JUDGMENT : D.A. Mehta, J. 1. The appellants herein are original judgment debtors, respondent no. 1 herein being the judgment creditor (original applicant in Special Darkhast No. 22 of 1994) and respondent no. 2 herein being an auction purchaser. The parties shall hereinafter be referred to as per their respective description in the original Darkhast proceedings for the sake of convenience. On the basis of an Arbitration Award made, judgment creditor, a Cooperative Society, filed Special Darkhast No. 22 of 1994 seeking execution of the Award. In satisfaction of the said decree, the Court conducted an auction sale pursuant to the proclamation for sale dated 30.7.2005 on the basis of decree made in 1994. The auction purchaser successfully emerged as the highest bidder and made payment of a sum of Rs.20,50,000/-. 2. On 17.10.2005, the Executing Court made an order below application Exh.1 moved by the judgment creditor and also application Exh.67 moved by the liquidator of the creditor society to be joined. The application moved by the liquidator came to be rejected while, application Exh.1 came to be granted. The auction sale was approved subject to condition that judgment debtors deposit the entire decretal amount with interest within a period of 15 days, and upon such deposit being made within the stipulated period, the auction sale shall not be implemented. But in the event judgment debtors failed to deposit the amount, the auction sale shall stand approved and further proceedings in relation to such auction sale shall be taken up. 3. It is the say of the judgment debtors, the appellants herein, that a sum of Rs.19,50,000/- was deposited on 27.10.2005 and further amount of Rs.25,000/- was deposited subsequently. That accordingly, vide Exh. 74 an application came to be moved by the judgment creditor seeking withdrawal of the amount deposited by the judgment debtors. This application was moved on 28.10.2005. On 25.11.2005, the auction purchaser moved application Exh.75 seeking confirmation of sale and praying for issuance of sale certificate. Both the applications were heard together by the Executing Court and vide order dated 13.2.2006, application Exh.74 was ordered to be 'filed' and application Exh.75, moved by the auction purchaser, was granted with a direction to issue sale certificate as prayed for. It is this order which is under challenge in the present proceedings. 4. Both the applications were heard together by the Executing Court and vide order dated 13.2.2006, application Exh.74 was ordered to be 'filed' and application Exh.75, moved by the auction purchaser, was granted with a direction to issue sale certificate as prayed for. It is this order which is under challenge in the present proceedings. 4. Learned advocate for the judgment debtors has assailed the impugned order principally on the ground that the sale could not have been confirmed in favour of the auction purchaser considering the fact that judgment debtors had complied with the order dated 17.10.2005 made below Application Exh.1 by depositing an amount of Rs.19,50,000/- on 27.10.2005. It was submitted that as per proclamation for sale published on 30.7.2005, the amount which was payable was Rs.19,48,603/- and that was the decretal amount inclusive of interest on the date of proposed auction namely 30.8.2005. That in fact, the judgment debtors had calculated the interest up-to 30.10.2005 while making payment on 27.10.2005. The Executing Court had placed unnecessarily reliance on various conflicting figures when in fact at that stage, the Court was not required to ascertain correctness or otherwise of the amount recoverable by the judgment creditor, the amount having been fixed on the date when the proclamation for sale was issued. It was further submitted that the objection raised by way of endorsement on application Exh.74 was wrongly read by the Executing Court and in fact, the judgment debtors had submitted at the time of hearing, as recorded by the Court, no objection if the judgment creditor was permitted to withdraw the amount deposited by the judgment debtors. In fact the objection was only to locus of the applicant of Exh.74 as by then the Liquidator had already been appointed but the Executing Court had not appreciated the contentions raised. The learned advocate submitted that the judgment debtors had also expressed willingness to make payment of any deficit amount, if any. That once there was substantial compliance by deposit of the amount, the Executing Court ought not to have issued the sale certificate in favour of the auction purchaser and the said order resulted in grave prejudice to the judgment debtors whose property stood alienated for all times to come by the impugned order. 5. Mr. That once there was substantial compliance by deposit of the amount, the Executing Court ought not to have issued the sale certificate in favour of the auction purchaser and the said order resulted in grave prejudice to the judgment debtors whose property stood alienated for all times to come by the impugned order. 