Judgment :- (1) The above three applications (G.A. No. 3232 of 2008, G.A. No. 3233 of 2008 and G.A. No. 3234 of 2008) have been taken out by the Samantha Fay (Respondent No. 3), Nadine Causey (Respondent No. 4) and Bruce Steinberg (Respondent No. 9) respectively in the pending contempt application. All these applications have been taken out with a prayer for exemption of all of them and or causing them from appearing in person before this Honble Court pursuant to Rule issued by this Court in the aforesaid contempt application. The grounds set out by the aforesaid respective applicants are distinct and separate, and those are absolutely individualistic in nature and the same needs to be set out briefly : Samantha Fay (Respondent No.3) in her application she has stated that she holds any order passed by the Honble Court in the highest regard. At no time she even had or has intention of disobeying order, or flouting direction of the Honble Court. She always followed instructions to the best of her ability and in good faith. However, for any lapse that may have occurred, even if inadvertently, in complying with the order dated March 22, 2008, she tenders unconditional apology. She states further that she may not be required to undertake very long and strenuous journey to India from the United Kingdom involving considerable time and substantial expense. She states further that she has been on maternity leave since 24th March, 2007 for a period of 12 months and, since she has a very small baby, the journey to India would be particularly onerous for her. (2) In the affidavit in opposition the aforesaid statement of undergoing maternity leave and having given birth to a child has not been denied and disputed. Therefore, these facts are deemed to have been admitted and there is no difficulty for the Court to accept such statement as being true though no document has been annexed to the petition. Whetherthis ground is good and sufficient to exempt her or not is to be discussed and decided a little later. (3) Nadine Causey (Respondent No. 9): In paragraph 8 of her petition she had made statement purporting to make ground for exemption that she may not be required to undertake very long and strenuous journey to India from United Kingdom involving substantial time and expense. (3) Nadine Causey (Respondent No. 9): In paragraph 8 of her petition she had made statement purporting to make ground for exemption that she may not be required to undertake very long and strenuous journey to India from United Kingdom involving substantial time and expense. This apart she has also stated that order has been carried out and fact of compliance has been stated in affidavit affirmed and filed in the application. Therefore, she should not be compelled to come personally to contest this application. (4) Those facts have been denied and disputed in the affidavit in opposition. (5) Bruce Steinberg (Respondent No. 9) : In his application he contends that he became an employee of HIT on Gth June, 2005 and was appointed a Company Director of HIT on 18th July, 2005, consequent on the take-over of HIT by Sunshine Acquisition Ltd. he did not remain Director of GWR until 22nd August, 2005. He was not a Director nor was he employed with GWR when order dated 22nd March, 2005 was passed and also within four weeks during which the said order was to be complied with. He also contends that journey to India from United Kingdom is strenuous and expensive. (6) In the affidavit in opposition those facts have been denied. (7) Mr. Sankaranand learned Senior Counsel with Mr. Dhruba Ghosh learned Advocate appearing on behalf of all these applicants submitted highlighting the facts stated in the respective petitions that all three reside in the United Kingdom and it would be very expensive and onerous for them to travel to India to record personal appearance before this Court. (8) He would urge that fact on record prima facie shows that order dated March 22, 1998 was directed against the company which is a huge multi-national company, but petitioners had arbitrarily singled out these employee-respondents for no particular reason for the collective action of the company and its many other employees. These persons do and did not have any intention to violate the order of the Court. (9) He further submits that the company has already filed an affidavit in the proceedings through their present managing director Mr. These persons do and did not have any intention to violate the order of the Court. (9) He further submits that the company has already filed an affidavit in the proceedings through their present managing director Mr. Alister Richards, who categorically states that the companys top management was willing to take the responsibility for the collective action of the company and has volunteered to appear before the Court as and when required and as such individual employees, such as three respondents in question may be exempted from appearing in person. (10) He further states that language of Rule 19 of the Contempt Rules of this Honble Court suggests that it is directory and this Honble Court has the discretion to waive or exempt personal appearance of the respondents. There are instances where the Court has waived the requirements. In support of his submission he has relied on two judgments (1957)1 QB 159 and AIR 1997 SC 2555 . (11) He further contends that 9th Respondent was not in the employment of the company when Order of the Court on 22nd March, 2005 was made. He became the CEO of HIT, the parent company of GWR on 18th July, 2005 after filing of the Affidavit of Compliance by GWR, and he became the director of 1st Respondent on 22nd August, 2005, after the petition for contempt was affirmed. He can therefore not be held even vicariously liable. He is now no longer employed by the 1st Respondent Company, since 14th February, 2008, when it was sold to a Canadian. (12) He further contends that 3rd and 4th Respondents are not officers of