Honble JAIN.— The aforesaid three cases i.e. two criminal appeals and one criminal revision petition, are directed against the common order dated 19th February, 2005 passed by the Additional District & Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No.1, Jaipur District, Jaipur, in Sessions Case No.13/2002, therefore, they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. Under the impugned order, the learned trial court, while acquitting the accused-persons, namely Sanjay, Smt. Shakuntla, Miss Sunita and Smt. Urmila from the charges under Section 302/120-B IPC and in alternative under Sections 304-B, 498-A, 201/120-B, IPC, convicted and sentenced the accused Akhilesh as under:- S. No. Accused Under Section Sentence of Imprisonment 1. Akhilesh S/o Dwarka Prasad 302, IPC To undergo life Imprisonment and a fine of Rs.500/- 498A, IPC To undergo two years RI and a fine of Rs.100/- 201, IPC To undergo five years RI and a fine of Rs.100/- In default of payment of total fine of Rs.700/-, as mentioned above, the appellant was to further undergo additional simple imprisonment of three months. All the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. 2. Being aggrieved with the impugned judgment and order, accused Akhilesh has preferred D.B. Criminal Appeal No.243/2005 challenging his conviction and sentence passed by the trial court, as mentioned above. The State of Rajasthan has challenged the order of acquittal of accused-persons, namely, Sanjay, Smt. Shakuntla, Miss Sunita and Smt. Urmila, from the charge under Section 302/120-B IPC and, in alternative under Sections 304-B, 498-A, 201/120-B, IPC, by filing D.B. Criminal Appeal No.818/2005. The complainant/informant Krishnavtar has also preferred D.B. Criminal Revision Petition No.282/2005, challenging the order of acquittal of accused-persons, namely, Sanjay, Smt. Shakuntla, Miss Sunita and Smt. Urmila from the charges levelled against them. 3. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that on 23rd June, 2000, PW-14 Suresh Chand Gupta lodged a written-report (Exhibit P-29), stating therein that he received an information in Tehsil from his brother-in-law Nagarmal at about 11.45 AM to the effect that the wife of his nephew Akhilesh got burnt; whereupon, he immediately rushed to the house of his brother Dwarka Prasad. His sister-in-law (Bhabhi-elder brothers wife) Smt. Shakuntla Devi, nephews - Akhilesh and Sanjay were present and, in their prese-nce, he saw that Kavita had died due to burn injuries, therefore, he prayed that nece-ssary proceedings in this regard may be drawn. Kavita was married about 2 years ago. His sister-in-law (Bhabhi-elder brothers wife) Smt. Shakuntla Devi, nephews - Akhilesh and Sanjay were present and, in their prese-nce, he saw that Kavita had died due to burn injuries, therefore, he prayed that nece-ssary proceedings in this regard may be drawn. Kavita was married about 2 years ago. 4. On the basis of above information, a Murg FIR No.17/2000 was registered under Section 176 Cr.P.C., and the matter was referred for enquiry to the Additional District Magistrate, Kotputali. The Additional District Magistrate, Shri Yunus Ali Khan (PW-19), reached at the spot and prepared inquest report (Exhibit P-18) and site-inspection-report (Exhibit P-39). Postmortem of the dead-body was also conducted by the Medical Board. During the pendency of the enquiry under Section 176, Cr.P.C., PW-1 Krishnavatar lodged a handwritten-report running in seven pages (Exhibit P-1) at the Police Station Kotputali, District Jaipur, wherein it was alleged that he is resident of Tilak Nagar, Jaipur, and he has his business at Jaipur. It was further alleged that he received a telephonic call on 23rd June, 2000 at about 12O Clock in the noon from Kotputali and thereby it was informed that his daughter Kavita has been killed and call was disconnected. Thereafter he started weeping; he tried to contact on telephone at Kotputali and he was told that Doctor is examining Kavita and there is nothing to be worried. He again contacted on telephone but he did not receive any satisfactory reply; thereafter, he asked his son Manoj, younger brother Rajendra Prasad and younger son-in-law Pramod Agrawal to proceed for Kotputali. Thereafter he received one another telephonic call at about 1 P.M. that his daughter Kavita has been admitted in the hospital at Kotputali. He along-with his relatives also went to Kotputali in mini-bus. It was further stated that at about 2.30 PM they reached the Government Hospital at Kotputali and came to know that no patient in the name of Kavita was admitted there. Thereafter he went to the Police Station Kotputali and came to know that Kavita has been killed and her dead-body is lying at her matrimonial home. The In-charge, Police Station Kotputali, is also at the place of incidence i.e. the residence of the accused. On their reaching at the matrimonial house of Kavita, his younger brother told him that Kavita was killed in the morning itself. The In-charge, Police Station Kotputali, is also at the place of incidence i.e. the residence of the accused. On their reaching at the matrimonial house of Kavita, his younger brother told him that Kavita was killed in the morning itself. He made an enquiry about the incident but Smt. Shakuntla, the mother-in-law of Kavita, Miss Sunita, the unmarried sister-in-law, Smt. Urmila, the married sister-in-law, Sanjay (Devar) and husband Akhilesh did not give any satisfactory reply and told that they had a courage to kill Kavita and thereafter all of them started beating the mother of Kavita. Thereafter he went in the room with the police where dead-body of Kavita was lying and he came to know that she was killed by throttling (strangulation) and thereafter the dead-body was put to flames. They saw that her tongue was protruded, her nostrils were bleeding; face was burnt; there was no sign of flame in the room anywhere. It was further stated that his daughter has been killed by throttling and thereafter put to flames after pouring kerosene oil on her body. It was further stated that on 22nd June, 2000, on telephone received by him from Kotputali, he heard his daughter telling about ill-treatment of her inlaws and regarding demand of four lac rupees. He wanted to go to Kotputali on 22nd June, 2000 itself but his son-in-law Akhilesh and his brother advised him not to come at Kotputali. Kavita also told him that there is no need of his coming at Kotputali. It was also stated in the report that on 17th April, 1998 his daughter Kavita was married with Akhilesh S/o Dwarka Prasad; the marriage took place at Jaipur; the mediator was Shri Radheyshyam Gupta - the uncle of Akhilesh. He agreed to spend five to six lac rupees in the marriage but Radheyshyam Gupta, Dwarka Prasad, Radhey Mohan Gupta, Akhilesh and Sanjay manipulated the things in such a manner and he was compelled to spend thirteen to fourteen lac rupees in the marriage. He gave a sum of Rs.1,50,000/- for furniture, Rs.2,50,000/- for Maruti Car, Rs.1,00,000/- for clothes but neither they purchased furniture or clothes nor Maruti Car for his daughter. The other details of the items, which were given in dowry, were also mentioned in the report. He gave a sum of Rs.1,50,000/- for furniture, Rs.2,50,000/- for Maruti Car, Rs.1,00,000/- for clothes but neither they purchased furniture or clothes nor Maruti Car for his daughter. The other details of the items, which were given in dowry, were also mentioned in the report. On the basis of the above report, the police registered F.I.R. No.407/2000 against accused-persons for the offence under Sections 498-A, 304-B and 201, IPC., and commenced investigation. 