JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal has been directed against the judgment dated 23.02.2000 delivered in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 775/1997, wherein the question was, whether in a situation where application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short the Act") presented by the Management before the Labour Court, seeking approval of the proposed punishment of removal of the workman has been rejected and the order of the Labour Court/Tribunal being challenged by way of filing writ petition, in such circumstances, Section 17(B) of the Act can be pressed into service for payment of wages. 2. The learned Single Judge has held that the application under Section 17-B of the Act is maintainable for issuing direction to the Management to make payment of wages in terms of the mandate of Section 17-B of the Act. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the application under Section 17-B of the Act can be held to be maintainable only where the award has been passed and proceedings culminating therefrom are pending before the High Court or Supreme Court. In view of this, his submission is that the judgment of the learned Single Judge, being de hors the mandate of Section 17-B of the Act, deserves to be set aside. 4. Learned counsel for the respondents relying upon the judgmet of the Division Bench of this Court delivered in case title Karan Singh v. Authorised Disciplinary Authority RSRTC & Anr., reported in 2009(2) WLC (Raj.) 209 , has submitted that the legal controversy raised by the learned counsel for the appellant has already been set at rest beyond the pale of controversy by the Division Bench of this Court. Contra, the learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the judgment under appeal is not correct statement of law as the Division Bench has not specifically dealt with the proposition in hand. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. Contra, the learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the judgment under appeal is not correct statement of law as the Division Bench has not specifically dealt with the proposition in hand. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. The learned Division Bench of this Court in the case of Karan Singh (supra), has dealt with and relied upon the judgments delivered in case titles [1] RSRTC v. Kumaresh Gautam and another, 2007(5) WLC (Raj.) 59 , [2] Delhi Transport Corporation v. Jagdish Chander, 2006(1) SLR 610 , [3] Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. v. Ram Gopal Sharma and Others, 2002(2) SCC 244 , [4] T.N. State Transport Corporation v. Neethivilangan, Kumbakonam, 2001(9) SCC 99 , [5] Hotel Mansingh v. Judge, Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur & Anr., 2000(4) WLC (Raj.) 184 , [6] V. John v. Chief General Manager, Singareni Collieries Co. Ltd. and another, 1995(8) SLR 304 , [7] Bata India Limited v. Seventh Industrial Tribunal West Bengal and others, 1994(1) SLR 155 , [8] Sheikh Shamser Ali v. M/s Kesoram Industrial Cotton Mills Ltd., 1987 (2) Calcutta High Court Notes 39 , [9] M/s Punjab Beverages (P.) Ltd. v. Suresh Chand and another, 1978(2) SCC 144 and [10] P.D. Sharma v. State Bank of India, AIR 1968 SC 985 . 7. We have carefully perused the judgments. In Karan Singh's case (supra), the learned Division Bench has considered the judgment delivered in case titled RSRTC v. Kumaresh Gautam and another (supra), which is the judgment of the learned Single Bench of this Court relying upon the decision, under appeal. 8. Learned Division Bench has further cited the judgment in the course of the order, under appeal, delivered by the learned Single Judge in case titled Hotel Mansingh v. Judge, Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur & Anr. (supra), which is the judgment impugned herein. 9. In case titled T.N. State Transport Corporation v. Neethivilangan, Kumbakonam (supra), while determining the dispute, wherein an application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act was rejected by the Tribunal, the Apex Court held that the workman could get his right enforced under Article 226 and need not raise a new industrial dispute for that purpose. 10. In the judgment delivered in case title V. John v. Chief General Manager, Singareni Collieries Co. 10. In the judgment delivered in case title V. John v. Chief General Manager, Singareni Collieries Co. Ltd. and another (supra), the Andhra Pradesh High Court dealt with the similar proposition where the application presented by the Management seeking approval under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act was rejected, which was challenged by way of writ petition and along with the writ petition, application under Section 17-B was filed. Objection was taken about the maintainability of the application and the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that the order of Labour Court disapproving order of dismissal of the workman amounts to an award within the meaning of Section 17-B of the Act 'and in terms of Section 17-B of the Act, the workman- is entitled to all benefits. 11. In case title Bata India Limited v. Seventh Industrial Tribunal West Bengal and others (supra), while dealing with the similar proposition, the Apex Court held as under - "In that view of the matter we are unable to accept the admission of Mr. Ginwala that provision of section 17B would not be applicable as there was no award directing reinstatement. The definition of award and Industrial Disputes as it would appear from section-2(b) and section 2(k) of the said Act themselves, are of the widest amplitude. Award has been defined under Section 2(b) of the Act as an interim or final determination of any Industrial Disputes or of any question relating thereto of any Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and Industrial Dispute has been defined under section 2(k) of the said Act as any dispute between the employers and employees or between the employees and workman and between the workman and employers which is connected with the employment or non-employment or with the terms of the employment or with the conditions of Labour of any persons. The decision of the Industrial Tribunal under section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act disapproving the order of dismissal, is certainly a matter relating to employment or non-employment of the workman and is certainly a determination that the dismissal in question is invalid and, therefore, cannot be approved. The decision of the Industrial Tribunal under section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act disapproving the order of dismissal, is certainly a matter relating to employment or non-employment of the workman and is certainly a determination that the dismissal in question is invalid and, therefore, cannot be approved. There is no reason, therefore, as to why giving a liberal interpretation to the provision of section 17B of the said Act, Such-a decision of the Industrial Tribunal under section 33(2)(b) of the said Act cannot be termed as an award within the meaning of Section 17B of the said Act. Even if the provision of section 17B of the said Act would not have been applicable in such a case even then in our view the workman is entitled to all his arrear salaries and payment of further salaries month by month as a matter of right since in case of such disapproval of the order of dismissal under section 33(2)(b) of the said Act by a Tribunal, the workman concerned is deemed to