JUDGMENT (1) The petitioner assails in this revision the legality of the order dated 9-5-1996 passed by the learned S. D. J. M., udala in I. C. C. No. 39 of 1996 refusing to take cognizance in respect of offences alleged to have been committed by the opposite party who is the sole accused on the ground of want of sanction as envisaged under section 197 Cr. P. C. (2) The petitioner, as the complainant, instituted the complaint case on the allegation of commission of offences under sections 323, 294 and 384 I. P. C. by the opposite party-accused, the then O. I. C. of khunta Police Station in the district of mayurbhanj. It was alleged that as the petitioner-complainant was a witness in a vigilance enquiry against the accused, many false cases were manufactured against him by the accused in order to harass him. On 19-4-1996 at about 9. 00 p. m. when the complainant was returning from Baripada after complaining against the accused before the superintendent of Police and attending to some personal work, on the way, the accused stopped the bus in which the complainant was travelling, arrested him and forcibly took him to Khunta Police Station. When Pradip kumar Upadhyaya and Ajit Kumar choudhary, neighbours of the complainant, came to the police station and asked the accused to release the complainant, the accused used filthy language and threatened that he would not spare the complainant. Thereafter, the accused pressed complainant's neck and assaulted the lower part of his abdomen with a police lathi. Accused also forcibly took away all the papers from the complainant. However, he returned all the papers except copy of the F. I. R. which the complainant had submitted before the Circle Inspector of Police on 11 -4-1996. It was also averred in the complaint petition that when the complainant was produced in Court on 20-4-1996, he complained to the S. D. J. M., Udala regarding such treatment by the accused, upon which he was medically examined and thereafter released on bail. On presentation of the complaint petition, learned S. D. J. M. recorded initial statement on 24-4-1996 and thereafter held an enquiry under Section 202 Cr. P. C. in course of which two witnesses, i. e. Witness No. 1 Pradip Kumar Upadhyaya and witness No. 2 Lingaraj Tripathy, were examined. Thereafter the impugned order was passed and the complaint petition was dismissed. P. C. in course of which two witnesses, i. e. Witness No. 1 Pradip Kumar Upadhyaya and witness No. 2 Lingaraj Tripathy, were examined. Thereafter the impugned order was passed and the complaint petition was dismissed. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that initial statement of the complainant and the evidence of the two witnesses examined in course of enquiry clearly make out commission of the alleged offences. The acts complained of against the accused were not in any manner connected with the official duties of the accused nor were the same so integrally connected with the official duties attached to the accused to conclude that the accused abused, assaulted and committed extortion in discharge of his duties. Therefore, there was no basis for the learned Magistrate to insist upon sanction for prosecution against the accused. (3) Learned counsel for the opposite party supported the impugned order stating that the act of taking cognizance is not a mechanical function. The learned Magistrate is required to take into account the nature of allegations and the circumstances under which the alleged acts are stated to have been committed by the accused as well as relationship between the parties. It was strenuously contended that as, admitted by the complainant himself, the complainant was produced in Court consequent upon his arrest when he was returning to his village from Baripada, in course of such arrest and production, in order to contain the resistance offered by the complainant, the accused who is a police officer, might have used some force in discharge of his official duties. (4) There was absolutely no dispute over" the settled principle of law that protection under Section 197 Cr. P. C. has certain limits and is available only when the alleged act done by the public servant is reasonably connected with the discharge of official duty and not merely a cloak for doing the objectionable act. Before protection under section 197 Cr. P. C. is claimed, it must be shown that the official concerned was accused of an offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official capacity. Before protection under section 197 Cr. P. C. is claimed, it must be shown that the official concerned was accused of an offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official capacity. If on facts it is prima facie found that the act or omission for which the accused was charged has reasonable connection with discharge of his duty then it must be held to be official, to which applicability of section 197 Cr. P. C. cannot be disputed. What a Court has to find out is whether the act and the official duty are so interrelated that one can postulate reasonably that it was done by the accused in the performance of official duty, though, possibly in excess of the need and requirements of situation. In this connection, decisions in P. K. Pradhan v. State of Sikkim, 2001 (21) OCR 640 : (2001 Cri LJ 3505), Bakhshish Singh Brar v. Gurmej Kaur, 1987 (4) SCC 663 : (1988 cri LJ 419); Raj Kishore Roy v. Kamaleswar pandy, 2002 (23) OCR (SC) 510 : (2002 Cri lj 3780); State of Maharashtra v. Devahari devasingh Pawar, 2008 (39) OCR (SC) 726 : (2008 Cri LJ 1593) may be referred to. It is also pertinent to refer to decision of this Court in Premjit Mohananda v. Mohanpani Karua and another. (1995) 8 ocr 594 : (1996 Cri LJ 836) in which complaint had been made against a police officer for alleged commission of offences under Sections 342/323/294/506/34 [. P. C. After referring to earlier decisions of this court including the decisions in Lalit Mohan panigrahi v. Mayadhar Samarath, 67 (1989)CLT 147, T. P. Reddy v. Devraj Panigrahi, 1991 (II) OLR 253 and Kartikeswar Nayak v. Satyabadi