigned or signed by the person charged. 21. Rule 115(2) of the rules provides that if an accused person pleads guilty, that plea shall be recorded as a finding of the Court but, before recording the same, the Presiding Officer is required to do certain things. The contention of petitioner-respondent that the plea of guilty has not been signed by him on the certificate given to that effect, which was done to comply with rule 115(2) and, instead, was signed by his alleged friend, is of no consequence, for, the plea of guilty in terms of the requirements of rule 115(2) of the rules is required to be recorded as the finding of the Court and the finding of the Court need not be countersigned or accepted by the person charged. As held in Union of India v Ex. Havildar Clerk Prithpal Singh, KLJ 1991 513 (DB), signature of the accused is not required after recording of the plea of guilt, but as a matter of caution the same should be taken. In the instant case, the same was taken in course of the proceedings under Rule 22. Since at that stage summary of evidence was not recorded, the same was directed to be recorded and later the certificate was issued signifying compliance of the mandate contained in Rule 115(2) to conclude the Summary Court-martial. 22. In the instant case, the same was taken in course of the proceedings under Rule 22. Since at that stage summary of evidence was not recorded, the same was directed to be recorded and later the certificate was issued signifying compliance of the mandate contained in Rule 115(2) to conclude the Summary Court-martial. 22. It is true that the alleged friend of petitioner-respondent could not sign on his behalf the subject certificate and his signing of the same is of no effect inasmuch as in terms of Rule 95(4) of the Rules the friend of the person charged is not even entitled to examine or cross-examine witnesses or to address the Court, but the same will not vitiate the finding of the Court that petitioner-respondent pleaded guilty. When the plea of guilty had been taken of the sole charge, in terms of Rule 54, the Court, upon receiving any statement made by the person charged, was required to take further steps as were taken in the instant case and, accordingly, the sentence was awarded in terms of rule 65 and the same was accepted by the Brigadier by his counter-signature and, therefore, it does not appear that the applicable rules were not followed by the Summary Court-martial. Consequentially, overstaying leave without sufficient cause, a punishable offence under section 39 of the Act, was determined not only on the plea of guilt pleaded, but also on evidence which appears to be the mandate of the law. Such determination entailed conviction, on which it cannot be said that petitioner-respondent could not be removed from service. 23. That being the situation, there was no scope of interference in the instant case. The other aspect of the matter is that the proceedings in question, resulting in conviction and dismissal took place outside the jurisdiction of this Court. The Appellate Authority decided the appeal outside the jurisdiction of this Court. Mere communication of a copy of the order within the jurisdiction of this Court is no part of the cause of action which could give jurisdiction to this Court to entertain the present writ petition. The Appellate Authority decided the appeal outside the jurisdiction of this Court. Mere communication of a copy of the order within the jurisdiction of this Court is no part of the cause of action which could give jurisdiction to this Court to entertain the present writ petition. The judgment rendered in Union of India v. Narinder Singh Mehta, 1996 SLJ 276, is distinguishable inasmuch as in that case pre-confirmation petition against conviction and sentence was dismissed on February 19, 1994 and the sentence was promulgated on October 3, 1994 and on October 10, 1994 the post-confirmation appeal was filed when the petitioner was serving on transfer within the jurisdiction of this Court. An appeal is a continuation of the original proceeding and, accordingly, it must be held that the original proceeding at the appellate stage continued against the employee residing within the jurisdiction of this Court as a condition of his service, and termination of the proceedings by appeal, resulting in his dismissal, took effect within the jurisdiction of this Court. 24. The appeal, accordingly, stands allowed and the judgment and order under appeal is set-aside.