Green Bala Guria v. State of Jharkhand through the Secretary, Dept. of H. R. D. , Ranchi
2009-12-08
D.G.R.PATNAIK
body2009
DigiLaw.ai
Order Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The petitioner in this writ application has prayed for a direction upon the respondents to pay her salary for the period she was placed under suspension. 3. The petitioner was employed as a teacher in the Indian Gandhi Residential School, Hazaribagh. 4. An incident had occurred in the girls hostel on 22.1.1992 in which one of the girls in the mess of the hostel had died. An inquiry was conducted against the then Matron of the school. Later, a charge memo against the petitioner was also served upon her on 9.8.99 on the ground of negligence. In contemplation of the departmental proceeding, the petitioner was placed under suspension. Though the respondents had informed that the departmental proceeding had been contemplated, but no proceeding was initiated at all and the petitioner continued to remain under suspension only on the amount of subsistence allowance given to her. 5. The petitioner thereafter, filed a writ application before this Court, vide C.W.J.C. No. 2821 of 2000(R). The case was disposed of by this Court with a direction to the respondents to conclude the departmental proceeding drawn up, if any, within a period of four months from the date of the order. When the order was not complied with within the period stipulated, the petitioner had to file a contempt application and it was only then that the respondents, by order dated 31.7.2001 (Annexure-12), had declared that the petitioner has been exonerated of the charge, but with a warning. The order also declared that as far as the payment of the balance of salary to the petitioner is concerned, the same would be paid in accordance with law. 6. The grievance of the petitioner is that though, on the one hand, the order (Annexure-12) had given the petitioner to understand that the payment of the balance of salary for the suspension period would be made to her in accordance with law, but to her surprise, by the impugned order dated 29.8.2003 (Annexure-16), it has been declared now that the petitioner would not be entitled to her salary for the suspension period, except the amount of subsistence allowance which she has already received. The petitioner is, therefore, aggrieved by the order denying her salary for the suspension period. 7.
The petitioner is, therefore, aggrieved by the order denying her salary for the suspension period. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner, while assailing the impugned order, submits that as per Rule 97 of the Jharkhand Service Code, it is incumbent upon the disciplinary authority of the petitioner to pass a specific order as to how the period of suspension of the Government servant shall be treated and also regarding payment of salary for the suspension period. Such discretion is vested in the disciplinary authority where a major punishment is imposed against the delinquent employee. 8. Referring to Annexure-12, learned counsel would explain that while taking decision to exonerate the petitioner of the charge by giving her warning, the disciplinary authority, namely, the Secretary of the Human Resource Development, had declared that the balance of salary for the suspension period would be given in accordance with law. Such a declaration amply indicates that a decision was taken to pay the salary for the suspension period to the petitioner. This decision, could not have been revoked or modified by any officer junior in authority to the Secretary. As a matter of fact, the impugned decision has been taken by the Joint Secretary, vide the impugned order (Annexure-16). Learned counsel adds further that salary for consecutively two years has been withheld and denied to the petitioner in a most illegal and arbitrary manner. 9. In the counter affidavit, the stand taken by the respondents is that the decision under Rule 97 of the Jharkhand Service Code, was taken by the respondents authority, vide Annexure-12. However, since the order was not clear, a clarification was subsequently sought for, from the Finance Department (Annexure-15) and the clarification was subsequently given by the impugned order (Annexure-16), whereby it has been clarified that except the subsistence allowance, the petitioner shall not get any other salary. Learned counsel for the respondents argues that the petitioner, therefore, cannot claim that the impugned order (Annexure-16), is revised order and that too, contrary to the order, vide Annexure-12. 10. Upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after going through the records, I find that by the order dated 31.7.2001 (Annexure-12), the disciplinary authority of the petitioner had recorded his decision that the petitioner has been exonerated of the charge framed against her and that the payment of salary for the 'suspension period shall be made in accordance with Rules.
On a plain reading of the order, it does appear that there was no ambiguity in the order as to how the period of suspension would be treated and as such, there could be no occasion to seek any further clarification of the order. Even, if such clarification was required, it should have been obtained from the same authority, who had passed the earlier order. The impugned order (Annexure-16), which is purported to be the clarification of the previous order, virtually denies the petitioner her claim for salary, although on the date of conclusion of the proceeding when the final order was passed, there was no indication to deny the salary for the period of suspension. 11. In the light of the above facts and circumstances, I am convinced that the impugned order by which the petitioner's salary for the suspension period has been refused, is illegal and contrary to the Rules as laid down in the Jharkhand Service Code and, therefore, not sustainable. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 29.8.2003 (Annexure-16), is hereby, quashed. 12. The respondents authorities are directed to assess the total amount of the arrears of salary for the suspension period, and pay the same to the petitioner within two months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. With these observations, this writ application is disposed of. Let a copy of this order be given to the counsel for the respondents.