JUDGMENT Hon'ble TOTLA, J.-Appellant challenges his conviction for the offence of Section 392 IPC and sentence awarded to two years rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs. 1000/- vide judgment dated 2.6.1989 in Sessions Case No. 39/1986 (63/1985). 2. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned Public Prosecutor. 3. Appellant Jetha Ram S/o Jagaji was charged for the offence Section 366 of 376 IPC (in relation to wife of PW 1 Jetha Ram S/o. Perna) and also for the offence of Section 392 IPC regarding her ornaments. One other accused Bhanwar Lal was also charged for the offence of Section 411 IPC - appellant per judgment under consideration is acquitted for other charge for the offences of Sections 366 & 376 IPC and is convicted and sentence for the offence of Sections 392 IPC. 4. Brief alleged facts as per prosecution and relevant for the offence convicted appear to be that on 25.5.84, Jetha Ram s/o Pemaji PW.1, presenting a typed report Ex.P1 at police station, describing in detail, informed that his wife Smt. Dharmi is deceitfully or forcibly taken by Jetha Ram s/o. Jagaji r/o. Palaya and on report is registered FIR No. 122/84 Ex.P.24 for the offence of Section 366 IPC- the woman was found with appellant on 1.9.84. In course of investigation, appellant Jehta Ram S/o Jagaji was arrested on 1.9.84 and (1) as per his information of 6.9.84 Ex.P.31 a silver "karikni" ornaments weighing about 50 gm recovered from a goldsmith shop of Tarachand S/o Hinduji at Takhatgarh which seized and sealed, preparing memo Ex.P.9 and memo of paper slip affixed on packet is Ex.P.29, (2) per disclosure made by appellant on 7.9.84 and reduced in writing Ex.P.32 at appellant's instance from goldsmith shop of Bhanwar Lal recovered a melted silver little piece "dali" weighing 160 gm which seized, preparing memo EX.P.10 and paper slip affixed is Ex.P.23, (3) per disclosure made by appellant on 8.9.84 and reduced in writing as Ex.P.30 and at his instance from his house lying in a box recovered silver a pair "uttarni" & "jela" weighing 115 gm which sealed, preparing Ex.P.11. As matter is not under consideration for the other acts offences of Section 376 and 366 IPC, no relevance appears for describing other details. As matter is not under consideration for the other acts offences of Section 376 and 366 IPC, no relevance appears for describing other details. It appears that at the time of above recoveries, goldsmith Bhanwar Lal S/o Meda also presented a receipt dated 28.8.84 of mortgaging silver "karias" similarly, goldsmith Tarachand s/o Hinduji also presented a receipt Ex.P.3 of pleading "kankni" -Jetha Jaga describing the day of Bhadwa Vadi 13 of Samvat 2040. The recovered "kankni", "jeta" and "uttarni" were identified by PW.1 and PW.7 as to be of PW.6 and other which were on her person-memo of identification parade conducted before Executive Magistrate is Ex.P.16. After investigation, charge-sheet submitted for the offences of Secs.376, 366. and 392 IPC and also for the offence of Sec. 411 IPC for other acquitted Bhanwar Lal. 5. The prosecution, in total examined 32 witnesses, As above, appellant is convicted for the offence of Section 392 IPC and is acquitted of other charges. Thus, alleged facts and events and also the evidence not relevant for the offence of Section 392 IPC, hardly needs to be gone into detail. For the offence of Section 392 IPC, evidence is of PW.1 Jetha and his the wife prosecutrix PW.7 who has identified recovered articles in be her's and PW.7 also deposes about taking of these ornaments from her person by appellant. I lead Constable PW.32 investigating the matter on information furnished by appellant, recovered the articles. Tara Chand PW.3, Girdhari PW.11 Achla Ram PW. 12, Bhanwar Lal PW. 13, Jawahar Singh PW. 19, Jetharam PW. 19, Mangilal PW. 23, Gopilal PW. 24 are witnesses of recovery etc. of which PWs. 11, 12, 13, 14, 19, 23 and 24 are declared hostile by the prosecution. Before Tara Chand PW. 20, the then Executive Magistrate, articles were identified by PW.1 and PW. 7. 6. As per appellant he is falsely implicated. In defence, is examined the then Judicial Magistrate who recorded statement Ex. D.2 under Section 164 Cr.P.C. of witness Smt. Dharmi PW. 7 Art. 2 "kakni", Art. 3 "uttarni", Art. 4 "Jhela Jori" and Art. 5 silver geli alleged to have been recovered. 7. Learned trial Judge, describing and analyzing the evidence in detail, for the reasons and circumstances mentioned in judgment acquitted appellant for the offences of Sections 366 and 376 IPC and convicted for the offence of Section 392 IPC. 8. 7. Learned trial Judge, describing and analyzing the evidence in detail, for the reasons and circumstances mentioned in judgment acquitted appellant for the offences of Sections 366 and 376 IPC and convicted for the offence of Section 392 IPC. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that (1) regarding pledge of the articles are receipts Ex. P. 3 and Ex. P. 35 and as per receipt, the articles were pleaded prior to that alleged incident of prosecutrix going with appellant. (2) Silver "dali" recovered, cannot be said to be of "Karia" any other article belonging to PW.7 which is also accepted by the learned trial Judge. (3) Per receipt Ex. P.3 articles were pledged on Bhadwa Sud 13 Samvat 2040 which is about year prior to alleged events for which prosecution is - learned Judge purely on possibilities inferred that probably instead of 2041 written was 2040. (4) If no evidence of 366 or any like offence, then hardly can be question of taking ornaments forcibly or without consent, (5) Taking evidence together of entire incident, there is nothing to infer that of theft or extortion and/or obtaining articles putting the concerned in fear. 9. Learned Public Prosecutor countering arguments, submitted that inferences regarding commission of offences convicted for are based on strong evidence and reasons. 