JUDGMENT 1. - This Criminal revision petition under Section 397/401 Cr.P.C. is directed against the judgment and order dated 08.06.1994 passed by Additional Sessions Judge No. 2, Sriganganagar (for short 'the appellant Court' hereinafter) in Criminal Appeal No. 7/94 whereby the appeal filed by the petitioner against the judgment and order dated 07.01.1994 passed by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sriganganagar (for short 'the trial Court' hereinafter), was dismissed. By the order dated 07.01.1994, the trial Court convicted the petitioner for the offences under Section 3/25(1)(B)(a) of the Arms Act, 1959 (for Short 'the Arms Act' hereinafter) and sentenced him to undergo one year simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 100/-, in default of payment of fine, further to undergo two months simple imprisonment. 2. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties. 3. At the outset, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the petition does not challenge his conviction for the offence noticed above, however, learned Counsel has confined his arguments on the quantum of sentences and grant of benefit under Section 360 Cr.P.C. or under the provisions of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (for short 'the Act of 1958' hereinafter). It is submitted by learned Counsel for the petitioner that on the relevant date of occurrence, the petitioner was 19 year of age and as such he has not attained the age of 21 years on the relevant date of occurrence and therefore, both the Courts below fell in error in not extending the benefit of the Act of 1958. It is further submitted that both the Courts below have not assigned any special reason denying the benefit of Section 360 Cr.P.C. as envisaged under Section 361 Cr.P.C. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied on decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Satyabhan Kishore and Anr. v. The State of Bihar AIR 1972 SC 1554 , in Masarullah v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1983 SC 654 and in Daljit Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab through Secretary Home Affairs 2006 (2) WLC Criminal 341 (SC) . Learned Counsel for the petitioner has also relied on decisions of this Court in Mander Singh v. State of Rajasthan 2003 (3) RCC 1352 , in Ram Pratap v. State of Rajasthan 1989 Cr.L.R. 139 (Raj.) , in Roshan @ Ram Gopal v. State of Rajasthan 2005(1) Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 690 . 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has also relied on decisions of this Court in Mander Singh v. State of Rajasthan 2003 (3) RCC 1352 , in Ram Pratap v. State of Rajasthan 1989 Cr.L.R. 139 (Raj.) , in Roshan @ Ram Gopal v. State of Rajasthan 2005(1) Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 690 . 4. Learned public prosecutor supported the judgment and orders impugned including sentence awarded to the petitioner. According to learned public prosecutor, for the offence under Section 25(1B)(a) of the Arms Act, the Legislature provided that imprisonment for such offence shall be of a term which shall not be less than one year and therefore, both the Courts below were justified in passing the sentence of one year. However, Section further provides that such sentence may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine and proviso to this Section provides that the Court may for any adequate and special reason to be recorded in the judgment impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than one year. Thus, the proviso, empowers for imposition of a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than one year may be for adequate and special reasons to be recorded in judgment.Section 360 Cr.P.C. deals with release in the accused on probation of good conduct or after admonition.Section 360 Cr.P.C. reads as under: "360. Order to release on probation of good conduct of after admonition. Order to release on probation of good conduct of after admonition. (1) When any person not under twenty-one years of age is convicted of an offence punishable with fine only or with imprisonment for a term of seven years or less or when any person under twenty-one years of age or any woman is convicted of an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life, and no previous conviction is proved against the offender, if it appears to the Court before which he is convicted, regard being had to the age, character or antecedents of the offender, and to the circumstances in which the offence was committed, that it is expedient that the offender should be released on probation of good conduct, the Court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment, direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period (not exceeding three years) as the Court may direct and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour. Provided that where any first offender is convicted by a Magistrate of the second class not specially empowered by the High Court, and the Magistrate is of opinion that the powers conferred by this Section should be exercised, he shall record his opinion to that effect, and submit the proceedings to a Magistrate of the first class, forwarding the accused to, or taking bail for his appearance before, such Magistrate who shall dispose of the case in the manner provided by Sub-section (2). (2) Where proceedings are submitted to a Magistrate of the first class as provided by Sub-section (1), such Magistrate may thereupon pass such sentences or make such order