Judgment : Oral Judgment: (D.D. Sinha, J.) 1. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard Mr. Anand Jaiswal, Adv. for Petitioner, Mr.N. W. Sambre, Government Pleader for Respondent Nos.1 & 2 and Mr. S. P. Dharmadhikari, Senior Counsel with Mr.D.V.Chauhan, Adv. for Respondent Nos. 3 & 4. 2. This petition is directed against the order dt. 12.9.2006 passed by the State of Maharashtra rejecting the application of petitioner for grant of sanction to prosecute respondent nos. 3 and 4 under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as well as the order dt. 6.9.2006 passed by the Collector, Nagpur. The petitioner, in addition to quashing of these orders, has also prayed that sanction may be granted to prosecute respondent nos. 3 and 4 for committing the alleged offence punishable under Section 95 of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949. 3. Counsel for petitioner has submitted that a raid was conducted on the establishment of petitioner on 9.4.2000 under the supervision and directions of respondent nos. 3 and 4. During the course of raid, entire stock of liquor and cash from the hotel of petitioner was seized. The raiding party manhandled, abused and assaulted the persons who were present in the hotel, at the instance of respondent nos.3 and 4. 4. It is contended that, on the instructions of respondent no.3 and 4, the Police Authorities have registered offences against the petitioner under Sections 292, 294, 109, 176 r/w. Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code; Sections 81, 84, 77-A of the Bombay Prohibition Act and Section 33(x) and Section 131 of the Bombay Police Act as well as Section 30 of the Arms Act. First Information Report bearing No. 3020 was registered on 10.4.2000 and criminal proceedings were initiated against the Directors of the establishment, the employees, the Artists who were performing as well as all the customers who were present at the relevant time. The petitioner and other Directors challenged the action of Police Authorities before this High Court by filing an application u/s. 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure bearing No. 414 of 2003, which was allowed by this High Court vide judgment dt. 4.4.2005 and the criminal proceedings initiated by the Police Authorities were quashed. The judgment of this Court was challenged by respondent no.1 and others before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India by filing Special Leave Petition No. 4723 of 2005, which was dismissed vide order dt. 4.4.2005 and the criminal proceedings initiated by the Police Authorities were quashed. The judgment of this Court was challenged by respondent no.1 and others before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India by filing Special Leave Petition No. 4723 of 2005, which was dismissed vide order dt. 17.4.2006. 5. Mr. Anand Jaiswal, learned counsel has contended that, in the meanwhile, petitioner had made an application dt. 8.8.2000 before respondent nos.1 and 2 u/s. 146-A of the Bombay Prohibition Act for grant of sanction to prosecute respondent nos.3 and 4 for an offence punishable u/s. 95 of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949. Respondent nos. 1 and 2 did not take any steps in this regard and therefore, the petitioner was constrained to file Criminal Writ Petition No. 333 of 2006 before this Court. This Court was pleased to direct respondents to decide the said application within a stipulated period. In the meanwhile, this Court quashed the First Information Report and criminal proceedings and the Hon’ble Supreme Court also dismissed the Special Leave Petition. These facts were brought to the notice of respondent nos. 1 and 2 by filing additional submissions. Respondent no.1 called the petitioner and respondent nos. 3 and 4 for hearing and vide order dt. 12.9.2006 rejected the application of petitioner for grant of sanction. In view of the order of rejection passed by respondent no.1, respondent no.2 also rejected the application vide order dt. 6.9.2006. Being aggrieved by both these orders, the petitioner filed present petition. 6. Mr. Anand Jaiswal, learned counsel has submitted that respondent no.1 did not take into consideration the contentions raised by petitioner either in the Original application dt. 8.8.2000 or in the additional submissions filed thereafter. It is contended that the orders impugned do not show application of mind to the facts of the case and therefore, they suffer from total non-application of mind and cannot be sustained in law. The order passed by respondent no.1 is on extraneous consideration and not on the considerations required u/s. 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is contended that the reasons given in the order passed by respondent no.1 are thus: a) This Hon’ble Court in Writ Petition No. 414 of 2003 has not directed taking of any action against respondent nos. 3 and 4. It is contended that the reasons given in the order passed by respondent no.1 are thus: a) This Hon’ble Court in Writ Petition No. 414 of 2003 has not directed taking of any action against respondent nos. 3 and 4. b) That one Girish Ratansingh Padwanshi has filed Contempt Petition No. 24 of 2001 for taking action against respondent nos.3 and 4 and the same had been dismissed stating that there was no substance in taking any action against two Officers. c) That there were many complaints against the establishment of the petitioner and by reading the same the credibility of the police authorities had gone up in the minds of the people. 7. It is contended that all these reasons are not relevant either for granting or refusing sanction u/s. 