Mallik, (1994) 7 OCR 326, in which sanction for prosecution against accused police officer was held to be necessary under Section 197 Cr. P. C., it was held : "the principle under Section 197, Cr. P. C. is well established. The difficulty, however, lies in its application to the facts of a given case. Before the provision of Section 197, Cr. P. C., it was held : "the principle under Section 197, Cr. P. C. is well established. The difficulty, however, lies in its application to the facts of a given case. Before the provision of Section 197, Cr. P. C. is invoked, two conditions must be first fulfilled : (i) the public servant is not removable from his office except by or with the sanction of the State Government or the Central Government, as the case may be, and (ii) he is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him. After these two pre-conditions are satisfied a further enquiry is necessary to be made as to whether the alleged offence was committed by the public servant while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. It is in this connection that the expression "purporting to act in the discharge of official duty" assumes importance. This expression is neither to be too narrowly interpreted nor too widely. The narrow interpretation will make it altogether otiose inasmuch as it in no part of an official duty-never can it be-the official duty to commit an offence. It is not the 'duty' which requires scrutiny so much as the 'act' because the official act can be performed both in the discharge of official duty as well as in dereliction of it. If it is too widely construed, every act constituting an offence committed in the course of the same transaction in which the official duty is performed or purports to be performed would come within its sweep which should be avoided. In our constitutional set-up, no one whatever be his rank or position is above the law and every official, irrespective of his rank, is under the same liability for his act done without legal justification as any other citizen. As such, the right approach to the problem lies between the two extremes. A middle line which is adopted is that it is not every offence committed by a public servant in course of performance of his official duty, which is entitled to the protection of Section 197 (2). What comes under the protective umbrella is an act conslilulirig an offence, which directly or reasonably connects with his official duty. Protection of Section 197 does not extend to acts done purely in a private capacity by a public servant. What comes under the protective umbrella is an act conslilulirig an offence, which directly or reasonably connects with his official duty. Protection of Section 197 does not extend to acts done purely in a private capacity by a public servant. In Hori Rarn singh v. Emperor, AIR 1939 FC 43 : (1939 (40) Cri LJ 468) it was argued that one of the tests for applicability of Section 197, Cr. P. C. should be that there must be some thing in the nature of the act complained of that attaches it to the official character of the persons doing it. Vardacharier, J. in his separate judgment accepted it to be the "correct view". In P. Arulswami v. State of Madras, AIR 1967 SC 776 : (1967 Cri LJ 665), the suprerne Court observed as below : "it is the quality of the act that is important and if it falls within the scope and range of his official duties the protection contemplated by Section 197, Cr. P. C. will be at tracted. An offence may be entirely unconnected with the official duty as such or it may be committed within the scope of the official duty. Where it is unconnected with the official duty there can be no protection. It is only when it is either within the scope of the official duty or in excess of it that the protection is claimable. " " Upon reference to allegations made by the complainant, it was held : "the aforesaid allegalions made in the complaint would show that opp. party No. 1 arrested and detained the petitioner in police hazat in connection with gambling case. Refusal of opp. party No. 1 to release the petitioner on bail cannot be said to be unconnected or not reasonably connected with his official duty. The request made by the petitioner to allow him to go on bail seemed to have been not appreciated by opp. party no. 1 for which he got annoyed and directed the Grama-rakhi to assault the petitioner. When the petitioner made further request not to assault him, opp. party No. 1 was alleged to have rushed towards the petitioner and assaulted him and rebuked htm in filthy language. It has to be borne in mind that all these things, if they were all true, happened following the arrest of the petitioner in connection with the gambling case. When the petitioner made further request not to assault him, opp. party No. 1 was alleged to have rushed towards the petitioner and assaulted him and rebuked htm in filthy language. It has to be borne in mind that all these things, if they were all true, happened following the arrest of the petitioner in connection with the gambling case. Non-release of the petitioner on bail followed by assault and rebuke might be in excess of the performance of the official duty but they cannot be said to be totally unconnected with the official duty or cannot be held to be not in course of performance of official duty. " (5) In State of Orissa Through Kumar raghvendra Singh and Ors. v. Ganesh chandra Jew, 2004 (2) Crimes 404 : (2004 cri LJ 2011) (SC), relied upon by the learned counsel for the opposite parties, it has been held that the protection is available only when alleged act done by public servant is reasonably connected wilh discharge of his official duly and is not merely a cloak for doing objectionable act. If in doing his official duly, he acted in excess of his duty, but there is a reasonable connection between the act and the performance of the official duty, the excess will not be a sufficient ground to deprive the public servant from the protection. (6) Having examined the materials on record upon reference to the contentions raised from eilher side as well