Judgment :- (1) All the aforementioned writ petitions are taken up together since identical issues are involved and disposed of by this common judgment. (2) These writ petitions have been filed by several petitioners, who were employees of the Durgapur Steel Plant Alloys Steels Plant/Bokaro Steel Plant of the Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as SAIL), and who have since retired from service. The principal grievance of the writ petitioners emanates from the action of respondent authorities following two different methods in the matter of payment of gratuity to its employees. (3) The petitioners have stated that the posts held by them before retirement were classified by the respondent authorities as "executive" posts and they were given limited amount of gratuity, upto a maximum ceiling of rupees one lakh upon their retirement. However, in case of other employees of SAIL, they were given gratuity without any ceiling for their entire period of service, classifying them as "non-executives". According to the petitioners, although there were certain baste conditions mentioned in their letter of appointment, the same were changed from time to time on the basis of bipartite settlement, entered into between the employers and the employees union. The petitioners have also referred to the settlement, arrived at in the steel industry through the machinery of Joint Negotiating Committee. According to the petitioners, the National Joint Committee of Steel Agreement, popularly known as NJCS, agreement provides under Chapter V Clause 5.1(e), which deals with retiring gratuity, that there shall be no ceiling or limit on the amount of gratuity payable. Referring to Section 4(5) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), it has been submitted that it provides the right of an employee to receive better terms of gratuity under any agreement with the employer. It has also been submitted that the NJCS agreement, which was arrived at on 27th October, 1970, became part of the service conditions of the employees of SAIL, which included the petitioners. According to the petitioners, since there was no ceiling or limit on the amount of gratuity payable to those employees covered under the said NJCS agreement, they are also entitled to payment of gratuity without any ceiling for their entire period of service, like other employees as per provision of sub-section 5 of Section 4 of the said Act. According to the petitioners, since there was no ceiling or limit on the amount of gratuity payable to those employees covered under the said NJCS agreement, they are also entitled to payment of gratuity without any ceiling for their entire period of service, like other employees as per provision of sub-section 5 of Section 4 of the said Act. It has also been stated by the petitioners that although the respondent authorities raised the ceiling of gratuity to Rupees one lakh in the year 1988 and included it in the SAIL Gratuity Rules, consistent with the statutory provisions, it was also provided in the SAIL Gratuity Rules that in respect of employees governed by the Memorandum of Agreement they would be given payment of gratuity as per the terms of the agreement. (4) It has been further stated by the writ petitioners that they joined services of SAIL right from the day of implementation of the agreement dated 27th October, 1970 and were enjoying the better terms provided thereunder, since they were coming under Rule 2 of the SAIL Gratuity Rules. It has been specifically stated in the writ petitions that the orders issued to the petitioners promoting/upgrading them to the "executive" scale do not say that they were not entitled to payment of gratuity under the terms of settlement of the agreement dated 27th October, 1970, consequent upon their elevation to executive cadre. Petitioners have stated that as per terms and conditions of their appointment, they were to be regulated under the rules of company and they were no specific or separate rules for "executives" and "non-executives* in SAIL Gratuity Rules. It has been contended that the authorities cannot adopt two sets of formula in the matter of payment of gratuity, contrary to the statutory provisions, thereby limiting the quantum of amount for the employees classified as "executives" and unlimiting the same for those employees classified as "non-executives". (5) At the time of hearing of the writ petition, the learned Advocate for the petitioners has sought to highlight the fact that interim relief of Rs. (5) At the time of hearing of the writ petition, the learned Advocate for the petitioners has sought to highlight the fact that interim relief of Rs. 33/-per month, in pursuance to an agreement dated 19th December, 1969, was received by the petitioners, which would go to show that the "executive" employees of the steel industry also came under the service condition enunciated in the Memorandum of Agreement dated 27th October, 1970 and the "executive" employees were, thus, expressly covered under the scope of Chapter-l coverage Clause 1 (iii) of the said NJCS agreement. Learned Advocate for the petitioners submitted that when the petitioners were promoted to the post of "executive", they