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is submitted that this Court has not given any direction to take any action against respondents while disposing of application under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure or contempt petition cannot be a ground to shirk the responsibility of applying mind to the facts of the case to find out whether those facts were adequate enough to grant sanction or not. Similarly, dismissal of Contempt Petition No. 24 of 2001 has no bearing on the issue. 8. Mr. Anand Jaiswal, Adv. for petitioner has further submitted that the third reason given by respondent no.1 about complaints against the establishment of petitioner is clearly false as can be seen from the findings given by this Court in the Judgment rendered in Writ Petition 1926 of 2002, wherein it is stated that the raid which was carried out was not on the basis of complaint from the public at large, but merely on the basis of directions issued by this Court for conducting raids on various establishments. There was absolutely no material with respondent no.1 to come to the conclusion that by virtue of such raids credibility of police department has gone up. 9. Mr. Anand Jaiswal, Adv. has further contended that there is difference between the State Government granting sanction to prosecute a Government servant and a private citizen making application to the State Government to grant sanction. 9. Mr. Anand Jaiswal, Adv. has further contended that there is difference between the State Government granting sanction to prosecute a Government servant and a private citizen making application to the State Government to grant sanction. The State while granting sanction to prosecute the Government servant does not need reasons and the subjective sanction of the Government that it has considered all the materials would be sufficient since the order of grant of sanction is an administrative order. However, in the present case, it is not the case of grant of sanction, but the case of refusal of sanction and therefore, a private citizen is entitled to know on what grounds the sanction sought has been refused by the State Government. Transparency in the system of administration requires that order of refusal to grant sanction must disclose reasons so that a citizen can seek review of the order if he so desires. In order to substantiate these contentions, reliance is placed by the petitioner on the decision of Apex Court in the case of Chairman, Disciplinary Authority, Rani Lakshmi Bal Kshetriya Gramin Bank vs. Jagdish Sharan Varshney and Ors, reported in (2009) 4 SCC 240 (relevant Para nos. 8 and 9), Daya Ram .vs. Raghunath and Ors. reported in (2007) 11 SCC 241 (relevant para nos. 8 and 9) and Harbhajan Singh Dhalla vs. Union of India reported in 1986 (4) SCC 678 (relevant para nos. 19 and 26). 10. Mr. Anand Jaiswal, learned Counsel has further submitted that the order passed by respondent no.1 does not show what was the material which was placed before it and was taken into consideration by it while passing the order. 11. Counsel for petitioner has further contended that the contention of respondents that under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure there is a limitation for taking cognizance and since the period of limitation is already over, grant of sanction would be an empty formality is misconceived. Provisions of Section 470 (3) clearly shows that the period required for obtaining sanction has to be excluded. It is contended that the entire argument of respondents is based on technical grounds which is affecting faith of common citizen. Provisions of Section 470 (3) clearly shows that the period required for obtaining sanction has to be excluded. It is contended that the entire argument of respondents is based on technical grounds which is affecting faith of common citizen. Rejection of application for grant of sanction without dealing with the contentions of petitioner and without considering the materials would lead to eroding the faith of the common man in the system of administration which will have a far-reaching effect. Unless there are checks and balances to the high handedness of the Authorities, a common man will be left high and dry. It is contended that the facts clearly show that offence u/s. 95 of the Bombay Prohibition Act was committed by the concerned respondents. The correctness or otherwise would be decided in the course of trial. In order to substantiate these contentions, reliance is placed on the decision reported in 2002 ALL MR (Cri) 2370, Ratanlal Pralhad Gindodiya vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. which shows that the Officers had no jurisdiction to cease the liquor. Assuming though not admitting that the provisions of law give them power to do so, it was always open to the Superior Officer to regularise their function. It is contended that there was no propriety in seizing the liquor since the persons present on the spot were ready and willing to produce the license; however, were not allowed to do so. Even otherwise, they could have sealed it and informed the Excise Authorities about it. Their refusal to do so clearly shows mala fides and oblique motives. 12. Mr. Anand Jaiswal, learned Counsel for petitioner, has therefore, contended that the orders impugned are misconceived and therefore, liable to be quashed and set aside; Similarly, if this Court, on the basis of material available on record is satisfied that a case is made out for grant of sanction, may kindly grant sanction to prosecute respondent nos. 3 and 4. 