Judgment :- 1. The writ petition is directed against the order passed by the first respondent/Labour Officer in A/572/2007 dated 20.12.2007, under which the first respondent has ordered that the dismissal of one G.Karunakaran, Working President of the second respondent Union is opposed to section 33(1)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (in short, "the Act") since the conciliation proceedings in respect of the dispute are pending and the dismissal has been ordered without approval from the Conciliation Officer. 2. The writ petitioner is a publisher of various magazines and one G.Karunakaran, working as Assistant Printer, was said to have been involved in the charge of misconduct, in respect of which a charge sheet was issued on 9. 2006 and he was kept under suspension pending enquiry. It is stated that on 19. 2006, the second respondent Union has raised an industrial dispute regarding retrenchment, lock out, etc., including that of suspension of G.Karunakaran and that dispute was numbered as A/514/2006 by the first respondent. 2(a). The first respondent issued notice on 19. 2006 for enquiry which was posted on 29. 2006, 10. 2006 and 110. 2006. On 111. 2006, the petitioner submitted a reply to the effect that the petitioner is not proposing to indulge in retrenchment or lock out and that G.Karunakaran has been suspended pending disciplinary proceedings and therefore, the dispute is not maintainable. While the enquiry was posted on 22. 2007, the second respondent approached this Court by filing W.P.No.38315 of 2006 against the disciplinary action initiated against G.Karunakaran and also filed W.P.No.41190 of 2006 challenging the charge sheet-cum-suspension order dated 9. 2006 and both the writ petitions were dismissed on 4. 2007 on the basis that the second respondent raised a dispute and hence, the alternative remedy was resorted to. 2(b). It is the case of the petitioner that against the said G.Karunakaran, enquiry was conducted and a second show-cause notice dated 06.04.2007 was issued, proposing to dismiss him from service, for which there was no reply and therefore, by order dated 24. 2007, the said G.Karunakaran was dismissed from service. It is the case of the petitioner that even though the first respondent issued various notices, no conciliation proceedings have been initiated as per section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947. On the memorandum filed by the second respondent on 6. 2007, the said G.Karunakaran was dismissed from service. It is the case of the petitioner that even though the first respondent issued various notices, no conciliation proceedings have been initiated as per section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947. On the memorandum filed by the second respondent on 6. 2007 questioning the dismissal of the said G.Karunakaran from service without prior approval, particularly when the dispute stood posted by the first respondent for enquiry on various dates, the petitioner replied stating that no conciliation proceedings were pending when G.Karunakaran was dismissed on 24. 2007. 2(c). Thereafter, the first respondent took up an application regarding non-employment of G.Karunakaran and the petitioner participated in the enquiry on 9. 2007. That was also in case No.A/514/2006 and the enquiry was subsequently adjourned to 19. 2007 and there were no further proceedings. It is stated that in the meantime, the second respondent raised two more disputes and the same were numbered as 591/2006 and 810/2006 and according to the petitioner, they were not taken up by the first respondent for conciliation. 2(d). It is the case of the petitioner that in case of non-public utility service like that of the petitioner, notices are issued for enquiry inviting parties to attend to verify the records and when notices are issued for conciliation proceedings within the meaning of section 12 of the Act, the Conciliation Officer is bound to submit his report and the first respondent has not submitted any such conciliation failure report. 2(e). Even though the first respondent in A/572/07 called for the discussion in respect of dismissal of G.Karunakaran during the pendency of dispute in A/514/06, the petitioner was unable to attend by oversight and ultimately, the first respondent passed the impugned order and after the impugned order was passed, the workman G.Karunakaran filed C.P.No.44/08 on the basis that the termination was in violation of section 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act and he was entitled for the balance of subsistence allowance and wages for the period from October,2006 to January,2008 to the extent of Rs.1,21,457/-. It was only after receipt of claim petition in May, 2008, the petitioner was able to peruse the impugned order of the first respondent dated 20.12.2007. 3. It was only after receipt of claim petition in May, 2008, the petitioner was able to peruse the impugned order of the first respondent dated 20.12.2007. 3. The impugned proceedings of the first respondent are challenged by the petitioner on various grounds including that there were no conciliation proceedings pending within the meaning of section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act and in such circumstances, there was no necessity for the petitioner to obtain prior permission for dismissing G.Karunakaran, since the petitioner being a non-public utlity service, the discussion held in A.No.514/2006 would not amount to conciliation proceedings in the eye of law and it is only an enquiry. 