JUDGMENT By the Court.—This petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 13th March, 2009 by which the Commissioner, Kanpur Division, Kanpur accorded approval to the highest bid of Rs. 65 lacs offered by respondent No. 5, M/s. Habib Cold Storage Private Limited, in the auction held on 9th March, 2009 for realisation of toll tax over the bridge Mehndighat situated on the river Ganga in District Kannauj. 2. Notice dated 27th January, 2009 was published in the newspaper by the Chief Engineer, Public Works Department, Kanpur for auction of the right to realise toll tax on the aforesaid bridge by public auction on 9th March, 2009. The notice mentioned that the auction will be held under the supervision of a Committee consisting of the Divisional Commissioner, Kanpur as the Chairman and Chief Engineer Public Works Department, Kanpur, District Magistrate, Kanpur and the Additional Director, Finance as members of the Committee. It was also mentioned that the relevant documents should be submitted in the Office of the Commissioner, Kanpur Division, Kanpur by 28th February, 2009 whereafter the list of eligible applicants would be declared on 7th March, 2009. The notice further provided that the persons/firms participating in the auction will have to comply with the terms and conditions of auction and the bid will be accepted by the Commissioner of the Division. 3. On 7th March, 2009, the list of eligible and ineligible persons/firms was put up on the notice board. Six persons/firms were shown in the list of eligible persons/firms while the name of respondent No. 5 was mentioned in the list of ineligible applicants. The reason assigned for inclusion of the name of respondent No. 5 in the said list was non-compliance of Clauses 7(11)Kha, 10(25)(1), 11(26), 12(27)(I) and 12(27)(II) of the terms and conditions of auction. 4. Respondent No. 5 filed objections in writing on 9th March, 2009 against the inclusion of its name in the list of ineligible persons/firms and insisted that it should be declared eligible as all the aforesaid terms and conditions had infact been complied by it. The Chief Engineer examined the matter and after considering the objections and after having consultations with the Additional Commissioner (Administration), took a decision that the name of respondent No. 5 should be included in the list of eligible persons/firms. The Chief Engineer examined the matter and after considering the objections and after having consultations with the Additional Commissioner (Administration), took a decision that the name of respondent No. 5 should be included in the list of eligible persons/firms. An additional factor which weighed in his mind for arriving at this decision was that participation in the auction by an additional bidder may benefit competitive bidding. 5. The auction was held on 9th March, 2009 but out of the 7 applicants only 6 turned up to participate in the auction. Vinod Kumar Pandey, ’U’ Toll Corporation Ltd. and M/s. Habib Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd. offered bids but Rajiv Kumar Singh (brother of the petitioner), Vinay Kumar Singh (petitioner) and Pratyush Kumar Shukla did not offer any bid. The bid of Rs. 65 lacs offered by respondent No. 5 was the highest bid. The Committee thereafter sent the entire papers to the Commissioner of the Division who on the basis of the recommendation of the Committee accorded his approval to the bid offered by respondent No. 5. This decision that was conveyed to the Executive Engineer, Public Works Department by the communication dated 13th March, 2009 has been impugned in the present petition. 6. On 27th March, 2009, the Court granted time to the learned Standing Counsel to seek instructions and the petitioner was also required to serve respondent No. 5 personally within 24 hours. The matter was directed to be placed before the Court on 30th March, 2009. 7. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 to 4 but no one has put in appearance on behalf of respondent No. 5, even though the affidavit of service filed by the petitioner indicates that the said respondent No. 5 was personally served on 28th March, 2009. 8. The counter affidavit gives details of the previous contracts to highlight that the amount offered by respondent No. 5 was much higher than the bids made in previous years. It mentions that for the year 2004-05 the contract was given for Rs. 39 lacks while in the subsequent years 2006-07 and 2007-08 it was given for Rs. 46 lacs and Rs. 31 lacs respectively. It has also been stated that in the previous year, i.e., 2008-09, the contract was given to Sri Rajiv Kumar Singh who is the real brother of the petitioner for an amount of Rs. 39 lacks while in the subsequent years 2006-07 and 2007-08 it was given for Rs. 46 lacs and Rs. 31 lacs respectively. It has also been stated that in the previous year, i.e., 2008-09, the contract was given to Sri Rajiv Kumar Singh who is the real brother of the petitioner for an amount of Rs. 31 lacs and though Sri Rajiv Kumar Singh had also turned up to participate in the auction held on 9th March, 2009, he did not offer any bid but subsequently submitted a letter dated 27th March, 2009 that the contract may be given to him after increasing the amount of the previous year bid by 5%. The bid sheet which has also been enclosed with the counter affidavit shows that the bids started from 32 lacs and ‘U’ Toll Tax Corporation Ltd. offered bids upto Rs. 50 lacs but thereafter the bids were offered by respondent No. 5 and Vinod Kumar Pandey only. The last bid offered by Sri Vinod Kumar Pandey was for Rs. 63.10 lacs whereafter respondent No. 5 offered the bid of Rs. 65 lacs which was eventually accepted. 