V. K. SHUKLA, J. ( 1 ) PRESENT writ petition has been filed by the petitioners for quashing of the letters dated 12. 02. 2009/08. 03. 2009 and 18. 03. 2008 issued by respondent No. 3, U. P. Police Shiksha Samiti through its Chairman. Petitioners are teaching and non-teaching staff of Green Meadows School, Police Training Centre, Pratham Chakkar Ka Maidan, Moradabad, which is affiliated to Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE), New Delhi. Petitioners submit that the Green Meadows School was established in the Police Training Centre, Pratham Chakkar Ka Maidan, Moradabad for imparting education to the students up to class V. It has been stated that on 24. 10. 1998, a committee was formed and the same was got registered under the provisions of Societies Registration Act, 1860 with the Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits. Petitioners submit that the Committee of Management of the School applied for no objection certificate from the State Government for its affiliation with CBSE, New Delhi and said permission was accorded on 19. 11. 1993 and thereafter affiliation had been accorded with effect from the academic session 1994-95 and since then the affairs of Green Meadows School are being governed and controlled by the Bye-laws of the CBSE, New Delhi. Petitioners claim that with the passage of time, their services have been confirmed vide order dated 11. 02. 1995. Petitioners have further mentioned that U. P. Police created a society, which was registered on 08. 08. 1997 known as U. P. Police sh9ksha Samiti. Said society has framed its bye-laws for the purposes of running Police Modern School throughout the State of U. P. Petitioners have contended that Police Modern School at Moradabad is situated within the campus of 9th Bn. P. A. C. which is far away from the campus of Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Police Academy, Moradabad. The petitioners have tried to contend that status of both the schools is different. It has also been stated that the Committee of Management of the school is not getting any financial assistance/aid or monetary benefit from the U. P. Police Shiksha Samiti nor any aid is being credited by the Sate Government. The petitioners have contended that resolution has been passed on 12. 02. It has also been stated that the Committee of Management of the school is not getting any financial assistance/aid or monetary benefit from the U. P. Police Shiksha Samiti nor any aid is being credited by the Sate Government. The petitioners have contended that resolution has been passed on 12. 02. 2009 in respect of petitioners institution and as per which all the teachers and employees of the school will have to undergo training test and will be given fresh appointment on contractual basis. The petitioners have also tried to contend that Police Shiksha Samiti has no control or any business with the affairs of respondent No. 2. Both the committees are different and individual body having their own legal and separate existence. At this juncture present writ petition has been filed. ( 2 ) ON presentation of writ petition, preliminary objection has been raised by Sri K. K. Chand, learned Standing Counsel, that in the present case, the institution in question is affiliated to CBSE and respondent No. 3 is a private society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, as such writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not maintainable. Countering the said submission Sri I. P. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that respondent No. 3 has been discharging public duty, as such writ petition is fully competent and maintainable. ( 3 ) AFTER respective arguments have been advanced, the question to be looked into is as to whether the writ petition against private society is maintainable or not. ( 4 ) A Full bench of this Court qua an institution, which was affiliated to CBSE, in the case of M. K. Gandhi and others vs. Director of Education (Secondary), U. P. Lucknow and others, (2005) 3 UPLBEC 2187 , while considering point No. IV has held as under: "point-IV to VI: WRIT AGAINST THE SCHOOL--NOT MAINTAINABLE 36. Is a writ petition maintainable for,. violation of the bye-laws that do not have statutory force?. enforcement of a private contract between the school and the teacher? we are afraid; our answer has to be in the negative. The full bench of our court in Aley Ahmad Abidi vs. District Inspector of Schools: AIR 1977 Allahabad 539 (The Aleyabidi Case) has held that: the Committee of Management of an Intermediate College is not a statutory body. enforcement of a private contract between the school and the teacher? we are afraid; our answer has to be in the negative. The full bench of our court in Aley Ahmad Abidi vs. District Inspector of Schools: AIR 1977 Allahabad 539 (The Aleyabidi Case) has held that: the Committee of Management of an Intermediate College is not a statutory body. Nevertheless, a Writ Petition filed against it is maintainable if such petition is for enforcement of performance of any legal obligations or duties imposed on such committee by a statute. " 37. The committee of management of the DPS School is recognised by the Board but it is neither a statutory body nor a State within the meaning of Article 12. The legal obligation or