5. Mr. J.D. Ajmera, learned advocate appearing on behalf of auction purchaser submitted that the Executing Court had assigned cogent reasons while accepting application Exh.75 moved by the auction purchaser after considering the overall conduct of the judgment debtors. It was pointed out that the Executing Court had also taken into consideration the fact that mere deposit of the amount in the Court by itself did not discharge the judgment debtors from their liability because the requirements of Order XXI, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) were required to be complied with by the judgment debtors and the Executing Court had noted that judgment debtors had failed to satisfy the requirements of the said Rules. In support of the aforesaid proposition reliance was placed on decision of this Court rendered in case of State of Gujarat & Anr v. Gangaji Ramji [M/s.], reported in 1996(1) GCD 767 (Guj). It was further submitted that the Apex Court in case of Hukumchand v. Bansilal And Others, reported in AIR 1968 Supreme Court 86 held that the Executing Court has no powers to extend the time for making payment. That in fact, the Executing Court while passing the earlier order dated 17.10.2005 had wrongly granted time of 15 days to the judgment debtors to deposit the amount to discharge the liability. According to the learned advocate, the order made by the Executing Court on 13.2.2006 was correct and just in the facts and circumstances of the case and did not merit interference. 6. Learned advocate Ms. Jani appearing for the judgment creditor through the Liquidator submitted that in fact, as recorded by the Executing Court, at no stage, was an application moved by the judgment debtors objecting to the auction sale either under Rule 89, Order XXI of CPC or under Rule 90, Order XXI of CPC. 6. Learned advocate Ms. Jani appearing for the judgment creditor through the Liquidator submitted that in fact, as recorded by the Executing Court, at no stage, was an application moved by the judgment debtors objecting to the auction sale either under Rule 89, Order XXI of CPC or under Rule 90, Order XXI of CPC. That as noted in earlier order of 17.10.2005, objections were raised, which were in the nature of objections, which could be raised by an application under Rule 90, Order XXI of CPC without there being a specific application under the said Rules. That the Executing Court had dealt with such objections and rejected the said objections for the reasons stated in order of 17.10.2005 and that order had attained finality in as much as the said findings had not been challenged thereafter in any proceedings. That while passing the impugned order, the Executing Court had categorically recorded that no objections were raised by the judgment debtors against the confirmation of sale as required by the provisions of Order XXI Rules 89 and/or 90 of CPC and therefore, the oral submissions made on behalf of the judgment debtors in application moved by the auction purchaser for confirmation of sale could not be equated with compliance of requirements of Rules 89 or 90 of Order XXI of CPC. That therefore, under Rule 92 of Order XXI, the Executing Court was bound to make an order confirming the sale where no application is made under Rules 89, 90 or 91. It was therefore submitted that in the circumstances, the impugned order was correct in law and appeal was required to be dismissed. 7. While passing the impugned order, the Executing Court has observed in Paragraph No. 5 of the order that when the Darkhast came to be made on 14.11.1994, the amount stated in the Darkhast was Rs.11,76,839=35ps. and if the interest on the said amount is calculated up-to 2006 (2005?) then, the amount of Rs.19,50,000/- deposited with further deposit of Rs.25,000/- by the judgment debtors cannot be termed to be the deposit of the decretal amount. The Executing Court has in this context observed that the judgment debtors have not only not correctly computed the correct amount but not done so intentionally. 8. The Executing Court has in this context observed that the judgment debtors have not only not correctly computed the correct amount but not done so intentionally. 8. The Executing Court has further referred to provisions of Rules 1 and 2 of Order XXI of CPC and found that the requirements of said Rules have not been fulfilled. That after deposit of the amount, the judgment debtors are under an obligation to inform the judgment creditor about such deposit, which has not been done by the judgment debtors. That even the deposit is not without prejudice and amount has been deposited with objections as endorsed on the application Exh.74. That the judgment debtors have raised the same objections since the point of time when the Darkhast was filed and the said objections have continued upto the date of hearing of applications Exhs.74 and 75. That the said objections have already been overruled in the earlier proceedings, more particularly order dated 17.10.2005, despite which same objections have been repeatedly raised even after the amount has been deposited. That the oral submission made at the time of hearing that the judgment debtors have no objection if the creditor withdraws the amount cannot be countenanced in context of the written objection which has not been withdrawn. On a cumulative reading of the aforesaid factors, the Executing Court has come to the conclusion that the conduct of the judgment debtors only indicates that the amount has been deposited not for the purpose of discharging liability of the judgment debtors, but only for the purpose of saving the property from being auctioned off. The Court has further taken note of the legislative scheme and observed that once the Court auction has taken place, the Court has limited powers to set aside such auction and for this purpose necessary application as required by provisions of Order XXI Rule 89 of CPC has to be made, but no such application has been made. Similarly, no objection has been raised even under Rule 90 of Order XXI of CPC. The Court has further recorded that the amount deposited by the judgment debtors is not in compliance with relevant Rules. It is in context of the aforesaid findings recorded by the Executing Court that the sale has been confirmed with a direction to issue sale certificate in favour of the auction purchaser. 