13. Mr. N. W. Sambre, learned Government Pleader for Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 has submitted that the order of sanction ex-facie shows that the Sanctioning Authority has considered the evidence and other materials placed before it. This fact can be established by extrinsic evidence by placing relevant files before the Court to show that the relevant facts were considered. 13. Mr. N. W. Sambre, learned Government Pleader for Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 has submitted that the order of sanction ex-facie shows that the Sanctioning Authority has considered the evidence and other materials placed before it. This fact can be established by extrinsic evidence by placing relevant files before the Court to show that the relevant facts were considered. The Sanctioning Authority has only to see whether the facts stated in the complaint prima facie disclose commission of an offence or not. Production of evidence and its appreciation is a matter of proof during the trial. It is contended that the order passed by respondent no.1 is just and proper and is legally sustainable in law. In order to substantiate the contention, reliance is placed on decision of the Supreme Court reported in (2005) 4 SCC 81 , C.S. Krishnamurthy vs. State of Karnataka. The learned Government Pleader has further contended that the order of grant or refusal of sanction is administrative order and therefore, it is not necessary for the Authorities to give reasons in detail. The material which was considered by the Authorities while dealing with the issue of sanction can be seen from the record of the department. In the instant case, entire original record of the department was produced before this Court which clearly shows that the contention of petitioner that there was no material before respondent no.1 and it rejected the application of petitioner without considering the same has no merit. Mr. N. W. Sambre, learned Government Pleader has submitted that the impugned orders passed by the respondents are passed after taking into consideration the relevant facts and circumstances and after proper application of mind and therefore, they are sustainable in law. 14. Mr. S.P. Dharmadhikari, learned Senior Counsel for respondent nos. 3 and 4 has submitted that grant or refusal of sanction to prosecute Government Servants is essentially an administrative function. This can be seen from the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Superintendent of Police (CBI) vs. Deepak Choudhari and Ors. reported in (1995) 6 SCC 225 . In para 5 of the Judgment, the Supreme Court has observed thus: “We find force in the contention. The grant of sanction is only an administrative function, though it is true that the accused may be saddled with the liability to be prosecuted in a Court of law.” 15. reported in (1995) 6 SCC 225 . In para 5 of the Judgment, the Supreme Court has observed thus: “We find force in the contention. The grant of sanction is only an administrative function, though it is true that the accused may be saddled with the liability to be prosecuted in a Court of law.” 15. It is contended that u/s. 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as well as u/s. 146-A of the Bombay Prohibition Act, exercise of power to grant or refuse sanction is essentially an administrative function. Power to grant or refuse sanction is a discretion vested with the Sanctioning Authority and required to be exercised by the said Authority only on the basis of material on record. This is clear from the observations in the judgment of Privy Council in case of Gokulchand Dwarkadas Murarka vs. King, reported in AIR 1948 PC 82, which reads thus: “The sanction to prosecute is an important matter; it constitute a condition precedent to the institution of the prosecution and the Government has an absolute discretion to grant or withhold their sanction. They are not, as the High Court seem to have thought, concerned merely to see that the evidence discloses a prima facie against the person sought to be prosecuted. They can refuse sanction on any ground which commands itself to them, for example, that on political or mechanic grounds they regard a prosecution as inexpedient. Looked at as a matter of substance it is plain that the Government cannot adequately discharge the obligation of deciding whether to give or withhold a sanction without a knowledge of facts of the case. 16. Mr. S. P. Dharmadhikari, learned Senior Counsel has further contended that since the power to grant sanction vests in the Authority, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan .vs. State of Gujarat, (1997) 7 SCC 622 , it is not for the Courts to exercise said power. The Apex Court in the said judgment has observed thus: “The High Court put the Secretary in a piquant situation. The Apex Court in the said judgment has observed thus: “The High Court put the Secretary in a piquant situation. While the Act gave him the discretion to sanction or not to sanction the appellant’s prosecution, the judgment gave him no choice except to sanction the prosecution as any other decision would have exposed him to an action in contempt for not obeying the mandamus issued by the High Court. The High Court assumed the role of the sanctioning authority, considered the whole matter, formed an opinion that it was a fit case in which sanction should be granted and because it itself could not grant sanction, it directed the Secretary to sanction the prosecution so that the sanction order may be treated to be an order passed by the Secretary and not that of the High Court. This is a classic case where a brand name is changed to give a new colour to the package without changing the contents there of. In these circumstances, the sanction order cannot but be held to be wholly erroneous having been passed mechanically at the instance of the High Court.” 