9. We have heard Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner assisted by Sri Udayan Nandan and the learned Standing Counsel for respondent Nos. 1 to 4. 10. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 5 could not have been permitted to participate in the auction held on 9th March, 2009 as it did not comply with the terms and conditions of auction and because of its participation the entire auction proceedings stood vitiated. He further submitted that the petitioner and other persons had raised an objection that respondent No. 5 cannot participate in the auction but their objection was ignored by the Authorities and it is for this reason that the petitioner did not offer any bid in the auction. He further submitted that not only had respondent No. 5 not complied with the conditions mentioned in the list declared on 7th March, 2009, but the solvency certificate submitted by him for an amount of Rs. 1,89,87,889/- could also not be treated as valid as the property shown therein was under mortgage with the Central Bank of India and was not free from all encumbrances. 11. 1,89,87,889/- could also not be treated as valid as the property shown therein was under mortgage with the Central Bank of India and was not free from all encumbrances. 11. Learned Standing Counsel, on the other hand, submitted that the Office Order dated 9th March, 2009 (Annexure CA-2 to the counter affidavit) gives good and valid reasons for permitting respondent No. 5 to participate in the auction since on examination of the objections filed by respondent No. 5, it was found by the Chief Engineer that the said respondent satisfied the terms and conditions of auction. He further submitted that in any case the petitioner does not have a locus-standi to challenge the impugned order as he is not a “person aggrieved” since he did not offer any bid in the auction. It is also his submission that the petitioner or any other persons/firms present on 9th March, 2009 did not raise any objection at the time of auction that respondent No. 5 could not participate in the auction. 12. We have carefully considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties. 13. We may, before we proceed to examine the preliminary objection raised by learned Standing Counsel that the writ petition cannot be entertained at the behest of the petitioner since he is not a person aggrieved, first briefly refer to the five clauses of the terms and conditions of auction mentioned in the list dated 7th March, 2009 for including the name of respondent No. 5 in the list of ineligible applicants. 14. The first non-compliance is about non-submission of the affidavit regarding partnership with any person/firm. The second and third are that the signatures and photographs had not been attested by a Gazetted Officer. The fourth is with regard to non-submission of ‘No Dues Certificate’ by the Income Tax Department. The fifth is with regard to non-submission of the ‘Clearance Certificate’ from the Trade Tax Department. 15. The Chief Engineer, Public Works Department, Kanpur in his order dated 9th March, 2009 has dealt with all the aforesaid clauses of the terms and conditions of auction. In respect of the first reason, he has stated that an affidavit dated 27th February, 2009 had been submitted by respondent No. 5 mentioning therein that he did not have partnership with any person/firm. In respect of the first reason, he has stated that an affidavit dated 27th February, 2009 had been submitted by respondent No. 5 mentioning therein that he did not have partnership with any person/firm. Regarding the second and third reason he mentions that the photographs and the signatures had been attested by the Public Notary. In respect of the fourth reason he has stated that respondent No. 5 had clarified that as per instruction of the Income Tax Department, the Income Tax Clearance Certificate’ was not required for bidding or submitting tenders for the contracts and that respondent No. 5 had disclosed his Income Tax PAN. Regarding the fifth reason he has stated that respondent No. 5 had submitted an affidavit alongwith the documents stating therein that the firm had not indulged in any trade and, therefore, Clearance Certificate was not required from the Trade Tax Department. 16. In our view the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of the aforesaid terms and conditions of auction will assume significance only when we hold that the petitioner is a “person aggrieved” and has a locus-standi to challenge the impugned order. 17. The submission of learned Standing Counsel is that the petitioner is not an ‘aggrieved person’ as he did not offer any bid at the time of auction even though he was present at the time of auction and had also signed the bid sheet. 18. