Judgment: Pius C. Kuriakose, J. RCR. No. 204 of 2007 is instituted by the tenants and RCR. Nos. 35 of 2008 is instituted by the landlords. Both these revision petitions are directed against the common judgment of the Rent Control Appellate Authority dismissing the appeals filed by the tenants and the landlords. The landlords filed the rent control petition invoking the grounds of eviction under Sections 11(2)(b) (arrears of rent), 11(3) (bona fide need for own occupation) and 11(8) (requirement for additional accommodation for personal use). 2. The landlords case in the context of the ground for eviction under Section 11(2)(b) was that the contract rent was Rs.4840/- per mensem and that the same is in arrears since January 2002 and that despite the statutory demand notice issued under Section 11(2)(b) the tenant did not pay the arrears of rent within the period of 15 days of receipt of the notice or even thereafter. The Rent Control Court on appreciating the evidence adduced by the parties became inclined to accept the landlords case that the tenant did not pay the arrears of rent payable since January, 2002. However, that court found hat there was no evidence to hold that the contract amount of Rs.4400/- payable as per Ext.A5 lease agreement was increased to Rs.4840/-and accordingly concluded that rent is in arrears only at the rate of Rs.4400/-per mensem. Considering the grounds for eviction under Sections 11(3) and 11(8) the Rent Control Court noticed that the evidence given by the power of attorney holder of the petitioner who was examined as PW1 was only hearsay evidence regarding the requirement of the petitioners to expand their jewellery business which was being conducted by them in the adjacent northern rooms of the petition schedule building. That court also found that no acceptable evidence was let in for proving that the rooms available in the upstair portion already in the possession of the landlords was not sufficient for meeting the projected need of expansion of the landlords business. That court relied on the evidence of CPW-2, a retired Chief Engineer of Thiruvananthapuram Corporation to find that the area of the upstair portion possessed by the landlords was equal to the corresponding area in the first floor. That court relied on the evidence of CPW-2, a retired Chief Engineer of Thiruvananthapuram Corporation to find that the area of the upstair portion possessed by the landlords was equal to the corresponding area in the first floor. More importantly that court noticed that none of the landlords who are three in number have chosen to enter the witness box to testify regarding the bona fides of their need for additional accommodation. Rent Control Court relied on the judgment WP(C)N0. of this Court in 2005(2) KLJ 46, the judgment of the Supreme Court in 2005 (2) SCC 217 and also the judgment of this Court in 1994(2) KLT 571 and held that the failure on the part of anyone of the petitioners to speak about their own bona fides was fatal and accordingly declined order of eviction sought for under Sections 11(3) and 11(8). The Rent Control Appellate Authority on a reappraisal of the evidence would concur with all the conclusions of the Rent Control Court and dismissed the appeals preferred by the landlords and the tenants. In the context of a contention seriously raised by the tenants that the previous owners of the building had agreed to sell the building to them and that they are possessing the building on the strength of that agreement for sale and that there is no landlord tenant relationship between them and the petitioners in the RCP, the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority concurrently held against the tenants that the jural status of the respondents in RCP who were admittedly tenants under the predecessors in interest of the present landlords was that of tenants in view of the conceded position that the ownership had not been conveyed to them and that the suit filed by them for specific performance was only pending. 3. As already indicated RCR No. 204 of 2007 has been filed by the tenants impugning the order of eviction passed against them under Section 11(2)(b) and in RCR No. 35 of 2008 the landlords challenge the finding of the Rent Control Court regarding the contract rent payable by the tenants as well as rejection of their petition for eviction on the grounds of bona fide own occupation and for requirement of additional accommodation. 