10. Considering arguments, perused judgment and evidence on record. It seems that the learned Judge arrived at conclusions of Dharmi being above relevant age and about 25 years and also on given facts inferred about consent etc. 11. Going through the evidence of PW.1 husband of prosecutrix who lodged FIR is, she was away since August 24th if not earlier by a day or two. Appellant and Smt. Dharmi were found at some public place near Railway Station, Balotra on 30.8.84 that is, 7-8 days after the incident and the ASI Balotra PW.29 deposed that he observed appellant and prosecutrix who appeared to be afraid like, so interrogated and prosecutrix first disclosed her name to be Bhanwar Bai, then Rukmani and then right one who were arrested on 30.8.84, PW. 29 further says that initiating proceedings under Section 41/109 Cr.P.C. these persons were produced before Executive Magistrate on 31.8.84 and prosecutrix, when interrogated, did not say any of snatching or taking her ornaments. 12. 29 further says that initiating proceedings under Section 41/109 Cr.P.C. these persons were produced before Executive Magistrate on 31.8.84 and prosecutrix, when interrogated, did not say any of snatching or taking her ornaments. 12. A perusal of statement of PW.7 discloses that according to her for village where leaving her in house of a purohit, appellant ran away, who came after three days, then she taken to Takhatgarh, where appellant threatening of injuring by knife, obtained her "kankani" and then similarly, at Jalore also obtained her "kare" which were on her person and all these articles sold to goldsmith, PW.7 states that appellant took her articles soon after he returned from village and at home of the Purohit. As per prosecutrix, then after 3-4 days, appellant did have physical relations with her at several places and they then taken by police men. Per PW. 7, physical acts perhaps only after 3-4 days, thus, after ornaments taken from her. As appellant is acquitted for the other charges so appears that for other acts elements of fear, use of force, elopement etc. were not proved. 13. Articles "ultarna", "Jhcla" and "Kankni" are proved of prosecutrix. Though the recovery witnesses PWs. 11, 12, 13, 14, 23 and 24 are declared hostile, but they accept their signatures on memos of recovery F.xs. P.9, 10 & 11 and Head Constable Amar Singh PW.32 deposing that on information of appellant reduced in writing by him Exs. P.30, 31 and 32, the recoveries made from shop of goldsmith accused Bhanwar Lal other goldsmith Tarachand and from house of appellant, so the recoveries may be taken as proved. 14. Per memo Ex. P. 9."Kankni" is recovered from shop of Tara Chand at which shop Head Constable was lead by appellant. As per statement of goldsmith Tara Chand PW.3, the "kankni" was pledged with him by appellant Jethiya for Rs. 125/- and he at the time of pleading, obtained receipt Ex. P.3 which bears thumb impression of the appellant and the receipt was submitted by him to police. Recovering Officer PW. 32 states that receipt Ex. P. 3 was presented by PW. 3 then and therefore. As per receipt Ex. P.3, "Kankni" is pledged by Jetha s/o Jagani and also written is day of Bhadwa Vad 13 Samvat 2010. P.3 which bears thumb impression of the appellant and the receipt was submitted by him to police. Recovering Officer PW. 32 states that receipt Ex. P. 3 was presented by PW. 3 then and therefore. As per receipt Ex. P.3, "Kankni" is pledged by Jetha s/o Jagani and also written is day of Bhadwa Vad 13 Samvat 2010. Learned Judge has observed that incident is of 2041 but possibilities or erroneously writing 2040 appears because PW.3 does not say of pleading of this day of 2010, in opinion of this Court, this reasoning is not based on sound facts or reasons. Equally, if not equal at least some possibility may be of 2040. Even then whatever be PW.3 says that the same was pledged by Jethiya, PW.3 does not say that wrong is the date mentioned and also have stated ignorance about pledging on 25.8.83 (incident of 84). So for this recovery, provenly no inference can be against the appellant. 15. "Uttarni" and "Jela" are recorded from the house of appellant. Per recovery memo Ex. P.11, appellant leading, policeman taken by him to house where in iron box were this "uttarni" and "gela" weighing 118 gm. Now, corning to the totality of alleged incident, as per PW. 7 because she was not having any child, so on calling by Jetha s/o Duda, the son of her Mausi, she went to house of Mausi where Jetha s/o Jagga was also present and after some spiritual like ceremony in night she sent and came back to her house and then Jetha s/o Duda (cousin brother) and also Jetha s/o Jaga (appellant) came and, thereafter, she accompanied appellant and than events for charge fall out. Thus, prosecutrix, on calling of her cousin brother, going and coming back and then going again and further as no elements of inducement, fear and force etc. are inferred by the learned trial Judge, only because these articles "uttarna" and "Jela" were found in house of appellant, hardly can be in absence of any other evidence inference of theft or extortion. If such happened, certainly the articles would have been sold at a place out of 3-4 places visited together by appellant and prosecutrix. 17. For recovery of melted silver itself, learned trial Judge has held that no inference on the basis of this recovery and for kankni is Ex. P.3 along with other circumstances 18. If such happened, certainly the articles would have been sold at a place out of 3-4 places visited together by appellant and prosecutrix. 17. For recovery of melted silver itself, learned trial Judge has held that no inference on the basis of this recovery and for kankni is Ex. P.3 along with other circumstances 18. Appellant is acquitted for the offence of Sections 366 and 376 IPC. Meaning thereby absence of force, threat, eloping inducement, force and like. Though not necessarily, but if for continuous acts, the above elements are found to be missing, then certainly, for acts related to same incident and of same time, more strong and particular specific evidence is certainly required. Rarely can be for the simultaneous actions of such alleged nature of same time duration elements can be said to be proved for one act and not for other act- any how for the above reasons, it cannot be inferred that above silver articles of PW 7 were taken without her consent or extortionally, as such, appellant is to be acquitted of charge of Section 392 IPC. The articles be returned to Smt. Dharmi PW.7 as is ordered by the learned trial Judge. 