as he might have passed or made if the case had originally been heard by him and, if he thinks further inquiry or additional evidence on any point to be necessary, he may make such inquiry or take such evidence himself or direct such inquiry or evidence to be made or taken. (3) In any case in which a person is convicted of theft, theft in a building, dishonest misappropriation, cheating or any offence, under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) punishable with not more than two year's imprisonment or any offence punishable with fine only and no previous conviction is proved against him, the Court before which he is so convicted may, if it thinks fit, having regard to the age, character, antecedents or physical or mental condition of the offender and to the trivial nature of the offence or any extenuating circumstances under which the offence was committed, instead of sentencing him to any punishment, release him after due admonition. (4) An order under this Section may be made by any Appellate Court or by the High Court or Court of Session when exercising power of revision. (5) When an order has been made under this Section in respect of any offender, the High Court or Court of Session may, on appeal when there is a right of appeal to such Court, or when exercising its powers of revision, set aside such order, and in lieu thereof pass sentence on such offender according to law: Provided that the High Court or Court of Session shall not under this Sub-section inflict a greater punishment than might have been inflicted by the Court by which the offender was convicted. (6) The provision of Sections 121, 124 and 373 shall, so far as may be, apply in the case of sureties offered in pursuance of the Provisions of the Section. (7) The Court, before directing the release of an offender under Sub-section (1), shall be satisfied that an offender or his surety (if any) has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in the place for which the Court acts or in which the offender is likely to live during the period named for the observance of the conditions. (8) If the Court which convicted the offender, or a Court which could have dealt with the offender in respect of his original offence, is satisfied that the offender has failed to observe any of the conditions of his recognizance, it may issue a warrant for his apprehension. (8) If the Court which convicted the offender, or a Court which could have dealt with the offender in respect of his original offence, is satisfied that the offender has failed to observe any of the conditions of his recognizance, it may issue a warrant for his apprehension. (9) An offender, when apprehended on any such warrant, shall be brought forthwith before the Court issuing the warrant, and such Court may either learned him in custody until the case is heard or admit him to bail with a sufficient surety conditioned on his appearing for sentence and such Court may, after hearing the case, pass sentence. (10) Nothing in this Section shall affect the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958), or the Children Act, 1960 (60 of 1960), or any other law for the time being in force for the treatment, training or rehabilitation of youthful offenders." 5. Section 361 Cr.P.C. provides for special reason to be recorded in certain cases. Section 361 Cr.P.C. reads as under: "361. Special reasons to be recorded in certain cases.- Where in any case, the Court could have dealt with. (a) an accused person under Section 360 or under the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act 1958 (20 of 1958), or (b) a youthful offender under the Children Act, 1960 (60 of 1960), or any other law for the time being in force for the treatment, training or rehabilitation of youthful offenders; but has not done so, it shall record in its judgment the special reason for not having done so." 6. In Chandreshwar Sharma v. State of Bihar (2000)9 SCC 245 , Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a mandatory duty is cast on the Court to record in its judgment specific reason for not granting benefit of Section 360 where it could have dealt with the accused under that Section. 7. In Daljit Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab through Secretary Home Affairs (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court held that where the provisions of the Probation Act are applicable the employment of Section 360 of the Code is not to be made. In case of such application, it would be an illegality resulting in highly undesirable consequences, which the legislature, who gave birth to the Probation Act and the Code wanted to obviate. In case of such application, it would be an illegality resulting in highly undesirable consequences, which the legislature, who gave birth to the Probation Act and the Code wanted to obviate. Yet the legislature in its wisdom has obliged the Court under Section 361 of the Code to apply one of the other beneficial provisions; be it Section 360 of the Code or the provisions of the Probation Act. It is only by providing special reasons that their applicability can be withheld by the Court. The comparative elevation of the provisions of the Probation Act are further noticed in Sub-section (10) of Section 360 of the Code which makes it clear that nothing in the said Section shall affect the provisions of the Probation Act. Those provisions have paramountcy of their own in the respective areas where they are applicable. Section 360 of the Code relates only to person not under 21 years