5. After completion of investigation, the police filed a charge-sheet against Akhilesh, (the husband), Sanjay (Devar – younger brotherin- law), Dwarka Prasad (father-in-law), Smt. Shakuntla Devi (mother-in-law), Miss Sunita (Nanad – unmarried sister-in-law) and Smt. Urmila (Nanad – married sister-in-law) for the offence under Sections 304-B, 498-A, 201 and 120-B, IPC, in the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kotputali, District Jaipur. The case was committed for trial to the Court of Sessions Judge, who, vide its order dated 18th September, 2000, transferred the same for trial to the Court of Additional District & Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No.1, Jaipur District, Jaipur. 6. The learned trial court framed charges against all the accused-persons for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 120-B, IPC and, in alternative under Section 304-B, 498-A and 201/120-B, IPC. The accused-persons denied the charges and claimed to be tried. 7. In support of its case, the prosecution examined PW-1 Krishanavtar, PW-2 Rajendra Prasad, PW-3 Sushil Kumar, PW-4 Surendra Prasad, PW-5 Dr. Birbal Yadav, PW-6 Bindu Devi, PW-7 Parmeshwari, PW-8 Sharwan Singh, PW-9 Hirawati Devi, PW-10 Pinky Agrawal, PW-11 Mahesh Kumar, PW-12 Manoj Kumar Agrawal, PW-13 Ramavtar Gupta, PW-14 Suresh Chand, PW-15 Raju Saini, PW-16 Pawan Kumar Agrawal, PW-17 Prem Chand, PW-18 Dr. Vijay, PW-19 Yunus Ali Khan, PW-20 Sushil Kumar, PW-21 Dr. Birbal Yadav, PW-6 Bindu Devi, PW-7 Parmeshwari, PW-8 Sharwan Singh, PW-9 Hirawati Devi, PW-10 Pinky Agrawal, PW-11 Mahesh Kumar, PW-12 Manoj Kumar Agrawal, PW-13 Ramavtar Gupta, PW-14 Suresh Chand, PW-15 Raju Saini, PW-16 Pawan Kumar Agrawal, PW-17 Prem Chand, PW-18 Dr. Vijay, PW-19 Yunus Ali Khan, PW-20 Sushil Kumar, PW-21 Dr. Ashvini Goyal, PW-22 Nagarmal Mahajan, PW-23 Pramod Agrawal, PW-24 Shivram, PW-25 Raghuveer Singh, PW-26 Sukhdeo Meena, PW-27 Gopi Singh, PW-28 Sunil, PW-29 Raghuveer Dayal, PW-30 Govind Narain and PW-31 Chain Singh Rajpurohit, and produced documentary evidence Exhibit P-1 Written-report, Exhibit P-2 F.I.R., Exhibit P-3, Receipt of dead body, Exhibit P-4 to Exhibit P- 14 Telephone Bills and Receipts, Exhibit P-15 to Exhibit P-17, pre-invitation and invitation letters, Exhibit P-18 inquest-report, Exhibit P- 19 seizure-memo of one pair of silver anklet and two ear-rings, Exhibit P-20 Postmortem Report, Exhibit P-21 memo of developing-chance-printphoto, Exhibit P-22 to Exhibit P-27 arrest memo of accused, Exhibit P-28 statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. of Suresh Chand, Exhibit P-29 Written-report, Exhibit P-30 to Exhibit P-37 photos and negatives, Exhibit P-38 to Exhibit P- 39 Site-Plan, Exhibit P-40 to Exhibit P-42 seizure-memo, Exhibit P-43 seizure-memo of agreement, Exhibit P-44 agreement, Exhibit P-45 to Exhibit P-47 seizure-memo of Kisan Vikas Patra, Exhibit P-48 to Exhibit P-49 statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. of witnesses Sushil Sharma and Nagar Mal, Exhibit P-50 statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. of Shivram, Exhibit P- 48 FSL Report, Exhibit P-51 to Exhibit P-66 Finger print of accused, Exhibit P-67 and Exhibit P-68 FSL Receipt, Exhibit P-69 statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. of Raghuveer Dayal, Exhibit P-70 to Exhibit P-72 Photos negatives, Exhibit P-73 to Exhibit P-77 Photocopies of thumb impression, Exhibit P-78 FSL Report, Exhibit P-79 Report of Finger Print Bureau, Exhibit P-80 Letter sent by the SP to Director of Finger Print, Exhibit P-81 court statement of Radheyshyam Gupta. Thereafter the statement of the accused-persons were recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein it was stated that the prosecution evidence is false; a writtenexplanation was also given by accused Akhilesh. Thereafter the statement of the accused-persons were recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein it was stated that the prosecution evidence is false; a writtenexplanation was also given by accused Akhilesh. The accused-persons examined DW-1 Trilok Chand, DW-2 Radhey Shyam Gupta, DW-3 Ramesh Kumar Jindal and DW-4 Manju Mathur; and produced documentary evidence Exhibit D-1 statement of Rajendra Prasad, Exhibit D-2 to Exhibit D-12 statements of Rajendra Prasad, Sushil Kumar, Surednra Prasad, Bindu Devi, Parmeshwari, Hirawati Devi, Pinky, Mahesh, Manoj, Ramaotar, Pramod Agrawal recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. The trial court, vide its impugned judgment and order, acquitted all the accusedpersons, except accused Akhilesh, from all the charges and convicted and sentenced accused Akhilesh for the offence under Sections 302, 498A and 201 IPC and sentenced, as mentioned above. 8. Shri S.R. Bajwa, learned Senior Advocate, appearing on behalf of the accused persons argued that the trial court has committed an illegality in convicting accused Akhilesh for the offence under Sections 302, 498A and 201 IPC; the finding of the learned trial court in this regard is absolutely illegal, perverse; there is no discussion specifically about conviction under Section 498A IPC in the entire judgment and, as such, the trial court committed an illegality in convicting and sentencing the accused Akhilesh under this offence. 9. The learned counsel for the accused persons contended that so far as offence under Sections 304B and 120B IPC are concerned, the learned trial court has acquitted all the accused-persons including accused Akhilesh from these offences and said finding of the trial court has attained finality. The accused Akhilesh was also charged for the offence under Sections 304B and 120B IPC but the trial court has acquitted him from both the offences. Although, the State as well as the complainant, both, have preferred appeal/revision challenging the order of acquittal of other accused persons, but have not challenged the order of acquittal of accused Akhilesh, who was the main accused as per prosecution case, of the offence under Sections 304B and 120B IPC and, in these circumstances, the finding of the trial court about offence under Sections 304B and 120B IPC has attained finality and no interference in it should be and can be made in the order of the trial court in respect of other accused persons also. In alternative, he contended that the prosecution tried to lead evidence about demand of dowry for the period before and at the time of marriage and the allegations have been levelled against the husband, father-in-law and uncle-in-law of the deceased. He