duty on the DPS School is neither imposed by any statute nor by any statutory provision: it has been imposed by the affiliation bye-laws and agreement which is a contract between the parties and non statutory. In view of this the writ petition is not maintainable against the DPS School for violation of the affiliation bye-laws. 38. The counsel for the petitioners submits that: the Aley Abidi case is no longer good law. Education upto age of 14 years is a fundamental right under Article 21-A of the Constitution. The writ jurisdiction has been expanded and a writ petition is maintainable against the Schools as they perform public functions. Unaided recognised institutions are discharging function as the instrumentality of the state and have to be governed by the principles of fair play. A writ petition--rather than the suit--is the right remedy. 39. The counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the following decisions: (i) K. K-Krishnamacharyalu vs. Venkateshwari College of Engineering: (1997) 3 SCC 571 (the Krishnamacharyalu case ). (ii) Anadi Mukta Sadgura Trust vs. UR Rudani: (1989) 2 SCC 691 (the Anadi Trust case ). (iii) TMA Pai Foundation vs. State of Karnataka: 2002 (8) SCC 481 (the Pai Foundation case) (iv) Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Vs. BN Ganguli; AIR 1986 SC 1571 = 1986 (3) SCC 156 (the Central Corporation Case ). Lets consider whether the aforesaid cases, overrule the Aley Abidi case or not; and are applicable to the facts of this case. Article 21-A 40. BN Ganguli; AIR 1986 SC 1571 = 1986 (3) SCC 156 (the Central Corporation Case ). Lets consider whether the aforesaid cases, overrule the Aley Abidi case or not; and are applicable to the facts of this case. Article 21-A 40. Education is necessary and is fundamental in progress of civilisation; it is the education that makes the life different than the mere animal existence: if there is no education then no nation can progress. It is for this reason that: the Supreme Court while interpreting constitutional provisions in Uni Krishnan vs. State of AP 1993 (1) SCC 645 (the Unikrishnan case) held that the children below the age of 14 years had a fundamental right to free education. This part of the Unikrishnan case was upheld in the Pai Foundation case; and article 21-A was inserted by the Constitution 86th Amendment Act as a fundamental right though this Article is yet to be enforced. 41. Article 21-A provides that State shall provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of six to fourteen years in such manner as the State may, by law, determine. This fundamental right mandates a duty on the State to provide free and compulsory education to the children up to the age of fourteen years. It does not mandate that unaided schools will become State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution or writ petition against them is maintainable for enforcement of a non-statutory contract. The Krishnamacharyalu Case 42. In the Krishnamacharyalu case the question was whether the petitioners, who were lab assistants, were entitled to pay scale on par with the government employees or not. 43. In this case, the government issued the instructions for grant of pay scale equivalent to the government employees. The Supreme Court held that these instructions had statutory force. This case related to the payment of salary and not for specific performance of contract of personal service. It is in light of these facts that the writ petition was held to be maintainable. So were the facts in the Anadi Trust case. The Anaditrust Case44. In the Anaditrust case there was dispute between the teachers and the management regarding pay scales. This dispute was referred to the Chancellor. The Chancellor gave an award which was in favour of the teachers. This award was accepted by the State Government. So were the facts in the Anadi Trust case. The Anaditrust Case44. In the Anaditrust case there was dispute between the teachers and the management regarding pay scales. This dispute was referred to the Chancellor. The Chancellor gave an award which was in favour of the teachers. This award was accepted by the State Government. The management refused to pay the higher pay scale and closed down the school. The teachers then, filed a writ petition for the salary of the period taught by them and post retirement benefit for the period that they had worked. This writ petition was not for the specific performance of the contract of service; it was for payment of salary for services already rendered. There was already a statutory order in favour of the teachers. It is in this light that the Supreme Court held that the writ petition to be maintainable. This is clear from the following observations of the Supreme Court: there is no plea for specific performance of contractual service. The respondents are not seeking a declaration that they be continued in service. They are not asking for mandamus to put them back into the college. They are claiming only the terminal benefits and arrears of salary payable to them. The question is whether the trust can be compelled to pay by a writ of mandamus? 