4. Wehave heard the submissions of Mr.V.Chitambaresh, senior counsel for the tenant petitioners in RCR. 4. Wehave heard the submissions of Mr.V.Chitambaresh, senior counsel for the tenant petitioners in RCR. No. 204 of 2007 and also those of Mr.S.V.Balakrishna Iyer, senior counsel for the landlords petitioners in RCR. No. 35 of 2008. Defending the order of the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority declining the eviction on the grounds under Sections 11(3) and 11(8) Mr.Chitambaresh would cite a catena of decisions before us including the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Indian Saree House v. Radhalakshmy, 2006(3) KLT 129, the judgment of another Division Bench of this Court in K.T.Thomas v. P.Sreedhara Varma, 2008(1) K.L.J. 125, judgment of a Division Bench of this court in Ratheesh Kumar v. Jithendra Kumar, 2005(2) KLT 669, the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Subramaniyan Pillai and others v. M.Shamsar Jihan and others, 2009 (1) KHC 384, the judgment of this Court in Sivadasa Panicker v. Travancore Mats and Mattings Co., 2009(1) KHC 472, the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Aboobacker v. Sahithya P.S.Sangham Ltd., 2004(2) KLT 947, Janki Vashdeo . Indusind Bank, 2005(2) KLT 265 (SC), the judgment of the Supreme Court in Joseph Mathew v. Jose Thomas, 2005 (4) KLT 764 (SC), the judgment of the Supreme Court in Davis v. Sebastian, (1999) 6 SCC 604, the judgment of the Supreme Court in S.R. Babu v. T.K.Vasudevan and others, (2001) 8 SC 110 and the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ubaiba v. Damodaran, (1999) 5 SCC 645 were some of them. Mr.Chitambaresh would argue that at any rate, in the light of the principles of law laid down by the decisions cited by him there was no warrant for interfering with the orders concurrently passed by the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority and that the maximum relief which could be aspired for by the landlords was leave to institute a fresh rent control petition on the same cause of action. 5. Resistingthe submissions of Mr.Chitambaresh Sri.Balakrishna Iyer would argue that the finding of the Rent Control Court that the contract rent payable by the tenants was Rs.4400/- only per month and not the sum of Rs.4840/- per month as averred by the landlords was faulty being contrary to the pleadings and the evidence. 5. Resistingthe submissions of Mr.Chitambaresh Sri.Balakrishna Iyer would argue that the finding of the Rent Control Court that the contract rent payable by the tenants was Rs.4400/- only per month and not the sum of Rs.4840/- per month as averred by the landlords was faulty being contrary to the pleadings and the evidence. Learned senior counsel submitted in this context that there was no specific denial of the landlords pleadings regarding rate of rent and at any rate, CPW-1 had admitted in his evidence that the tenants used to pay rent to the previous landlord at the rate of Rs.4840/-. Trying to distinguish the decisions cited by Mr.Chitambaresh taking the view that the non-examination of any one of the landlords is fatal when the need is for bona fide own occupation Mr.Balakrishna Iyer would submit that all these decisions have been rendered following the judgment of the Supreme Court in Janki Vashdeo v. Indusind Bank, 2005(2) KLT 265 (SC) wherein the Supreme Court was concerned with the powers conferred on the holder of a power of attorney in terms of Order III Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure to act on behalf of the principal. The ratio of that decision, according to the learned senior counsel was only to the effect that an agent is not capable of deposing for the principal in respect of matters on which only principal can have personal knowledge. In the instant case the person examined on behalf of the landlords was the manager and actual conductor of the business. The landlords are youngsters and it is this PW1 who is actually conducting the business and hence he is aware of the ground realities including the extent of space required for conducting the business in a more profitable way. Mr.Balakrishna Iyer argued that at any rate, all the decisions cited by Mr.Chitambaresh were decisions rendered in the context of a claim under Section 11(3) and not under Section 11(8). Mr.Balakrishna Iyer conceded that though in the instant RCP both 11(3) and 11(8) were quoted in view of the ratio of the judgment of this Court in Indian Saree House v. Radhalakshmy, 2006(3) KLT 129 and the judgment of the Supreme Court in S.R. Babu v. T.K. Vasudevan and others, (2001) 8 SCC 110 the rent control petition can be maintained only under section 11(8). Counsel submitted that the standards of bonafides required for establishing a ground under Section 11(8) were not so rigorous as in a case under Section 11(3) and hence the bonafides of the petitioners for additional accommodation has been established by the oral evidence of PW1, their manager who is in the know of things. When the attention of the senior counsel was drawn to the situation that in the instant case neither the Rent Control Court nor the Appellate Authority appears to have considered the question of comparative advantages and hardships as is necessary in the case of petitions under Section 11(8) in view of the second proviso to section 11(10) the senior counsel would draw our attention to Sections 18(3) and 23(1) of the Rent Control Act and also to Rule 16(2) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Rules and argue that if it becomes necessary the issue be remanded to the Rent Control Court. 