contended that so far as father-in-law Dwarka Prasad is concerned, he has already died during the trial of the case. The uncle-in-law was not made accused in the case. The husband Akhilesh has already been acquitted for the offence under Section 304-B IPC and there is no appeal or revision against his acquittal by the State or complainant from the offence under Section 304B IPC. He also read the statements of prosecution witnesses and pointed out that as per the prosecution story there was demand by the accused in December, 1998 of some amount to meet out the expenses of marriage of uncles daughter; thereafter in January, 1999 demand of money was made to make payment of electricity bills; thereafter in March, 2000 a demand of Seven Lac Rupees was made to establish a factory by accused Akhilesh, the husband of deceased, at Bagru; then demand was made to meet out the medical expenses incurred on treatment of Dwarka Prasad, the father-in-law of the deceased. He contended that PW-1 Krishnavtar, in his statement, has admitted that although above demands were made but no amount was given by him to Kavita or any member of her in-laws. He also contended that although there was no such demand of money and even if there was some demand then no amount was paid to them and further that even for the sake of argument it is admitted, although it was not admitted, then the above demand does not fall within the definition of “dowry” and cannot be construed as demand of dowry within the definition of “dowry” as defined under the provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act. He further contended that there is allegation about mortgage of Kisan Vikas Patra which were in the name of deceased Kavita and demand of Four Lac Rupees by husband Akhilesh to make the payment to one Mr. Ram Kumar Lahoti under one agreement and the said demand cannot be said to be a demand of dowry, therefore, the learned trial court was fully justified in acquitting all the accused persons including accused Akhilesh from the charge under Section 304B IPC. Ram Kumar Lahoti under one agreement and the said demand cannot be said to be a demand of dowry, therefore, the learned trial court was fully justified in acquitting all the accused persons including accused Akhilesh from the charge under Section 304B IPC. He also contended that there is no evidence about all these demands also. The prosecution witnesses have not stated specifically as to when and before whom the said demand was made; the prosecution witnesses have also not stated specifically as to who made the said demands of the amount for the purpose as mentioned above. He also referred the statement of accused Akhilesh recorded under Section 313, Cr.P.C., particularly the written-statement given by him wherein it was stated that he is innocent and has been falsely implicated in the case; and that all the witnesses have stated against him at the instance of Krishnavtar; his marriage took place on 17th April, 1998 and Krishnavtar incurred the expenses in the marriage at his own; he and his wife Kavita both were living in Jaipur in a house at Bani Park; he established a factory at Bagru (District- Jaipur) and his family members were living in Kotputali; his brother Sanjay was residing in Jaipur in another rented house as he was preparing for RAS Examination. 10. The learned senior counsel further contended that accused Akhilesh, in his statement, has specifically stated that he visited Kotputali on 20th June, 2000 for mundan ceremony of his son; the ceremony took place on 21st June, 2000; and, he and his wife Kavita both planned to come back to Jaipur on 22nd June, 2000 but all of a sudden his father fell ill and therefore they could not come to Jaipur. On 22nd June, 2000 at about 5.00 PM he received one telephonic call from his father-in-law Krishnavtar who told him that an iron Almira is ready but could not be sent to their house as their house at Jaipur was found locked. He showed his ignorance about any Almira and told him that he does not want any Almira and asked him to keep the same with him; he further told that his father is not well and asked his father-in-law to send Manoj to make an enquiry about availability of Dr. He showed his ignorance about any Almira and told him that he does not want any Almira and asked him to keep the same with him; he further told that his father is not well and asked his father-in-law to send Manoj to make an enquiry about availability of Dr. Govil at Jaipur; thereafter Shri Krishnavtar assured him to make an enquiry in this regard; thereafter he reprimanded his wife as to why she did not wait for Almira and why asked her father for the same and told her that he will not accept the said Almira; thereafter Kavita told him that she had demanded some money from her father as a loan but he refused to give the same; thereupon he reprimanded Kavita on her demanding anything from her father. On 23rd June, 2000 also he repeated the same thing to Kavita; thereafter he received an information in Tehsil, as he visited there, from son of Surji Devi that Kavita got burnt. 11. The learned counsel for the appellant also contended that there is overwhelming evidence of the prosecution itself that Kavita was seen alive up-to 9.00 AM on 23rd June, 2000 and it is wrong to say that she was killed in the intervening night of 22nd and 23rd of June, 2000. He referred the statements of PW-17 Premchand, PW-24 Shivram and DW-3 Radheyshyam Gupta, and contended that from their statements it is clear that Kavita was seen alive up-to 9.00 AM on 23rd June, 2000 therefore there was no question of killing her during the intervening night of 22nd and 23rd of June, 2000. He also referred the statements of PW-17 Premchand, PW- 24 Shivram, DW-3 Radheyshyam Gupta and DW-4 Ramesh Kumar, and contended that from these it is clear that accused Akhilesh was not inside the house when Kavita died or got burnt. He further contended that accused Akhilesh got established his factory at Bagru and he was living separately in Jaipur with his wife Kavita. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the accused Akhilesh referred the contents of the F.I.R. and the statements of PW-1 Krishnavtar, PW-2 Rajendra Prasad, PW-7 Parmeshwari, PW-10 Pinki Agrawal, PW-12 Manoj Kumar Agrawal, PW-14 Sureshchand, PW-16 Pawan Kumar Agrawal and PW-17 Premchand. 12. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the accused Akhilesh referred the contents of the F.I.R. and the statements of PW-1 Krishnavtar, PW-2 Rajendra Prasad, PW-7 Parmeshwari, PW-10 Pinki Agrawal, PW-12 Manoj Kumar Agrawal, PW-14 Sureshchand, PW-16 Pawan Kumar Agrawal and PW-17 Premchand. 