JUDGMENT B.K. PATEL, J. — This revision is directed against the judgment dated 21.03.1996 passed by the learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Cuttack dismissing the Criminal Appeal No.51 of 1993 preferred against judgment dated 17.3.1993 passed by the learned J.M.F.C., Jagatsinghpur in I.C.C. No.94 of 1986 (Trial No.22 of 1993) convicting the petitioner under Section 494 of the I.P.C. and sentencing him to undergo R.I. for one year and to pay fine of Rs.500/-, in default to undergo S.I. for two months with further direction to pay Rs.400/- to opposite party as compensa¬tion if the fine amount is realized. 2. Opposite party-complainant is the petitioner’s legally married wife. It appears that I.C.C. No.94 of 1986 (Trial No.22) of 1993) was instituted by the opposite party against the peti¬tioner and some co-accused persons for commission of offence under Section 494 read with 109 of the I.P.C. It was alleged that the marriage between the petitioner and opposite party was solem¬nized in 1971. They were blessed with two children. However as the petitioner deserted the opposite party she took shelter in her parent’s house and instituted the proceeding for award of maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. During subsistence of marriage between the petitioner and the opposite party, the petitioner took one Tuni Dei @ Yoshna as his second wife on 14.7.1983 by getting married to her. The petitioner did not dispute regarding status of opposite party as his legal married wife. However, defence plea was denial of petitioner’s marriage for the second time with above said Tuni Dei @ Yoshna. In order to substantiate her allegations the complainant examined three witnesses including herself as P.W.2 and also relied upon documents marked Exts.1 to 5. Two defence witnesses including the petitioner, examined as D.W.2, were examined on behalf of the petitioner. One Dr. Sampat Kumar Mohanty was exam¬ined by the Court as C.W.1. Considering the evidence on record learned Magistrate convicted and sentenced the petitioner as stated supra while acquitting the co-accused persons. 3. In assailing the impugned order it was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in view of inordinate delay in lodging the complaint till 27.06.1986, though the peti¬tioner is alleged to have got married for the second time on 14.07.1983, the complaint petition should have been dismissed in limine. 3. In assailing the impugned order it was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in view of inordinate delay in lodging the complaint till 27.06.1986, though the peti¬tioner is alleged to have got married for the second time on 14.07.1983, the complaint petition should have been dismissed in limine. It was further contended that in order to substantiate the allegations under Section 494 of the I.P.C. The factum as well as validity of both the marriages are to be cogently estab¬lished. It was argued that the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 2 and 3 is too vague to conclude that the petitioner got married for the second time as alleged. It was also argued that as C.W.1, exam¬ined as Court witness, has not proved the contents of Birth Certificates Exts.1 and 2, there is no basis to record any find¬ing on the basis of the two documents. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kanwal Ram and others v. The Himachal Pradesh Administration : A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 614, and this Court in Patra Mirgan v. The State : (1993) 6 OCR 540, Manjula Nayak v. Rama Chandra Nayak : (1994) 7 OCR 576 and Bira Dang v. Dhyana Dang : (1995) 8 OCR 481. Though the learned counsel appearing for the opposite party initially participated in the hearing, none appeared on behalf of the opposite party at later stage in course of further hearing. Learned counsel for the opposite party supported the findings and conclusion of the learned Courts below and argued that there is no compelling reasons to disturb the concurrent findings. 4. In the present case there has admittedly been substan¬tial delay in filing the complaint. The second marriage was alleged to have been solemnized on 14.07.1983. However, the complaint petition was presented in Court on 27.06.1986. P.W.2-opposite party-complainant neither in her evidence nor in com¬plaint petition assigned any reason for delay in lodging the complaint in Court. In Patra Mirgan (supra) it has been held that if there is delay in either coming before the police or before the Courts, the Courts always view the allegations with suspicion and look for satisfactory explanation. In the present case, the inordinate delay in filing the complaint has remained unex¬plained. 5. In Patra Mirgan (supra) it has been held that if there is delay in either coming before the police or before the Courts, the Courts always view the allegations with suspicion and look for satisfactory explanation. In the present case, the inordinate delay in filing the complaint has remained unex¬plained. 