4. In the counter affidavit filed by the second respondent it is reiterated that the union raised dispute on 19. 2006, which was taken up as A/514/2006 by the Conciliation Officer at Kuralagam, Chennai and when the conciliation proceedings were actually pending, W.P.Nos.38351 of 2006 and 41190 of 2006 came to be dismissed for the reason that the second respondent availed the alternative remedy and in the order, the learned Judge has also explained the conciliation proceedings bearing No.A/514/06. After the W.A.Nos.703 and 704 of 2007 filed against the above said order were dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy, the petitioner dismissed the said G.Karunakaran from service without obtaining prior permission as contemplated under section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, since the conciliation proceedings were pending before the first respondent at that time. It is also stated that the management itself admitted that A/514/2006 are conciliation proceedings and on 19. 2007, the second respondent gave a letter to the first respondent to convert the dispute under section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act into one under section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act and thereafter, A/514/2006 was renumbered as A/620/2007 and the conciliation failure report was submitted on 30.10.2007. Even if the proceedings under section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act were not converted into one under section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, the conciliation proceedings were still pending on the date of dismissal of G.Karunakaran, in case the Conciliation Officer has no power to effect such conversion. On the other hand, if such conversion has been made, the failure report has been submitted on 30.7.2007. .5. On the other hand, if such conversion has been made, the failure report has been submitted on 30.7.2007. .5. Mr.S.Ravindran for M/s.T.S.Gopalan & Co, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner by referring to section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act would submit that only in respect of public utility services, the method is prescribed and therefore, in the case of non-public utility service, there is no method for conciliation with the result the notices sent by the first respondent for enquiry cannot be deemed to have been sent pursuant to the conciliation proceedings. He would also submit that the first respondent has never treated the proceedings as conciliation proceedings and even otherwise, he has no authority to decide the validity or otherwise of the dismissal since in the eye of law there is no conciliation. He would also rely upon the judgment reported in Management Essorpe Mills Ltd., vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court and others [2008(2) LLN 761]. His submission is that conciliation in any proceedings must be as per section 2(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Even assuming that the conciliation started in A/514/2006, there is no conciliation failure report. 6. On the other hand, it is the contention of Mr.S.Vaidhyanathan, learned counsel appearing for the second respondent that in the absence of a precise definition for the term conciliation in respect of non-public utility service, the notices issued by the first respondent should be treated as having been sent for conciliation proceedings and the argument that such enquiry cannot be deemed to be conciliation proceedings is only technical which cannot take away the substantive right of a workman under the Industrial Disputes Act, which is a beneficial legislation. He would also rely upon the judgment in V.Palanishanmugavel and others vs. The General Manger, Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (Madurai) Ltd., Tirunelveli and others [2007 (4) CTC 478] to substantiate his contention apart from the judgment in The Correspondent, Sacred Heart Primary School, Kamaraj Nagar, Padanthalumoodu, Kanyakumari District and another vs. The District Elementary Educational Officer, Kanyakumari District at Nagercoil, Kanyakumari and others [ 2006 (4) CTC 34 ]. 7. The admitted facts are that the petitioner is a non-public utility service and the second respondent Union has raised some dispute before the first respondent on 19. 2006 under section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 7. The admitted facts are that the petitioner is a non-public utility service and the second respondent Union has raised some dispute before the first respondent on 19. 2006 under section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The crux of the said dispute raised by the second respondent as stated above is that the petitioner is attempting to close the unit and the said G.Karunakaran was placed under suspension illegally on 9. 