19. Consequently, this criminal appeal (judgment dated 2.6.89 S/C 39/86) is accepted and the appellant is acquitted of the charge of Section 392 IPC. Appellant is on bail and bail bonds are discharged. [2010(4) RLW 3085 (Raj.)] Rajasthan High Court HON'BLE SANGEET LODHA; J. Deepa Ram Versus State of Rajasthan & Drs. S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4251 of 2008, Decided on 09.03.2010 (a) Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Sec. 6 - Initiating proceedings for acquisition of land for RSMM at its own costs without complying with the provisions of Part VII of the Act and Rule 4 of the Rules of 1963 - Whether it stands vitiated -Held - The acquisition being for the benefit of a Govt. company which is deemed to be a public purpose in terms of Sec. 3(f) of the Act, the provisions of Chapter VII do not apply: (b) Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Sees. company which is deemed to be a public purpose in terms of Sec. 3(f) of the Act, the provisions of Chapter VII do not apply: (b) Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Sees. 4, 5, 6 - Non-compliance of mandatory provisions of Sec. 5-A before issuing declaration u/S. 6 - Held - The petitioners having failed to raise any objection in terms of Sec. 5-A, cannot be permitted to contend that proceedings are vitiated on account of alleged non-compliance of the provisions of Sec. 5-A and it must be accepted that they had no objection to Sec. 4 notification issued in respect of their land, therefore, they cannot be permitted to question the validity of the declaration issued u/S. 6 of the Act. Writ petitions dismissed. (Paras 15 to 18) Case Referred 1. Devinder Singh vs. State of Punjab ( 2008(1) SCC 728 ) 2. M/s. Hindusthan Petroleum Corporation Limited vs. Darius Shapur Chennai (2005) 7 SCC 627 = RLW 2005(4) SC 2407) 3. Nandeshwar Prasad & Ors. vs. V.P. Govt. & Ors. ( AIR 1964 SC 1217 ) 4. Sooraram Pratap Reddy & Others vs. District Collector, Ranga Reddy District & Ors. (2008(4) RL W 2794) 5. Hanuman Singh & 4 Ors. vs. State of Raj. & Ors. (2009(1) DNJ (Raj.) 103) 6. Delhi Admn. vs. Gurdeep Singh Uban & Ors. ( AIR 1999 SC 3822 ) 7. Aircraft Employees' Co-op. Society Ltd. vs. Secretary, Rural Development & Panchayat Raj Govt. of Kamataka & Ors. ( AIR 1996 SC 350 ) Advocates Appeared J. L. Purohit, for Petitioners; G.R. Punia, Additional Advocate General, for State of Rajasthan; M.R. Singhvi, for Respondent-Rajasthan Mines & Minerals Ltd. Hon'ble LODHA, J.-These writ petitions assailing the declaration u/S. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in short "the Act") published vide notification dated 5.2.2008 involve common questions and therefore, the same were heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. 2. 2. The relevant facts in nutshell are that the State Government issued a notification dated 7.4.2007 under Section 4(1) of the Act, whereby 1424, 81 hectares agriculture land situated in Revenue village Beethnok, Lakhasar, Chak Khuri, Gurha, Chak Madhogarh in colonisation tehsil Kolayat No.1, district Bikaner was proposed to be acquired in favour of the company Rajasthan State Mines & Minerals Corporation Limited ("RSMM") at its own costs, for excavation of the mineral lignite in the mining area covered by the said land. The persons interested were directed to submit their objections against the proposed acquisition of the land in writing within a period of days of publication of the notification before the Land Acquisition Officer. Admittedly, none of the petitioners submitted their objections. However, a few objections were raised by the agriculturist of village Gurha. After consideration of the report made under Section SA, the declaration u/S. 6 of the Act was issued by the State Government vide notification dated 5.2.2008 which was published in the Rajasthan Gazette dated 20.2.2008. A notice u/S. 9 of the Act was issued to the petitioners and they were asked to hand over the possession (Para No.) 3 of the land. At this stage, the validity of the land acquisition proceedings is challenged by the petitioners herein on various grounds before this court by way of these writ petitions. 3. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the land acquisition proceedings initiated for the benefits of RSMM, a company, at its own costs without complying with the mandatory provisions of Part VII of the Act and Rule 4 of the Rules of 1963 are void ab initio and deserves to be quashed and set aside for this reason alone. In this regard, the learned counsel has relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of "Devinder Singh vs. State of Punjab", 2008(1) SCC 728 . It is submitted by the learned counsel that before issuing the notification u/S. 4 of the Act, the State Government is under an obligation to form an opinion after due consideration of all relevant aspects that the land needs to be acquired for the public purpose or a company. It is submitted by the learned counsel that before issuing the notification u/S. 4 of the Act, the State Government is under an obligation to form an opinion after due consideration of all relevant aspects that the land needs to be acquired for the public purpose or a company. It is submitted by the learned counsel that before issuing the notification, even the availability of the mineral was not ascertained by the State Government and therefore, the notification issued without forming any opinion as to the actual need of the acquisition is not sustainable in the eye of law. It is submitted that the excavation of the mineral lignite can only be done under the provisions of Mining & Minerals (Regulation & Development) Act, 1957 and the Rules framed thereunder. It is submitted that for the purpose of excavation of the lignite a prospective license was required to be obtained by the company for coming to the conclusion that the lignite is available in the land sought to be acquired. It is submitted that in absence of the prospective license and the investigation thereunder, the land could not be acquired on the assumption that the lignite exists underneath. It is next contended by the learned counsel that the report u/S. 5-A after enquiry was submitted to the State Government by the Assistant Commissioner Colonisation, who is not authorised to undertake such exercise. It is submitted that the Assistant Commissioner Colonisation is the authority different than the Sub