17. Mr. S. P. Dharmadhikari, learned Senior Counsel has contended that the aforesaid observations would clearly show that the additional prayer made by the petitioner for grant of sanction to prosecute respondent nos. 3 and 4 is liable to be rejected. 18. Learned Senior Counsel for respondent nos. 3 and 4 has further contended that so far as the scope and ambit of judicial review of the order granting or refusing sanction passed by the Authorities is concerned, the same has been already decided by the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan (cited supra). The relevant observations are in para nos. 15 to 23 of the judgment, which read thus: “15. In Gokulchand Dwarkadas Morarka v. King, it was pointed out that: “....... The sanction to prosecute is an important matter; it constitutes a condition precedent to the institution of the prosecution and the Government have an absolute discretion to grant or withhold their sanction. They are not, as the High Court seem to have thought, concerned merely to see that the evidence discloses a prima facie case against the person sought to be prosecuted. They are not, as the High Court seem to have thought, concerned merely to see that the evidence discloses a prima facie case against the person sought to be prosecuted. They can refuse sanction on any ground which commends itself to them, for example, that on political or economic grounds they regard a prosecution as inexpedient. Looked at as a matter of substance it is plain that the Government cannot adequately discharge the obligation of deciding whether to give or withhold a sanction without a knowledge of the facts of the case,” (emphasis supplied) 16. In Basdeo Agarwalla vs. Emperor it was pointed out that sanction under the Act is not intended to be, nor is an automatic formality and it is essential that the provisions in regard to sanction should be observed with complete strictness. This Court in State through Anti-Corruption Bureau, Govt. of Maharashtra v. Krishanchand Khushalchand Jagtiani while considering the provisions of Section 6 of the Act held that one of the guiding principles for sanctioning authority would be the public interest and, therefore, the protection available under Section 6 cannot be said to be absolute. 17. Sanction lifts the bar for prosecution. The grant of sanction is not an idle formality or an acrimonious excise but a solemn and sacrosanct act which affords protection to government servants against frivolous prosecutions. (See Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed .vs. State of A.P.). Sanction is a weapon to ensure discouragement of frivolous and vexatious prosecution and is a safeguard for the innocent but not a shield for the guilty. 18. The validity of the sanction would, therefore, depend upon the material placed before the sanctioning authority and the fact that all the relevant facts, material and evidence have been considered by the sanctioning authority. Consideration implies application of mind. The order of sanction must ex-facie disclose that the sanctioning authority had considered the evidence and other material placed before it. This fact can also be established by extrinsic evidence by placing the relevant files before the Court to show that all relevant facts were considered by the sanctioning authority. (See also Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab and State of Bihar vs. P. P. Sharma). 19. This fact can also be established by extrinsic evidence by placing the relevant files before the Court to show that all relevant facts were considered by the sanctioning authority. (See also Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab and State of Bihar vs. P. P. Sharma). 19. Since the validity of “sanction” depends on the applicability of mind by the sanctioning authority to the facts of the case as also the material and evidence collected during investigation, it necessarily follows that the sanctioning authority has to apply its own independent mind for the generation of genuine satisfaction whether prosecution has to be sanctioned or not. The mind of the sanctioning authority should not be under pressure from any quarter nor should any external force be acting upon it to take a decision one way or the other. Since the discretion to grant or not to grant sanction vests absolutely in the sanctioning authority, its discretion should be shown to have not been affected by any extraneous consideration. If it is shown that the sanctioning authority was unable to apply its independent mind for any reason whatsoever or was under an obligation or compulsion or constraint to grant the sanction, the order will be bad for the reason that the discretion of the authority “not to sanction” was taken away and it was compelled to act mechanically to sanction the prosecution. 20. The narration of facts, set out in the beginning of the judgment, would show that while the matter of grant of sanction was under the consideration of the State Government, Harshadrai had filed a petition on behalf of his firm in the Gujarat High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the State Government to grant sanction. In this petition, the Secretary of the Department who, originally was not impleaded, was, subsequently, arrayed as Respondent 7 and a direction was issued to him to grant sanction and the Secretary, acting in pursuance of the order of the High Court, granted the sanction. 21. The question is whether the High Court could issue a mandamus of this nature and whether the order of sanction, in these circumstances, is valid. 22. 21. The question is whether the High Court could issue a mandamus of this nature and whether the order of sanction, in these circumstances, is valid. 