MRF LIMITED v. COMMISSIONER OF COMMERCIAL TAXES, BANGALORE.
2009-02-24
D.V.SHYLENDRA KUMAR
body2009
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT D. V. Shylendra Kumar, J. - This writ petition is by an assessee assessed under the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003. The writ petitioner is aggrieved by the assessment order vide annexure T-1 to the petition and the consequential demand as in annexure T-2 to the petition whereunder the assessing authority has finalised the assessments in respect of the petitioner under section 39 of the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003 for the period from April, 2006 to June, 2008. Such assessment orders are called in question in these writ petitions and Sri Kumar the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, would urge that the petitioner is constrained to approach this court by-passing the statutory remedy of appeal available under the very Act for the simple reason that the assessing authority has while passing such assessment orders not applied his mind independently as an adjudicated authority, but has surrendered his decision to the dictates of the higher officer-Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, who incidentally has the power and authority for issuing clarifications under section 59 of the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003. The submission proceeds on the premise that the petitioner while had indicated that the vulcanized and non-cellular rubber manufactured and sold by it is a product which is classified under the sub-heading 4008.21.20 Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, the assessing officer has assessed and determined the liability under the Act by proceeding on the premise that the product is one referable to sub-heading 4008.21.20 of the Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act and after taking such view the assessing officer is guided by the dictates of the Commissioner and therefore the appellate remedy available under the Act will not be an efficacious remedy if the petitioner has to approach the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Tax, (Appeals) who is in fact an officer lower in rank to the Commissioner and under such circumstances the petitioner has approached this court for relief. In support of the submission the learned senior counsel for the petitioner places reliance on the following decisions : 1. Our own honourable High Court decision between Ashok Agencies v. State of Karnataka reported in [2008] 16 VST 570. 2. In the Supreme Court of India between Filterco v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1986] 61 STC 318 (SC).
In support of the submission the learned senior counsel for the petitioner places reliance on the following decisions : 1. Our own honourable High Court decision between Ashok Agencies v. State of Karnataka reported in [2008] 16 VST 570. 2. In the Supreme Court of India between Filterco v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1986] 61 STC 318 (SC). The submission is that while normally writ court will not exercise jurisdiction to interfere in matters where there is an alternative remedy of appeal in the statute itself, there is no absolute bar on the writ court to entertain a writ petition just because there is a remedy of appeal or other alternatives and it is within the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the writ petition notwithstanding the alternative remedy. Notice had been issued to the respondents and State officers are represented by the learned Government Pleader. While the learned counsel submits that the matters of this nature where the question is one relating to the product falling under the one entry or the other is to be decided by the High Court even in a 226/227 petition, the learned Government Pleader appearing for the State submits that, it is left to the parties both on facts and applying the relevant law and therefore, this court should not interfere under article 226 as disputed questions of facts and law can be satisfactorily examined only by the authorities under the Act and not by the writ court. It is also submitted that the assessing authority in fact has independently applied his mind and he has given reasons as to how the assessee is liable for payment of taxes at 12.5 per cent and not as four per cent as claimed by the assessee and the order clearly spells out such reasons and draws attention to the following passage in the assessment order : "The reply filed is examined with reference to all the facts on records. The Excise Tariff Act has been amended from February 28, 2008. The judgment cited by the dealer in the case of Speedway Rubber Co. v. Commissioner, Central Excise reported in [2004] 137 STC 503 (SC) relates to the period earlier to February 28, 2005.
The Excise Tariff Act has been amended from February 28, 2008. The judgment cited by the dealer in the case of Speedway Rubber Co. v. Commissioner, Central Excise reported in [2004] 137 STC 503 (SC) relates to the period earlier to February 28, 2005. At that time eight digit excise tariff entry was not there and specific entries have brought into the Central Excise Tariff Act making the goods which are coming under heading or sub-heading more specific and for the reasons stated above the reply filed by the dealer cannot be accepted and sale of procured thread rubber needs to be taxed at 12.5 per cent and not four per cent as claimed by the dealer." and then after this, the assessing officer no doubt draws support to this reasoning from the clarification issued by the Commissioner in clarification No. CLR. CR. 259/2005-06 dated November 30, 2006. The only question is as to whether the product which is manufactured and sold by the assessee is one which is covered under a stipulated entry in the Schedule to the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003, which are all taxable at four per cent as per Notification No. FD 197 CSL 2005 (6) dated April 30, 2005 and if not covered by this notification it taxable at 12.5 per cent. That question is dependant on the nature of the product and as to whether the product would fall under one entry or the other, figuring in the notification issued under the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003 or even under the Central Excise Tariff Act, 2003 which is a mixed question of fact and law. Such questions are best resolved by the authorities and matters can always be brought to this court in the manner provided under the very statute, as provided under section 65 of the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003, after going through the appellate authorities, at different levels, namely, the first appeal to the Joint Commissioner under section 62 and second appeal to the Tribunal under section 63 of the Act. Assuming that the petitioner contends that the appeal to the Joint Commissioner is not efficacious that argument does not hold good for the further appeal to the Tribunal which is undoubtedly a superior forum even to the Commissioner.
Assuming that the petitioner contends that the appeal to the Joint Commissioner is not efficacious that argument does not hold good for the further appeal to the Tribunal which is undoubtedly a superior forum even to the Commissioner. As observed by the honourable Supreme Court in the case of Serai Kella Glass Works Pvt. Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Patra reported in [1997] 91 ELT 497, in tax matters it is not desirable that the High Courts exercise jurisdiction under articles 226 and 227 at the threshold but allow the assessee to go through the normal remedies provided under the Act. Just because the assessee feels it has a very good case on the merits, that by itself is not a justification for this court to entertain a writ petition by-passing the appellate remedies. If that were to be so, then all merited matters should be examined under articles 226 and 227 and not by way of appeals and can lead to unnecessary burdening of the High Court. I do not find this is a proper case to entertain the petition under the discretionary writ jurisdiction and to permit the petitioner to by-pass the appeal remedies available under the Act. It is open to the petitioner to urge before the appellate authority for explaining delay if any in presentation of the appeal about time spent in prosecuting the petition before this court till now. Without prejudice to this possibility, these petitions are dismissed.