JAGDISH SINGH RATHOR v. CANE COMMISSIONER U P LUCKNOW
2009-04-27
SUDHIR AGARWAL
body2009
DigiLaw.ai
SUDHIR AGARWAL, J. 1. Heard Sri Udai Nandan holding brief on behalf of Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner and Sri S. K. Mishra, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents. 2. Aggrieved by the order of punishment dated 7. 10. 1998 passed by the Cane Commissioner, U. P. , Lucknow the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed. 3. By means of the impugned order the following punishments has been imposed upon the petitioner: (1) Recovery of Rs. 2, 04, 621. 85 (2) Stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect. (3) Censure entry. (4) Non entitlement of full salary except of subsistence allowance for the period of suspension. (5) The petitioner should not be posted in future on any post of sensitive nature. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the impugned order is illegal being in violation of principles of natural justice for the reasons; (1) no oral enquiry was conducted and the inquiry officer has submitted ex parte report; (2) copy of the inquiry report was not furnished to petitioner; and (3) in the preliminary inquiry report the petitioner was not found guilty but in the impugned order he has been found guilty and punishment has been imposed. 5. So far as the first submission is concerned, I find that the charge-sheet dated 3. 9. 1998 was issued to the petitioner by the inquiry officer alleging four charges and besides requiring the petitioner to submit his reply it was also stated therein that he may inform whether he wants to be heard in person or not. The petitioner submitted his reply dated 8. 9. 1998 denying/explaining all the four charges. The said reply though does not show that the petitioner stated therein that he does not want any oral inquiry but it appears that the said reply was accompanied with a letter dated 8. 9. 1998, copy whereof is Annexure- CA-2 to the counter-affidavit, wherein the petitioner has said that he submitted reply on 8. 9. 1998 and he wants to inform that he does not want any personal hearing and the matter may be considered and decided on the basis of his reply which may be treated as final and the report may be sent to the Cane Commissioner.
9. 1998 and he wants to inform that he does not want any personal hearing and the matter may be considered and decided on the basis of his reply which may be treated as final and the report may be sent to the Cane Commissioner. It is in these circumstances the inquiry officer concluded the inquiry and submitted report holding charges No. 1 and 2 partly proved, charge No. 3 fully proved and charge No. 4 not proved. Cane Commissioner, i. e. , the disciplinary authority agreeing with the finding of inquiry officer imposed punishment. 6. Once the petitioner himself stated that he does not want any personal hearing and his reply to the charge-sheet be treated to be final, in my view, it is not open to the petitioner to contend that the proceeding is ex parte since no oral inquiry was conducted/the procedure for holding inquiry was governed by Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 as applicable in State of UP. (hereinafter referred to as the "1930 Rules") and Rule 55 (1) thereof relevant for the present purpose is reproduced as under: "55 (1 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The grounds on which it is proposed to take action shall be reduced in the form of definite charge or charges which shall be communicated to the person charged and which shall be so clear and precise as to give sufficient indication to the charged Government servant of the facts and circumstances against him. He shall be required, within a reasonable time to put in a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person. If he so desires, or if the authority concerned so directs, an oral inquiry shall be held in respect of such of the allegations as are not admitted. At that inquiry such oral evidence will be heard as the inquiring officer considers necessary. The person charged shall be entitled to cross-examine the witness to give evidence in person and to have such witnesses called as he may wish provided that the officer conducting the inquiry may, for sufficient reason to be recorded in writing, refuse to call a witness. The proceedings shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and statement of the findings and the grounds thereof.
The proceedings shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and statement of the findings and the grounds thereof. The officer conducting the inquiry may also separately, from these proceedings, make his own recommendation regarding the punishment to be imposed on the charged Government servant. " 7. A perusal of the aforesaid Rule clearly shows that if the disciplinary authority has specifically directed or if the delinquent employee expressed his desire, an oral inquiry shall be conducted by the inquiry officer. There is nothing to show on record in the present case that the disciplinary authority specifically directed inquiry officer to hold oral inquiry even if it is not desired by the delinquent employee. On the contrary, the employee himself informed the inquiry officer that he does not want any personal hearing and the inquiry be concluded and report be submitted treating his reply to be final. In these circumstances, it would not be correct to say that non holding of oral inquiry vitiate the proceeding and the inquiry report can be validly termed as ex parte. The petitioner cannot be turn around once he himself informed inquiry officer that he does not want any personal hearing. 8. State of Bombay v. Narul Latifkhan, AIR 1966 SC 269 , was a case where Rule 55 of 1930 Rules came to be considered and it was held : "this clause lays down that if he, that is to say the charge-sheeted officer, so desires or if the authority concerned so directs, an oral enquiry shall be held. In our opinion, it is plain that the requirement that an oral enquiry shall be held if the authority concerned so directs or if the charge-sheeted officer so desires is mandatory. Indeed this requirement is plainly based upon considerations of natural justice and fairplay. If the charge-sheeted officer wants to lead his own evidence in support of his plea, it is obviously essential that he should be given an opportunity to lead such evidence. Therefore, we feel no hesitation in holding that once the respondent expressed his desire to Mr. Mehta that he wanted to lead evidence in support of his plea that his alleged disobedience of the Government orders was not deliberate, it was obligatory on Mr. Mehta to have fixed a date for recording such oral evidence and give due intimation to the respondent in that behalf. " 9.
