Judgment Vinod K.Sharma, J. 1. The petitioners have invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to challenge the order dated 18.7.2006 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.), Jagadhri vide which application moved by the petitioners for setting aside ex parte order dated 29.1 1.1999 was ordered to be dismissed. 2. The plaintiff/respondents filed a suit for possession by way of specific performance of an agreement dated 11.3.1995 executed by Sh. Balak Ram defendant No. 1 in favour of the plaintiffs. 3. Defendants Nos. 2 to 4 were proceeded against ex parte on 29.11.1999. 4. The petitioners being subsequent vendees got themselves impleaded as a party to the suit on 4.8.2004 and moved an application for setting aside ex parte proceedings against defendants Nos. 2 to 4 and sought permission to participate in the proceedings from the stage of case i.e. 29.11.1999 and further sought permission to cross-examine the witnesses of the plaintiffs and adduce evidence in defence. 5. On 14.2.2000, defendant No. 1 was also proceeded against ex parte and thereafter ex parte evidence of the plaintiffs was recorded and the case was fixed for arguments. 6. As already observed above, it was at that stage that application was moved by the petitioners for being impleaded as party, which was allowed on 4.8.2004. Application was moved on the plea that the petitioners had a right to get ex parte order set aside as they would be affected by the proceedings, as defendants Nos. 2 to 4 sold land to them on 18.4.2000. It was alleged that the petitioners were bona fide purchasers without notice. 7. The application was contested by the plaintiffs, wherein it was pleaded that defendant No. 1 had entered into an agreement to sell dated 11.3.1995 to sell the land @ Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only, per acre. The sale consideration was paid to the vendor on the same day against valid receipt and possession of the suit land was also delivered to the plaintiffs. It was claimed that defendant No. 1 secretly entered into an agreement to sell in favour of defendants Nos. 2 to 4 and executed sale deed in their favour. in violation of the agreement therefore, the subsequent agreement was said to be void, illegal and not binding on the plaintiffs. It was claimed that defendant No. 1 secretly entered into an agreement to sell in favour of defendants Nos. 2 to 4 and executed sale deed in their favour. in violation of the agreement therefore, the subsequent agreement was said to be void, illegal and not binding on the plaintiffs. In the suit an application for injunction was also moved but in spite of injunction order the suit land was purchased by the petitioners herein. It was pleaded that petitioners had the knowledge of pendency of suit as well as injunction. 8. The learned trial Court was of the view that application by the petitioners i.e. defendants Nos. 5 & 6 for setting aside ex parte order against defendants Nos. 2 to 4 was not competent. The learned trial Court was further pleased to hold that subsequent vendee only enters into the shoes of his vendor and has no right to file separate written statement and lead evidence. He could only be impleaded as a proper party to watch the proceedings. This finding was recorded in view of the law laid down by this Court in the case of Jaswinder Singh v. Sohan Singh and others, 2004(4) RCR (Civil) 785, wherein this Court was pleased to lay down as under :- "4. Undisputedly, Smt. Gurpal Kaur deceased had purchased a major chunk of the suit property from Ajit Singh defendant after the plaintiffs had filed the present suit for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 22.8.1994, already executed by the defendants in their favour. She was the subsequent vendee and has stepped into the shoes of her vendors. She has no right to file separate written statement and to defend her case. In Jarnail Singh v. Devinder Kumar and others, 1991 (2) RRR 111 (P&H) : 1991 PLJ 242, it was held by this Court that the transferee "on being impleaded as a party cannot claim any right to contest the suit by filing a separate written statement."It was further held that he "can only watch his interest along with other defendants from whom he had purchased the land." In Shree Kishan Somani v. Ram Nath and others, 1991 (1) PLR 650, it has been held by this Court that " under Order 22 Rule 10 of the C.P.C. the transferees were to continue the proceedings from the stage they were impleaded as parties. No doubt the transferors could amend the written statement by showing reasonable ground. Likewise the transferees could also move an application for taking fresh pleas which transferors had not taken in the earlier written statement. From that it cannot be said that the transferees had a right to file a written statement .........." In the case reported as Dhanna Singh and others v. Baljinder Kaur and others, 1997(2) RCR (Civil) 701 (SC) : AIR 1997 SC 3720, it has been held by their Lordships cf the Supreme Court that a subsequent purchaser, who has been impleaded as a party, cannot get any right to lead evidence as he had stepped into shoes of first defendant who had given up right to lead evidence. In the case Smt. Sarvjeet Kaur v. Rang Lal, 1998(4) RCR (Civil) 674 (P&H) : 1990(1) CCC 310, it has been held by this Court that the suit for specific performance of the agreement is bound by the decree against the vendor and the plea that he is a bona fide purchaser without notice, is of no consequence. Similarly, of in Smt. Munni Devi v. Nathu Singh and another, 1996(1) CCC 200, it has been held by the Allahabad High Court that in a suit for specific performance, the subsequent transferee, even though he obtained transfer without notice of original contract, cannot set up any right against the plaintiff. 9. The learned trial Court thereafter placed reliance on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Dhanna Singh v. Baljinder Kaur 1998(1) P.L.R. 706, wherein the Honble Supreme Court it has been pleased to lay down that the subsequent purchaser who stepped into the shoes of the first defendant does not get any right to lead any evidence as transfer in his favour is hit by the doctrine of lis pendens. The application moved, therefore, was ordered to be dismissed. 