JUDGMENT :- Shylendra Kumar, J. This writ petition is by the first and second defendants in a pending suit in OS No.16158 of 2005 on the file of the court of the city civil judge at Bangalore, Mayohall, [CCH-21] aggrieved by the order dated 24.3.2008 passed on an interlocutory application filed under section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure--- the application filed by the plaintiff in the suit and which has been ordered in favour of the plaintiff 2. The application itself reads as under: "That for the reasons stated in the annexed affidavit, the plaintiff prays that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to direct/permit the Defendant No.4 to carry out works relating to levelling and metalling and asphalting the road connecting 3rd cross, Judicial Layout, GKVK, Bangalore ['the schedule road'] in the interest of justice and equity." 3. The application was in the pending suit, a suit for permanent injunction in respect of the plaint schedule property described as a road within the boundaries of ABCD and marked in red colour and praying for relief as indicated in the application. 4. The plaintiff had earlier filed an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the trial court after hearing the parties had granted an interim order on 8.12.2005 directing the plaintiff and defendants 1 & 2 in the suit to maintain status quo with regard to the use of the road in question. 5. The first defendant University had preferred a miscellaneous first appeal No.2559 of 2006 to this court against this order of the trial court and the miscellaneous first appeal was disposed of in terms of the Judgment dated 19.10.2006, order portion which reads as under: "3. Having regard to the contentions put forward before the trial Court and the trial Court having observed that the appellant – respondent No.1 [University) has to place sufficient material to show that the disputed area is being used for scientific research, in my view, the matter can be referred back to the trial court for disposal on merits, within a period of six months. 4. In the result, the trial Court is directed to dispose of the main suit itself within a period of six months from the date of communication of this order: Until such time, the status quo order passed shall continue to remain in force. 4. In the result, the trial Court is directed to dispose of the main suit itself within a period of six months from the date of communication of this order: Until such time, the status quo order passed shall continue to remain in force. Both the parties are directed to Co-operate with the trial court for early disposal of the suit." 6. It is much later that the application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure dated 1.3.2008 referred to above came to be filed. 7. The application was opposed and it was, inter alia, pointed out that the relief sought for in the application was one beyond the scope of the main relief sought for in the suit; that the subject property was property belonging to the first defendant – University a statutory body and no third parties including the third defendant Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike can be directed or permitted to carry out works within the precincts of the University and to the detriment of the interest of the University and had prayed for dismissal of the application with costs etc.,. 8. The subject order has come to be passed on such application and by allowing the application. 9. 8. The subject order has come to be passed on such application and by allowing the application. 9. The learned Judge of the trial Court was of the view that the plaintiff was justified in seeking for such directions to the third defendant Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike for the reason that in the wake of the status quo order that had been passed by the trial Court earlier and which has been confirmed by the High Court, it may not be possible for the Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike to take up any developmental works; that the plaintiff having pleaded that the mud road which was in existence has deteriorated in its condition and as it was required to be maintained and ensure that it was useful for the purpose of using it as a road, issuing directions to the third defendant —Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike to asphalt it and maintain it in a good condition is to subserve the order of maintaining status quo and therefore the objection on the part of the defendants cannot be sustained and rejected the same and proceeded to allow the application as under: "The application is allowed as under:- The defendant No.4 is permitted to carry out works relating to leveling, metalling and asphalting the suit road as it is only subject to and without prejudice to the decision of this case on merits and creating any rights over the parties in this case. Both the parties are directed to be ready with this case on the adjourned date without any excuse." 10. It is aggrieved by this order, the present writ petition under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. 11. Writ petition had been admitted on 17.4.2008 and the impugned order had been stayed. Both the parties are directed to be ready with this case on the adjourned date without any excuse." 10. It is aggrieved by this order, the present writ petition under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. 