MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, HINGANGHAT, DIST. WARDHA v. SUDHIRKUMAR KRUSHNAKUMAR SARANI
2009-11-30
A.H JOSHI, A.R.JOSHI
body2009
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT A. H. JOSHI, J. :- Admit. Learned Advocate Mr. N. C. Phadnis waives service. 2. Heard rival arguments at length. 3. Order dated 22nd June, 2009 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in Writ Petition No. 5092 of 2008 is challenged before us in this Letters Patent Appeal. 4. Present respondent is original plaintiff, who filed suit for recovery of Rs. 16,61,236/- against the present appellant/defendant Municipal Council, Hinganghat. 5. After service of summons appellant/ defendant appeared. Defendant had filed various applications seeking time to file written statement. One of such applications, dated 6th October, 2006 was rejected by the trial Court. Subsequently, on 10th November, 2006 order was passed below Exh.1 plaint that suit to proceed without written statement. 6. In January, 2007 present respondent/ original plaintiff filed the affidavit of examination in chief and the suit was posted for cross-examination of the witness by the defendant. The suit was adjourned from time to time for cross-examination, either by consent of parties or due to non-availability of stenographer or the witness and also as the Presiding Officer or Court being busy in other suit, or otherwise unavailable. 7. Even at times, adjournment was obtained by consent of both parties as the recovery suit was kept before Lok Adalat, though it could not be settled. 8. Record shows that during the pendency of the suit for cross-examination of the plaintiff, he filed application for permission to file additional documents. This application was allowed and documents have been produced. 9. Record does not reflect that the plaintiff has filed additional or further examination-in-chief to prove the documents later-on filed. It is also not seen if a notice for admission of documents was given by the plaintiff. 10. It appears that the matter was adjourned from time to time for cross-examination of the plaintiff even after the additional documents were filed by the plaintiff. 11. On 26th February, 2008 present appellant/ defendant again filed an application Exh.33 for permission to file written statement. It was opposed by the respondent/plaintiff. After hearing both sides said application Exh.33 was allowed on 29th July, 2008 by the trial Court permitting the appellant/ defendant Municipal Council to file written statement. 12.
11. On 26th February, 2008 present appellant/ defendant again filed an application Exh.33 for permission to file written statement. It was opposed by the respondent/plaintiff. After hearing both sides said application Exh.33 was allowed on 29th July, 2008 by the trial Court permitting the appellant/ defendant Municipal Council to file written statement. 12. Said order below Exh.33 dated 29th July, 2008 was challenged by filing writ petition on 15-10-2008 and the said writ petition has been allowed by judgment and order dated 22-6-2009, reversing the order of the trial Court. 13. We have gone through the reasons recorded by the learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition of the present respondent/ plaintiff. It is observed by the learned Single Judge that the applications of present appellant/ defendant seeking adjournment to file written statement were filed casually and were also dealt with by the trial Court casually. This casual approach of learned trial Court found by learned Single Judge to be very strongly depreciable, and rightly so. In the result, learned Single Judge was pleased to adopt the said reasoning which was based on the letter of law as to filing of the written statement learned Single Judge was right in holding that the written statement was liable to be filed within thirty days and grant of extension of further time for that purpose was to be done for exceptional reasons on recording reasons. 14. It is evident that the casual approach on behalf of the defendant Municipal Council towards the suit and towards its duty in filing written statement punctually, has propelled the reasoning adopted by the learned Single Judge, and to decide the matter against the council. 15. Now in view of the grounds raised in present appeal the question which arises before us is : "Whether the outer limit of 90 days fixed in Order VIII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a so rigid and inflexible time frame, that Courts should be unmindful or powerless in taking into account the totality of facts and circumstances of the case, despite that the objective of laying down said 90 days' outer limit was not achieved in the facts and circumstances of the case?" 16. Now this Court is called upon to address this larger question, which has arisen in peculiar facts and circumstances.