22. Mandamus which is a discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution is requested to be issued, inter alia, to compel performance of public duties which may be administrative, ministerial or statutory in nature. Statutory duty may be either directory or mandatory. Statutory duties, if they are intended to be mandatory in character, are indicated by the use of the words “shall” or “must”. But this is not conclusive as “shall” and “must” have, sometimes, been interpreted as “may”. What is determinative of the nature of duty, whether it is obligatory, mandatory or directory, is the scheme of the statute in which the “duty” has been set out. Even if the “duty” is not set out clearly and specifically in the statute, it may be implied as correlative to a “right”. 23. In the performance of this duty, if the authority in whom the discretion is vested under the statute, does not act independently and passes an order under the instructions and orders of another authority, the Court would intervene in the matter, quash the order and issue a mandamus to that authority to exercise its own discretion.” 19. In the present case, the State Government has produced concerned files for perusal of this Court. Even the order of refusing sanction ex-facie shows that the Government has considered all the factual aspects of the matter. Under the circumstances, no case is made out for quashing of the order refusing sanction. Mr. S. P. Dharmadhikari, Senior Counsel for respondent nos.3 and 4 has contended that, in the order itself, the sanctioning authority has already given reasons which clearly show that the sanctioning authority has not only considered the reasons but also applied its mind to those facts. Those reasons are: 1) The raid in question was in pursuance of the orders of the High Court in Writ Petition No. 399 of 1999. 2) In the Judgment of High Court in Writ Petition No. 414 of 2003, there is no direction to proceed against respondent nos. 3 and 4. 3) Contempt petition filed by Girish Ratansing Padvanshi against respondent nos. 3 and 4 was dismissed. 4) There were complaints by the public against Executive Club Hotel, Nagpur. Because of the raids conducted by respondent nos. 3 and 4. 3) Contempt petition filed by Girish Ratansing Padvanshi against respondent nos. 3 and 4 was dismissed. 4) There were complaints by the public against Executive Club Hotel, Nagpur. Because of the raids conducted by respondent nos. 3 and 4, the credibility of police was enhanced in the estimation of the general public. 5) Respondent nos. 3 and 4 had honestly conducted the raid. 20. It is contended that under the circumstances, the grievance of petitioner is wholly untenable and the petition is liable to be dismissed. 21. Learned Senior Counsel has further contended that so far as the offence u/s. 95 of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 is concerned, it is punishable with imprisonment which extends to one year or with fine. It is contended that u/s. 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the limitation for the Court to take cognizance for such an offence is one year. The alleged offence in question is said to have been committed on 9.4.2000. Under the circumstances, even if sanction is granted, respondent nos. 3 and 4 cannot be prosecuted for the alleged offence u/s. 95 of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949. The whole issue has, therefore, become academic and the petition even on this point is liable to be dismissed. 22. We have considered the contentions canvassed by the respective counsel and also considered various decisions cited by the learned Counsel. It will be appropriate to consider the scope, ambit and power of judicial review of the order granting or refusing sanction by the Authority, though this aspect is more or less already settled by the decisions of Courts. In the case of Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan (cited supra), the Supreme Court has already held that the grant of sanction is not an ideal formality or an acrimonious exercise but a solemn and sacrosanct act which affords protection to government servants against frivolous prosecution. Sanction is a weapon to ensure discouragement of frivolous and vexatious prosecution and is a safeguard for the innocent but not a shield for the guilty. The Supreme Court has further held that the validity of the sanction would, therefore, depend upon the material placed before the sanctioning authority and the fact that all the relevant facts, material and evidence have been considered by the sanctioning authority. Consideration implies application of mind. The Supreme Court has further held that the validity of the sanction would, therefore, depend upon the material placed before the sanctioning authority and the fact that all the relevant facts, material and evidence have been considered by the sanctioning authority. Consideration implies application of mind. The order of sanction must ex-facie disclose that the sanctioning authority had considered the evidence and other material placed before it. This fact can also be established by extrinsic evidence by placing the relevant files before the Court to show that all relevant facts were considered by the sanctioning authority. 23. Similarly, in case of Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan (cited supra), the Supreme Court has held that the mandamus issued by the Gujarat High Court to the Secretary, which left no choice but to grant sanction to prosecute. In such circumstances, the Supreme Court has held that the sanction order cannot but be held to be only erroneous having been passed mechanically at the instance of the High Court. 