2006 with an intention to terminate him from service. In the said petition under section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the second respondent has requested the first respondent to give direction to the petitioner not to retrench workmen, not to close down the factory without prior approval from the Government and to declare that the suspension against G.Karunakaran is null and void and to set aside the same and also requested the first respondent to conduct enquiry and pass appropriate orders at the earliest point of time. .8. The respondents therein have given reply denying various allegations wherein it is stated that enquiry officer was appointed in the matter of Karunakaran but the said Karunakaran did not co-operate and therefore requested to reject the application. Based on the said complaint, the first respondent has issued notices for enquiry in A.No.514/06 and in all enquiry notices, it is true, the first respondent has chosen to state it as enquiry (tprhuiz) and not conciliation (rkurk;). Up to the date of order passed by this Court on 4. 2007 in W.P.Nos.38315/06 and 41190/06, it is seen that the first respondent has referred the said proceedings in A.514/06 as enquiry. W.P.No.38315 of 2006 was filed by the second respondent Union against the disciplinary proceedings initiated against G.Karunakaran and the subsequent W.P.No.41190 of 2006 was filed challenging the order of petitioner dated 9. 2006 placing the said G.Karunakaran under suspension. Both the writ petitions were dismissed on 4. 2007 holding that the second respondent has already filed application under section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act and hence, resorted to alternative remedy. 9. At this juncture, it is relevant to point out that the said G.Karunakaran was placed under suspension on 9. 2006 and charge memo was issued against him on the same day. Ultimately, the petition under section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act as stated above, was filed by the second respondent Union on 19. 2006. 9. At this juncture, it is relevant to point out that the said G.Karunakaran was placed under suspension on 9. 2006 and charge memo was issued against him on the same day. Ultimately, the petition under section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act as stated above, was filed by the second respondent Union on 19. 2006. The said G.Karunakaran was dismissed on 24. 2007 viz., after the dismissal of writ petitions on 4. 2007. Even after the dismissal order, the first respondent has issued notice to the parties on 30.4.2007 for enquiry fixing the date as 5. 2007 and in that enquiry no order was passed and in the meantime, on 6. 2007, the second respondent Union filed an application before the first respondent to the effect that when the application in respect of G.Karunakaran was pending before the first respondent, the dismissal order passed by the petitioner without prior approval from the authority under section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act becomes invalid and therefore, prayed to set aside the dismissal order. .10. It is, thereafter, by a communication dated 6. 2007, the first respondent in addition to A.No.514/2006 has included 591 and 810 of 2006, which appear to be relating to enhancement of salary and some other demand and the enquiry in respect of the above said three applications was subsequently adjourned to 26. 2007 as communicated by the first respondent in the notice dated 16. 2007. By subsequent communication dated 28. 2007 in A.No.514/2006 relating to the suspension of G.Karunakaran, the first respondent has fixed the enquiry on 9. 2007. By another communication dated 9. 2007, the first respondent restricted the enquiry to A.591/2006 and A.810/2006 which, as stated above, appears to relate to the enhancement of salary and some other demands. Ultimately, under the impugned order, the first respondent by numbering it as A.572/07, decided that the dismissal of G.Karunakaran is against section 33(1)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act. .11. The impugned order refers to the petition of the second respondent dated 28. 2007. It appears, as it is seen in the counter affidavit filed by the second respondent, that the second respondent Union had given a letter to the first respondent on 19. 2007 for converting the original application filed under section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act on 19. 2007. It appears, as it is seen in the counter affidavit filed by the second respondent, that the second respondent Union had given a letter to the first respondent on 19. 2007 for converting the original application filed under section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act on 19. 2006 into an individual dispute under section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act and the same was numbered as A.620/07. It is true that in respect of conciliation proceedings relating to other establishments and workmen, the first respondent has been issuing notices captioned, conciliation notices (rkur ngr;Rthu;j;ij) while in respect of present case, in all notices issued by the first respondent, the term used is enquiry (tprhuiz). But, a reference to the proceedings of the first respondent in A.514/2006, the extract of which has been filed by the petitioner/management in typed set of papers, shows that what was effected by the first respondent throughout was only conciliation. On various dates of adjournment from September, 2006 the first respondent has been using the word (rkur ngr;Rthu;j;ij) which means conciliation talk. It is also true that the first respondent had no jurisdiction to pass orders, since he was effecting conciliation. On the date of hearing, 112. 2006, there was an endorsement by the first respondent as follows: 12. Again, on 212. 