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, however, submitted that the petitioner had raised an objection that respondent No. 5 could not participate in the auction but as the objection was overlooked, the petitioner did not offer any bid as participation by respondent No. 5 would be rendering the auction illegal. He, therefore, submitted that the petitioner has a locus-standi to challenge the order. 19. What we find from the records is that the petitioner had not raised any objection in writing at the time of auction before the Committee or any other Authority about the participation of respondent No. 5. A perusal of the bid sheet which has been annexed as Annexure CA-1 to the counter affidavit also shows that the petitioner, Rajiv Kumar Singh and Pratyush Kumar Shukla who had signed the bid sheet did not raise any such protest. 20. A perusal of the bid sheet which has been annexed as Annexure CA-1 to the counter affidavit also shows that the petitioner, Rajiv Kumar Singh and Pratyush Kumar Shukla who had signed the bid sheet did not raise any such protest. 20. It is the case of the petitioner that he had raised such an objection orally at the time of auction but this fact has been denied by the respondents in paragraphs 4 and 16 of the counter affidavit. 21. We have, therefore, to determine whether the petitioner had actually raised any oral objection about the participation of respondent No. 5 at the time of auction on 9th March, 2009. 22. The petitioner claims to have made an oral objection about the participation of respondent No. 5 in the auction. If the petitioner had actually intended to raise such an objection he would have certainly made a remark to this effect in the bid sheet when he signed it and would have also made objection in writing before the Committee that was constituted for holding the auction but that was not done. Though in paragraph 9 of the writ petition the petitioner has stated that the petitioner and other persons had objected to the participation of respondent No. 5 in the auction but there is no material to substantiate this plea. The reply to the said paragraph in the counter affidavit is very categorical that the petitioner had not raised any objection. 23. We find it extremely difficult to accept the story built up by the petitioner that he had raised objection about the participation of respondent No. 5 in the auction. If he had such strong reservations about the participation of respondent No. 5 in the auction, the least that was expected of him was a protest in writing particularly when he was intending to withdraw from the auction since he thought that the participation of respondent No. 5 would render the auction illegal. What is also of some significance is that even though it was mentioned in the auction notice that the bid was required to be approved by the Divisional Commissioner, the petitioner did not make any objection in writing before him till 21st March, 2009 when the bid had been approved earlier on 13th March, 2009. What is also of some significance is that even though it was mentioned in the auction notice that the bid was required to be approved by the Divisional Commissioner, the petitioner did not make any objection in writing before him till 21st March, 2009 when the bid had been approved earlier on 13th March, 2009. The reason given by the petitioner for not offering any bid because of the presence of respondent No. 5, therefore, does not commend us. 24. The Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Yoginder Sharma Onkar Rai & Co. and others, (1996) 6 SCC 173 had an occasion to consider this aspect about oral plea raised at the time of auction. In this case, M/s. Yoginder Sharma Onkar Rai & Company (first respondent) had raised an oral plea that in the auction held on 11th March, 1996 it had actually offered bid of Rs. 4.21 crores for Group No. 108 as against the successful bid of Rs. 3.71 crores and it had also offered bid of Rs. 3.50 crores for Group No. 111 as against the successful bid of Rs. 3.05 crores but the bids were not recorded. The Financial Commissioner rejected the oral plea about bidding observing that mere possession of a receipt for entry in the auction pandal did not mean that the first respondent had actually made the bids unless it was so recorded in the bid sheet and merely being a sitting licensee for the last 4 or 5 years did not give it any right unless it offered bid in the open auction. It was the submission of the first respondent before the High Court that it had raised an objection that its bids were not recorded but no action was taken. The High Court accepted this submission of the first respondent in view of the fact that the first respondent was in possession of bank drafts worth Rs. 1.90 crores on the date of auction for the purpose of bidding in the auction. The High Court, accordingly, held that the auction was not fair or proper since the first respondent had wrongly been deprived from participation in the auction and the State exchequer was subjected to a huge loss of Rs. 95 lacs. 1.90 crores on the date of auction for the purpose of bidding in the auction. The High Court, accordingly, held that the auction was not fair or proper since the first respondent had wrongly been deprived from participation in the auction and the State exchequer was