Divisional Officer and therefore, the notification dated 2.5.87 issued by the State Government authorising Sub Divisional Officer-cum-Land Acquisition Officer to perform the functions of the Collector under the Act cannot validate the report submitted by the Assistant Commissioner Colonisation acting without jurisdiction. It is submitted that even subsequent notification dated 18.1.94 issued by the State Government is not a general notification u/Sec. 3(c) of the Act, authorising all Assistant Commissioner, Colonisation to act as a Collector in the matters of land acquisition. It is submitted that under the said notification the powers of the Collector has been conferred upon the Assistant Colonisation Commissioner only in respect of the acquisition of the land for Department of Colonisation. It is submitted that under the said notification the powers of the Collector has been conferred upon the Assistant Colonisation Commissioner only in respect of the acquisition of the land for Department of Colonisation. Accordingly, it is submitted by the learned counsel that in absence of a specific notification issued by the State Government authorising Assistant Commissioner Colonisation to discharge the functions of the Collector under the Act, the inquiry conducted u/S. SA of the Act stands vitiated. Lastly, learned counsel urged that the State Government has even not applied its mind to the report submitted by the Assistant Commissioner Colonisation in terms of the provisions of Section SA so as to form an opinion regarding the alleged public purpose or the suitability of the land for, the purpose it is sought to be acquired and "therefore, 'the notification issued by the State Govt. deserves to be quashed and set aside for this reason also. In this regard, the learned counsel has relied upon decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in "M/s. Hindusthan Petroleum Corporation Limited vs. Darius Shapur Chennai", (2005) 7 SCC 627 = RLW 2005(4) SC 2407 and in "Nandeshwar Prasad and Others vs. U.P. Government and Others" Am 196'1 SC 121 7. 4. Per contra, Mr. G.R. Punia, the learned Additional Advocate General submitted that the lands are sought to be acquired for RSMM which is admittedly a Government company not covered by the expression "company" as used under the Act. Learned Additional Advocate General submitted that a government company as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act stands specifically excluded from the definition of the "company" as defined under clause (e) of Section 3 of the Act therefore, Chapter VII of the Act which deals with the acquisition of the land for the company is not attracted in the matter. It is submitted that the Government company registered under the provisions of Section 617 of the Indian Companies Act fails within the definition of "Corporation owned and controlled by the State" within the meaning of Clause (cc) of Section 3 of the Act and as per sub-clause (iv) of Clause (f) of Section 3, the provision of the land for a corporation owned or controlled by the State is deemed to be fur public purpose and therefore, the land sought to be acquired for a government company is treated to be for public purpose and it is not even required to be mentioned in the notification that the land is proposed to be acquired for public purpose. Learned Additional Advocate General further submitted that no objections were raised by the petitioners against the acquisition within the stipulated period and therefore, they cannot be permitted to question the validity of the enquiry conducted in terms of Section 5A of the Act. It is urged that the report submitted by the Land Acquisition Officer-cum-Assistant Commissioner Colonisation cannot be said to be without jurisdiction inasmuch as, the Land Acquisition Officer/Assistant Colonisation Commissioner, concerned stands specifically authorised by the State Government to discharge the function of the Collector under the Act vide notification dated 2.5.87/18.1.94. Drawing the attention of the court to the notification dated 7.4.2007 issued u/S. 4 of the Act, learned Additional Advocate General submitted that the persons interested were directed to file their objections, if any, in writing within a period of 30 days before the Land Acquisition Officer, therefore, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the Land Acquisition Officer was not authorised to discharge the function of the Collector under the Act is devoid of any merit. Learned Additional Advocate General submitted that before initiating the land acquisition proceedings for acquiring the land in question in favour of RSMM for excavation of the minerals lignite, the availability of the lignite in the mining area has been ascertained and only thereafter, the notification u/S. 4 has been issued. That apart, it is submitted that by virtue of provisions of Section 4 of the Act of 1957, the general restrictions or undertaking prospecting and mining operations are not at all applicable to a government company. That apart, it is submitted that by virtue of provisions of Section 4 of the Act of 1957, the general restrictions or undertaking prospecting and mining operations are not at all applicable to a government company. Showing the reports of the Land Acquisition Officers available on record of the land acquisition proceedings, learned Additional Advocate General submitted that the declaration under Section 6 has been issued only after due consideration of the reports. Accordingly, it is submitted that the land acquisition proceedings do not suffer from any infirmity or illegality warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 5. Mr. M.R. Singhvi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the RSMM while adopting the arguments advanced by learned Additional Advocate General further submitted that the issue with regard to acquisition of land in respect of the companies has been considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court threadbare in the case of "Sooraram Pratap Reddy & Others vs. District Collector, Ranga Reddy District & Others" 2008(4) RLW 2794, wherein the parameters for interference in land acquisition proceedings initiated for acquisition of the land for development of infrastructure in the larger public interest have been laid down. It