were promised that their service condition would remain unaltered. In the case of promotee "executives", like the writ petitioners, the special feature was that they were always given the benefit arisen out of the agreement dated 27th October, 1970, following the settlement arrived at by the Joint Negotiating Committee. (6) The learned Advocate for the petitioners has relied, by way of an example, on an office order dated 13th October, 1972, which is annexed to W.P.No.13004 (W) of 1999 and submitted that from a bare perusal of the same, particularly paragraph 4 thereof, it would be apparent that even when an employee was promoted to an "executive" post, other terms and conditions of his appointment remained unaltered, thereby giving the promotee "executive" benefit of the NJCS agreement, which, admittedly, covered the writ petitioners, at the point of time they were promoted to "executive" posts from "non-executive" cadre. The office order is reproduced hereinbelow :- "No. ASP- L-1/243/424 dated : October 13, 1972 OFFICE ORDER Shri N.K.Saha (Employee No, 84136), Accountant (Rs. 450-720/-) of the Finance and Accounts Department, Alloy Steels Plant is hereby promoted to the post of Assistant Accounts Officer in the grade of Rs. 550-550-600-40-1000-50-1100 with effect from the date he assumes charge of the higher post. 2. On his promotion the pay of Shri Saha in the grade of Rs. 550- 1100 will be fixed in accordance with the rules. 3. He will be on probation for a period of six months in the post of Assistant Accounts Officer. 4. 550-550-600-40-1000-50-1100 with effect from the date he assumes charge of the higher post. 2. On his promotion the pay of Shri Saha in the grade of Rs. 550- 1100 will be fixed in accordance with the rules. 3. He will be on probation for a period of six months in the post of Assistant Accounts Officer. 4. Other terms and conditions of his appointment will remain in unaltered." (7) Learned Advocate for the petitioners has also submitted that the intention of the legislature, which has been reflected in the said Act, is that the social security benefit enjoyed by the employees should be protected. The benefit, which the petitioners otherwise would have been entitled to, till their promotion, should not be curtailed, and on the contrary, should be carried forward. Drawing attention of this Court to Section 4 (1) of the said Act, the learned Advocate for the petitioners submitted that the same would show that entitlement of gratuity had nothing to do with payment of gratuity. Gratuity, being a social security arrangement, in lieu of pension, is payable only after superannuation, but the same could not be a consideration to curtail the quantum of payment. By way of an example it was submitted that if an employee was promoted to an "executive" post just one year before his superannuation, he would be denied the benefit of gratuity, which he would have been otherwise entitled to under the said Act, except for one year. According to the learned Advocate, any such interpretation would be destructive to the purpose and objective of the said Act. (8) It was submitted that irrespective of promotion to the post of "executive" cadre, which was supervisory in nature, the writ petitioners were entitled to get the benefit of full amount of gratuity for their continuous service in terms of the service conditions as stated in the NJCS agreement dated 27th October, 1970. (9) On behalf of the SAIL, it has been contended that the writ petitioners have suppressed the fact that a substantive writ petition had been filed by the Steel Executive Federation of India, an association of "executive" employees of SAIL, being C.W.P. No. 486 of 1995, before the Honble High Court at Delhi, and by a judgment and order dated 13th September, 1996, the said writ petition was dismissed by the Honble High Court at Delhi. It was further submitted that the issues raised in the present writ petitions by the writ petitioners, who are the members of the said Executive Federation, have already been clearly decided in the said judgment and order of the Honble Delhi High Court and the writ petitioners are bound by the same under the principle of res judicata. (10) It has also been contended on behalf of the SAIL that the writ petitioners were "executive" employees on the respective dates of their superannuation. Each of the writ petitioners were governed by the SAIL Gratuity Rules which, inter alia, provides a ceiling for the maximum amount of gratuity payable to "executives". Throughout the period during which each of the petitioners retired from the services of SAIL, the maximum amount of gratuity payable, both under the said Act and under the SAIL Gratuity Rules, was Rupees one lakh. The writ petitioners, being fully conscious of the said provisions, accepted their respective gratuity, without any demur or protest. It was, thus, contended that the writ petitioners, by their conduct, were estopped from claiming further relief towards gratuity. (11) On behalf of SAIL, it was further submitted that Hindustan Steel, the predecessor-in-interest of SAIL, had Rules providing for payment of gratuity to its employees. Subsequently, on formation of SAIL, by virtue