11. Writ petition had been admitted on 17.4.2008 and the impugned order had been stayed. On all respondents, petition being represented and the matter being adjourned at the request of the learned Counsel for third respondent Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike for the purpose of filing statement of objections if any on their behalf and on this court noticing that the affidavit filed before the court on behalf of the third defendant — Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike was by the Head of the legal cell and not by any official of the Corporation having any personal knowledge of the state of affairs in respect of the subject matter of the suit, had directed an affidavit to be sworn to by an officer conversant with the facts of the case. 12. Subsequently, as the affidavit was filed and the matter was taken up, it was noticed that the learned Counsel for the third respondent— Palike made submission at variance with the contents of the affidavit and the objections, particularly, on the question as to whether the subject road measuring 110 metres in length and lying within the campus of the petitioner — University was a public road or otherwise. As learned Counsel submitted that it was not a public road and also as to the development in the wake of the order passed by the trial Court if any further action had been taken pursuant to the order passed by the trial Court, a more responsible officer of the Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike was directed to place an affidavit before the Court. 13. In response, further affidavit sworn to by one Sri. Virupaksha Mysore, son ofJunjappa, Joint Commissioner of the Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike sworn to on 20.9.2008 is placed before the Court and the contents of this affidavit are at variance with the contents of the earlier affidavit filed on behalf of the very respondent -- Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike and sworn to by either the Law Officer of the Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike on 21.8.2008 or sworn to by B T Mohankrishna, son of P H Thanmiaiah, Executive Engineer, Yelahanka Division, Br chat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike sworn to on 11.9.2008. 14. 14. A noticeable variance is that while as per the earlier affidavits, the suit schedule property was a road and was used by public, in the later affidavit it is clarified with reference to the village map of the area, which showed existence of a cart track and on the representation of some of the villagers and residents of the Judicial Layout who claimed they were using this stretch for their benefit also, the authorities of the Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike had taken up work to repair and improve upon the road and not for destroying the road or the property in dispute; that the disputed area was being used by the villagers and residents of the second respondent society for several years and as they had treated it as public street and keeping in mind their convenience, the Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike had taken up the proposed work for improving the cart track and to asphalt the same as per the directions of the court. However, in view of further dispute no further work is being carried out and the Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike will await further decision of this Court etc.,. 15. It is in the background of such controversies, the matter has been presented for examination. The matter was being heard intermittently and it is taken up for further hearing today. 16. I have heard Sri. V. S. Hegde, learned Counsel for the petitioners, Sri. Jayavittal Rao Kolar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the first respondent — plaintiff in the suit, Sri. Mahadevaswamy, learned Counsel appearing for the second respondent Society, Sri. G K Bhat, learned counsel appearing for the third respondent — Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike. 17. Sri. Jayavittal Rao Kolar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the first respondent — plaintiff in the suit has taken up preliminary objection that this court should not entertain a petition under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India in respect of an order of this nature; that no injustice or grave irregularity has occasioned under the impugned order and neither it can be characterized that there is failure of justice and therefore the matter does not warrant interference. 18. Submission of Sri. 18. Submission of Sri. Hegde, learned Counsel for the petitioners and contesting defendants in the suit is that the suit itself is not one tenable in law; that in respect of the earlier prayer for temporary injunction to restrain the defendants, the trial Court had granted an order of status quo and that order having been brought to this Court by way of miscellaneous first appeal, status quo order had been affirmed but further direction was issued to the trial Court to dispose of the suit within six months while maintaining the position as it is and in such state of affairs neither the trial Court could have entertained any further applications for modification of the status quo order nor could have passed an order which is virtually in the nature of mandatory injunction to direct or to permit the third respondent — Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike to take any steps which can have effect of altering the status quo position, particularly, for metalling and asphalting the subject property lying in the University campus and besides its research unit; that it would adversely affect the research work; that damages caused to the research work will be irreversible and of great degree; that in a suit for bare injunction such orders are one going beyond the scope of the main relief and can be characterized as orders beyond the jurisdiction of the relief that can be granted by the trial Court and therefore submits the matter definitely warrants interference in writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India; that the trial Court has gone beyond the scope of the suit for granting such orders at an intermediary stage of the suit and the order on the face of it is not sustainable and liable to be set aside; that the present order is clearly in contravention of the earlier direction issued by this court in MFA No. 2559 of 2006. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that as the application was styled under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and there being no other efficacious remedies, the petitioners are constrained to approach this court seeking relief under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 20. On the other hand, Sri. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that as the application was styled under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and there being no other efficacious remedies, the petitioners are constrained to approach this court seeking relief under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 20. On the other hand, Sri. Jayavittal Rao Kolar, learned Counsel for the first respondent plaintiff in the suit would vehemently urge that it is not a fit matter for examination by this court in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India; that supervisory jurisdiction of this court is seldom exercised and in only extreme situation warranting interference some such situations having been illustrated and pointed out by the Supreme Court in the case of Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander Rai AIR 2003 SC 3044 particularly as indicated in paragraph-38 of this Judgment which reads as under: "38. Such like matters frequently arise before the High Courts. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder:- (1) Amendment by Act No.46 of 1999 with effect from 01.07.2002 in Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by the CPC Amendment Act No. 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. .(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction, i.e., when a subordinate court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction - by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate, Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate, Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When the subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (iii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident, i.e., which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view the error cannot be called gross or patent. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not covert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or, correct errors of mere formal or technical character. (9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate Court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case. that the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court almost akin to certiorari jurisdiction is seldom used for interference with interlocutory orders passed in a pending suit by the trial Court; that unless it is so imminent that not acting will result in failure of justice or miscarriage of justice and irreversible damage will occur the High Court should not interfere with the order passed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in respect of interlocutory orders passed by the trial Court in pending suits; that under the impugned order, neither injustice nor grave miscarriage or failure of justice can be said to have occurred to the petitioners nor an irreversible damage or injury can be claimed to have happened to the petitioners and therefore the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 21. Sri. 21. Sri. G K Bhat, learned Counsel for the third respondent—Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike would submit that the Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike only carries out the directions of the Court and acts as per the orders; that in respect of public roads while it has a responsibility, in respect of cart tracks as indicated in the village map, though it may not have any responsibility as per the Court direction, the Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike was prepared to act for the benefit of its users; that no malice or illegality can be attributed to the officers of the Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike and the Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike would abide by the directions. 22. It is also submitted that the earlier affidavit which had been sworn to by an officer is only on the understanding that the subject disputed property in the suit was road and it was not the case of the Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike that it was a public road. But on a closer scrutiny, it was found out that the village map has described it as cart track and this position has been clarified. 23. In a matter of this nature where the trial Court passes such orders on an interlocutory application and during the pendency of the suit as Mr. Jayavittal Rao Kolar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the first respondent pointed out, orders are rarely examined or interfered by this court in the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 24. The Supreme Court also had occasion to examine such situations and to the extent possible has indicated situations wherein the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can be exercised in paragraph-38 of the SURYA DE VRAI's case [supra] and it also indicates when the jurisdiction is required to be exercised and when not. 25. The jurisdiction of this Court even under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is required to be exercised in a situation where it is so warranted and it is not as though this Court has never exercised this jurisdiction. In fact, even as indicated by the Supreme Court, the jurisdiction is meant to be exercised and not to be kept in cold storage but the question will be as to whether a situation warrants interference in writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 26. In fact, even as indicated by the Supreme Court, the jurisdiction is meant to be exercised and not to be kept in cold storage but the question will be as to whether a situation warrants interference in writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 26. The present writ petition arises from out of a suit pending before the trial Court which is a suit for mere injunction. The subject matter is claimed to be a road used by the members of the plaintiff--association and cause of action was pleaded to be that the first defendant – University was preventing the user of this road by the members of the association and other road users. The defence was there was no road, there was no right either to members of the plaintiff-association or to the general members at large and suit itself was not tenable as the subject property was the private property of the university and no right can be claimed in respect of such properties by the third parties including the plaintiff. 