12. The learned counsel for the accused further contended that there was no motive established in the present case to kill Kavita and in absence thereof the entire prosecution story is liable to be thrown out. The trial court itself has recorded a finding that no person demanded any dowry at any time. 13. The learned counsel for the accusedappellant further contended that the trial court has convicted the accused Akhilesh for the offence under Section 302 IPC on the basis of medical-evidence, finger-print evidence, agreement (Exhibit P-44) and telephonic calls. He contended that the prosecution evidence in this regard was not sufficient to connect the accused with the crime. He contended that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the accused Akhilesh beyond all reasonable doubts. He referred the statements of PW-5 Dr. Birbal Yadav, who admitted that the immediate shock from vasovagal-inhibition causes instant death. He also admitted that if a person got burnt and receives instant shock then he can die immediately due to vasovagal-inhibition. He further admitted that if burnt-body is taken from one place to another place and if there is mishandling then hide-bone and cartilage-bone can be broken. He referred the Modis Medical Jurisprudence, particularly the causes of death and contended that severe pain and marked protein rich fluid loss from extensive burns which result in increased capillary permeability, cause shock and produce a feeble pulse, pale and cold skin, and hypotension resulting in death instantaneously or within 24 to 48 hours. He further contended that persons removed from houses destroyed by fire are often found dead from suffocation due to the inhalation of smoke, carbon monoxide and other irrespirable gases, which are the products of combustion. In such a case, burns found on the body are usually postmortem. He, therefore, contended that the conclusion drawn by the Medical Board about cause of death of Kavita was without proper application of mind and the same is contrary to the settled medical jurisprudence and the trial court committed an illegality in relying upon the same. In such a case, burns found on the body are usually postmortem. He, therefore, contended that the conclusion drawn by the Medical Board about cause of death of Kavita was without proper application of mind and the same is contrary to the settled medical jurisprudence and the trial court committed an illegality in relying upon the same. He contended that the opinion of the Doctors about the cause of death is mainly based on external appearance of the dead-body, whereas the external appearance of burns may vary according to the nature of the substance used to produce them, and the period of exposure. The minimum temperature capable of causing a burn is about 44 degree Celsius for an exposure of about five to six hours and exposure for two seconds is sufficient at 65 degree Celsius. If the body, of a victim dying of thermal burns, continues to remain exposed to flame and intense heat, some or all of the antemortem burns covering the body of such a victim, may exhibit the appearance of postmortem burns. 14. He further argued that the trial court has wrongly relied upon fingerprint Bureau Report (Exhibit P-79), according to which fingerprint of accused Akhilesh of left index finger was found on Bhagona (vessel) which was lying in the room i.e. the place of incident. He contended that the inquest-report was prepared by the Additional District Magistrate on 23rd June, 2000 itself but there is no such reference therein of said Bhagona. He contended that it was recovered after five days i.e. on 27th June, 2000, therefore, the same should not have been relied upon by the trial court in evidence. He further contended that the said vessel was not produced in the Court, which was the primary evidence and in absence of it the secondary evidence should not have been taken into consideration. He further contended that there is no evidence as to whether the said vessel (Bhagona) contained any kerosene. There is no evidence as to whether the said vessel was used for committing the crime. There can be other purpose of it also even if it is assumed that the vessel was lying in bed-room. He, therefore, contended that the evidence relating to fingerprint was also not proved beyond reasonable doubt against the accused Akhilesh. 15. There is no evidence as to whether the said vessel was used for committing the crime. There can be other purpose of it also even if it is assumed that the vessel was lying in bed-room. He, therefore, contended that the evidence relating to fingerprint was also not proved beyond reasonable doubt against the accused Akhilesh. 15. He further contended that the trial court committed an illegality in connecting the crime with the agreement (Exhibit P-44), which was not proved in the case. He contended that it was not recovered from the custody of the accused but it was handed over by grandfather of accused Akhilesh. There are only two parties to the said agreement i.e. the first party Shri Ram Kumar Lahoti (the owner of Balaji Gases) and second party the accused Akhilesh. Neither Shri Ram Kumar Lahoti was examined in the present case to prove the said agreement nor the signatures of the parties on the said agreement were got proved, therefore, in case the said agreement is discarded from the said evidence then there is no other evidence to prove the reason or background for so-called demand of four lac rupees by accused Akhilesh. So far as telephonic calls are concerned, he contended that there was reasonable explanation about these telephonic calls. Shri Krishnavtar (PW-1) was asking about the health of Dwarka Prasad, the father of accused Akhilesh. He further contended that the exact contents of the dialogues were not produced on the record by the prosecution. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313, Cr.P.C., has explained about all these calls. The learned counsel contended that there is no reason for not accepting the reasonable explanation of the accused in this regard. So far as Section 498-A IPC is concerned, he contended that from the judgment itself it is clear that no evidence whatsoever in this regard has been discussed nor any finding has been recorded about this offence and directly in the operative portion of the judgment the trial court convicted the accused-appellant for this offence also, which is not proper. He, therefore, contended that there is no cogent evidence available on the record to convict the accused-appellant Akhilesh for the offence under Section 302 IPC. He, therefore, contended that there is no cogent evidence available on the record to convict the accused-appellant Akhilesh for the offence under Section 302 IPC. In alternative, without conceding anything, he contended that as per the prosecution evidence, at the most, the accused Akhilesh can be held guilty of the offence of abetment to suicide as he reprimanded Kavita in the intervening night of 22nd and 23rd of June, and again in the morning of 23rd June, 2000 for asking her father to purchase iron Almira for them, can be a circumstance under which Kavita might have felt badly and committed suicide by setting herself on fire after pouring kerosene oil on her body. He contended that accused Akhilesh has already remained in jail for about nine years whereas maximum sentence for the offence under Section 306 IPC is ten years imprisonment, therefore, the conviction under Section 302 IPC may be set-aside and at the most accused