9. The Court has further recorded that the amount deposited by the judgment debtors is not in compliance with relevant Rules. It is in context of the aforesaid findings recorded by the Executing Court that the sale has been confirmed with a direction to issue sale certificate in favour of the auction purchaser. 9. When one reads the legislative scheme commencing from Rule 1 of Order XXI and culminating in Rule 94 of Order XXI of CPC, it becomes clear that the legislature has granted specific rights to a judgment debtor to discharge his liability at different stages of proceedings to satisfy the dues of the decree holder. But the said rights are coupled with corresponding duties and legislative requirements on the basis of which the judgment debtor can either object to, or dispute the satisfaction of the decree by sale of properties of the judgment debtor. At every such stage where the judgment debtor exercises such a right, the right is circumscribed by conditions which operate as pre-conditions on fulfilment of which judgment debtor can avoid the property of the judgment debtor being put to sale in satisfaction of the decretal amount. 10. Even before the property of the judgment debtor could be proceeded against it is open to the judgment debtor to satisfy the decree by making payment of the decretal amount by any of the modes prescribed in Rule 1 of Order XXI of CPC, though such deposit per-se would not be sufficient compliance and the judgment debtor is required to follow up the deposit by complying with the requisite procedure laid down in the scheme, and such requirement being judgment creditor being informed about such deposit. 11. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 1 of Order XXI of CPC provides for the consequences upon failure to intimate the judgment creditor entitling the creditor to interest which shall otherwise continue to run and form part of the decretal amount. Sub-rules (4) and (5) speak at what point of time interest shall cease to run. Thus, the Legislature has categorically provided that requirement of informing the judgment creditor does not remain an idle formality and the legal obligation cast on the judgment debtor is a substantial obligation and cannot be termed to be merely a procedural requirement. Sub-rules (4) and (5) speak at what point of time interest shall cease to run. Thus, the Legislature has categorically provided that requirement of informing the judgment creditor does not remain an idle formality and the legal obligation cast on the judgment debtor is a substantial obligation and cannot be termed to be merely a procedural requirement. Thus, any lapse on this count cannot be termed to be a procedural lapse and it cannot be stated that in absence of such an intimation there is substantial compliance not warranting any further steps by the Executing Court. It is not possible to state that there could be a constructive intimation as held by this Court in case of State of Gujarat v. Gangaji Ramji [M/s.] (Supra). In paragraph No.12 of the said judgment, this High Court has after referring to judgments of Orissa and Punjab High Courts, noted that Orissa High Court has followed the decision of the Apex Court in case of PSL Ramanathan Chettiar & Others v. Ormprm Ramanathan Chettiar, reported in AIR 1968 SC 1047 and thereafter reproduced the relevant extract from the Apex Court decision. The crux of the issue is whether by such deposit, the judgment debtor has put the money beyond the reach of judgment debtor and simultaneously made the money available to the decree holder, namely judgment creditor. Applying the aforesaid ratio to the present case, it becomes apparent that, as noted by the Executing Court, all through out, even after making the deposit, the judgment debtors have been continuously raising objections and thus, the monies deposited were not made available to the judgment creditor nor had the judgment debtor put himself beyond reach of such money. 