continue in service and for the aforesaid purpose it is not at all necessary for the workman to go before the authority under the Payment of Wages Act, but such salary can be claimed as a matter of right by the workman concerned before the Court itself where the employer has challenged such order of disapproval of the Tribunal under section 33(2)(b) of the said Act. High Court, therefore, in exercise of its. writ jurisdiction which is invoked, by the employer by making an application under article 226 of the Constitution challenging such order of disapproval by the Tribunal passed under section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, is fully competent to direct payment of such wages of the workman concerned both arrears as well as current, whether an application has been made before the authority of Payment of Wages Act for recovery of such wages or not." 12. The judgment delivered in case titled M/s Punjab Beverages (P.) Ltd. v. Suresh Chand and another (supra), has been overruled by the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court vide judgment reported in 2002(2) SCC 244 , case titled Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. v. Ram Gopal Sharma and Others . 13. The judgment delivered in case titled M/s Punjab Beverages (P.) Ltd. v. Suresh Chand and another (supra), has been overruled by the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court vide judgment reported in 2002(2) SCC 244 , case titled Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. v. Ram Gopal Sharma and Others . 13. The judgment delivered in case titled P.D. Sharma v. State Bank of India, reported in AIR 1968 SC 985 , has no relevance as,Section 17-B came to be enacted by the Act of 1982 w.e.f. 21.08.1984. 14. Besides aforesaid judgments, the learned counsel has also relied upon the judgment delivered in case title Bharat Singh v. Management of New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre, New Delhi And Others, reported in (1986) 2 SCC 614 , wherein the dispute was, whether the provisions of Section 17-B of the Act are applicable to the cases which were pending before coming into force of Section 17-B and while dealing with this- proposition, the Apex Court held as under - "6. Before we deal with the rival contentions, it would be useful to read Section 17-B with which we are concerned : 17-B : Where in any case, a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal by its award directs reinstatement of any workman and the employer prefers any proceedings against such award in a High Court or the Supreme Court, the employer shall be liable to pay such workman, during the period of pendency of such proceedings in the High Court or the Supreme Court, full wages last drawn by him, inclusive of any maintenance allowance admissible to him under any rule if the workman had not been employed in any establishment during such period and an affidavit by such workman had been filed to that effect in such court : Provided that where it is proved to the satisfaction of the High Court or the Supreme Court that such workman had been employed and had been receiving adequate remuneration during any such period or part thereof, the court shall order that no wages shall be payable under this section for such period or part, as the case may be. The three necessary ingredients for the application of this section are (i) the Labour Court should have directed reinstatement of the workman, (ii) the employer should have preferred proceedings against such award in the High Court or in the Supreme Court, (iii) that the workman should not have been employed in any establishment during such period. 7. The question now before us is whether a workman would be denied the benefit of this section, even if all the above three conditions are satisfied, if the award was passed prior to August 21, 1984 ? We may, even at this stage, say that in cases where the award had become final prior to August 21, 1984, Section 17-B cannot be pressed into service to reopen the same. It is only when the award is challenged and the challenge is pending, that the section becomes operative.'' 15. He has also relied upon the judgment delivered in case title Dena Bank v. Kiritikumar T. Patel, reported in AIR 1998 SC 511 , wherein the dispute was as to what would be full wages in terms of Section 17-B of the Act and while dealing with the dispute as to whether Section 17-B can be made applicable in a situation while there is no award passed by the Tribunal or by the Labour Court, the Apex Court observed as under - "It would thus appear that the object underlying the enacting of the provisions contained in Section 17-B is to give relief to the workman in whose favour an award of reinstatement has been passed by the Labour Court and the said award is under challenge in the High Court or this Court. The said relief has been given with a view to relieve the hardship that would be caused to a workman on account of delay in implementation of the award as a result of the pendency of the proceedings in the High Court or this Court." 16. He further relied upon the judgment delivered in case title Uttaranchal Forest Development Corpn. And Another v. K.B. Singh And Others, reported in (2005) 11 SCC 449 , wherein the application under Section 17-B was filed in proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the Apex Court observed as under - "2. He further relied upon the judgment delivered in case title Uttaranchal Forest Development Corpn. And Another v. K.B. Singh And Others, reported in (2005) 11 SCC 449 , wherein the application under Section 17-B was filed in proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the Apex Court observed as under - "2. The benefit of Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 by directing reinstatement in service or payment of last wages drawn in lieu thereof can be granted only in favour of such workmen who have obtained awards in their favour from the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court and in support of their claims filed affidavits. Learned counsel for the employer states that such workmen who had directly approached by writ petitions to the High Court for seeking relief of reinstatement, cannot be granted benefit of Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act as there was no evidence before the Tribunal or the Labour Court about their non-employment or gainful employment elsewhere after discontinuance of their services. 3. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we direct that only such workmen in whose favour there are awards of reinstatement and who have filed affidavits of their not being in gainful employment, shall be entitled to be granted reinstatement or in lieu thereof paid wages last drawn by them on respective dates of their terminations from services. Their entitlement for such wages would be from the respective dates by filing affidavits by each of them in this Court in compliance with Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947." 17. On appreciation of the dispute in terms of the aforesaid judgments, we find that there are divergent opinions of the High Courts and there is no judgment or pronouncement of this Court on the point except the judgment under appeal of which we have doubt in our mind in presence of the judgments of the Apex Court. Therefore, we refer this appeal to the Larger Bench for deciding the issue involved.Deputy Registrar (Judicial) shall place the file before the Lord Chief Justice for orders. *******