2006, the endorsement made by the first respondent as it is seen in the typed set of paper of the petitioner is, 13. Therefore, the hearing before the first respondent up to 16. 2007 is only for effecting conciliation even though notices issued are for enquiry. The mere reason that the first respondent has not sent notices captioned conciliation notice but has sent notices with the caption, enquiry notice does not take away the power of jurisdiction and the nature of enquiry of the first respondent in effecting conciliation as per the Industrial Disputes Act. For, it is the substance of the proceedings of the first respondent which has to be taken into consideration and not the form in a technical manner, especially while construing a beneficial legislation like the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner as if the proceedings pending before the first respondent was not conciliation proceedings and it was only an enquiry which is not contemplated under the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be countenanced. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner as if the proceedings pending before the first respondent was not conciliation proceedings and it was only an enquiry which is not contemplated under the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be countenanced. On record, it is seen that what had been done by the first respondent was only relating to conciliation even though the prayer in the petition filed by the second respondent under section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act is to set aside the suspension order, etc. 14. As it is stated in the counter affidavit filed by the second respondent, the conciliation failure report was submitted on 30.10.2007, which fact is not controverted in the reply affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner. While so, the dismissal which was on 24. 2007 before the filing of conciliation failure report by the first respondent dated 30.10.2007 has to be taken only as an order passed during the pendency of the conciliation proceedings. It is the definite case of the second respondent in the counter affidavit that on an application filed by the second respondent on 19. 2007 for converting the original representation under section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act into one under section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, A.No.514/2006 stood renumbered as A.620/07 and ultimately, failure report was submitted on 30.10.2007 which fact also stands not controverted in the reply affidavit. 15. The Industrial Disputes Act, being a labour legislation is intended for the purpose of investigation and settlement of industrial disputes by various methods like, conciliation, adjudication, etc. and while construing the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, the view that advances the object of the Act and serves its purpose must be preferred to the one which obstructs the object and paralyses the purpose of the Act, as it was held by the Supreme Court in Kunal Singh v. Union India and another [ (2003) 4 SCC 524 ], wherein similar statutory provisions of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 were construed. 16. 16. A Division Bench of this Court consisting F.M.Ibrahim Kalifulla,J and P.Murgesan,J. in The Correspondent, Sacr4ed Heart Primary School v. The District Elementary Educational Officer, Kanyakumari ( 2006 (4) CTC 34 ), while explaining the purposive construction known as Heydons case, has held that while construing the provisions of law importance must be given to the true intent of the makers of the Act,Pro bono publico. The Division Bench, after referring to various judgments of English Courts as well as our Supreme Court, has observed as follows: "17. In this context, it will be worthwhile to refer to the decisions wherein the rule in Heydons case, which is also known as purposive construction or "mischief rule" has been succinctly set out. In the earliest decision of the Honble Supreme Court in Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar and others AIR 1955 SC 661 , in paragraph 22 the Honble Supreme Court set out the principle in Heydons case which reads as under: "22. It is a sound rule of construction of a statute firmly established in England as far back as 1584 when – Heydons case 1584(3) Co Rep 7a(V) was decided that - ".... for the sure and true interpretation of all Statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be discerned and considered: 1st What was the common law before the making of the Act; 2nd What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide; 3rd What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth; and 4th The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico". In a subsequent decision of the Honble Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Madhya Pradesh and Bhopal v. Sodra Devi, AIR 1957 SC 832 , the Honble Supreme Court has stated as under in paragraph 14: "14. .... In a subsequent decision of the Honble Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Madhya Pradesh and Bhopal v. Sodra Devi, AIR 1957 SC 832 , the Honble Supreme Court has stated as under in paragraph 14: "14. .... It is only when the words used are ambiguous that they would stand to be examined and construed in the light of surrounding circumstances and constitutional principle