12. When one reads Rules 89, 90, 91 and 92 of Order XXI of CPC together, it becomes clear that only in a case where an application is made under either of Rules 89, 90 or 91, and when the Court disallows such application, the Court shall make an order confirming the sale. In other words, only if the objections raised by way of an application prescribed under the relevant rules of Order XXI of CPC are accepted, can the Executing Court not confirm the sale, otherwise, the Executing Court is under a legal obligation by virtue of provisions of Rule 92 of Order XXI of CPC to confirm a sale. 13. In other words, only if the objections raised by way of an application prescribed under the relevant rules of Order XXI of CPC are accepted, can the Executing Court not confirm the sale, otherwise, the Executing Court is under a legal obligation by virtue of provisions of Rule 92 of Order XXI of CPC to confirm a sale. 13. In the facts of the present case as already noted hereinbefore, no such application under any of the relevant rules was ever made and therefore, the Executing Court was bound by the legal requirement of Rule 92, Order XXI of CPC to confirm the sale. The Executing Court had no option. 14. There is one more aspect of the matter. What are the circumstances when an auction sale made under the aegis of a Court can be set aside. Over and above the statutory requirements referred to hereinbefore the following principles are required to be borne in mind as laid down by Division Bench of this High Court in case of Savariya Exports Ltd. v. Official Liquidator of Urmi Oil Ltd. And Others, reported in (2009) 147 Comp cas 336 (Guj.). The High Court has observed as under:- "....In the unreported orders dated October 15 and 19, 2004, in Company Application No. 305 of 2004 the position of law, by which the Court can interfere with a concluded contract by way of auction sale for the purposes of setting aside the same, has been summarised in the following words: "16. Apart from the applicability of principles regarding review jurisdiction being equally applicable to order dated March 5, 2004, it is also necessary to bear in mind the settled position of law by which the court can interfere with concluded contract by way of auction sale for the purpose of setting aside the same. The applicant has to show that there was some material irregularity and fraud. However, an allegation in this regard is not enough. There must be adequate material to substantiate such allegations. Further, the objector must show that such material irregularity resulted in substantial injury to the objector. In the absence of such pleading and evidence in support thereof it is not open to set aside an auction sale (ref: Ram Maurya v. Kailash Nath, AIR 2000 SC 2402). 16.1. There must be adequate material to substantiate such allegations. Further, the objector must show that such material irregularity resulted in substantial injury to the objector. In the absence of such pleading and evidence in support thereof it is not open to set aside an auction sale (ref: Ram Maurya v. Kailash Nath, AIR 2000 SC 2402). 16.1. Other factors which would come into consideration are where the sale is conducted with undue haste without any reserve or upset price being fixed; the valuation itself is suspect and there is inadequate publicity resulting into situation where best possible price was not procured. These factors cumulatively would affect an auction sale and would permit the court to set aside the same considering the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 (ref: Allahabad Bank v. Bengal Paper Mills Co. Ltd, [1999] 96 Comp Cas 804; AIR 1999 SC 1715 ). 16.2. As already stated mere proof of material irregularity and inadequacy of price realised by itself are not sufficient. What the objector has to establish is that not only there was inadequacy of price realised but that, that inadequacy was caused by reasons of material irregularities or fraud. (ref: Radhy Shyam v. Shyam Behari Singh, AIR 1971 SC 2337 )." 19. One more important factor which is required to be borne in mind is : an auction sale made and confirmed by the court should not be lightly set aside/cancelled as the same would go to affect the credibility of the court in the eyes of public at large. The apex court has also in this context stated in the case of Kayjay Industries P. Ltd. [1974] 2 SCC 213, that merely because one or the other party requests for waiting for a higher price the court is not expected to keep on postponing confirmation of sale and the requirement is only that the court should satisfy itself that having regard to the fair value of the property adequate price is available, otherwise it would strain the credibility of the court sale itself." In the present set of facts and circumstances of the case even on application of the aforesaid principles, it is not possible to state that the impugned order suffers from any legal infirmity so as to warrant interference. 15. 15. Therefore, neither on facts nor in law, can it be stated that the impugned order dated 13.2.2006 suffers from any legal infirmity so as to warrant interference. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. 16. As a consequence, the Civil Application No. 2411 of 2006 is also rejected and the stay granted vide order dated 31.3.2006 against further proceedings of Execution Application shall stand vacated. 17. At this stage, learned advocate for the appellants - judgment debtors prays for stay of operation of this judgment and order for a further period of 8 weeks. The said oral request is objected to by the learned advocates appearing for the auction purchaser as well as judgment creditor. 18. In light of the facts which have come on record and considering the period which has elapsed since the date Darkhast was moved, the oral request is rejected. Appeal is rejected.