Judgment : 1. Heard. Perused the petition and annexures therewith. 2. Rule, made returnable forthwith. The respondents waive notice for final hearing. Taken up for final hearing by mutual consent. 3. Order dated 22.07.2009 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Mapusa dismissing the revision application No.54/2009 moved by the petitioner under Section 397 of Cr.P.C., 1973 for challenging the order of grant of interim maintenance dated 13.04.2009 is under scanner for examining its legality and propriety. 4. The respondents being the wife and children of the petitioner moved an application for interim maintenance in an application for grant of maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 i.e. Criminal Maintenance Case No.3/2007/C in the Court of J.M.F.C., Bicholim. The learned J.M.F.C., upon hearing the parties i.e. the petitioner and the respondents herein, granted interim maintenance of Rs.1,000/- each per month to the respondents vide order dated 13.04.2009. This order was assailed by the petitioner husband in Criminal Revision Application No.54/2009 before the Additional Sessions Judge, Mapusa. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, after hearing the parties and upon considering the ratio in the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court reported in 1992 Criminal Law Journal 2605 – Smt. Mamata A. Vaidya Versus Ashok M. Vaiday, dismissed the revision application on the ground that it was not maintainable as per Section 397(2) of the Code being a revision against the interlocutory order. 5. It is this act of dismissing the revision on the ground of its maintainability is questioned as to its legality and propriety in the light of several verdicts of the Hon'ble Apex Court laying down the parameters and guidelines for understanding the term “interlocutory orders”. Learned Advocate Raunaq Rao for the petitioner argued with reference to elaborate guidelines enunciated for understanding the term 'interlocutory order' in Hasmukh Zhveri's case – Hasmukh J. Jhaveri Versus Shella Dadlani and another reported in 1981 CRI.L.J. 958(1) that the interim order of maintenance is an order, which decides or touches the important rights or liabilities of the parties following the adjudication as envisaged in Section 125 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and is not an interlocutory order pure and simple made merely as a steps-in-aid of the procedure. 6. 6. To highlight this nature of the order of interim maintenance, he submitted, the learned Trial Court is required to examine, may be prima facie, the relevant material and answer a pertinent question as to whether the person having sufficient means has neglected or refused to maintain his wife and his minor children unable to maintain themselves even at the stage of grant of interim maintenance, and the consequence of every breach of order of interim maintenance entails the curtailment of right to liberty as per section 125(3) of the Code and, therefore, the order of interim maintenance is not an interlocutory order as sought to be made out on the basis of the judgment of the learned Single Judge in Smt. Mamata Vaidya's case(supra). He further pointed out from the judgment in Smt. Mamata Vaidya's case that the learned Single Judge had merely quoted the guidelines enunciated in Hasmukh J. Jhaveri's case without discussing as to how these guidelines/ tests did not lead to a conclusion contrary to the view taken by him in Para.17 of the judgment. Learned Advocate, therefore, urged this Court to take a view concerning the character of interim order of maintenance under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. as solicited by him and refer the matter if necessary to the Division Bench for ironing out the differences in views on this material aspect. In support of his submissions, he further placed reliance on the Division Bench rulings of the Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court reported in 1991 Cri. L.J. 2056 Sunilkumar Sabharwal Versus Mrs. Neelam Sabharwal on one such similar issue. Judgement of Allahabad High Court reported in 1999 Cri.L.J. 321 Mukhtar Ali Versus Judge, Family Court and another was further cited in support of his submissions. 7. Learned Advocate Bhobe for the respondents submitted that the learned Additional Sessions Judge had no option but to yield to the view of the learned Single Judge of this Court as expressed in Smt. Mamata V. Vaidya's case and, therefore, there has been no illegality or impropriety committed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in passing the impugned order. He invited the attention of the Court to the material observations made by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Wahane while delivering the judgment in Smt. Mamata Vaidya's case, which are quoted herein below for ready reference: “17. He invited the attention of the Court to the material observations made by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Wahane while delivering the judgment in Smt. Mamata Vaidya's case, which are quoted herein below for ready reference: “17. The Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure contains summary and quick remedy for securing some reasonable