Now this Court is called upon to address this larger question, which has arisen in peculiar facts and circumstances. We, therefore, again propose to have a quick glance on the facts which is as follows: (a) Present defendant-petitioner is a statutory body described as local authority. (b) It is common knowledge that lis of Government or public offices is at times an astute child cared by none. (c) Though it is expected that these statutory institutions are to function ideally, yet they are manned by local staff who has divergent interest and interest of the institution is always taking the back seat. (d) If at all decree is passed the money will have to come from the coffers of the Committee which is always sourced from farmers' peasants' and consumers' money. (e) The suit subject matter is a suit for recovery of money by contractor. (f) Had the suit been worthy of decreeing, at the outset, the trial Court proceeded under Order VIII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which it did not do, and this will have to be seen as conscious judicial act. (g) The trial Court found it appropriate to have the suit heard, and claim proved by the plaintiff instead of replying upon the plaint and accompanying documents. (h) The suit has so far proceeded with snail's feet. (i) Time lost in writ petition and this Letters Patent Appeal is of about 13 months. By this date suit could have been decided even on allowing written statement. (j) No cause of justice would be advanced if the defendant's plea comes on record and facts are inquired into and judgment is rendered on facts as would be proved upon a full contest. 17. This Court will have to see that the object of expeditious disposal of the suit is the only object as to why 90 days outer time limit for filing written statement has been enforced in Order VIII of the Code of Civil Procedure with duty to record reasons for every adjournment even within 90 days. 18. The documents to be relied upon by the plaintiff also have to be filed along with the plaint to prevent further delays on that ground so that restriction of 90 days bears strength and object there of is fructified. 19.
18. The documents to be relied upon by the plaintiff also have to be filed along with the plaint to prevent further delays on that ground so that restriction of 90 days bears strength and object there of is fructified. 19. As already recorded earlier this Court subscribes to the reasoning recorded by the learned single Judge recorded in the order under appeal indicating that the learned trial Court was expected to pass reasoned orders while granting application for taking written statement on record expressing the process of forming of opinion in favour of defendant. We also agree with the reasons recorded by learned single Judge to the extent that while passing impugned order, learned trial Judge has acted casually. 20. It is always to be noted and kept in mind that the reasons are the device through which superior Court and litigants can peep in the mind of the Court to view and notice the fact of matter and the law, which has formed the basis of satisfaction of trial Court which has led to the order under scrutiny. 21. The perspective dealt with by us in paras 19 and 20 are the matters in general however justice is the ultimate object of trial of causes. In our humble view, and for which with due humility, we differ from learned single Judge that it should always be an endeavour of the Courts to give reasonable opportunity to the parties to put forth their case and to decide the matter on merits. Letter of law and intention of legislature is bound to be respected, however it cannot be lost sight that entire exercise is for doing complete justice between the parties and not justice by technicalities and barely in the format. 22. Objective of having suit decided early is already sacrificed in view of the collective lapses of the plaintiff-defendant and the mechanism of the Court. When the goal of expeditious disposal of suit was already sacrificed and was beyond cure, recovery and restitution, now the question to be dealt with is as to whether 'justice' as well should be a casualty, in addition to defeated desire of expediting the process of justice. 23. Now, therefore, in order that casualty of justice is avoided, we may have to remand the case to trial Court, who may pass fresh order and record reasons for what it may decide to do.
23. Now, therefore, in order that casualty of justice is avoided, we may have to remand the case to trial Court, who may pass fresh order and record reasons for what it may decide to do. This course shall however, result in further loss of time and would at time not achieve object of entire exercise. This option is therefore, given up and we shall have to opt for other course. 24. On the overall assessment of facts, law and justice we lean in favour of conclusion that there exist sufficient grounds and reasons on record where the application for filing written statement though filed belatedly and casually, deserves to be allowed. Remand would not therefore be prudent proposition, and it shall be better if the issue is given a full point right here. The matters as to delay and latches can be chastised by ordering heavy costs which would compensate the plaintiff of any loss due to delay in decision. 25. In the result, the present Letters Patent Appeal is allowed in the following terms : a) Order passed by the trial Court below Exh.33 is restored, subject to appellant's depositing in trial Court the costs of Rs. Ten Thousand, within thirty days from today. b) The plaintiff is permitted to withdraw said amount unconditionally, however, subject to the decision as to costs as the trial Court may order finally. c) Appellant/defendant is allowed to file its written statement within four weeks from today subject to payment of costs as directed in clause (a). d) The learned trial Court shall proceed with the suit in accordance with law and according to its turn. e) The plaintiff shall be free to file fresh affidavit of examination in chief at appropriate stage. f) Parties are directed to bear costs of this Letters Patent Appeal. Appeal allowed.