27. The very right of the plaintiff to seek relief is disputed by the defendants. In so far as the application for grant of temporary injunction is concerned, the trial Court granted an order of status quo, in the sense that if the plaintiff or members of the association were using perhaps their user cannot be prevented and nothing more. This order further came to be affirmed by this court in the miscellaneous first appeal referred to above and this court directed the trial Court to dispose of the main suit itself within six months. 28. For whatever reasons that has not happened but much later the plaintiff had come up with another application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for either directing the third respondent --Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike or to permit the Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike to act at variance with the status quo order. 29. Though Sri. 28. For whatever reasons that has not happened but much later the plaintiff had come up with another application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for either directing the third respondent --Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike or to permit the Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike to act at variance with the status quo order. 29. Though Sri. Jayavittal Rao Kolar, learned Counsel for the first respondent points out that even when there is an order of temporary injunction granted under order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, subsequent application for modification can always be filed and it can be considered by the court, I am of the considered view that in the present situation, particularly, this court having directed the trial Court to ensure that the present state of affairs is maintained and to dispose of the suit expeditiously and at any rate within six months, entertaining application for passing orders at variance with the earlier situation unless warranted by an imminent situation should not have been entertained by the trial Court. That apart, the nature of the relief sought for is virtually in the nature of a mandatory injunction mandating the third respondent - Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike to carry out certain works in the disputed property. The property which is claimed to be private property of the defendants and when the defendants are complaining that such action is detrimental to the interest of the university, particularly, affecting their research work etc., the learned Judge of the trial Court should not have entertained an application nor should have passed any orders and such application which if allowed would virtually cause irreversible damage to the existing state of affairs and to the detriment of the interest of the university for their research work etc., the applications should have been dismissed by the Court. 30. When it is the case of the university — defendant in the suit that its research work will be affected and this Court did not interfere with the earlier order of status quo only for the reason that the university will be enabled to place further material in this regard, it is not for the trial Court to venture to pass further orders adverse to the interest of the defendant— university and to further jeopardize its interest and to put to harm its research activities. 31. 31. On a proper understanding of the earlier order of status quo it could never be construed as to do something beyond what was the existing state of affairs and as claimed by the plaintiffs and indicated by the Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike if what was in existence was either a road as claimed by the plaintiff or a cart track as claimed by the Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike, there could not have been an order to convert that into an asphalted road only to suit the convenience of the plaintiff and its members. The relief of this nature goes much beyond the main relief of mere injunction. 32. Whether such relief could have been got by the plaintiff or its members by resorting to any other methods, that was not a possibility in the present suit and an order of this nature is definitely one going beyond the scope of the suit and when it was opposed vehemently by the defendant – university and as one causing harm to its research work, an order of this nature could not have been passed by the trial Court. 33. I am of the clear opinion that this is a situation warranting exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of this court even under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to interfere with the order passed by the trial Court permitting or directing the Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike to carry out work of metalling and asphalting the disputed area and to the detriment of the interest of the university. What consequences may occur to the research prospects of the university while is definitely speculative damage is definite and may be irreversible and therefore situation also warrants prevention of such damage. This court by an interim order had stayed operation of the order and it is the version of the Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike that they have not carried out any work either for metalling or asphalting. 34. It is for this reason, this writ petition is allowed. Rule made absolute. 35. The impugned order under Annexure-E dated 24.3.2008 passed on an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure in OS No.16158 of 2005 passed by the Court of the City Civil Judge at Bangalore, Mayo Hall, [CCH-21] is quashed and the application dismissed. 36. It is for this reason, this writ petition is allowed. Rule made absolute. 35. The impugned order under Annexure-E dated 24.3.2008 passed on an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure in OS No.16158 of 2005 passed by the Court of the City Civil Judge at Bangalore, Mayo Hall, [CCH-21] is quashed and the application dismissed. 36. The trial Court is directed to dispose of the suit as had been earlier impressed by this court and at least now within a further period of six months from this date without bestowing more attention to the interlocutory applications but on the main matter.