as relevant legal provisions, it may be pointed out that examination of complainant under Section 200 of the Cr. P. C., inquiry under Section 202 of the Cr. P. C. and issuing of processes under Section 204 of the Cr. P. C. are not empty formalities. Rule 21 of the General rules and Circular Orders of the High Court of Judicature, Orissa (Criminal), Volume-I, prescribes that examination of the complainant under Section 200 of the Cr. P. C. should be a thorough and intelligenl enquiry into the subject matter of a complaint to enable the Magistrate to find out whether the complainant is really aggrieved, or whether it would amount to abuse of the process of the Court and harassment lo the accused. In course of inquiry under Section 202 of the Cr. P. C. the Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, take evidence of witness on oath. In course of inquiry under Section 202 of the Cr. P. C. the Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, take evidence of witness on oath. Proviso to sub-section 2 of Section 202 of the cr. P. C. provides that if it appears to the magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and to examine them on oath. Before issuance of process, the magistrate taking cognizance of an offence has to arrive at the opinion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused which means that the Magistrate has to be satisfied regarding existence of prima facie case before issuing process. For that purpose, the Magistrate is required to examine the complaint petition, initial statement of the complainant and the statements of the witnesses examined on oath. The magistrate is required to judicially consider the desirability to terminate the proceeding under Section 203 of the Cr. P. C. or to proceed against all or some of the accused persons under Section 204 of the Cr. P. C. upon reference to materials on record. Process ought to be issued when there is sufficient ground for proceeding against an accused. It is salutary to note that judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression or needless harassment. See Punjab national Bank and others v. Surendra Prasad sinha, AIR 1992 SC 1815 : (1992 Cri LJ 2916). Considering the question of applicability of Section 197 of the Cr. P. C. to the facts of the present case, admittedly, the complainant was arrested in connection with khunta P. S. Case No. 26 of 1996 corresponding to G. R. Case No. 67 of 1996 of the Court of learned S. D. J. M., Udala. Therefore, prima facie, the acts complained of were committed after the complainant was legally taken to custody by the accused. Complainant has also admitted existence of bitter feelings between him and the accused as the complainant was a witness against him in a vigilance enquiry. Therefore, prima facie, the acts complained of were committed after the complainant was legally taken to custody by the accused. Complainant has also admitted existence of bitter feelings between him and the accused as the complainant was a witness against him in a vigilance enquiry. In the complaint petition it was alleged that the accused used filthy language saying that "salara bahuta PHUTANI, C. I. EBAM S. P. PAKHARE MO BIRUDDHARE KAHUCHHI, taku MU SAHAJARE CHHADIBINI" when the complainant's neighbours requested the accused to release him and, thereafter, pressed the neck and assaulted on the lower part of abdomen of the complainant with a lathi. As regards allegation of commission of offence under Section 384 of the I. P. C., there is no such allegation even in the complaint petition except to the effect that the accused snatched away papers from the complainant's possession and, thereafter, returned all the papers except the copy of the F. I. R. lodged before the C. I. of Police. There is no averment in the complaint petition alleging commission of offence of extortion of any property or valuable security or anything signed or sealed which might have been converted to valuable security. Therefore, complaint petition does not make out commission of offence under Section 384 of the I. P. C. by the accused. Neither in the initial statement of the complainant nor in the evidence of the two witnesses examined in course of enquiry under Section 202 of the Cr. P. C. there is whisper regarding use of any obscene word or commission of any obscene act by the accused. Neither in the initial statement of the complainant nor in the evidence of the two witnesses examined in course of enquiry under Section 202 of the Cr. P. C. there is whisper regarding use of any obscene word or commission of any obscene act by the accused. Words used by the accused stated to be filthy or obscene extracted from the complaint petition above also do not indicate commission of offence under Section 294 of the I. P. C. So far as the allegation of offence of causing hurt is concerned, the allegation is to be appreciated in the background of the circumstances that though the complainant moved the court by filing complaint petition to prosecute the accused for commission of offences under Sections 323, 294 and 384 I. P. C., materials on record do not make out commission of offences under Sections 294 and 384 of the I. P. C. As has been pointed out in Premjit Mohananda (1996 Cri LJ 836) (supra) arrest of an accused in discharge of official duty may involve some elements of force which cannot be said to be unconnected with the duty of an arresting police officer. Such assault might be in excess of the performance of the official duty but cannot be totally unrelated to the official duty and/or cannot be held to be not in course of performance of official duty. Therefore, the opposite party is entitled to the protective umbrella under Section 197 of the Cr. P. C. In such circumstances, there being no illegality in the impugned order refusing to take cognizance of offences as alleged against the accused, there appears no reason to interfere with the impugned order by invoking revisional jurisdiction. (7) In view of the above discussion, I find no merit in the revision and accordingly, dismiss the same. Petition dismissed.