subjected to a huge loss of Rs. 95 lacs. The Supreme Court, however, noticed that the question that went to the root of the matter was whether the first respondent had actually made the bids for Rs. 50 lacs and Rs. 45 lacs respectively over the successful bids for Group Nos. 108 and 111 and observed that if it had actually made the bids it would have certainly made a long and loud protest but it claims to have made only an oral complaint to the Excise and Taxation Commissioner. In the words of the Supreme Court “in the ordinary course of events, one would have expected a bidder making such large bids which are ignored to shoot off notices in all directions”. The Supreme Court, accordingly, refused to accept the story built by the first respondent regarding oral plea and set aside the order of the High Court holding that finality of auction must also be recognized to be in the interest of the exchequer and if auctions are set aside and re-auctions are ordered on less than satisfactory material, the loss of the exchequer would be far greater. 25. We, therefore, have no hesitation in rejecting the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner had raised an oral objection or that the petitioner did not participate in the auction since respondent No. 5 was permitted to participate in the auction. 26. The preliminary objection raised by learned Standing Counsel needs to be considered now in the light of the aforesaid finding. The submission is that the petitioner cannot be permitted to challenge the order granting approval to the highest bid offered by respondent No. 5 since the petitioner did not offer any bid at the time of auction even though he was eligible and was present and had also signed the bid sheet. It is the contention of the learned Standing Counsel that in such a situation the petitioner is not a “person aggrieved” and, therefore, does not have a locus-standi to challenge the order. 27. It is the contention of the learned Standing Counsel that in such a situation the petitioner is not a “person aggrieved” and, therefore, does not have a locus-standi to challenge the order. 27. In order to have a locus-standi to invoke the certiorari jurisdiction of the Court, the petitioner should be an “aggrieved person”. The Supreme Court in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and others, AIR 1976 SC 578 , examined this aspect at length. In this case, the issue before the High Court was whether the proprietor of a cinema theatre holding a licence for exhibiting films could invoke the certiorari jurisdiction for setting aside No Objection Certificate’ granted by the District Magistrate in favour of a rival businessman who had made an application under the relevant Rules for grant of the ‘No Objection Certificate’ for opening a new cinema theatre. The District Magistrate had issued a notice inviting objections to the grant of ‘No Objection Certificate’ and in response thereto several persons lodged objections but the petitioner did not file any objection. He, however, challenged the grant of ‘No Objection Certificate’ before the High Court which dismissed the writ petition on the ground that he was not a “person aggrieved” having a locus-standi in the matter. 28. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner had not lodged any objection in response to the notice inviting objections to the grant of ‘No Objection Certificate’. He was, therefore, obviously not a “person aggrieved”. The Supreme Court then examined whether his rights or interests recognised by general law had been infringed as result of the grant of No Objection Certificate and in this connection it observed : “In the light of the above discussion, it is demonstrably clear that the appellant has not been denied or deprived of a legal right. He has not sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In fact, the impugned order does not operate as a decision against him, much less does it wrongfully affect his title to something. He has not been subjected to a legal wrong. He has suffered no legal grievance. He has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on. Therefore he is not a ‘person aggrieved’ and has no locus standi to challenge the grant of the No Objection Certificate.” 29. He has not been subjected to a legal wrong. He has suffered no legal grievance. He has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on. Therefore he is not a ‘person aggrieved’ and has no locus standi to challenge the grant of the No Objection Certificate.” 29. In Trivedi Himanshu Ghanshyambhai v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and others, 2007 AIR SCW 6338, the Supreme Court examined whether a candidate whose name did not figure in the merit list as he had failed in the interview could challenge the selection of the appellant before the Supreme Court on the ground that he did not have 10 years experience on the administrative side for appointment to the post of Assistant Manager. The High Court had allowed the writ petition and quashed the appointment of the appellant. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner did not have the locus-standi to move the writ petition because he had not been selected as he could not clear the interview test. In coming to this conclusion, the Supreme Court placed reliance upon its earlier decision in the case of Madan Lal and others v. State of J.