Mehta that he wanted to lead evidence in support of his plea that his alleged disobedience of the Government orders was not deliberate, it was obligatory on Mr. Mehta to have fixed a date for recording such oral evidence and give due intimation to the respondent in that behalf. " 9. Here the case is apposite. The delinquent employee himself has said that he does not want any personal reply and his reply be treated as final. In these circumstances, in my considered view, this ground is not available to the petitioner. 10. Moreover, in the present case from the perusal of charge-sheet it does appear that no witness was shown in the list of oral evidence for proving the charges but only documentary evidence was relied on in support of the charges. Therefore, even if no witness was examined by the inquiry officer, I do not find any illegality therein. 11. Now coming to the second aspect of the matter i. e. non furnishing of inquiry report, the law is well settled that mere non furnishing of inquiry report would not itself render the proceedings illegal unless some prejudice is shown to have caused to employee concerned. In the entire writ petition there is not even a whisper that any prejudice caused to the petitioner due to non furnishing of inquiry report. In the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad, etc. v. B. Karunakar, etc. , MR 1994 SC 1074, the Constitution Bench of Apex Court said as under: "since the denial of the report of the enquiry officer is a denial of reasonable opportunity and a breach of the principles of natural justice, it follows that the statutory rules, if any, which deny the report to the employee are against the principles of natural justice and, therefore, invalid. The delinquent employee will, therefore, be entitled to a copy of the report even if the statutory rules do not permit the furnishing of the report or are silent on the subject. " 12.
The delinquent employee will, therefore, be entitled to a copy of the report even if the statutory rules do not permit the furnishing of the report or are silent on the subject. " 12. Further, question No. V, i. e. , the effect of non furnishing of inquiry report on the order of punishment was also answered by the Constitution Bench as under: "the next question to be answered is what is the effect on the order of punishment when the report of the enquiry officer is not furnished to the employee and what relief should be granted to him in such cases. The answer to this question has to be relative to the punishment awarded. When the employee is dismissed or removed from service and the inquiry is set aside because the report is not furnished to him, in some cases the non-furnishing of the report may have prejudiced him gravely while in other cases it may have made no difference to the ultimate punishment awarded to him. Hence to direct reinstatement of the employee with back-wages in all cases is to reduce the rules of justice to a mechanical ritual. The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the report, no different consequence would have followed, itwould be a perversion of justice to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an unnatural expansion of natural justice which in itself is antithetical to justice.
It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an unnatural expansion of natural justice which in itself is antithetical to justice. Hence, in all cases where the enquiry officers report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the Courts and Tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the Court/tribunal and give the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If after hearing the parties, the Court/tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the Court/tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The Court Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The Courts should avoid resorting to short cuts. Since it is the Courts/tribunals which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment, (and not any internal appellate or revisional authority), there would be neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity. It is only if the Court/tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment. " 13. The above view has been followed by the Apex Court subsequently in a large number of cases. In State of U. P. v. Harendra Arora and another, 2001 (6) SCG 392, the Apex Court considered the effect of non furnishing of inquiry report even in those cases where it is contemplated by a Rule and in para 23 the Court held as under: "23.
In State of U. P. v. Harendra Arora and another, 2001 (6) SCG 392, the Apex Court considered the effect of non furnishing of inquiry report even in those cases where it is contemplated by a Rule and in para 23 the Court held as under: "23. Thus, from a conspectus of the aforesaid decisions and different provisions of law noticed, we hold that provision in Rule 55-A of the Rules for furnishing copy of enquiry report is procedural one and of a mandatory character, but even then a delinquent has to show that he has been prejudiced by its non observance and consequently the law laid down by the Constitution Bench in the case of EC/l, to the effect that an order passed in a disciplinary proceeding cannot ipso facto be quashed merely because a copy of the enquiry report has not been furnished to the delinquent officer, but he is obliged to show that by non-furnishing of such a report he has been prejudiced, would apply even to cases where there is requirement of furnishing copy of enquiry report under the statutory provisions and/or service rules. " 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on a decision of Apex Court in State of Uttaranchal and others v. Kharak Singh, 2008 (8) SCC 236 , to submit that non furnishing of inquiry report is a serious flaw. 15. From the perusal of aforesaid judgment this Court find that therein no inquiry whatsoever was conducted by the authority concerned. The Apex Court also found that the inquiry officer in fact acted as investigator, prosecutor and judge, therefore, the entire procedure was in utter violation of principles of natural justice as is evident from para 17 of the judgment which is reproduced as under: "17. On the other hand, one Mr. P. C. Lohani, Dy. Divisional Forest Officer, Nandhaur acting as an enquiry officer after putting certain questions and securing answers submitted a report on 16. 11. 1985. No witnesses were examined. Apparently there was not even a presenting officer. A perusal of the report shows that the enquiry officer himself inspected the areas in the forest and after taking note of certain alleged deficiencies secured some answers from the delinquent by putting some questions. It is clear that the enquiry officer himself has acted as investigator, prosecutor and judge.
Apparently there was not even a presenting officer. A perusal of the report shows that the enquiry officer himself inspected the areas in the forest and after taking note of certain alleged deficiencies secured some answers from the delinquent by putting some questions. It is clear that the enquiry officer himself has acted as investigator, prosecutor and judge. Such a procedure is opposed to principles of natural justice and has been frowned upon by this Court. " 16. In the aforesaid judgment the Apex Court has not held the proceeding vitiated in law merely on the ground of non furnishing of inquiry report but that was only one aspect accompanied with other serious irregularities. However, in the case in hand, the petitioner wants to assail the impugned order merely on the ground of non furnishing of inquiry report. In view of what has been held by the Constitution Bench in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad, etc. v. B. Karunakar (supra), in my view the judgment in Kharak Singh (supra) has no application in the case in hand. 17. So far as the third aspect is concerned, the disciplinary authority has found serious lapses on the part of petitioner and in the writ petition there is nothing to controvert those findings or to show that the finding are perverse or based on no material. 18. No other points has been argued. I, therefore, do not find any reason to interfere in the impugned order of punishment. The writ petition lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. There shall be no order as to costs. .