the 1st Respondent Company as alleged. They both refer to and adopt statements in the affidavit filed by Janet Rowland on behalf of the 1st Respondent, the company. Each of them followed full instructions of their respective superiors in obtaining compliance of the Order of the Court to the best of their abilities. The required corrigendum was indeed issued, translated into various languages and sent to distributors in various countries around the world. (13) Mr. J. K. Mitra learned Senior Advocate appearing with Mr. Ranjan Bachawat learned Advocate appearing on behalf of both the petitioners Saloo and Neena Chowdhury submits very briefly that no ground has been made out to exempt them from personal appearance, as far as the respondent Nos. 4 and 9 is concerned. (13) Mr. J. K. Mitra learned Senior Advocate appearing with Mr. Ranjan Bachawat learned Advocate appearing on behalf of both the petitioners Saloo and Neena Chowdhury submits very briefly that no ground has been made out to exempt them from personal appearance, as far as the respondent Nos. 4 and 9 is concerned. The ground of journey to India from United Kingdom being strenuous, is not tenable as there are direct flights which take only about 10 hours. As far as the grounds of health and having small baby taken by the respondent No. 3 is concerned it is for the Court to accept or not to accept the same. However, it may constitute a case of compassion, and her personal appearance may be kept in abeyance for a while till the time she can travel to India. The respondent No. 1 is a company who acts through its various officers. Sections 12(4) and 12(5) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 provides the person in charge of the company are liable for act of contempt. The Respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 9 are obliged to carry out order dated March 22, 2005. The respondent No. 4 has also acted under the control of the respondent No. 2. The respondents, therefore, are accountable for the sales and marketing of the respondent No. 1 and they are directors and Managing Director of the respondent No. 1 so the argument that the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 are mere employees is untenable. The order dated 22nd March, 2005 cast an obligation upon the respondents to issue a corrigendum and without any correction the books could not published, nor circulated and distributed. The respondent No. 9 being the CEO was also obliged to carry out the order dated 22nd March, 2005. On the question of obligation of officials and employees of the. corporate body he has relied on decision of the Supreme Court rendered in case of DDA v. Skipper Construction, (1996) 4 SCC 622 . He wants this Court to apply the legal principle of lifting corporate veil and to pass appropriate order to do justice to the parties. He then submits that the object of initiating contempt proceeding is for punishing for wilful disobedience of any order of the Court and also for securing enforcement of the order. It is imperative to lift the corporate veil to punish for improper conduct. He then submits that the object of initiating contempt proceeding is for punishing for wilful disobedience of any order of the Court and also for securing enforcement of the order. It is imperative to lift the corporate veil to punish for improper conduct. This proposition of law has been held in case reported in 1988(1) Company Law Journal 198. A decision of English Court reported in 1995(1) AER 135 has also been relied on by Mr. Mitra for the proposition of law that a company is only capable of acting through its agents. The actions and the conduct of an employee acting in course of their employment, constitutes carrying on business by the company. The liability for contempt does not require any direct intention on the part of the employer to disobey the order, an employing company is liable for contempt for disobedience of an order by an employee. (14) I have perused the petition, affidavits filed by the respective parties and heard the learned Counsel. The learned Counsels have submitted a lot of things both on fact and law and the petitioners have also stated in the petition what their learned lawyer say in Court. According to me all are not relevant for the time being to decide the issue involved in the present applications. The precise point of these three applications are whether the applicants is entitled to exemption from personal appearance in terms of the Rule issued by this Court on the ground mentioned therein. The Rule commands each and every person to appear personally. The grounds for exemption as I understand is that the journey from London to Calcutta to record their personal attendance in Court are expensive, hazardous and harassing. One of the petitioners namely third respondent Samantha Fay has special reason for her inability to appear in this Court personally as she is having an one-year old baby on her lap. Other grounds are that these persons are not responsible or for that matter when the order was passed the 9th respondent was not in employment. The principal officer of the first company has already taken upon himself the responsibility for carrying out the order or if necessary he will appear in person on their behalf. According to them orders have been carried out and company only has its responsibility to do so which has already been done. The principal officer of the first company has already taken upon himself the responsibility for carrying out the order or if necessary he will appear in person on their behalf. According to them orders have been carried out and company only has its responsibility to do so which has already been done. Significantly no Rule has been issued against the company. I think those issues whether they are liable or not have prima facie been decided by this Court while issuing Rule. The Court is empowered to punish under the provision of sub-section 5 of Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) amongst