5. Learned Courts below have recorded the findings that during the subsistence of marriage between the petitioner and opposite party, the marriage between the petitioner and Tuni Dei was solemnized. Though both the Courts below have come to such finding, such finding being strenuously challenged as having no basis, the evidence on record requires to be closely scrutinized in view of the settled proposition of law that in a bigamy case, the second marriage as a fact, that is to say, the essential ceremonies constituting it, must be proved. Admission of marriage by the accused is not evidence of it for the purpose of proving marriage in an adultery or bigamy case. Where, in prosecution for offences under Sections 494 of the I.P.C., the evidence of the witnesses called to prove the marriage ceremonies, showed that the essential ceremonies had not been performed, the conviction of the accused is not justified. In this connection, Kanwal Ram and others (supra) and Manjula Nayak (supra) may be referred to. 6. In Bira Dang (supra) it has been held : “In a case of bigamy under Section 494, I.P.C., the prosecution, in order to succeed must prove not only the factum of both the marriages but also their validity. In Santimani Dei v. Lingaraj Moharana, 1982 Cri. LJ 1567, it has been held by this Court relying on Smt. Priya Bala Ghosh v. Suresh Chandra Ghosh, A.I.R. 1971 SC 1153 and Lingari Obulamma v. L. Venkata Reddy, A.I.R. 1979 SC 848 that in order to convict a person for the offence of bigamy under Section 494 of the I.P.C. The second marriage must be proved to have been performed in accordance with law and customary rites. In Subir Kumar Kundu v. State of West Bengal, 1992 Cri LJ 1502 the Calcutta High Court has held as under : “In a trial for Bigamy under Section 494, Penal Code the Court will presume due performance of all requisite ceremonies from the circumstances of a marriage in fact, however, a convic¬tion for bigamy cannot be sustained on such presumption alone and must fail unless the observance of the requisite form and per¬formance of the necessary ceremonies are affirmatively proved...” 7. In the present case complainant-P.W.2 admitted that she had not seen the second marriage. P.Ws.1 and 3 deposed to have witnessed marriage between the petitioner and Tuni Dei. P.W.1 happens to be complainant’s sister’s husband. He deposed that on 14.07.1983, hearing about marriage of petitioner, he alongwith three others went to the petitioner’s house. When they reached there they saw that the second marriage of petitioner was being performed and that there were “Hastaganthi, Homa and Saptapadi”. He deposed to have raised protest against performance of second marriage. P.W.3 deposed that he along with P.W.1 and others went to the house of the petitioner and in their presence “Hastaganthi and Saptapadi” were performed. This witness also said that they raised protest against the second marriage. P.W.3 deposed that one Bishnu Rath performed the marriage ceremony as priest. Said priest has not been examined. P.W.3 categorically deposed that they reached the house of the petitioner when Hastaganthi was performed, and that Saptapadi was performed after Hastaganthi and the Homa. Such sequence of rites as deposed by P.W.3 is not con¬sistent with the version of P.W.1 who, testified in cross-examination that Homa was performed first and thereafter Khai were spread and then Hastaganthi was performed. In case P.W.3 is to be believed, none of the witnesses including P.W.1 could not have witnessed Homa. P.W.3 also testified that they stayed for two hours in the house of the petitioner. Such an assertion is not capable on being accepted on the face of assertion of P.Ws.1 and 3 that they raised protest against the second marriage. Thus, scrutiny of evidence of P.Ws.1 and 3 reveals that their evidence as to the actual rites and ceremonies performed in their presence is not consistent and is rather vague and sketchy. Such an assertion is not capable on being accepted on the face of assertion of P.Ws.1 and 3 that they raised protest against the second marriage. Thus, scrutiny of evidence of P.Ws.1 and 3 reveals that their evidence as to the actual rites and ceremonies performed in their presence is not consistent and is rather vague and sketchy. In view of well-settled position of law that the alleged second marriage has to be established by adducing proof of essential ceremonies constituting such marriage, any amount of other evidence indicat¬ing nexus between the petitioner and another woman including birth of children is inconsequential. 8. Therefore, there is no scope to hold that prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the second marriage was validly solemnized so as to sustain conviction of the peti¬tioner under Section 494 of the I.P.C. 9. Consequently, the revision is allowed. Impugned judgments passed by the learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Cuttack in Criminal Appeal No.51 of 1993 and learned J.M.F.C., Jagatsinghpur in I.C.C. No.94 of 1986 are set aside. Revision allowed.