10. The learned Court also took note of the fact that the lane was transferred in favour of the petitioners i.e. defendants Nos. 5 & 6 during the pendency of the suit and in violation of an order of injunction therefore the sale deed conferred no right, title or interest in the transferees, in view Honble law laid down by the Honble Bombay High Court in the case of Keshrimal Jivji Shah & Ayer. v. Bank of Maharashtra & Ors., 2004(3) C.C.C. 375. 11. v. Bank of Maharashtra & Ors., 2004(3) C.C.C. 375. 11. Mr. Anil Kshetarpal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, challenged the impugned order on the contention that lis pendens transferee is entitled to move an application under Order 9 Rule 13 to set aside the decree passed against his transferor i.e. the defendants in the suit as also ex parte order passed against their vendors. In support of this contention the reliance was placed on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Raj Kumar v. Sardari Lal and others (2004) 2 Supreme Court Cases 601, wherein the Honble Supreme Court has been pleased to lay down as under :- "13. The appellant cannot dispute that the decree though passed against Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 could be executed even against Respondent No. 4 he being a lis pendens transferee though not having been joined in the suit as a party. Such a person can prefer an appeal being aggrieved. Clearly, the person who is liable to be proceeded against in execution of the decree or can file an appeal against in decree, though not a party to the suit or decree, does have locus standi to move an application for setting aside an ex parte decree passed against the person in whose shoes he has stepped in. In the expression employed in Rule 13 of Order 9 CPC that "in any case in which a decree is passed ex parte against a defendant, he may apply...... for an order to set it aside", the word "he" cannot be construed with such rigidity and so restrictively as to exclude the person, who has stepped into the shoes of the defendant, from moving an application for setting aside the ex parte decree especially in the presence of Section 146 CPC. 14. Incidentally, we may observe that in Surjit Singh v. Harbans Singh the assignees pendente lite were refused by this Court to be brought on record as they had purchased the suit property after the passing of the preliminary decree and in clear defiance of the restraint order passed by the Court injuncting any alienation/assignment. 14. Incidentally, we may observe that in Surjit Singh v. Harbans Singh the assignees pendente lite were refused by this Court to be brought on record as they had purchased the suit property after the passing of the preliminary decree and in clear defiance of the restraint order passed by the Court injuncting any alienation/assignment. It was a case of exercising discretion not to grant leave under order 22 Rule 10 CPC, in the circumstances of the case, as in the opinion of this Court impleadment and recognizing the alienation/assignment would amount to defeating the ends of justice and the prevalent public money. That case is clearly distinguishable. 15. We hold that a lis pendens transferee, though not brought o1 1 record under Order 22 Rule 10 CPC, is entitled to move an application under Order 9 Rule 13 to set aside a decree passed against his transferor, the defendant in the suit." 12. Learned counsel for the petitioners also contended that the learned trial court was wrong in coming to the conclusion that the petitioners had no right or interest in the transfer of the property as the sale deed was executed in their favour in violation of injunction order, by relying upon the judgment of Honble Bombay High Court in the case of Keshrimal Jivji Shah & Anr. v. Bank of Maharashtra & Ors. 2004 (3) Civil Court Cases 375, as the findings recorded by the learned trial court are contrary to the law laid down by this court in the case of Dalbara Singh v. Chhaja Singh, 1993(1) R.R.R. 543 : 1993 Civil Court Cases 535, wherein this court was pleased to lay down that the sale, deed executed in violation of injunction order does note invalidate the sale deed or render it nullity, vendor could only be liable to penal consequences of violating injunction order. 13. On consideration of matter, I find force in the contentions raised by the petitioners. As per law of precedent the later judgments of coordinate benches are to be followed. Therefore, in of the law laid down by Honble Supreme Court in the case of Raj Kumar. v. Sardari Lal & Ors., (supra), reliance on the case of Dhanna Singh v. Baljinder Kaur (supra), could not be placed to non-suit the petitioners. 14. As per law of precedent the later judgments of coordinate benches are to be followed. Therefore, in of the law laid down by Honble Supreme Court in the case of Raj Kumar. v. Sardari Lal & Ors., (supra), reliance on the case of Dhanna Singh v. Baljinder Kaur (supra), could not be placed to non-suit the petitioners. 14. Once it has been authoritatively held by Honble Supreme Court that transferee lis pendens has a right to challenge the ex parte proceedings learned trial court was not justified in holding that the petitioners had no locus standi to challenge, the ex parte order, the court was required to consider the application on merit. 15. It may be noticed here that the respondents referred to the judgment of Honble Supreme Court in the case of Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram and Ors., 2008(1) R.C.R.(Rent) 451 : 2008(3) R.A.J. 71 : 2008 (3) RCR (Civil) 145, to contend that lis pendens transferee is presumed to be aware of the proceedings before the court of law to contend that the petitioners were not entitled to challenge the ex parte orders after being impleaded as party. 16. It is for the learned trial court to look into the matter. whether sufficient cause for setting aside ex parte order is made out or not, a the petition filed by the petitioners was not decided on merit but on the question of maintainability of application by lis pendens transferee. 17. For the reasons stated above, this revision petition is allowed, the impugned order is set aside and the case is remanded back to the learned trial court to decide the application for setting aside ex parte order in accordance with law on merit, by treating it to be maintainable. The parties through their counsel are directed to appear before the learned trial court on 16.11.2009.