and practice Per Lord Ashbourne in Nairn v. University of St.Andrews, 1909 A.C.147 (B), in the latter event the following observations of Lord Lindley M.R., in Thomson v. Lord Clanmorris, 1900 (1) Ch 718 at p.725 would be apposite: "In construing any statutory enactment, regard must be had not only to the words used but to the history of the Act and the reason, which led to its being passed. You must look at the mischief which had to be cured as well as at the cure provided" (See also the observations of Goddard C.J., in R. v. Paddington and St.Maryleborne Rent Tribunal, 1949 (65) TLR 200 at p.203(D)". In an English decision in 1985 (2) All ER 355, the very same rule has been succinctly set out by Lord Rokill in the following words: "It is, therefore, important that the question of construction should be approached by reference to well known principles ignoring that which is irrelevant however interesting, but remembering that statutes should be given what has become known as a purposive construction, that is to say that the Courts should where possible identify the mischief which existed before the passing of the statute and then if more than one construction is possible, favour that which will eliminate the mischief so identified. In the recent decision of the Honble Supreme Court in D.Saibaba v. Bar Council of India and another, AIR 2003 SC 2502 , the Honble Supreme Court has held as under in paragraphs 9,18 and 19: "9. .... Where the law provides a remedy to a person, the provision has to be so construed in case of ambiguity as to make the availing of the remedy practical and the exercise of power conferred on the authority meaningful and effective. A construction which would render the provision nugatory ought to be avoided. .... Where the law provides a remedy to a person, the provision has to be so construed in case of ambiguity as to make the availing of the remedy practical and the exercise of power conferred on the authority meaningful and effective. A construction which would render the provision nugatory ought to be avoided. True, the process of interpretation cannot be utilized for implanting a heart into a dead provision; however, the power to construe a provision of law can always be so exercised as to give throb to a sinking heart .... (Emphasis added) 18. Reading word for word and assigning a literal meaning to Section 48-AA would lead to absurdity, futility and to such consequences as the Parliament could have never intended. The provision has an ambiguity and is capable of being read in more ways than one. We must, therefore, assign the provision a meaning and so read it – as would give life to an otherwise lifeless letter and enable the power of review conferred thereby being meaningfully availed and effectively exercised. (Emphasis added) 19. On the same principle, the provision has to be interpreted from the point of view of exercise of the power by the Bar Council. The interpretation ought to be directed to wards giving the expression a meaning which will carry out the purpose of the provision and make the remedy of review conferred by the provision meaningful, practical and effective...." In yet, another decision of the Supreme Court in Nasiruddin v. S.T.A. Tribunal, AIR 1976 SC 331 , the Honble Supreme Court has held as under in paragraph 26: "26. If there are two different interpretations of the words in an Act, the Court will not adopt that which is just reasonable and sensible rather than that which is none of those things....." 17. The significance of purposive interpretation theory being applied in welfare legislation like, the Industrial Disputes Act is also reiterated by the Supreme Court in Bharat Singh v. New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre [ (1986) 2 SCC 614 ]. While referring to section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Supreme Court has held as follows: "11. The significance of purposive interpretation theory being applied in welfare legislation like, the Industrial Disputes Act is also reiterated by the Supreme Court in Bharat Singh v. New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre [ (1986) 2 SCC 614 ]. While referring to section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Supreme Court has held as follows: "11. In interpretation of statutes, courts have steered clear of the rigid stand of looking into the words of the section alone but have attempted to make the object of the enactment effective and to render its benefits into the person in whose favour it is made. The legislators are entrusted with the task of only making laws. Interpretation has to come from the courts. Section 17-B on its terms does not say that it would bind awards passed before the date when it came into force. The respondents contention is that a section which imposes an obligation for the first time, cannot be made retrospective. Such sections should always be considered prospective in our view, if this submission is accepted, we will be defeating the very purpose for which this section has been enacted. It is here that the court has to evolve the concept of purposive interpretation which has found acceptance whenever a progressive social beneficial legislation is under review. We share the view that where the words of a statute are plain and unambiguous effect must be given to them. Plain words have to be accepted as such but where the intention of the