6. In reply Sri.V.Chitambaresh, senior counsel would oppose Mr.Balakrishna Iyers request for a remand of the matter and that too to the Rent Control Appellate Authority. According to him by remanding the matter to the Rent Control Appellate Authority the tenants are being deprived of the statutory right of appeal guaranteed under Section 18 against the order of the Rent Control Court. Counsel submitted that on facts the case of Joseph Mathew v. Jose Thomas, 2005(4) KLT 764 (SC) was much stronger for the landlord and that in that case the Supreme Court had set aside orders of eviction concurrently passed in favour of the landlords on the sole ground of non-examination of the landlords. Yet the Supreme Court became inclined not to remand the matter, but only to permit the landlord to file a fresh petition. 7. We have considered the rival submissions addressed by the learned senior counsel. In the light of the relevant statutory provisions and the ratio emerging from the various decisions cited at the Bar. We will initially deal with the correctness of the findings entered by the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority regarding the contract rent and the tenants liability to suffer order of eviction under S.11(2)(b) of the Act. In the light of the relevant statutory provisions and the ratio emerging from the various decisions cited at the Bar. We will initially deal with the correctness of the findings entered by the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority regarding the contract rent and the tenants liability to suffer order of eviction under S.11(2)(b) of the Act. The Rent Control Petition does contain pleading to the effect that the current contract rent is Rs.4840/- per mensem and that payment of rent at that rate was defaulted by the tenant since 2002 and also that in spite of issuance of statutory demand notice under S.11(2)(b) the arrears of rent was not discharged by the tenant. In the statement of objections filed by the tenants these averments are certainly denied. But when the pleadings of the tenants are carefully analysed it will be seen that the contention prominently raised is on the basis of the agreement for sale and the denial of the landlords pleading regarding rate of rent, arrears etc. It would appear, are raised as corollary contentions. An argument which was raised before us by Mr. Chitambaresh very forcefully was that the landlord has not chosen to produce the renewal lease deed in which the revised contract rent is allegedly mentioned and the non-production of the renewal lease deed is a circumstance warranting drawal of adverse inference against the landlords. Despite the vagueness in the pleadings of the tenants regarding the rate of rent averred by the landlords, we would have accepted the above argument of Mr. Chitambaresh, but for the tenants own admissions in his testimony before the Court as CPW.1. In cross-examination, CPW.1 stated in a clear and unambiguous language that rent was paid last at the rate of Rs.4840/-per mensem. The landlords version that the monthly rent which on the terms of the lease deed was Rs.4400/- was enhanced to Rs.4840/- stands proved by the admission of the tenant and according to us the Courts below erred seriously in not noticing CPW.1s admission regarding the current rate of rent. We therefore reverse the finding of the Courts below regarding rate of rent and hold that the rent payable every month by the tenant is at the rate of Rs.4840/-. We therefore reverse the finding of the Courts below regarding rate of rent and hold that the rent payable every month by the tenant is at the rate of Rs.4840/-. The tenants contention that he is not liable to pay rent in view of the agreement for sale allegedly executed in his favour was rightly repelled by the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority. Tenants jural status in the building will continue to be that of a tenant until ownership is conveyed to him in execution of decree for specific performance of the contract for sale if such a decree is passed in his favour by the civil court which is presently in seizin of the suit. 8. The next question which arises for consideration is whether the present R.C.P. wherein the landlord has invoked the ground of eviction under S.11(3) and under S.11(8) simultaneously is maintainable. The above question is no longer res Integra. It is now settled by judgment of the Supreme Court in S.R. Babu v. T.K. Vasudevan & Ors. (2001 (3) KLT 468 = (2001) 8 SCC 110) and by judgment of Division Bench of this Court in cases such as Indian Saree House v. Radhalakshmy (2006 (3) KLT 129) and K.T. Thomas v. P. Sreedhara Varma (2007 (4) KLT SN 58 (C.No.64) = 2008 (1) KU 125) that the ingredients of the eviction grounds under sub-ss.