24. The Apex Court while deciding Mansukhlal’s case considered the case of Gokulchand Dwarkadas Morarka .vs. King, AIR 1948 PC 82 wherein it is observed that the sanction to prosecute is an important matter; it constitutes a condition precedent to the institution of the prosecution and the Government have an absolute discretion to grant or withhold their sanction. They are not, as the High Court seems to have thought, concerned merely to see that the evidence discloses a prima facie case against the person sought to be prosecuted. They can refuse sanction on any ground which commends itself to them, for example, on political or mechanical grounds they regard a prosecution as inexpedient. Looked at as a matter of substance it is plain that the Government cannot adequately discharge the obligation of deciding whether to give or withhold a sanction without a knowledge of the facts of the case. 25. From the above referred decision of the Supreme Court, it is evident that grant or refusal of sanction is a very important function which is required to be discharged by the Authorities on the basis of material placed before it and in view of the other attaining circumstances which are referred by the Apex Court in its decisions. The order granting or refusing to grant sanction must show the application of mind and it should not be mechanically passed and in a routine manner. The order granting or refusing to grant sanction must show the application of mind and it should not be mechanically passed and in a routine manner. It is well settled that extra-ordinary power of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be curtailed nor can be restricted. However, so far as grant of sanction for prosecution is concerned, discretion is vested in the Authority by virtue of Statute and it is for the Authority to exercise the same on the basis of material placed on record. This Court should be slow in showing indulgence unless the situation is exceptional and the facts genuinely warrant indulgence of this Court in the larger public interest to avoid miscarriage of justice. 26. It is well settled that this Court does have a power of judicial review of administrative order passed by the Authorities. However, those powers cannot be equated with appellate or revisional powers. This Court is not expected to go into the adequacy of reasons given by the Authorities for passing such order, however, the Court can always consider whether the Authorities have given any reason in support of such order and it should not be perverse and based on extraneous circumstances and must demonstrate application of mind. It is no doubt true that the department can produce the record and material before the Court in order to justify the administrative order. However, if the Authority while passing the order applies its mind to the material placed before it and give reasons in support thereof in the order, it would be in the interest of everybody and would curtail unnecessary litigation. 27. In the instant case, raid was conducted on the premises of petitioner on 9.4.2000 under the supervision of respondent nos. 3 and 4. The Raiding party seized the entire stock of liquor and cash from the hotel of petitioner. At the instance of respondent nos. 3 and 4, the Police Authorities have registered offence under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code, Bombay Prohibition Act, Arms Act and initiated criminal proceedings against the Director of Establishment, employees, Artists etc. The petitioner and other Directors challenged the action of Police Authorities by filing criminal application u/s. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before this Court, which was allowed by this Court vide judgment dt. 4.4.2005 and the First Information Report and the criminal proceedings were quashed. The petitioner and other Directors challenged the action of Police Authorities by filing criminal application u/s. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before this Court, which was allowed by this Court vide judgment dt. 4.4.2005 and the First Information Report and the criminal proceedings were quashed. The Special Leave Petition against the said judgment was also dismissed. One of the employees of the petitioner/establishment Mr. Girish Ratansingh Padwanshi had filed Contempt Petition No.24 of 2001 for taking action against respondent nos. 3 and 4 which was dismissed by this Court. 28. The petitioner filed an application for grant of sanction to prosecute respondent nos. 3 and 4 before respondent nos. 1 and 2. Respondent No.1 rejected the said application vide order dt. 12.9.2006 and respondent no.2 rejected the application vide order dt. 6.9.2006. Both these orders are impugned in the present petition. The impugned order dt. 12.9.2006 passed by respondent no.1 whereby application of petitioner for grant of sanction is refused demonstrates the following reasons: 1) That the raid was conducted by respondent nos. 3 and 4 in view of the order passed by this Court in Writ Petition No.399 of 1999. 2) After the raid, offence was registered under various sections of the Indian Penal Code, Prohibition Act, Arms Act and Bombay Police Act. 3) In Writ Petition No. 414 of 2003 this Court cancelled the charge sheet filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nagpur. However, no direction was issued or remarks have been made for taking any action against the Officers namely Mr. Kulwant Kumar (I.P.S.) and Mr. Sanjay Kumar (I.P.S.). Similarly, Mr.Girish Ratansing Padwanshi had filed Contempt Petition No.24 of 2001 before this Court for taking action against the said two Officers. This High Court heard in detail the said matter and dismissed the petition mentioning therein that there was no substance in taking any action against the said two Officers. 