of age convicted for an offence punishable with fine only or with imprisonment for a term of seven years or less, to any person under 21 years of age or any woman convicted of an offence not punishable with sentence of death or imprisonment for life. The scope of Section 4 of the Probation Act is much wider. It applies to any person found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life. Section 360 of the Code does not provide for any role for Probation Officers in assisting the Courts in relation to supervision and other matters while Probation Act does make such a provision. While Section 12 of the Probation Act states that the person found guilty of an offence and death with under Section 3 or 4 of the Probation Act shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attached to conviction of an offence under any law, the Code does not contain parallel provision. Two statutes with such significant differences could not be intended to co-exist at the same time in the same area. Such co-existence would lead to anomalous results. The intention to retain the provisions of Section 360 of the Code and the provisions of the Probation Act as applicable at the same time in a given area cannot be gathered from the provisions of Section 360 or any other provisions of the Code. Such co-existence would lead to anomalous results. The intention to retain the provisions of Section 360 of the Code and the provisions of the Probation Act as applicable at the same time in a given area cannot be gathered from the provisions of Section 360 or any other provisions of the Code. Therefore, by virtue of Section B(1) of the General Clauses Act, where the provisions of the Act have been brought into force, the provisions of Section 360 of the Code are wholly inapplicable. 8. Section 6 of the Act of 1958 deals with restriction on imprisonment of offenders under 21 years of age. Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Act of 1958 provides that when any person under twenty-one years of age is found guilty of having committed an offence punishable with imprisonment (but not with imprisonment for life), the Court by which the person is found guilty shall not sentence him to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it would not be desirable to deal with him under Section 3 or Section 4, if the Court passes any sentence of imprisonment on the offender, it shall record its reason for doing so. 9. In Masarullah v. State of Tamil Nadu (supra), the accused 20 years of age was convicted under Sections 452 and 397 IPC and was sentenced to seven years imprisonment. The report of Probation Officer showing that accused belongs to a middle class respectable family but fell into undesirable company and came under evil influence of movie which accentuated the dormant criminal propensity in him. While allowing the appeal, the sentences awarded to the accused therein was suspended by Hon'ble Supreme Court and he was put under the supervision of his father with a direction to appear before Assistant Sessions Judge, Madras to enter into a bond with two sureties one of whom must be his father in the amount of Rs. 3000/- each, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period, not exceeding three years from the date, he enters into a bond and he must be informed that in the meantime he is required to keep peace and be of good behaviour. 10. In Satyabhan Kishore and Anr. 3000/- each, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period, not exceeding three years from the date, he enters into a bond and he must be informed that in the meantime he is required to keep peace and be of good behaviour. 10. In Satyabhan Kishore and Anr. v. The State of Bihar (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court held that Section 3 and 4 leave it to the discretion of the Court to make an order as provided therein. Section 6 provides that where a person under 21 years of age is found guilty of an offence punishable with imprisonment (but not with imprisonment for life), the Court by which he is found guilty shall not sentence him to imprisonment, unless it is satisfied, having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offence that it would not be desirable to deal with him under Section 3 or 4, and if the Court passes any sentence of imprisonment on such offender it shall record its reasons for doing so. Under Sub-section (2), the Court, for the purpose of satisfying itself whether it would not be desirable to deal with such an offender under Section 3 or Section 4, shall call for a report from the probation officer and consider such report, if any, and any other information available to it relating to the character and physical and mental condition of the offender. Section 6 thus lays down an injunction, as distinguished from the discretion under Section 3 and 4, not to impose a sentence of imprisonment upon an offender of the class covered by the Section unless for reasons to be recorded by it, the Court finds it undesirable to proceed with him under Section 3 or Section 4. In that case, it was not in dispute that appellants No. 1 and 2 therein were at the date of commission of offences, of which they have been found guilty, and at the time of the trial, below the age of 21 years. The offences of which they have been found guilty being punishable under Section 328 and 448 of the Penal Code are also not offences punishable with imprisonment for life. On these premises, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that there is therefore, no doubt that Section 6 applies to the present case. The offences of which they have been found guilty being punishable under Section 328 and 448 of the Penal Code are also not offences punishable with imprisonment for life. On these premises, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that there is therefore, no doubt that Section 6 applies to the present case. Nothing was shown to the Apex Court which would lead to think that it is not desirable to apply the provisions of Section 3 and 4 of the Act to the appellants therein. The Hon'ble Apex Court accordingly released the appellants therein under Section 4 of the Act upon their entering into bonds. 