(3) and (8) of S.11 of Kerala Act 2 of 1965 are distinct and different and they are mutually exclusive. We notice that all the statutory pre-requisites for maintaining a petition for eviction under S.11(8) in contra-distinction from a petition for eviction under S.11(3) do exist in this case. This is a case where the landlord is occupying a part of a building and the tenant is occupying another part of the same building. The requirement claimed by the landlord in this case is the requirement of the part under the occupation of the tenant for additional accommodation for personal use, i.e., the use of expanding the landlords ongoing business. We are sure that in the fact situation obtaining in the present case the landlord can aspire for order of eviction under S.11(8) only and not under S.11(3). We therefore hold that the Rent Control Petition filed by the landlord to the extent it seeks eviction on the ground under S.11(3) is not maintainable in law. 9. We are sure that in the fact situation obtaining in the present case the landlord can aspire for order of eviction under S.11(8) only and not under S.11(3). We therefore hold that the Rent Control Petition filed by the landlord to the extent it seeks eviction on the ground under S.11(3) is not maintainable in law. 9. Now we will examine the correctness of the view taken concurrently by the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority that the landlord has failed to establish the bona fides of the requirement under S.11(8) by examining anyone among the petitioners. In this context, it is necessary not only to consider the ratio emerging from the decisions relied on by the authorities below but also to appreciate the argument of Mr. S.V. Balakrishna lyer, that all those decisions have been rendered in the context of eviction ground under S.11(3) and hence not applicable to petitions where the ground invoked is additional accommodation falling under S.11(8). 10. Mr. Balakrishna lyer is certainly justified in submitting that the standards to decide bona fides of a claim under S.11(3) and that of a requirement of additional accommodation under S.11(8) are different, the former being more rigorous than the latter. The above submissions have the support of the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Pakran v. Kunhiraman Nambiar (2004 (1) KLT 824) to which one of us (myself) was a party and the judgment of another Division Bench of this Court in K.T. Thomas v. P. Sreedhara Varma (2007 (4) KLT SN 58 (C.No.64) = 2008 (1) KLJ125). But nevertheless, it is necessary that to succeed in a petition under S.11(8) the landlord establishes the bona fides of his requirement for personal use. Though the term "bona fide" is not used in sub-s.(8) it is certainly used in sub-s.(10) which qualifies and controls the decision to be taken under sub-s.(8). Mr. But nevertheless, it is necessary that to succeed in a petition under S.11(8) the landlord establishes the bona fides of his requirement for personal use. Though the term "bona fide" is not used in sub-s.(8) it is certainly used in sub-s.(10) which qualifies and controls the decision to be taken under sub-s.(8). Mr. Balakrishna lyers argument before us was that all the decisions taking the view that in claims for occupation under S.11(3) and the corresponding provisions in other local rent legislations have been rendered on the basis of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Janki Vashdeo v. lndusind Bank (2005 (2) KLT 265 (SC) and that the said decision deals with the scope of the powers conferred on a power of attorney holder in terms of Rr.1 and 2 of O.111 C.P.C. and not on any interpretation of substantive legal provisions such as sub-s.(3) of S.11 conferring eviction ground in favour of landlords. It is true that in Janki Vashdeo v. lndusind Bank (2005 (2) KLT 265 (SC) the Honourable Supreme Court was concerned mostly with the provisions of Rr.1 and 2 of O.111 and laid down that the word "acts" employed in Rr.1 and 2 of 0.111 can mean only acts done by the Power of Attorney Holder in exercise of the power granted by the instrument and that the word "acts" would not include deposing in place and instead of the principal. It is also true that in fact in the said decision their Lordships of the Supreme Court while stating that the Power of Attorney Holder is competent to depose for the principal in respect of acts done by the power of attorney holder in pursuance to the power of attorney ruled that he cannot depose for the principal in respect of the matter which only the principal can have a personal knowledge and in respect of which the principal is entitled to be cross examined. In Ratheesh Kumar v. Jithendra Kumar (2005 (2) KLT 669) this Court would follow earlier decisions of this Court in Thomas John v. Kochammini Amma (1994 (2) KLT 571) and the judgment in Shaji v. Raghunandanan (1999 (3) KLT SN 82 (C.No.85) and take the view that in respect of matters which are within the personal knowledge of a person the best evidence will be that of that person himself. The reasoning behind that decision is that bona fide means the state of mind and that state of a persons mind to have a need for a building for his own occupation can be manifested only by that person who harbours the need in his mind. Though the Division Bench in Ratheesh Kumars case referred also to other decisions including the judgment of the Supreme Court in Janki Vashdeo v. Indusind Bank (2005 (2) KLT 265 (SC) we notice that the decision of the Division Bench turned on the first principle that the person who can