45. It is correct that in this case, the Supreme Court also observed that: if the rights are purely of a private character no mandamus can issue. If the management of the college is purely a private body with no public duty mandamus will not lie. These are two exceptions to mandamus. But once these are absent and when the party has no other equally convenient remedy, mandamus cannot be denied. It has to be appreciated that the appellants-trust was managing the affiliated college to which public money is paid as government aid. Public money paid as government aid plays a major role in the control, maintenance and working of educational institutions. The aided institutions like government institutions discharge public function by way of imparting education to students. They are subject to the rules and regulations of the affiliating University. Their activities are closely supervised by the University authorities. Employment in such institutions, therefore, is not devoid of any public character. So are the service conditions of the academic staff. The aided institutions like government institutions discharge public function by way of imparting education to students. They are subject to the rules and regulations of the affiliating University. Their activities are closely supervised by the University authorities. Employment in such institutions, therefore, is not devoid of any public character. So are the service conditions of the academic staff. When the University takes a decision regarding their pay scales, it will be binding on the management. The service conditions of the academic staff are, therefore, not purely of a private character. It has super-added protection by University decisions creating a legal right-duty relationship between the staff and the management. When there is existence of this relationship mandamus cannot be refused to the aggrieved party. 46. However, the aforesaid observations in the Anadi Trust case are general and are made in the light of the fact that there were statutory rules, regulations and statutory order in favour of the petitioners. In the case here, there is no government or statutory rule/regulation/order as was in the Krishnamacharyalu case or the Anaditrust case. The observations in these cases have to be confined to the facts of these cases and are not applicable here. The Pai Foundation Case:47. The Pai Foundation case started on the question relating to scope and right of the minorities to establish and administer educational institutions under article 29 (2) and 30 (1) of the Constitution of India. The case was referred to eleven judges bench and eleven questions were framed. Some of the questions were answered by the eleven judges bench and some were left to be decided by the regular bench. None of the questions related to whether the unaided schools are State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution; or whether the contract of service between the private managed schools and the teachers are statutory; or whether a writ petition is maintainable for enforcement of contract of personal service. This case is not relevant for deciding the question that is before us. 48. It is correct that the service conditions have to be fair; we have already held that in absence of service rules chapter VII of the affiliation bye-laws shall be deemed to be adopted by the parties and the agreement shall be deemed to be in the same format as Appendix-III to the affiliation bye-laws. 48. It is correct that the service conditions have to be fair; we have already held that in absence of service rules chapter VII of the affiliation bye-laws shall be deemed to be adopted by the parties and the agreement shall be deemed to be in the same format as Appendix-III to the affiliation bye-laws. Nevertheless this does not mean that service rules are statutory or the writ petition is maintainable for enforcement of contract of service. The Central Corporation case:49. In the Centralcorporation case two questions were involved. Firstly, whether Central Inland Water Transport Corporation???a government company???is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution or not. It was held that it is state within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution; and secondly, whether Rule 9 (i) which permitted the termination of service of even a confirmed employee after three months notice was void under section 23 of the Indian Contract Act and article 14 of the constitution. The court held that the rule 9 (i) was arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 50. The writ petition in the Central Corporation case was against a body that was State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution for violation of Article 14; it is in this light the Supreme Court held that writ petition was efficacious remedy. In the case here neither the services have been terminated by a body that is a State within the meaning of Article 12 nor has any rule (or bye-law) been challenged. It is correct that in the Central Corporation case there are observations that reinstatement can not be decreed in a suit and only a writ petition is the appropriate remedy. However, this observation is merely casual one: this point was not involved in the Central Corporation case and nothing turns upon it. 51. The rights and obligations are determined under statute law or by common law. Article 226 merely provides a remedy for enforcement of these rights. It does not