legislature is not clear from the words or where two constructions are possible, it is the courts duty to discern the intention in the context of the background in which a particular section is enacted. Once such an intention is ascertained the courts have necessarily to give the statute a purposeful or a functional interpretation. Now, it is trite to say that acts aimed at social amelioration giving benefits for the have-nots should receive a liberal construction. It is always the duty of the court to give such a construction to a statute as would promote the purpose or object of the Act. A construction that promotes the purpose of the legislation should be preferred to a literal construction. A construction which would defeat the rights of the have-nots and the underdog and which would leave to injustice should always be avoided. A construction that promotes the purpose of the legislation should be preferred to a literal construction. A construction which would defeat the rights of the have-nots and the underdog and which would leave to injustice should always be avoided. This section was intended to benefit the workmen in certain cases. It would be doing injustice to the section if we were to say that it would not apply to awards passed a day or two before it came into force." 18. In Workmen v. Williamson Magor and Co. Ltd. [ (1982) 1 SCC 117 ] the Supreme Court has held that while construing beneficial legislation like the Industrial law, the benefit must go to the weaker section viz., the labour. The relevant portion of the judgment is as follows: "12. ..... The word victimisation has not been defined in the statute. The term was considered by this Court in the case of Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees ( 1950 SCR 459 : AIR 1950 SC 188 ). This Court observed, "It (victimisation) is an ordinary English word which means that a certain person has become a victim, in other words, that he has been unjustly dealt with". A submission was made on behalf of the management in that case that victimisation had acquired a special meaning in industrial disputes and connoted a person who became the victim of the employers wrath by reason of his trade union activities and that the word could not relate to a person who was merely unjustly dismissed. This submission however, was not considered by the Court. When, however, the word victimisation can be interpreted in two different ways, the interpretation which is in favour of the labour should be accepted as they are the poorer section of the people compared to the management. 13. This Court in the case of Employees Association vs. Management of K.C.P.Ltd., Madras ( 1978 (2) SCC 42 ) observed:(SCC p.44, para 5) "In Industrial Law, interpreted and applied in the perspective of Part IV of the Constitution, the benefit of reasonable doubt on law and facts, if there be such doubt, must go to the weaker section, labour. The Tribunal will dispose of the case making this compassionate approach but without overstepping the proved facts,...." 19. Under the Industrial Disputes Act, section 2(e) defines conciliation proceedings as follows: "2(e). The Tribunal will dispose of the case making this compassionate approach but without overstepping the proved facts,...." 19. Under the Industrial Disputes Act, section 2(e) defines conciliation proceedings as follows: "2(e). conciliation proceeding means any proceeding held by a conciliation officer or Board under this Act". 20. It is not in dispute that the first respondent is a Conciliation Officer appointed under the Industrial Disputes Act as per section 2(d) of the Act. The dispute raised by the second respondent Union making demands including the cancellation of suspension order against G.Karunakaran, one of the employees certainly falls under section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act which defines an industrial dispute as follows: "2(k). industrial dispute means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person". 21. Section 11 of the Industrial Disputes Act which speaks about the procedure, powers and duties of authorities including the Conciliation Officer, under sub-section (2), specifically states that the Conciliation Officer or a member of a Board or a Labour Court is empowered to conduct enquiry. The powers of Conciliation Officer include the power of entering into compromise, compelling attendance of any person and examining him under sub-section (4). In this regard, sub-sections (2) and (4) are relevant which are as follows: "11. Procedure and power of conciliation officers, Boards, Courts and Tribunals.- .(1) ... .(2) A Conciliation Officer or a member of a Board, [or Court or the presiding Officer of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal] may, for the purpose of inquiry into any existing or apprehended industrial dispute, after giving reasonable notice, enter the premises occupied by any establishment to which the dispute relates. .(3) ..... .(2) A Conciliation Officer or a member of a Board, [or Court or the presiding Officer of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal] may, for the purpose of inquiry into any existing or apprehended industrial dispute, after giving reasonable notice, enter the premises occupied by any establishment to which the dispute relates. .(3) ..... .