& K. and others, (1995) 3 SCC 486 . 30. In the present petition there was nothing which prevented the petitioner from participating in the auction bids and he on his own had decided not to offer any bid. This could be for the reason that the bid started at Rs. 32 lacs which was more than what his brother had offered last year or it could be some other reason but one thing is absolutely clear that by not bidding he had taken a conscious decision not to take the contract. It cannot, therefore, be said that any of his legal rights had been infringed by the participation of respondent No. 5 in the auction. He, therefore, in view of the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court is not a person aggrieved and has no locus-standi to challenge the impugned order. 31. It also needs to be remembered that mere inclusion of the name of respondent No. 5 in the list of candidates eligible to participate in the auction, even if there was some deviation from the stipulated terms and conditions of auction, did not deprive the petitioner from his right to participate in the auction. 31. It also needs to be remembered that mere inclusion of the name of respondent No. 5 in the list of candidates eligible to participate in the auction, even if there was some deviation from the stipulated terms and conditions of auction, did not deprive the petitioner from his right to participate in the auction. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that this has resulted in substantial prejudice or injustice to the petitioner. The action of the respondents would have been arbitrary if the petitioner or some person(s) similarly situated as respondent No. 5 had not been permitted to participate in the auction but this is not the case here. 32. In this connection, we need to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s. G.J. Fernandez v. State of Karnataka and others, AIR 1990 SC 958 , wherein it has been observed : “............The second consequence, indicated by this Court in earlier decisions, is not that the KPC cannot deviate from these guidelines at all in any situation but that any deviation, if made, should not result in arbitrariness or discrimination. It comes in for application where the non-conformity with, or relaxation from the prescribed standards results in some substantial prejudice or injustice to any of the parties involved or to public interest in general. For example, in this very case, the KPC made some changes in the time frame originally prescribed. These changes affected all intending applicants alike and were not objectionable. In the same way, changes or relaxations in other directions would be unobjectionable unless the benefit of those changes or relaxations were extended to some but denied to others. The fact that a document was belatedly entertained from one of the applicants will cause substantial prejudice to another party who wanted, likewise, an extension of time for filing a similar certificate or document but was declined the benefit. It may perhaps be said to cause prejudice also to a party which can show that it had refrained from applying for the tender documents only because it thought it would not be able to produce the document by the time stipulated but would have applied had it known that the rule was likely to be relaxed. It may perhaps be said to cause prejudice also to a party which can show that it had refrained from applying for the tender documents only because it thought it would not be able to produce the document by the time stipulated but would have applied had it known that the rule was likely to be relaxed. But neither of these situations is present here............................It is true that the relaxation of time schedule in the case of one party does affect even such a person in the sense that he would otherwise have had one competitor less. But, we are inclined to agree with the respondent’s contention that while the rule in Ramana’s case ( AIR 1979 SC 1628 ) (supra) will be readily applied by Courts to a case where a person complains that a departure from the qualifications has kept him out of the race, injustice is less apparent where the attempt of the applicant before Court is only to gain immunity from competition. Assuming for purposes of argument that there has been a slight deviation from the terms of the NIT, it has not deprived the appellant of its right to be considered for the contract; on the other hand, its tender has received due and full consideration. If, save for the delay in filing one of the relevant documents, MCC is also found to be qualified to tender for the contract, no injustice can be said to have been done to the appellant by the consideration of its tender side by side with that of the MCC and in the KPC going in for a choice of the better on the merits...............” (emphasis supplied) 33. In view of the above, we do not consider it necessary to deal with the contention advanced by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the auction should be set aside as respondent No. 5 did not fulfil the terms and conditions of auction. 34. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed. ————