sum by way of maintenance, thereby to protect the destitute wife against starvation. Chapter IX of the Code does not in reality create any serious new obligation unknown to Indian social life. This chapter provides “a mode of preventing vagrancy, or at least of preventing its consequences”. These provisions are intended to fulfill a social purpose. Their object is to compel a man to perform the moral obligation which he owes to society in respect of his wife and children. By providing a simple speedy but limited relief, they seek to ensure that the neglected wife and children are not left beggared and destituted on the scrap-heap of society and thereby driven to a life of vagrancy, immorality and crime for their subsistence. Thus, Section 125 is not intended to provide for a full and final determination of the status and personal rights of the parties. The jurisdiction conferred by the section on the Magistrate is more in the nature of a preventive, rather than a remedial jurisdiction; it is certainly not punitive. In view of the spirit of the provisions, the Magistrate is empowered either to modify or even to cancel the order passed by him earlier. Considering this fact, granting interim maintenance, pending proceedings under Section 125, Cr.P.C. is an “interlocutory order” and thereby no revision is maintainable under Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Thus, 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Chandrapur, committed error while entertaining and deciding the criminal revision No.9/91 and, therefore, the order passed by him is set aside.” However, he submitted that this Court was free to take an appropriate view in the matter in the interest of justice. 8. Controversy in the present case, therefore, gives rise to a question regarding the character of the interim order of maintenance passed under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 i.e. whether the order of interim maintenance under Section 125 of the Code is interlocutory or not. 8. Controversy in the present case, therefore, gives rise to a question regarding the character of the interim order of maintenance passed under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 i.e. whether the order of interim maintenance under Section 125 of the Code is interlocutory or not. On one hand, there is Smt. Mamata Vaidya's case, which expressed the view in favour of an affirmative answer to the aforesaid question. Contrary view is taken by the Hon'ble Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Sunilkumr Sabharwal's case. This view is further endorsed by the judgment of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in Muktar Ali's case. This calls for a critical evaluation of the views expressed in the aforesaid judgments. The learned Single Judge of this Court while dealing with the issues in Smt. Mamata Vaidya's case did take survey of the judgments delivered by the Hon'ble Apex Court on the subject since the year 1977. The learned Single Judge at Para. 14 of his judgment reproduced the scope of interlocutory order as expressed in detail in Hasmukh Jhaveri's case upon considering the earlier decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the following terms -“Bearing in mind the guidelines enunciated in Amar Nath V. State of Haryana, 1977 Cri LJ 1891 :( AIR 1977 SC 2185 ) (SC), Madhu Limaye V. State of Maharashtra, 1978 Cri LJ 165 : AIR 1978 SC 47 (SC), V. C. Shukla V. State, 1980 Cri LJ 690 : AIR 1980 SC 962 and Mohanlal V. State of Gujrat, 1968 Cri LJ 876 : AIR 1968 SC 733 (SC), the scheme of the Code, the object for enacting or incorporating the said term “interlocutory order” in Section 397(2) and the basic concept of the term, the following propositions would logically follow:- (1) That the term “interlocutory order” has been used in a restricted sense and not in a broad or realistic sense. (2) That it merely denotes an order of purely interim or temporary nature. The emphasis in this category is on the word “purely”, which would again highlight the concept that the nature of the order must be pure and simple temporary or interim in character and ostensibly deceptive appearance of a temporary character should not be confused with the real and outright temporary nature. The emphasis in this category is on the word “purely”, which would again highlight the concept that the nature of the order must be pure and simple temporary or interim in character and ostensibly deceptive appearance of a temporary character should not be confused with the real and outright temporary nature. (3) Such orders pertaining to some matters in the proceeding which merely and purely assume the character of steps-in-aid of the proceeding can be embraced by the said terminology, which again affords a pointer about the nature and categories of the orders that are purely temporary or interim without actually affecting or even touching substantially any right or material aspect of the proceeding. (4) Though a stamp of finality to the proceeding or termination of the proceeding may be quite a relevant and important consideration, yet it is not a sole criterion of the test in that behalf. (5) The potential capacity to terminate proceeding or to give it a label of