Akhilesh can be convicted under Section 306 IPC to a period of imprisonment already undergone by him. The learned counsel for the appellant, in support of his contentions, referred - Anjlus Dungdung vs. State of Jharkhan – (2005) 9 SCC 765 , Vithal Tukaram More and Others vs. State of Maharashtra – (2002) 7 SCC 20 , and Angoori and Another vs. State of Rajasthan – (2005) 10 SCC 210 , which were considered during the course of arguments itself and the same were not found to be applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 16. So far as other accused, except accused Akhilesh, are concerned, the learned counsel contended that it is a settled law that even if two views are possible on the basis of prosecution evidence then the order of acquittal passed by the trial court, cannot/should not be interfered with. He referred the prosecution evidence and contended that the finding of the trial court about acquittal of other accusedpersons from all the charges is absolutely based on evidence and it is not a fit case for interference in the order of their acquittal. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the accused referred the following judgments:- 1. State of Punjab vs. Ajaib Singh & Others - (2005) 9 SCC 94 2. State of Kerala vs. Nazar – (2005) 9 SCC 246 17. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the accused referred the following judgments:- 1. State of Punjab vs. Ajaib Singh & Others - (2005) 9 SCC 94 2. State of Kerala vs. Nazar – (2005) 9 SCC 246 17. The learned Public Prosecutor as well as the learned counsel for the complainant supported the impugned order of the trial court so far it relates to conviction of accused Akhilesh, but challenged the same so far it relates to acquittal of other accused-persons, and contended that there is overwhelming evidence available on the record against accused Akhilesh and the trial court has rightly convicted and sentenced him under Sections 302 and 201 IPC. So far as other accused-persons are concerned, their submission is that the trial court has wrongly acquitted them from the charges levelled against them and they are also liable to be convicted and sentenced for the same offence for which the accused Akhilesh has been convicted and sentenced. 18. Shri S.K. Gupta, learned counsel for the complainant, referred the postmortem-report (Exhibit P-20) and the statements of PW-5 Dr. Birbal Yadav, PW-18 Dr. Vijay and PW-21 Dr. Ashvini Goyal, and contended that the prosecution has proved beyond all reasonable doubts that Kavita died due to asphyxia caused by throttling. He also referred the negatives and photographs of the deceased to corroborate the contents of postmortem-report (Exhibit P-20) as well as the statements of all the three members of the Medical Board. The postmortem of deceased Kavita was conducted by the Medical Board and all the three members thereof, namely, PW-5 Dr. Birbal Yadav, PW-18 Dr. Vijay and PW-21 Dr. Ashvini Goyal, were examined on behalf of the prosecution in the present case, and all of them specifically stated that her death took place because of asphyxia caused by throttling. So far as statement of PW-5 Dr. Birbal Yadav, in cross-examination, about immediate shock and instant death, as argued by the learned counsel for the accused, is concerned, he contended that the questions put in cross-examination were only of academic nature and no specific question was put to them in cross-examination with reference to the present case. Therefore, the said crossexamination does not help the accused in any manner whatsoever. Therefore, the said crossexamination does not help the accused in any manner whatsoever. He also referred Kusa & Others vs. State of Orissa – AIR 1980 SC 559 , in support of his submission that unless there is a specific cross-examination of that particular case the same cannot be taken into consideration in the case. 19. The learned counsel for the complainant also referred the statements of PW-1 Krishnavtar, PW-2 Rajendra Prasad, PW-7 Parmeshwari and PW-10 Pinky, who, in their statements, have stated that deceased Kavita was crying on telephone about demand of four lac rupees by accused persons on 22nd June, 2000. He contended that from the admission of accused himself it is clear that he suffered huge loss in his factory and he had executed an agreement (Exhibit P-44) in favour of one Ram Kumar Lahoti; according to the terms of the agreement, accused Akhilesh was required to pay four lac rupees before 9th May, 2000, failing which he was required to pay penalty of one thousand rupees per day. The husband as well as all other family members were cruel to deceased Kavita and they were compelling her to make a demand of four lac rupees to her father PW-1 Krishnavtar and therefore she made a telephonic call to her father on 22nd June, 2000. He also referred the statement of PW-1 Krishnavtar and contended that from the very beginning there was a demand of dowry even before the marriage and also at the time of marriage. PW-1 Krishnavtar gave sufficient dowry in the marriage and tried to fulfill their demands. He also contended that although motive in the present case to kill Kavita is fully established from the prosecution evidence but even if the same is not established then the same cannot be fatal to the prosecution case and in support of it he referred Ganeshilal vs. State of Maharashtra – (1992) 3 SCC 106 . He also contended that although motive in the present case to kill Kavita is fully established from the prosecution evidence but even if the same is not established then the same cannot be fatal to the prosecution case and in support of it he referred Ganeshilal vs. State of Maharashtra – (1992) 3 SCC 106 . He also referred Exhibit P-5 to Exhibit P-14, the telephone bills and receipts; Exhibit P-30 to Exhibit P-36, the negatives and photographs, the fingerprint Bureau Report and the postmortem report, and contended that not only the appeal of accused Akhilesh is liable to be dismissed but the appeal of the State and the revision filed by him are liable to be allowed and acquitted accused persons are also liable to be convicted for the offence under Sections 302 and 201 IPC. 20. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and examined the impugned judgment as well as the record of the trial court. 21. The undisputed facts are that deceased Kavita married with accused Akhilesh on 17th April, 1998; out of their wedlock a son was born on 31st July, 1999 and Kavita died on 23rd June, 2000 at her matrimonial home. Accused Dwarka Prasad was father-in-law of the deceased and he died during trial of the case; Smt. Shakuntla Devi is the mother-in-law, Miss Sunita is the unmarried sister-in-law, Sanjay is the brotherin- law (Devar) and Smt. Urmila is the married sister-in-law of deceased Kavita. So far as offence under Sections 304-B and 120-B, IPC are concerned, it is correct that all the accused persons including accused Akhilesh were charged with these offences. The trial court has acquitted all the accused-persons from these charges. The State of Rajasthan has not preferred any appeal against accused Akhilesh for his acquittal under these offence. Accused Akhilesh is the husband of the deceased. In these circumstances the finding of the trial court about acquittal of accused Akhilesh for the offence under Sections 304-B and 120-B IPC has attained finality. 