is submitted by learned counsel that the land sought to be acquired for the Government company is deemed to be a public purpose but even otherwise, if a company is chosen to undertake the project for Development of infrastructure in the large public interest, then, it will be treated to be a public purpose. Learned counsel submitted that acquisition of land for a Government company is out of purview of part VII of the Act. In support of his contention, learned counsel has relied upon a decision of this Court in "Hanuman Singh & 4 Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors." 2009(1) DNJ (Raj.) 103, wherein this Court held that the planned development of the industrial area by way of systematic development of land and its disposal is directly a public purpose and the acquisition of the land for a Government company like RIICO is outside the purview of Part VII of the Act. vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors." 2009(1) DNJ (Raj.) 103, wherein this Court held that the planned development of the industrial area by way of systematic development of land and its disposal is directly a public purpose and the acquisition of the land for a Government company like RIICO is outside the purview of Part VII of the Act. Replying the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the validity of proceedings under Section 5A and submission of report by the Assistant Commissioner, Colonisation, unauthorisedly, learned counsel submitted that admittedly none of the petitioners had filed any objections under Section 5A of the Act, against the land acquisition proceedings, therefore, they are not entitled to question the validity of the enquiry under Section 5A Learned counsel submitted that the petitioners having failed to raise any objections, the declaration u/S. 6 must be deemed to be in force so far as they are concerned. In support of his contention, learned counsel has relied upon decisions of Supreme Court in "Delhi Administration vs. Gurdeep Singh Uban & Ors." AIR 1999 SC, 3822 and "Aircraft Employees' Co-operative Society Ltd. vs. Secretary, Rural Development and Panchayat Raj Govt. of Karnataka & Ors." AIR 1996 SC 350 . Drawing the attention of the court towards the various documents placed on record, learned counsel submitted that availability of mineral was ascertained after due survey incurring huge expenditure and even the mining plans stand already approved by the Government of India. The learned counsel submitted that the mineral lignite to be excavated from the mining area in question shall be used for a prima project of the State for generation of the electricity. Accordingly, it is submitted that the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the land acquisition' proceedings have been initiated without ascertaining the availability of mineral and it lacks the public purpose is absolutely, baseless. 6. I have considered the rival submissions and perused the material on record. 7. The first question comes for consideration of this Court is as to whether the proceedings initiated for acquisition of the land for the RSMM at its own costs without complying with the provisions of part VII of the Act and Rule 4 of the Rules of 1963 stand vitiated. 8. Indisputably, part VII of the Act deals with the acquisition of land at the instance of a "company". 8. Indisputably, part VII of the Act deals with the acquisition of land at the instance of a "company". The expression "company" has been defined under clause (e) of Section 3 of the which reads as under:- "(e) the expression' Company' means- (i) a company as defined in section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), other than a Government company referred to in clause (cc); (ii) a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860), or under any corresponding law for the time being in force in a State, other than a society referred to in clause (cc); (iii) a co-operative society within the meaning of any law relating to co-operative societies for the time being in force in any State, other than a co-operative society referred to in clause (cc); 9. As per clause (cc) of Section 3 defines expression "corporation owned of controlled by the State" in the following terms:- "(cc) the expression "corporation owned or controlled by the State" means any body corporate established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act, and includes a Government company as defined in section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860), or under any corresponding law for the time being in force in a State, being society established or administered by Government and a cooperative society within the meaning of any law relating to cooperative societies for the time being in force in any State, being a cooperative society in which not less than fifty-one per centum of the paid-up share capital is held by the Central Government, or by any State Government or Governments, or partly by the Central Government and partly by one or more State Government;" 10. Thus, the conjoint reading of Section 3(e)(i) and Section 3(cc) makes it abundantly clear that a "government company" as defined in Section 617 of the Company Act, 1956 is included within the definition of "Corporation owned and controlled by the State" and consequently, it does not fail within the definition of the "company". Thus, the conjoint reading of Section 3(e)(i) and Section 3(cc) makes it abundantly clear that a "government company" as defined in Section 617 of the Company Act, 1956 is included within the definition of "Corporation owned and controlled by the State" and consequently, it does not fail within the definition of the "company". In this view of the matter, the procedure laid down under Chapter VII of the Act which deals with the acquisition of the land for company as defined under clause (3)(e) cannot be made applicable for acquisition of the land at the instance of respondent RSMM which is admittedly, a government company registered under the provisions of the Act of 1956. 