best manifest the need in his mind to have the building which is subject matter of an eviction petition for his own occupation is the person himself. We are in agreement with the views expressed by Division Bench in Ratheesh Kumars case. At the same time, we do not intend to state that in all cases where an eviction petition is filed under S.11(3) it is obligatory that the landlord petitioner himself mounts the box and testifies regarding the genuineness of the need projected by him in the R.C.P. According to us, in cases where the need projected is not need for own occupation by the landlord himself but is need for occupation by a dependent family member of the landlord, then perhaps it may suffice that the dependent family member for whose occupation the landlord petitioner has filed the R.C.P. gives evidence as witness. In such a case also it is the bona fides of the landlords petitioners need which is to be scrutinized by the Court. But the dependent family member, the really needy person, the prospective occupant of the building after eviction, may be equally competent to testify not only regarding his need to occupy the building but also regarding the need of the landlord to accommodate him in the building. 11. It is true that the decision of the Supreme Court in Joseph Mathew v. Jose Thomas (2005 (4) KLT 764 (SC)), of this Court in Ratheesh Kumar v. Jithendra Kumar (2005 (2) KLT 669), Shaji v. Raghunandanan (1999 (3) KLT SN 82 (C.No.85), Thomas John v. Kochammini Amma (1994 (2) KLT 571) were all cases wherein eviction was sought under S.11(3)and not under S.11(8). It is also true that the standards required for establishing bona fides in the context of a petition under S.11(8) are less rigorous than the standards required for establishing a need and claim under S.11(3). We are however, unable to accept the argument that the bona fides of a requirement under S.11(8) unlike the bona fides of a need under S.11(3) can be established by examining a power of attorney holder or some witness who is not the requiring person. The bona fides of the requirement which is to be established in a case under S.11(8) is bona fides of the requirement for personal use. The genuineness or otherwise of a requirement for personal use to our mind can be best manifested and established only by the persons for whose personal use, additional accommodation is sought for, in this case the landlords themselves. The Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority in our view were justified in their view that the best evidence regarding the bona fides of the requirement of personal use for additional accommodation was not adduced and that the petition for eviction was liable to fail on that reason. 12. Sri. S.V. Balakrishna lyer on being informed about our agreement with the views expressed by the Rent Control Court and, the Appellate Authority on the question of examination of the landlords would request that the matter be remanded to the Rent Control Appellate Authority lest a final decision should get delayed indefinitely. Sri. Chitambaresh would place strong reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Joseph Mathew v. Jose Thomas (2005 (4) KLT 764 (SC)) and also the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ubaiba v. Damodaran (2000 (1) KLT 24 (SC) (1999) 5 SCC 645). Counsel submitted that both the decisions were rendered under Kerala Act 2 of 1965 and argued that there is no warrant for interfering with the orders concurrently passed by the authorities below under the attenuated jurisdiction of this Court under S.20 and that the maximum relief which the landlord can aspire for is permission to withdraw from the present eviction petition with liberty to institute a fresh one on the same cause of action. 13. S.20A of the Act deals with powers of the Appellate Authority and the revising authority to pass orders of remand. 13. S.20A of the Act deals with powers of the Appellate Authority and the revising authority to pass orders of remand. S.20A provides that by disposing of a Revision Petition the revising authority may remand the case for fresh disposal according to such directions as it may give. The argument of Mr. Balakrishna lyer that the Rent Control Appellate Authority has got every power if it becomes necessary to permit parties to adduce evidence before that authority is certainly strong. Ss.18(3) and 23(1) of the Act and R.16(2) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Rules do suggest that the power of the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority in the matter of holding enquiry and recording of evidence is co-terminus. We are therefore of the view that as the revising authority under S.20, this Court has power in appropriate cases to pass order to remand the matter to the Rent Control Appellate Authority directing further enquiry by that authority regarding any issue. But we do not think that we will be justified in the instant case in remanding the appeal filed by the landlord to the Appellate Authority. At the same time, we are not inclined to follow the decision taken by the