22. So far as other accused-persons for the purpose of connecting them with the offence under Sections 304-B and 120-B IPC are concerned, we examined the prosecu-tion evidence, including the statements of PW-1 Krishnavtar and PW-7 Parmeshwari, who are the parents of the deceased. 22. So far as other accused-persons for the purpose of connecting them with the offence under Sections 304-B and 120-B IPC are concerned, we examined the prosecu-tion evidence, including the statements of PW-1 Krishnavtar and PW-7 Parmeshwari, who are the parents of the deceased. PW-1 Krishnavtar stated that initially he agreed to spend five to six lac rupees in the marriage of his daughter Kavita with accused Akhilesh but he was pressurized by Dwarka Prasad, Sanjay, Akhilesh and Radheyshyam and they manipulated the things in such a manner that he had to incur thirteen to fourteen lac rupees in the marriage. He further stated that he gave Rs.2.5 lac for Maruti Car, Rs.1.5 lac for furniture and Rs.1 lac for clothes but the accused persons did not purchase Maruti Car or furniture for deceased Kavita. He further stated that in December, 1998 Radheyshyam, Dwarka Prasad and Akhilesh demanded Rs.2,00,000/-; in January, 1999 Dwarka Prasad, Shakuntla and Akhilesh demanded Rs.3,00,000/-. Kavita had telephoned him but he shown his inability to fulfill the demands. Kavita gave birth to a child and on that occasion also they raised a demand of Rs.1,00,000/-. On 16th March, 2000 Akhilesh raised a demand of Rs.7,00,000/- to establish his factory; Rs.3,00,000/- were demanded to pay electricity bills; Rs.2,00,000/- were further demanded for marriage of the daughter of Radheyshyam; however, he admits that he shown his inability to fulfill the demand so made and in fact no amount was paid as demanded by accused-persons. Similar is the statement of other prosecution witnesses about demand of socalled dowry. It is relevant to mention that demand of any amount for the purpose other than the marriage cannot be treated as demand of dowry. The statement of PW-1 Krishnavtar makes it clear that the demands alleged to have been made by accused-persons from him were not demands of dowry, but they were made for the purpose other than the marriage, and the same were also not fulfilled by him and thereafter nothing happened with Kavita. The trial court has also considered the statement of the prosecution witnesses in this regard in detail and recorded a finding that the prosecution has failed to prove the offence under Sections 304-B and 120-B IPC against any of the accusedpersons. The trial court has also considered the statement of the prosecution witnesses in this regard in detail and recorded a finding that the prosecution has failed to prove the offence under Sections 304-B and 120-B IPC against any of the accusedpersons. After considering the prosecu-tion evidence in detail we are of the view that the learned trial court was fully justified in acquitting all the accused-persons from the offence under Section 304-B as well as 120-B, IPC also. Even otherwise, the State as well as complainant both can not be allowed to challenge the finding of the trial court acquitting the accused-persons from the charges under Section 304-B and 120-B, IPC, for the simple reason that prosecution evidence in this regard against all accused-persons was common and the order of acquittal of Akhilesh from these offences i.e. 304-B and 120-B, IPC, has not been challenged either by the State or the complainant and the same has attained finality. 23. Now the question for consideration is as to whether offence under Section 302 IPC is made out or not and, in case, it is made out then against whom it is made out. The trial court has convicted the accused Akhilesh for this offence and acquitted remaining accused-persons from it. Further the question is as to whether the death of Kavita was homicide as argued on behalf of the prosecution or suicide as suggested on behalf of the accused. PW-5 Dr. Birbal Yadav, PW-18 Dr. Vijay and PW-21 Dr. Ashvini Goyal examined the dead-body of Kavita and prepared the postmortem-report (Exhibit P-20). The external appearance of the deceased and the cause of her death as per the postmortem-report (Exhibit P-20) are as under:- External Appearance: “Deceased body is of average built, average nourished. Burnt underwear on body present. Regor Mortis present all over the body. P.M. Staining cannot seen due to burns of body. Eyes opened. Tongue protruded from mouth. Frothing bleeding from nostrils present. Face swollen. Burns covering following parts – scalp hair churned anterior pad of head. Face and neck, with and abdomen anteriorly and posteriorly perineum. Left upper limb and right upper limb on right forearm with hand whole hairs burnt. Burns are visible. Both thigh with buttocks. Upper 1/3rd part of both legs. Parts spared from burns – Lower 1/3rd of the both legs – both feet. Face and neck, with and abdomen anteriorly and posteriorly perineum. Left upper limb and right upper limb on right forearm with hand whole hairs burnt. Burns are visible. Both thigh with buttocks. Upper 1/3rd part of both legs. Parts spared from burns – Lower 1/3rd of the both legs – both feet. Black mole was present on right foot and toe of foot (total area of burns is about 45%). There is no line of demarcation between healthy and burnt area. There are no vesications. There are no sign of repairative process. Cause of Death: In the opinion of Medical Board cause of death of deceased is asphyxia due to throttling although the viscera are protected and sent to FSL for chemical analysis. Burns are postmortem in nature. Duration of death is 6-18 hours. 24. The aforesaid report has been proved by all the members of the Medical Board i.e. PW-5 Dr. Birbal Yadav, PW-18 Dr. Vijay and PW-21 Dr. Ashvini Goyal. They have specifically stated that in the opinion of the Medical Board the cause of death of deceased is asphyxia due to throttling. They also opined that burns were postmortem in nature. Duration of death was given as 6 to 18 hours. As per the external appearance of the body, the tongue of the deceased was protruded from mouth. There was frothy bleeding from nostrils. Face was swollen. Although PW-5 Dr. Birbal Yadav, in his crossexamination, has admitted that immediate shock may cause intensely death. He also admitted that it cannot be denied that due to instant shock because of burn a person can die due to vasovagal-inhibition. He also admitted that due to mishandling in shifting of dead-body the hide-bone and cartilage-bone can be broken. But it is also correct that no specific question with regard to the facts of the present case or about the present postmortem-report was asked from the Doctor concerned by the defence in cross-examination. The Honble Supreme Court in Kusa & Others vs. State of Orissa – AIR 