11. The contention of the learned counsel that since the land is being acquired for the RSMM at its own cost therefore, the procedure laid down under Chapter VII has to be followed is also devoid of any merit. Undoubtedly, by virtue of proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Act no declaration can be made unless the compensation to be awarded for acquisition of the property is to be paid by a company or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by the local authority. A conjoint reading of Section 6 of the Act and the provisions contained in part VII of the Act leads to the conclusion if the property is sought to be acquired at the instance of the company simplicitor for its benefits then, the cost of the acquisition shall be borne by the company. Similarly, the declaration for acquisition for a public purpose also cannot .be made unless the compensation wholly or partly is paid out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. But in any case, the requirement of the payment by the compensation by the company shall not apply to the acquisition of the property in favour of a government company to which provisions contained in Part VII of the Act do not apply. But in any case, the requirement of the payment by the compensation by the company shall not apply to the acquisition of the property in favour of a government company to which provisions contained in Part VII of the Act do not apply. As a matter of fact, this stands further clarified by Explanation II attached to sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Act which specifically provides that where the compensation to be awarded for property sought to be acquired is to be paid out of the funds of the corporation owned or controlled by the State, such compensation shall be deemed to be compensation paid out of public revenues. The similar question came up before the consideration of this Court in Hanuman Singh's case (supra) wherein after examining the various provisions and the ratio of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Devinder Singh's case (supra) heavily relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners in support of his contention, this court held:- "18. The edifice on which the argument in these writ petitions has been developed by the petitioners is the principle explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Devinder Singh's case (supra) that the decisive test is the source of funds to cover the costs of acquisition and in the present case, for the notification under Section 4 having clearly stated that costs shall be borne by the company i.e., RIICO only, no state fund is involved and hence, the acquisition being for the company, Part VII was required to be complied with. The submission is not correct. It may be pointed out that the acquisition proceedings in Devinder Singh's case (supra) were not relating to a Government company but were specifically and indisputably for a private company. In the present case, the notification dated 16.2.2006 clearly states that RIICO is a Government company under Section 617 of the Act of 1956and such statement has not been questioned by the petitioners; and, as noticed above, for the Government company, Part VII does not apply. This apart, there is yet another aspect unfailingly pointing out that acquisition for a company like RIICO would indeed be an acquisition is treated to be decisive of the matter as to whether it is a public purpose acquisition or Part VII acquisition as per the ratio of Devinder Singh (supra). This apart, there is yet another aspect unfailingly pointing out that acquisition for a company like RIICO would indeed be an acquisition is treated to be decisive of the matter as to whether it is a public purpose acquisition or Part VII acquisition as per the ratio of Devinder Singh (supra). In the acquisition proceedings under Part II of the Act of 1894, after publication of preliminary notification under Section 4 and hearing of objections under Section 5A, declaration of intended acquisition that a particular land is needed for public purpose or for a company is to be made as per the prescribed procedure under Section 6 of the Act. Second proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 6 contemplates that "no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a Company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority." however, Explanation 2 to sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Act of 1894 makes it clear that where the compensation is to be paid out of funds of Corporation owned or controlled by the State, such compensation shall be deemed to be the compensation paid out of public revenues. As noticed, the Government company concerned, RIICO, answers to the description of the Corporation owned or controlled by the State' per Section 3(cc). The fiction created by Explanation 2 to sub-section (1) of Section 6 makes the funds of all such entities covered by Section 3(cc) as those of public revenues for the purpose of the Act. Thus, acquisition for a company like RIICO, which is a Government company and covered under Section 3(cc) of the Act is clearly an acquisition for public purpose: the funds thereto, even when borne by RIICO, being treated to be public revenue. The stipulation regarding funds as made in the notification dated 16.2.2006 seem to have been made in the light of such provisions as contained in second proviso and Explanation 2 to Section 6(1). This court has no hesitation in concluding that the impugned one is an acquisition for public purpose whereto Part VH of the Act of 1894 does not apply. The acquisition in question does not appear suffering from any infirmity." 12. This court has no hesitation in concluding that the impugned one is an acquisition for public purpose whereto Part VH of the Act of 1894 does not apply. The acquisition in question does not appear suffering from any infirmity." 12. Thus, it can be safely concluded that the acquisition of the lands in question being for the benefit of a government company which is deemed to be a public purpose in terms of Section 3(f) of the Act, the provisions of 25 Chapter VII of the Act do not apply and therefore, the challenge of the petitioners to the land acquisition proceedings on this count fails through. 