(4) A Conciliation Officer [may enforce the attendance of any person for the purpose of examination of such person or call for] and inspect any document which he has ground for considering to be relevant to the industrial dispute [or to be necessary for the purpose of verifying the implementation of any award or carrying out any other duty imposed on him under this Act, and for the aforesaid purposes, the conciliation officer shall have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), [in respect of enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him or of compelling the production of documents]." 22. Section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act which explains about the duties of Conciliation Officer makes it clear that in case of public utility service when notice is given under section 22 of the Act, it is mandatory on the part of the Conciliation Officer to conduct conciliation in the prescribed manner and in other cases where industrial dispute exists or apprehended, he may perform conciliation. When the Conciliation Officer proceeds with enquiry, he has the right of investigation to work for an amicable settlement. In the event of settlement being reached between the parties or its failure, he has to send a report to the appropriate Government. Section 12 is as follows: "12. Duties of Conciliation Officers.- .(1) Where any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, the conciliation officer may, or where the dispute relates to a public utility service and a notice under section 22 has been given, shall, hold conciliation proceedings in the prescribed manner. .(2) The conciliation officer shall, for the purpose of bringing about a settlement of the dispute, without delay investigate the dispute and all matters affecting the merits and the right settlement thereof and may do all such things as he thinks fit for the purpose of inducing the parties to come to a fair and amicable settlement of the dispute. .(2) The conciliation officer shall, for the purpose of bringing about a settlement of the dispute, without delay investigate the dispute and all matters affecting the merits and the right settlement thereof and may do all such things as he thinks fit for the purpose of inducing the parties to come to a fair and amicable settlement of the dispute. .(3) If a settlement of the dispute or of any of the matters in dispute is arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings, the conciliation officer shall send a report thereof to the appropriate Government [or an officer authorised in this behalf by the appropriate Government] together with a memorandum of the settlement signed by the parties to the dispute. .(4) If no such settlement is arrived at, the conciliation officer shall, as soon as practicable after the close of the investigation, send to the appropriate Government a full report setting forth the steps taken by him for ascertaining the facts and circumstances relating to the dispute and for bringing about a settlement thereof, together with a full statement of such facts and circumstances, and the reasons on account of which, in his opinion, a settlement could not be arrived at. (5) If, on a consideration of the report referred to in sub-section (4), the appropriate Government is satisfied that there is a case for reference to a Board, [Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal], it may make such reference. Where the appropriate Government does not make such a reference, it shall record and communicate to the parties concerned its reasons therefor. .(6) A report under this section shall be submitted within fourteen days of the commencement of the conciliation proceedings or within such shorter period as may be fixed by the appropriate Government: Provided that, [subject to the approval of the conciliation officer], the time of the submission of the report may be extended by such period as may be agreed upon in writing by all the parties to the dispute]." 23. In the present case, it is true that the second respondent is not a public utility service as defined under section 2(n) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is seen that after receiving petition under section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act from the second respondent, the first respondent has proceeded to investigate and in fact, he has proceeded with conciliation. 24. It is seen that after receiving petition under section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act from the second respondent, the first respondent has proceeded to investigate and in fact, he has proceeded with conciliation. 24. It is true that under section 20 of the Industrial Disputes Act, the commencement and the conclusion of proceedings under conciliation in respect of public utility service have been explained. 25. There is no reason to conclude that in the absence of any specific provision explaining the procedure to be followed in respect of commencement and the conclusion of proceedings relating to non-public utility service, the same procedure as explained under section 20 cannot be made applicable. 26. Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act contemplates that when conciliation proceedings before a Conciliation Officer are pending, no employer in regard to any matter connected with the dispute, shall alter, to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute, the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the commencement of such proceedings or with regard to any misconduct connected with the dispute, shall discharge, or punish whether by dismissal or otherwise, any workman concerned in such dispute, except with permission in writing from the authority before whom such proceedings are pending. Section 33(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act states as follows: "33.Conditions of service, etc., to remain unchanged under certain circumstances during pendency of proceedings.- .(1) During the pendency of any conciliation proceedings before a conciliation officer or a Board or of any proceeding before [an arbitrator or] a Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute, no employer shall- .(a) in regard to any matter connected with the dispute, alter, to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute, the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the commencement of such proceedings; or .(b) for any misconduct connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, any workmen concerned in such dispute, save with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending". 27. In such event, section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, as a special provision, enables the workman aggrieved by such contravention to make a complaint before the authority or Conciliation Officer before whom the dispute is pending who shall submit a report to the appropriate Government after enquiry. 27. In such event, section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, as a special provision, enables the workman aggrieved by such contravention to make a complaint before the authority or Conciliation Officer before whom the dispute is pending who shall submit a report to the appropriate Government after enquiry. Section 33A is as follows: "33-A. Special provision for adjudication as to whether conditions of service, etc., changed during pendency of proceedings.- Where an employer contravenes the provisions of section 33 during the pendency of proceedings [before a conciliation officer, Board, an arbitrator, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal], any employee aggrieved by such contravention, may make a complaint in writing, [in the prescribed manner,- .(a) to such conciliation officer or Board, and the conciliation officer or Board shall take such complaint into account in mediating in, and promoting, the settlement of, such industrial dispute; and .(b) to such arbitrator, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal and on receipt of such compliant, the arbitrator, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, shall adjudicate upon the complaint as if it were a dispute referred to or pending before it, in accordance with the provisions of this Act and shall submit his or its award to the appropriate Government and the provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly.]" 28. On the factual matrix enumerated above, I have no hesitation to hold that on the date when the said G.Karunakaran was dismissed viz., on 24. 2007, the conciliation proceedings before the first respondent were pending. As decided above, merely because the notice for conciliation was sent in the form of enquiry, it does not take away the character of conciliation especially when copies of records filed by the petitioner regarding the proceedings of the first respondent clearly show that what was effected by him was not a mere enquiry, but a conciliation within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act and in such view of the matter, there is no difficulty to conclude that there was a statutory obligation on the part of the petitioner under section 33(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act to obtain express permission, which has not been obtained in the present case and naturally by applying section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, it cannot be said that the impugned order of the first respondent is without jurisdiction. The statement of the first respondent in the impugned order that the conduct of the petitioner in dismissing the said G.Karunakaran while conciliation proceedings were pending is opposed to section 33(1)(b) of the I.D. Act cannot be brushed aside. 29. Again, on the facts, it is clear that the pendency of proceedings before the first respondent is relating not only to the general demands made by the second respondent Union against the alleged closure of units, but also to the suspension and disciplinary proceedings against G.Karunakaran and it cannot be said that the dispute relating to G.Karunakaran has no connection with the order of dismissal passed. In other words, it cannot be said that the conciliation proceedings pending before the first respondent do not relate to the order of dismissal passed against the said G.Karunakaran dated 24. 2007. In such view of the matter, the judgment of this Court in K.S.Mani Iyer v. Bombay Anand Bhavan, Coimbatore (23 FJR 541) on which reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner has no application, because in that case, the learned Judge has found on facts that there was no pendency of proceedings before any of the Tribunals as mentioned in section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act. In such view of the matter, it is not possible to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The writ petition therefore fails and the same is dismissed. No costs.