1980 SC 559 , held that whenever a particular view taken by authors of medical jurisprudence is adumbrated, the same must be put to the doctor to assess how far the views taken by the experts apply to the facts of the particular case. Para 8 of the Judgment reads as under:- “8. Para 8 of the Judgment reads as under:- “8. We are unable to place any reliance on these observations in absence of any questions put to the doctor by the accused in his cross-examination regarding the view expressed by the author regarding the state of mind of the deceased. It has been held by this Court in several cases that whenever a particular view taken by authors of medical jurisprudence is adumbrated, the same must be put to the doctor to assess how far the views taken by the experts apply to the facts of the particular case. On the other hand, the last certificate given by the doctor towards the end of the dying declaration that the patient became semi-unconscious clearly shows that the deceased was fully conscious when he started making the dying declaration before the doctor. For these reasons therefore, the first ground taken by the appellant fails and is not tenable. As to the second ground, namely, that the dying declaration was incomplete, we are unable to accept this contention because we find that the deceased Antarjami could not answer the last question which was “what more you want to say”, because he became semiunconscious and was unable to answer any further question. A perusal of the entire dying declaration would clearly show that the doctor had asked all the necessary questions that could be asked from the deceased and the last question was merely in the nature of a formality. It is obvious that having narrated the full story there was nothing more that the deceased could add. We are therefore unable to hold that the present dying declaration is an incomplete one. Reliance was placed by the counsel for the appellant on the case of Cyril Waugh vs. The King, 54 CWC 503 wherein it was held that no reliance could be placed where a dying declaration was incomplete. Reference to the facts of the case would show that the statement made by the deceased was really incomplete inasmuch as the deceased was unable to complete the main sentence where he was trying to describe the genesis and motive of the occurrence. The deceased in that case stated as when he fired the shot, he missed the other man. The man has an old grudge for me simply because ..... The deceased in that case stated as when he fired the shot, he missed the other man. The man has an old grudge for me simply because ..... It is clear from the statement of the deceased in that case that the deceased wanted to give the motive for the occurrence and other relevant facts which he could not say before the dying declaration was closed. This case therefore would have no application to the facts of the case.” 25. In view of the above principle laid down by the Honble Supreme Court, we are of the view that the so-called admission/statement of the Doctor made in his cross-examination are of academic nature and cannot be connected with the facts of the present case in absence of any specific question relating to the present case or present postmortem-report and it is proved beyond all reasonable doubts in the present case that deceased Kavita died due to asphyxia caused by throttling and it is a case of homicide and not suicide. 26. Apart from the above, the death of Kavita because of throttling is also proved from the statements of other prosecution witnesses like PW-1 Krishnavtar, who stated that tongue of the deceased was protruded; there were frothy bleeding from nostrils. In these circumstances, we are satisfied that the conclusion drawn by the trial court about the cause of death of deceased Kavita is correct and based on cogent evidence. 27. Now the question remains for consideration is as to who are responsible for her death and what was the motive behind it. In this regard, the prosecution has examined PW-1 Krishnavtar, PW-2 Rajendra Prasad, PW-7 Parmeshwari and PW-10 Pinky, who, in their statements, have stated that on 22nd June, 2000 the deceased was crying on telephone about demand of Rs.4,00,000/- and therefrom it is apparently clear that there was demand of Rs.4,00,000/-. Now the question is as to who was in need of Rs.4,00,000/-. Now the question is as to who was in need of Rs.4,00,000/-. In this regard the relevant document is Exhibit P-44, the agreement, produced on behalf of the prosecution, to prove its case and a perusal thereof makes it clear that it was executed in between Ram Kumar Lahoti (the owner of M/s Balaji Gases) on the one hand and accused Akhilesh on the other hand; and, as per the terms and conditions of this agreement, the accused Akhilesh was required to make the payment of Rs.4,00,000/- to Ram Kumar Lahoti on or before 9th May, 2000, failing which the accused Akhilesh was required to pay a penalty of Rs.1000/- per day. There is overwhelming evidence in the present case that accused Akhilesh had established his factory i.e. Oxygen Plant in the name of Tirupati Private Limited at Bagru and he was suffering huge losses in it and he was in dire need of money. The deceased Kavita failed to pursue her father to pay a sum of Rs.4,00,000/- to accused Akhilesh. In these circumstances the motive to kill Kavita is established in the present case. Even otherwise the Honble Supreme Court in Ganeshlal vs. State of Maharashtra – (1992) 3 SCC 106 , has held that in circumstantial evidence also when the facts are clear it is immaterial that no motive has been proved. Men do not act wholly without motive. Failure to discover the motive of the offence does not signify the non-existence of the crime. The failure to discover motive by appropriate clinching evidence may be a weakness in the proof of the prosecution case, but it is not necessarily fatal as a matter of law. Para 9 of the above judgment is reproduced as under:- “9. It is next contended that the parents, sister, maternal uncle and uncles daughter, A-1, A-3 to A-6 having been acquitted the appellant cannot be convicted under Section 302 I.P.C. The question therefore, is whether it is the appellant alone who has committed the offence or parents, sister and two others also are participis criminis. It is true as contended for the appellant that the evidence on record is not sufficient to arrive at an immediate motive to commit the crime and the case depends on circumstantial evidence. But in circumstantial evidence also when the facts are clear it is immaterial that no motive has been proved. It is true as contended for the appellant that the evidence on record is not sufficient to arrive at an immediate motive to commit the crime and the case depends on circumstantial evidence. But in circumstantial evidence also when the facts are clear it is immaterial that no motive has been proved. Men do not act wholly without motive. Failure to discover the motive of the offence does not signify the non-existence of the crime. The failure to discover motive by appropriate clinching evidence may be