13. Coming to the next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that before issuing the notification u/S. 4 of the Act, the State Government was under an obligation to form an opinion after due consideration of all the aspects that the land needs to be acquired for a public purpose or a company, it is to be noticed that before initiating the land acquisition proceedings for acquiring the land in question for the benefits of the RSMM, the availability of high quantity of lignite in the lands sought to be acquired was ascertained by conducting survey. In this regard, the survey report placed on record by the respondent as Annexure R2/5 and R/2/6 are self explanatory. Further, the mining plans prepared by the company also stand approved by the Central Government. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that before initiating the land acquisition proceedings, no prospective license u/S. 4 of the Act of 1957 was obtained by the respondent company for coming to the conclusion that the lignite is available in the land sought to be acquired and therefore, in abserce of prospective license and the investigation thereunder which is mandatory, no presumption regarding the availability of the mineral can be drawn, is also devoid of any substances. A bare perusal of Second proviso to Section 4 of the Act of 1957 makes it abundantly clear that the general restriction on undertaking prospective or mining operations set out in sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act of 1957 shall not apply to any prospective operation undertaken by a government company within the meaning of Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956. Be that as it may, the availability of the mineral having been ascertained by the respondents after conducting a detailed survey, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the land is sought to be acquired without ascertaining the availability of the mineral therein and therefore, it lacks the public purpose, is ex facie contrary to the record. 14. There is yet another aspect of the matter. It has come on record that the mineral lignite to be excavated from the lands sought to be acquired shall be used for the purpose of generation of electricity by the power projects undertaken by the State Government and the electricity so generated is to be supplied to Rajasthan Vidhyut Utpadan Nigam Limited for distribution to the public at large. Dealing with the definition of the "public purpose", as defined by clause 3(f) of the Act, in Sooraram Pratap Reddy's case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the expression "public purpose" is of very wide amplitude. It is merely illustrative and not exhaustive: It is used in a generic sense of including any purpose wherein even a fraction of community is interested or by which it may be benefited. It has been categorically observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the infrastructure development project conceived by the State and executed under the auspices contsoinstruinentality is one covered by the Act. Therefore, viewed from any angles in considered opinion of this court, the land sought to be land sought to be acquired vide impugned notification is undoubtedly for the public purpose. 15. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners which fails for the consideration of this Court is that before issuing the declaration u/S. 6, the mandatory provisions of Section SA have not been complied with and therefore, the entire land acquisition proceedings stand vitiated. It is not in dispute that vide notification dated 7.4.2007 (Annexure 2) issued u/S. 4(1) of the Act, it was notified that the person interested may submit his objections. if any, against the acquisition within a period of 30 days before the Land Acquisition Officer in writing. Admittedly, none of the petitioners before this court have raised objections in terms of Section SA of the Act questioning the validity of the land acquisition proceedings. 16. if any, against the acquisition within a period of 30 days before the Land Acquisition Officer in writing. Admittedly, none of the petitioners before this court have raised objections in terms of Section SA of the Act questioning the validity of the land acquisition proceedings. 16. As per provisions of Section 5A (1) of the Act, any person interested in the land which has been notified u/S. 4, sub-section (1) as being needed or likely to be need for public purpose and for company is entitled to raise objections to the acquisition of the land within a period of 30 days from the date of publication of the notification. As per sub-section(2) of Section SA, every objection' under sub-section (1) shall be made to the Collector in writing and the Collector shall give the objector an opportunity of being heard in person or by any person authorised by him in this behalf or by pleader and shall after hearing all such objections and after making such inquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary, either make a report in respect of the land which has been notified u/S. 4, sub-section (1) or make different reports in respect of different parcels of such land, to appropriate government, containing his recommendation on the objections together with the record of proceedings held by him for the decision of the government. The decision of the appropriate government on the objections is treated to be final. Thus there can be no quarrel with the preposition that Section 5A confers a valuable and important right in favour of a person' whose lands are sought to be acquired and this important stage of the land acquisition proceedings cannot be ignored and no declaration u/S. 6 of the Act can be issued unless the provisions of Section 5A are complied with. 17. But then, the question of consideration of objections and the Collector making recommendations thereon shall arise only when the objections are filed. If no objections are made then the Collector will obviously report that no objections are received and then the government shall proceed to issue a declaration u/S. 6 of the Act. However, in the either case where the objections are filed or no objections are filed, the Collector has to submit the report to the State Government. If no objections are made then the Collector will obviously report that no objections are received and then the government shall proceed to issue a declaration u/S. 6 of the Act. However, in the either case where the objections are filed or no objections are filed, the Collector has to submit the report to the State Government. It