11. In Ram Pratap v. State of Rajasthan (supra), the accused therein was convicted of the offence under Section 25(1)(a) of the Arms Act and was sentenced to the imprisonment, however, denied benefit of the Act of 1958. On a revision to this Court, while maintaining the conviction of the appellant therein for the offence under Section 25(1)(a) of the Arms Act, instead of sentencing him to jail, he was directed to be released on probation on furnishing personal bond and surety bond. 12. In Roshan @ Ram Gopal v. State of Rajasthan (supra), the accused revisionist at the relevant date of offence was 20 years of age and therefore, he was less than 21 years of age. He had suffered imprisonment for about 12 days. This Court considering the provisions of Section 360 and 361 Cr.P.C. released the petitioner therein on probation under Section 4 of the Act of 1958. 13. In Mander Singh v. State of Rajasthan (supra), the accused therein was convicted for the offence under Section 25(1-B)(a) of the Arms Act which provides minimum sentence of one year imprisonment. In that case, this Court relied on earlier decision of this Court in Surendrapal Singh v. State of Rajasthan 1995 Cr.L.R. 205 (Raj.) wherein it has been held that the Arms Act does not exclude the application of provisions of Section 360 Cr.P.C. as well as those of provisions under Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. In another decision of this Court in Jugta Ram v. State of Rajasthan 1981 Raj. Cr. In another decision of this Court in Jugta Ram v. State of Rajasthan 1981 Raj. Cr. C 01 , it has been held that unless any Act excludes the applicability of Section 360 Cr.P.C. or the provisions of Probation of Offenders Act, the mere fact that a minimum sentence has been prescribed for any offence, is not sufficient to refuse beneficiary probation. 14. On these premises, this Court in Mander Singh (supra) released the accused therein on probation of good conduct, on his entering into personal bond and solvent security. 15. In Darshan Kumar v. Secretary, Municipal Corporation, Jabaipur and Anr. 1973 Cri. L.J. 384 (SC) while considering the provisions of Section 6 of the Act of 1958, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that when an accused is found to be below 21 years of age at the time of commission of the offence, the High Court ought to have made an order under Section 6 of the Act of 1958. 16. Thus, from the various decisions referred herein above, it is clear that when any person under 21 years of age is found guilty of having committed the offence punishable with imprisonment, but not with the imprisonment for life, normally he should not be sent to be sentence of imprisonment unless the Court is satisfied that having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and character of the offender, it would not be desirable to deal with him under Section 3 or 4 of the Act of 1958. In the instant case, on the relevant date of occurrence the petitioner was 19 years of age. In the arrest memo, the age of the accused has been shown to be 19 years. Thereafter, when he made statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. on 07.10.1993 his age was shown to be 28 years. The occurrence in the instant case if of 13.07.1985. Thus, from the record, it appears that the trial Court while recording the statement of the accused petitioner noticed his age as 28 years, and if that age is considered then also the petitioner's age on the date of occurrence was about 20 years but at any rate less than 21 years of age. Both the Courts below failed to record any reason much less special reasons for denying the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. Both the Courts below failed to record any reason much less special reasons for denying the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. In my view, the petitioner requires to be dealt with under Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 and deserves to be released on probation under Section 4 of the Act of 1958. The petitioner has already suffered the imprisonment of about 20 days during pendency of the appeal and revision. 17. Consequently, the revision petition is partly allowed. The conviction of the petitioner for the offence under Section 3/25 (1-B)(a) of the Arms Act is maintained, however, instead of sentencing petitioner Gajraj Singh to any imprisonment, he is granted the benefit of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 and it is directed that the directed that the petitioner be released on his entering into bond in the sum of Rs. 20,000/- with one surety of like amount to the satisfaction of the trial Court to appear and receive the sentence when called upon during the period of two years and maintain peace and be of good behaviour. The petitioner to furnish the bonds as directed above within a period of 30 days.Revision allowed. *******