others any other officer of the company. Naturally the Court has to issue notice to appear in the form of Rule against those persons who were and still are associated with the company when alleged violation took place or such violation continues. From the statements and averment it appears to me admittedly the petitioners were at the relevant point of time and still now are associated with and/or employed under the first respondent. It is further alleged that commission of contempt in this case is continuing one. Under those circumstances it is not possible for the Court to relieve them without hearing the issues as to whether they were liable or not. (15) I think Mr. Sankaranands submission in this respect ought not to be dealt with at this stage as the same constitute defence. It can only be explained at the time of full-fledged hearing of the Rule. As such I think it fit not to resolve those issues finally at the present moment though I have observed tentatively and prima facie about their involvement to maintain the Rule as against them. These grounds really explain extent of liability or accountability which could or might be taken as defence. I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Sankaranand that cogent grounds have been made out for exempting them from personal appearance. The common ground of difficulty in travelling from England to Calcutta is unacceptable to this Court except in special and exceptional circumstances as it has been rightly urged by Mr, Mitra that there is direct flight from London to Calcutta that takes only about 10 to 12 hours to complete journey. The common ground of difficulty in travelling from England to Calcutta is unacceptable to this Court except in special and exceptional circumstances as it has been rightly urged by Mr, Mitra that there is direct flight from London to Calcutta that takes only about 10 to 12 hours to complete journey. This fact stated in the affidavit in opposition has not been denied and disputed in the affidavit in reply. Moreover now-a-days journey by aircraft is not so uncomfortable or hazardous as it has been projected before me. Therefore, this ground is flimsy and has been put forward intentionally for avoiding Courts process. As far as other ground taken by the third respondent that she is having one-year old baby, is concerned, I think that it needs consideration. A mother can not be asked to come to India leaving her baby for two or three days. It is absurd to think one-year baby would travel by air continuously 10 to 12 hours without hazards. It is settled position of the law while exercising contempt jurisdiction Court has inherent power to pass such or other order as it may think fit. (16) I, therefore, allow prayer for exemption of Smantha Fay (third respondent) from her personal appearance before this Court at the present moment. However, she must record her personal appearance on any working day within four weeks from the date of communication of this order before the Indian High Commissioner in London or any other Competent Official as may be nominated by him in London, and she must give an undertaking in writing before him to the effect that as and when this Court would require her presence during pendency of this contempt proceedings or at the time of hearing she shall appear personally before this Court. The decisions cited by Mr, Sankaranand, of the Supreme Court of this country does not lend any assistance in this matter at this stage as those decisions dealt with on fact at time of final hearing and enquired into issue of compliance and non-compliance of the order not at the early stage. The decision of the House of Lords similarly is of no assistance, it might be helpful at the time of final hearing of the Rule as this authority dwelt on responsibility and liability of an officer or staff of a company against whom charge of contempt was made. The decision of the House of Lords similarly is of no assistance, it might be helpful at the time of final hearing of the Rule as this authority dwelt on responsibility and liability of an officer or staff of a company against whom charge of contempt was made. Therefore I do not find any reason to exempt either of the two persons viz Nadine Causey and Bruce Steinburg from appearing personally. I reject their prayer, accordingly they must appear personally. However, their personal appearance would be subject to furnishing personal bond by the petitioners jointly in favour of the Registrar Original Side to pay a sum of Rupees one lac to each of the said two persons in the event contempt application fails. Such amount on realisation would be paid to those two persons forthwith by the Registrar, Original Side, as being estimated costs and expenditure for their travel to Calcutta in case of discharge of Rule. (17) Bruce Stienberg and Nadine Causey will appear before this Court pursuant to the Rule on first available Friday after seven weeks from date of receipt of intimation of furnishing bond as above by the petitioners. (18) After the judgment is delivered when this Court was fixing the time limit for appearances of the above petitioners before this Court Mr. Dhruba Ghosh, learned Advocate appearing for them prays for seven weeks time and this Court having accepted his prayer granted time as above. However, on second thought he prays for stay of operation of the judgment and order. (19) I do not find any reason to grant stay for seven weeks time has been granted. Accordingly prayer for stay is rejected. (20) All parties are to act on a signed xerox copy of this o.rder upon putting in requisition for drawing up and completion of the order and for obtaining certified copy thereof. (21) Let one copy of this judgment and order be communicated to the Indian High Commission in London through the Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India and another copy be communicated to High Commissioner directly by the Registrar, Original Side.