Supreme Court in Joseph Mathew v. Jose Thomas (2005 (4) KLT 764 (SC)). In that case the Supreme Court became inclined to pass the order permitting withdrawal of the Rent Control Petition giving liberty to the landlord to file a fresh Rent Control Petition on the same cause of action considering a request made in that regard by the counsel for the landlord observing that the request was reasonable. Unlike that case, in the present case Sri. Balakrishna lyers request on being informed about our views regarding the decisions of the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority was that the matter be remanded to the Appellate Authority under S.20A, so that delay in the matter of final disposal of the proceedings can be avoided and the entire evidence already on record including report submitted by Advocate Commissioners on the basis of local inspection will not go waste. We are of the view that in this case there is justification for passing order of remand invoking the power under S.20A. We are of the view that in this case there is justification for passing order of remand invoking the power under S.20A. But at the same time, the case is remanded to the Rent Control Court and not to the Appellate Authority in view of the reasons stated in the following paragraph. 14. We have already found that the Rent Control Petition can be maintained only under sub-s.(8) of S.11 andnot under sub-s.(3). It is trite that in all cases where the Rent Control Court comes to a conclusion that the requirement of additional accommodation for personal use is a bona fide one, it is further necessary that the court considers the comparative advantages which the landlord may gain out of order of eviction and the hardship which the tenant may have to suffer because of order of eviction. (See judgment of Supreme Court in S.R. Babu v. T.K. Vasudevan & Ors., (2001 (3) KLT 468 (SC) = (2001) 8 SCC 110). This is the mandate of the first proviso to sub-s.10. We find that the authorities below did not examine the question of comparative advantage/hardship in view of their conclusion that the bona fides is not established. In the event of the bona fides of the requirement under S.11(8) becoming established a finding will have to be entered regarding the first proviso to S.11(10) also. If we are to relegate decision on these essential issues to the rent Control Appellate Authority, that will be depriving the aggrieved party of the statutory right of appeal conferred under S.18 of the Act. Therefore we are of the view that notwithstanding the delay which may result, the Rent Control Court itself should decide whether the requirement of additional accommodation is bona fide and also whether the advantages to the landlord will outweigh the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by the order of eviction which may be passed. 15. The above discussions will lead these revision petitions to the following result. The order of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court under section 11(2)(b) is confirmed. However, the finding of that court regarding the contract rent payable by the tenant is modified and it is found that the contract rent payable by the tenant is Rs.4840/-per mensem. 15. The above discussions will lead these revision petitions to the following result. The order of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court under section 11(2)(b) is confirmed. However, the finding of that court regarding the contract rent payable by the tenant is modified and it is found that the contract rent payable by the tenant is Rs.4840/-per mensem. The arrears of rent to be deposited by the tenant for getting the order of eviction passed under Section 11(2)(b) set aside under Section 11(2)(c) will be quantified on that basis. It is found that R.C.P. No. 31 of 2004 is not maintainable under Section 11(3) and that it is maintainable under Section 11(8). The orders passed by the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority dismissing the R.C.P. are set aside and the R.C.P. is remanded to the Rent Control Court, Thiruvananthapuram for further enquiry and fresh decision. The Rent Control Court will permit the landlords to adduce further evidence by examining any one of the landlords and by producing any item of documentary evidence. In case further evidence as permitted above is adduced by the landlords the Rent Control Court will allow the tenants to adduce counter evidence. That court will pass fresh orders in the RCP on the basis of the entire evidence on record. The necessary finding in the context of the first proviso to Section 11(10) will also be entered by the Rent Control Court. The Rent Control Court will ensure that decision pursuant to this order of a remand is taken early and at any rate within four months of getting records back from this Court. Transmit records forthwith. The parties will appear before the Rent control Court on 7.3.09 R.C.R. No.204 of 2007 is dismissed and R.C.R. No. 34 of 2008 is allowed to the above extent. In the circumstances the parties will suffer their respective costs in the revisions.