finality is also not the only and conclusive criterion, though it by itself is a relevant feature. (6) The fact that the main proceeding is kept alive that does not ipso facto give a stamp to several such orders as “interlocutory order”. (7) It is not permissible to equate the expression “interlocutory order” as invariably being the converse of the term “final order”. (8) An order of moment would obviously be lifted out of the sweep of the said terminology. (9) In respective of the order bearing stamp of finality, there may be an intervening stage which can be called as 'intermediate stage' at which an order may be passed which in turn may be called as “intermediate order”, which neither gives the finality to the proceeding nor is purely interim or temporary and as such is not an interlocutory order, but would fall in between and in certain cases such order can be said to be not interlocutory. (10) An order which- (a) decides; or (b) even touches the important rights or liabilities of the parties; cannot be said to be interlocutory. (10) An order which- (a) decides; or (b) even touches the important rights or liabilities of the parties; cannot be said to be interlocutory. (11) An order which – (a) substantially affects the rights of the parties or (b) decides certain rights of the parties; cannot be termed as 'interlocutory.' (12) An order which – (a) adjudicates; or (b) even affects – (i) either the rights of the parties; (ii) even any particular aspect of the trial or the proceeding cannot be also termed as 'interlocutory order.'” 9. However, it is not clearly understood from the judgment in Smt. Mamata Vaidya's case as to how his view passes various tests laid own in the said guidelines. It appears that the learned Single Judge was moved more by the social purpose of preventing vagrancy and protecting the destitute wife and children against starvation than mechanics of Section 125 of the Code. 10. Section 125 of the Code requires proof of neglect or refusal to maintain destitute wife or minor children unable to maintain themselves on the part of the husband or the father as the case may be having sufficient means before any order of maintenance under the said provision is made. Subsection 4 of Section 125 in clear terms disentitles a wife to receive an allowance for the maintenance or the interim maintenance from her husband if she is living in adultery, or if, without any sufficient reason she refuses to live with her husband, or if they are living separately by mutual consent. Subsection 5 of Section 125 permits any husband to get the order of maintenance cancelled on giving proof of any of the aforesaid disqualifications on the part of any wife. How, the Magistrate has to deal with the issue of interim maintenance, has been pointed out by Their Lordship in a case of Sawitri Govindsing Rawat Versus Govindsing Rawat reported in 1985 Mh.L.J. 976 in the following terms: “The Magistrate may, however, insist upon an affidavit being filed by or on behalf of the applicant concerned stating the grounds in support of the claim for interim maintenance to satisfy himself that there is a prima facie case for making such an order.” 11. It can, therefore, be seen that virtually the Magistrate is expected to prima facie check every parameter of the case made out for final grant of maintenance under the said provision before interim maintenance is granted. It is not sufficient for a woman to merely claim status of wife, and yet successfully claim interim maintenance from a man whom she claims to be her husband. Thus, there is interim adjudication substantially affecting the rights of the parties in the process of granting interim maintenance under Section 125 of the Code. It is, therefore, certainly not a procedural steps-in-aid. 12. Consequence of the failure to comply with the order of interim maintenance as envisaged under subsection (3) of Section 125 is also pointer to the character of the interim order of maintenance. For every breach of the order, the Magistrate ordering the interim maintenance is free to sentence the person liable to satisfy the interim order of maintenance to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until the payment of the whole or any part of each month's allowance for interim maintenance, if sooner made. Thus, it can be seen that the order of interim maintenance substantially affects the rights of the parties before reaching final decision in the proceedings under Section 125 of the Code. These aspects I may say with respect and humility, were not considered by the learned Single Judge while deciding the case of Smt. Mamata Vaidya's case. It is therefore, difficult to subscribe to the view taken by the learned Single Judge in Smt. Mamata Vaidya's case(supra). Order of interim maintenance under Section 125 of Cr.P.C., in my humble view, is not an interlocutory order and, therefore, revision against it is not barred under Section 397(2) of the Code. 13. With diverse views on this material question framed as aforesaid, it will be advantageous that the matter is heard by the Bench of two or more judges. This matter is, therefore, referred to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for making appropriate order in that regard.