confer any right itself--except, perhaps, the right to move the court. Indeed MC Seetalvad in his Hamyln law lecturers the Common Law in India, (at page 207) remarks, having included a Bill of Rights in the Constitution the Constitution makers had necessarily to provide remedies for the enforcement of these rights. It does not confer any right itself--except, perhaps, the right to move the court. Indeed MC Seetalvad in his Hamyln law lecturers the Common Law in India, (at page 207) remarks, having included a Bill of Rights in the Constitution the Constitution makers had necessarily to provide remedies for the enforcement of these rights. They also envisaged a welfare state with its inevitable accompaniment of a mass of parliamentary and subordinate legislation which would involve constant interference with the normal activities of the citizen. It was, therefore, essential to provide procedures and remedies which would enable the citizen to approach the courts and obtain speedy and effective redress against interference with his fundamental rights or an unconstitutional enactment or unwarranted administrative action. These remedies are to be found in article 226 and article 32 of the Constitution. Under article 226 the High Courts have jurisdiction throughout the territories subordinate to them to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, "directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari or any of them. ," not only for the enforcement of the fundamental rights but also "for any other purpose. " Almost in identical words a similar jurisdiction has been conferred by article 32 on the Supreme Court of India but this jurisdiction is restricted to cases of invasion of fundamental rights. 52. In case the suit for reinstatement is not maintainable then a writ petition is also not maintainable. Nevertheless, we would like to clarify that in certain circumstances, the writ is more efficacious or may be only remedy: especially when, validity of any statutory Act/rules/bye-law is challenged; or fundamental rights are breached; or finality is attached to the orders making them immune from purview of the Civil Courts. In the Central Corporation case validity of a rule was challenged; it is for this reasons the Supreme Court held that the writ is more efficacious remedy. This case is not an authority for the proposition that for reinstatement only writ is maintainable. 53. In the Central Corporation case validity of a rule was challenged; it is for this reasons the Supreme Court held that the writ is more efficacious remedy. This case is not an authority for the proposition that for reinstatement only writ is maintainable. 53. More than hundred years ago Lord Halsbury in Quinn vs. Leatham (1901 AC 495 =1900-1903 All England Reports 1) had said, [e]very judgement must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but are governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. . . . [a] case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that law is not always logical at all. 54. The Krishnamacharyalu case, or the Anaditrust case or the Paifoundation case, or the Centralcorporation cases are not authority for the proposition that: the privately managed schools are State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution; or in absence of any statutory obligation, a writ petition or a suit is maintainable for specific performance of a contract of personal service. The Aley Abidi case is still good law. Does it mean that the petitioners are not entitled to any relief from this court and their writ petition is liable to be dismissed?" ( 5 ) SAID judgment has been approved by Honble Apex Court except for the direction that the Principal may issue show cause notice to D. P. S. School as to why it may not be disaffiliated for terminating the services of the petitioner contrary to bye-laws, and therein the Honble Apex Court has taken the view that remedy lies in filing suit for damages and nothing beyond the same. ( 6 ) IN the present case also U. P. Police Shiksha Samiti is registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and from the pleadings, it is apparent that the petitioners are trying to contend that said society has got no concern with the petitioners institution and the resolution which has been passed cannot be implemented and given effect to qua them. Once respondent No. 3 is a private society, then even if the claim of the petitioners is accepted that the said society discharges public duty by imparting education, but since various disputed questions of fact are sought to be raised and private civil rights are to be adjudicated in relation to rights of the societies, then remedy lies in filing civil suit and apply for injunction, but all such questions cannot be gone into in writ jurisdiction by this Court, as it is not being alleged that there is violation of any statutory Rules or Regulations, rather the contention is that said society has no authority to deal with petitioners. In this background, writ petition, as it has been framed and drawn is not maintainable. ( 7 ) CONSEQUENTLY, writ petition fails and is dismissed. However, it is made clear that dismissal of this writ petition will not prevent the petitioners from instituting civil suit, and applying for injunction,if any. .