is not the case of the petitioners that in the instant land acquisition proceedings, no report has been submitted u/S. 5A before the State Government prior to issuance of declaration u/S. 6 of the Act. It is not in dispute that none of the petitioners had raised any objection and therefore, they were not entitled for any opportunity of hearing. The petitioners who had never raised any objections against the acquisition proceedings in pursuance of the notice issued inviting objections cannot be permitted to question the validity of declaration under Section 6 of the Act on the ground that the inquiry under Section 5A was vitiated for non compliance of the mandatory provisions contained therein. This aspect of the matter stands settled by a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Delhi Administration's case (supra), wherein the Court held that "In connection with owners or persons interested who have not filed objections under S. 5A. in principle, it must be accepted that they had no objection to S, 4 notification operating in respect of their property, On the other hand, in respect of those who filed objections the might have locus standi to contend that S, 5A inquiry was not conducted properly, we, therefore, agree in principle with the view of the three Judge Bench in Abhey Ram's case (I 997 AIR SCW 2513; AIR 1997 SC 2564 ) that those who have not filed objections under S. 5A, could not be allowed to contend that the S. 5A inquiry was bad and that consequenlly S. 6 declaration must be struck down and that then the S. 4 notification would lapse. if, therefore, no objections were filed by the respondents, logically the 6 declaration must be deemed to be in force so far as they are concerned." 18. if, therefore, no objections were filed by the respondents, logically the 6 declaration must be deemed to be in force so far as they are concerned." 18. Thus, in considered opinion of this court, the petitioners having failed to raise any objections in terms of provisions of Section 5A of the Act cannot be permitted to contend that the proceedings are vitiated on account of alleged non compliance of the provisions of Section 5A of the Act and it must be accepted that they had no objection to Section 4 notification issued in respect of their land and therefore, they cannot be permitted to question the validity of the declaration issued u/S. 6 of the Act. 19. The last contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the Assistant Commissioner Colonisation had no jurisdiction to deal with the objection u/S. 5A and submit the report to the appropriate government and therefore, the declaration issued u/S. 6 on consideration of the said report, if any, submitted acting without jurisdiction vitiates the proceedings. As a matter of fact, in view of the conclusion arrived at by this Court as aforesaid, that the petitioners who have not raised any objections in terms of Section 5A of the Act are not entitled to question the validity of the inquiry on any ground, it is not necessary to deal with the said contention but since this question has been argued before this court and therefore, it is considered appropriate to deal with the same to the extent necessary. The expression "Collector" as defined in clause (c) of Section 3 includes "any officer specially appointed by the appropriate government to perform the functions of the Act." It is not in dispute that vide notification dated 2.5.87 issued by the State Government in exercise of powers conferred by clause (c) of Section 3 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the State Government has authorised all the Sub Divisional Officers cum Land Acquisition Officers to perform the functions of the Collector under the said Act within their respective jurisdiction. In the instant case, the report u/S. 5A in respect of the lands of the village Gura Bidhnok Lakhasar Chak Khori, Chak Madhogarh, the report u/S. 5A has been submitted by the Land Acquisition Officer cum Assistant Commissioner Colonisation, Kolayat whereas, the report in respect of the lands failing in Chak SaJiya has been submitted by the Land Acquisition Officer cum Sub Divisional Officer, Bikaner. It is true notification dated 2.5.87 does not specifically authorises the S.D.O. cum Land Acquisition Officer to discharge the functions of the Collector under the Act. That apart, in the notification issued u/s. 4 of the Act itself it has been specifically set out that the person interested are required to submit their objections to the acquisition before the Land Acquisition Officer. Therefore, even if the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is accepted that the notification dated 2.5.87 referred to by the respondents does not specifically empower the Assistant Commissioner Colonisation to discharge the functions of the Collector under the Act but nonetheless, it authorises the S.D.O. cum Land Acquisition Officer to discharge the functions of the Collector under the Act. That apart, in. the notification issued u/S. 4 of the Act itself it has bee specifically set out that the person interested are required to submit their objections to the acquisition before the Land Acquisition Officer. Therefore, even if the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is accepted that the notification dated 2.5.87 referred' to by the respondents does not specifically empower the Assistant Commissioner Colonisation to discharge the function of the Collector and the subsequent notification dated 18.1.94 authorises him only to exercise the power of Collector only in respect of the work related to the Colonisation Department, the authority of Assistant Commissioner Colonisation who is admittedly Land Acquisition Officer in respect of the land sought to be acquired, to make an inquiry u/S. 5A of the Act cannot be questioned. 20. In view of the discussion above, in considered opinion of this court, the impugned notifications dated 5.2.2008 issued u/s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act by the State Government does not suffer from any infirmity or illegality 40 warranting interference by this Curt in exercise of its extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 21. In the result the writ petitions fail, the same are hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.