a weakness in the proof of the prosecution case, but it is not necessarily fatal as a matter of law. Proof of motive is never an indispensable factor for conviction. In Atley vs. State of U.P. ( AIR 1955 SC 807 ), this Court held that where there is clear evidence that the person has committed the offence, it is immaterial where no motive for commission of the crime has been shown. Therefore, even in the case of circumstantial evidence, absence of motive which may be one of the strongest links to connect the chain would not necessarily become fatal provided the other circumstances would complete the chain and connect the accused with the commission of the offence, leaving no room for reasonable doubt, even from the proved circumstances. Therefore, the evidence of PW 4 and PW 5 partly with regard to the motive may not be sufficient to bring home the strong immediate motive. But the evidence of PW 5, Vanmala, that on the fateful day, she went to her sisters house situated at a distance of 40 to 50 ft. from her house and that she extended invitation to Kanchana and Kanchanas mother-in-law to attend the “Teej” ceremony in her house was not disputed in the cross-examination. It was around 10 to 10.15 a.m. It is not necessary to dilate the conversation for refusal to attend the ceremony but suffice to state that the appellant was present at that time. When Vanmala came down from the first floor, she heard exchange of words and somebody being beaten. After extending invitation to some people when she returned home, her maid servant, PW 9, after some time came and told her that her sister died. When Vanmala came down from the first floor, she heard exchange of words and somebody being beaten. After extending invitation to some people when she returned home, her maid servant, PW 9, after some time came and told her that her sister died. From her evidence in this behalf, there is no contradiction, but there is an omission of hearing exchange of words and somebody being beaten, in her statement recorded under Section 161 CrPC. Giving allowance to omit this part of the evidence i.e. exchange of words and hearing the beating of somebody, the fact remains that at 10.30 a.m. Kanchana died. It is established from evidence of Vanmala, PW 5 that she saw her sister Kanchana alive at about 10 to 10.15 a.m. in the company of her husband, in-laws, sister-in-law in the house and within a few minutes thereafter she was reported dead while in the house solely occupied by the accusedappellant and his family members.” 28. The evidence regarding need and demand of Rs.4,00,000/- is fully proved against accused Akhilesh but there is no cogent and reliable evidence in this regard against remaining accused-persons. The order of acquittal of all accused-persons from the offence under Section 120B IPC has already attained finality as discussed above. The trial court, after examining the evidence in detail, has acquitted other accused-persons, except Akhilesh, from all the charges levelled against them including the charge for the offence under Section 302 IPC also. On scrutiny of evidence, we are also satisfied that the conclusion drawn by trial court in this regard is perfectly justified in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Apart from above, it is also a settled law that the order of acquittal should not be interfered with unless the impugned order is perverse; even if where in a case two views are possible after appreciation of evidence then the view in favour of the accused is liable to be accepted. The Honble Supreme Court in State of Punjab vs. Ajaib Singh & Others – (2005) 9 SCC 94 , which was a case where there was murder of five members of a family at mid night in a village, did not interfere with the order of acquittal. Para 10 of the judgment is reproduced as under:- “10. The Honble Supreme Court in State of Punjab vs. Ajaib Singh & Others – (2005) 9 SCC 94 , which was a case where there was murder of five members of a family at mid night in a village, did not interfere with the order of acquittal. Para 10 of the judgment is reproduced as under:- “10. This being an appeal against acquittal, we have with the assistance of counsel for the parties gone through the evidence on record with a view to find whether the view favourable to the accused taken by the High Court is based on the evidence on record and is reasonable. It is well settled that in an appeal against acquittal, the appellate court is entitled to re-appreciate the evidence on record, but having done so it will not interfere with the order of acquittal unless it finds the view of the court acquitting the accused to be unreasonable or perverse. If the view recorded by the court acquitting the accused is a possible, reasonable view of the evidence on record, the order of acquittal ought not to be reversed.” 30. In State of Kerala vs. Nazar (2005) 9 SCC 246 , the Honble Apex Court did not interfere in the order of acquittal and held that even if another view may be possible, order of acquittal must be sustained. Para 4 of the judgment is reproduced as under:- “4. So far as PW 1 is concerned, there was a simple injury on his back of a very insignificant nature. PW 1 is also the first informant, but while lodging the first information report, he had stated that he had suffered a scratch on his back at the hands of some unknown persons. In his deposition, he admitted that he knew A-2 from before. It was found that he had not named A-2 as his assailant nor had he named him at all in the first information report. The High Court taking all these facts and circumstances came to the conclusion that the prosecution had not made out a case against A-2 and the other accused persons, who were appellants before the High Court. We find that the conclusion reached by the High Court is based on the evidence on record and we find no error in the appreciation of the evidence by the High Court. We find that the conclusion reached by the High Court is based on the evidence on record and we find no error in the appreciation of the evidence by the High Court. The High Court has taken a view which could reasonably be taken on the basis of the evidence on record. The conclusion reached by the High Court appears to be reasonable. In such circumstances, it would not be proper for this Court to interfere with the order of acquittal recorded by the High Court. Even if another view may be possible the order of acquittal must be sustained, if the finding of the High Court is a finding based on the evidence on record and is a possible reasonable view of the evidence.” 31. In view of the above discussion, we do not find any merit in any of the submissions of the learned counsel for the accused-appellant Akhilesh. We also do not find any merit in the contentions of the learned Public Prosecutor as well as learned counsel for the complainant for reversing the order of acquittal of remaining accused-persons, namely, Sanjay, Smt. Shakuntla, Miss Sunita and Smt. Urmila. Hence all the three cases i.e. two criminal appeals and one criminal revision, are dismissed being devoid of merits.