4) In the year 2000, when the Executive Club Hotel, Nagpur was run by the petitioner, at that time there were many complaints of people against the said Club. Because of the action taken by the then Deputy Commissioner of Police Mr. Sanjay Kumar(then Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone-I, Nagpur) and Mr. Kulwant Kumar (I.P.S.) (then Deputy Commissioner of Police-Crime), the credibility of Police department rose in the minds of people. Both the officers had worked in this matter honestly and sincerely. 29. Because of the action taken by the then Deputy Commissioner of Police Mr. Sanjay Kumar(then Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone-I, Nagpur) and Mr. Kulwant Kumar (I.P.S.) (then Deputy Commissioner of Police-Crime), the credibility of Police department rose in the minds of people. Both the officers had worked in this matter honestly and sincerely. 29. In view of these reasons, it will be appropriate to examine facts. This Court in Writ Petition No. 399 of 1999, Umesh s/o. Dayashankar Choubey vs. State of Mah. and Ors. on 23.12.1999 passed following order: “Notice before admission returnable on 10.1.2000. At this stage, we refrain from passing any ad-interim order but direct the licensing authorities to conduct frequent raid on all such establishment and maintain vigilance keeping in view the law and order situation and the forthcoming celebration of the millennium. In case any violation of license is detected in any establishment license should not be renewed. A. P. P. waives service for respondent nos.1 and 2” It is hereby accordingly directed that the above order should be observed punctually and carried into execution by all concerned.” 30. Contempt Petition No. 24 of 2001 was filed by Mr.Krishnakumar s/o. Ratansingh Padanwanshi against respondent nos. 3 and 4 alleging that they have committed contempt of Court for not following directions given by the Apex Court in case of D. K. Basu vs. State of West Bengal reported in (1996) 4 Crimes 233 (SC), particularly, the observations made in para 30 of the Judgment which lays down certain conditions to be followed in all cases of arrest or detentions till legal provisions are made in that behalf as preventive measures. The learned Single Judge of this Court after taking into consideration the pros and cons in para 12 of the decision in the Contempt Petition has observed thus: “Under these circumstances, I do not find, prima facie any substance in the Contempt Petition and the same is dismissed.” 31. The interim order dt. 23.12.2009 passed by this Court was of a general nature whereby the licensing Authorities were directed to conduct raid on all such establishments and to maintain vigilance keeping in view the law and order situation and were also directed to take action against those establishments who have violated the conditions of license. The second paragraph of the order required the Authorities to punctually execute the order. The second paragraph of the order required the Authorities to punctually execute the order. It is, therefore, apparent that, in view of the interim order of this Court, the Authorities had no choice but to execute the same and were required to take action against such establishments those who have violated the terms and conditions of the license. In the instant case, the raid which was conducted by respondent nos. 3 and 4 on the establishment of petitioner appears to be in view of the interim order passed by this Court dt. 23.12.1999. Since the raid was conducted in compliance of the interim order passed by this Court, therefore, no motive can be attributed in this regard to respondent nos. 3 and 4. 32. So far as arrest and detention of the petitioner and other employees is concerned, the issue was agitated before this Court by filing Contempt Petition No.24 of 2001 in view of decision of the Apex Court in case of D.K. Basu (cited supra). According to the petitioner the action of detention and arrest by respondent nos. 3 and 4 was in violation of the condition and requirement mentioned by the Apex Court in para 30 of the said judgment. However, the learned Single Judge, after taking into consideration the pros and cons, passed an exhaustive order and dismissed the Contempt Petition by holding that there was no substance in the Contempt Petition and therefore, by necessary implication, it is prima facie difficult to conclude that the procedure undertaken by respondent nos. 3 and 4 was inconsistent with the law. It is no doubt true that the Contempt Petition was not filed either by petitioner or any of the Directors of the establishment but by the employees of petitioner. However, the procedure of arrest and detention undertaken by respondent nos. 3 and 4 was not held to be in consistent with decision of the Apex Court by the learned Single Judge and therefore, who has filed the Contempt Petition makes no difference. The issue was whether the procedure of arrest and detention which was undertaken by the police was proper or not. 33. Another ground mentioned in the order is that though the charge-sheet filed in the Chief Judicial Magistrate’s Court is quashed by the High Court, there was no direction issued by the High Court for taking action against respondent nos. 3 and 4. 33. Another ground mentioned in the order is that though the charge-sheet filed in the Chief Judicial Magistrate’s Court is quashed by the High Court, there was no direction issued by the High Court for taking action against respondent nos. 3 and 4. It is nodoubt true that if frivolous prosecution is initiated with oblique motive and only to harass a common man, which is quashed by the High Court, in absence of any direction to take action against the Police Officer, the competent Authority is free to take independent decision in this regard. However, such decision must necessarily be based on the materials placed before such Authority. It is not that in every case where the First Information Report or a charge sheet is quashed and set aside by the Court, it would automatically result in prosecution of Investigating Officer. At the same time, it is open for the department in a given case to take a decision in this regard on the basis of the materials available on record in this regard. In the instant case, taking into consideration the overall view of the matter such as raid was conducted in view of the interim order passed by this Court, so far as the arrest and detention is concerned; the Contempt Petition came to be dismissed by this Court by holding that same was without any substance; though the charge sheet was quashed and set aside by the High Court; however, the fact remains that the Court did not find it necessary to issue direction either to prosecute the Investigating Officers or to take departmental action against them and therefore, the impugned orders dt. 12.9.2006 passed by the respondent no.1 and dt. 6.9.2006 passed by respondent no.2, in our view, is sustainable in law. 34. Learned Counsel for petitioner has cited decision of the Supreme Court in case of Chairman, Disciplinary Authority, Rani Lakshmi Bal Kshetriya Gramin Bank (cited supra) in support of his contention. However, the said decision deals with administrative law, natural justice, duty to give reasons by the Appellate Authority and in para 8, the Supreme Court has observed thus: “The purpose of disclosure of reasons, as held by a Constitutional Bench of this Court in S.N.Mukherjee v. Union of India, is that people must have confidence in the judicial or quasi-judicial authorities. Unless reasons are disclosed, how can a person know whether the Authority has applied his mind or not? Also, giving of reason minimises the chances of arbitrariness. Hence, it is an essential requirement of the law that some reasons, atleast in brief, must be disclosed in a judicial or quasi-judicial order, even if it is an order of affirmation.” 35. Powers of the Appellate Authorities cannot be equated with that of administrative decision required to be taken by Authorities, though the administrative order also must be of a nature which must demonstrate proper application of mind and must be based on the materials available on record. It is in this backdrop of the legal position, the Judgment of the Apex Court is not of much help to the petitioner. 36. So far as the decision of the Supreme Court in Daya Ram’s case cited by the petitioner is concerned, there is no quarrel with the proposition. However, nature of reasons required to be given in support of the order differs from situation to situation. Similarly, the scope and ambit of judicial review by this Court also differs from situation to situation. In case of Daya Ram, the Supreme Court was considering the judgment delivered by the High Court in Writ Petition and therefore, the principle laid down in that case cannot be applied to the case in hand where the order passed by the Authority is an administrative order, though the reasons must be adequate to demonstrate application of mind. Similarly, the decision of the Apex Court in case of Harbhajan Singh Dhalla (cited supra) does not further the case of petitioner. So far as the case of Ratanlal Pralhad Gindodiya cited by the petitioner is concerned, it deals with the scope and object of Section 50 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In the instant case, the petitioner is not challenging the action of respondent nos. 3 and 4 of illegal arrest or detention nor seeking any compensation for such detention. The petitioner is challenging validity of the orders passed by the Authorities whereby permission to grant sanction to prosecute respondent nos. 3 and 4 came to be rejected by the Sanctioning Authority. 3 and 4 of illegal arrest or detention nor seeking any compensation for such detention. The petitioner is challenging validity of the orders passed by the Authorities whereby permission to grant sanction to prosecute respondent nos. 3 and 4 came to be rejected by the Sanctioning Authority. We have already held that the entire procedure including impugned order is administrative in nature and in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court, the discretion in this regard vested in the Authority is absolute. However, the order refusing sanction must demonstrate application of mind and should be based on the material available on record. In this context when the decision in Ratanlal Pralhad Gindodiya’s case (cited supra) is considered, then we are of the view that it does not further the case of prosecution. 37. In the instant case, the raid was conducted way back in the year 2000. Application was filed by the petitioner in the year 2006 seeking permission for grant of sanction to prosecute respondent nos. 3 and 4 before the Sanctioning Authority and we are now in the year 2009. Taking into consideration the issue in totality, considerable time has already been lapsed and since we have already held that the impugned orders are sustainable in law, therefore, the action of respondents in rejecting the request of petitioner to prosecute respondent nos. 3 and 4 is just and proper. 38. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the petition suffers from lack of merits. Hence, the same is dismissed. Rule is discharged. No orders as to costs.