of the Public Sector Iron and Steel (Restructuring and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1978, SAIL framed its own Gratuity Rules, which came into force from 8th August, 1978. Prior thereto, on the basis of negotiations between the Unions representing non-executive workmen and the employer, under the auspices of National Joint Consultative Committee, an agreement was entered into on 27th October, 1970. In the said agreement, the provisions for payment of retiring gratuity to the "non-executive" employees covered by the said agreement had been made, which included a provision that there shall be no ceiling or limit on the amount of gratuity payable to the employees covered by the said agreement. Accordingly, when SAIL framed its own Gratuity Rules, "non-executive" employees, who were covered by the NJCS agreement, had been excluded from the purview thereof. In other words, the employees covered by the NJCS agreement were entitled to retiral gratuity and other benefits in accordance with the NJCS agreement. On the other hand, the "executive" employees of SAIL were governed by the SAIL Gratuity Rules. In other words, the employees covered by the NJCS agreement were entitled to retiral gratuity and other benefits in accordance with the NJCS agreement. On the other hand, the "executive" employees of SAIL were governed by the SAIL Gratuity Rules. Such provisions of payment of retiral benefits including gratuity have been uniformly followed and accepted by all concerned. (12) It has also been specifically contended on behalf of the SAIL that in W.P.No.9352 (W) of 1999, the writ petitioners in paragraph 25 thereof have admitted that they were covered under the NJCS agreement prior to their promotion. It is contended on behalf of SAIL that after accepting the offers of promotion to the post of "executive", the NJCS agreement, which had been admittedly arrived at the instance of several unions workers but not "executives", ceased to be applicable to the writ petitioners and as such, the contention of the writ petitioners that they were still covered by the NJCS agreement notwithstanding their promotion to "executive" cadre, have no basis at all. (13) It has been specifically contended by SAIL that the writ petitioners, upon accepting promotion and receiving the benefits attached to the promoted "executive" posts, cannot continue to be covered by the NJCS agreement. (14) Referring to the decision of the Honble Delhi High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 486 of 1995 (Steel Executives Federation of India and Am. v. Steel Authority of India Ltd.), learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the SAIL has contended that the writ petitioners entitlement of gratuity became effective on the respective dates of their retirement, superannuation or disablement, resulting in termination of the contract of employment, as per Section 4(1) of the said Act. In case of the writ petitioners, they were paid gratuity of rupees one lakh, which was the amount payable to them, as per law, on the date of their retirement. (15) Referring to the Conduct Rules, it was contended that the "executives" and "non-executives" are not guided by the same Rules. It has been submitted on behalf of the SAIL that "executives" are guided by the Conduct, Discipline and Appeals Rules, 1977 whereas factory workers are governed by Certified Standing Orders and the nonindustrial non-executives are governed by the Conduct Rules, 1960 and Disciplinary and Appeal Rules, 1962, so far as disciplinary measures are concerned. It has been submitted on behalf of the SAIL that "executives" are guided by the Conduct, Discipline and Appeals Rules, 1977 whereas factory workers are governed by Certified Standing Orders and the nonindustrial non-executives are governed by the Conduct Rules, 1960 and Disciplinary and Appeal Rules, 1962, so far as disciplinary measures are concerned. (16) It has also been stated on behalf of SAIL that factory workers and the "non-executives" are covered by the NJCS Agreement of 1970. As regards promotion of the "executives" and "non-executives", there exists separate promotion rules and policies, namely, promotion policy laid down for the purposes of promotion of the "executives", and in respect of promotion of "non-executives", bipartite agreements are signed. (17) It has been further contended that "executive" employees, like the writ petitioners, are not covered by the NJCS agreement providing gratuity without ceiling, and, therefore, they cannot take the benefit provided under Section 4(5) of the said Act. They are only entitled to gratuity, as stipulated under Section 4(3) of the said Act, which was paid to them. It has been submitted on behalf of SAIL that the NJCS agreement itself shows that only workers, i.e. "non-executives", are parties to the agreement. It is specifically contended by SAIL that as soon as writ petitioners were promoted to "executive" posts, they ceased to be entitled to any benefit under the NJCS agreement. (18) It was also submitted on behalf of SAIL that the writ petitioners having enjoyed all the service benefits, as made available to the "executives", cannot pray for gratuity amount, as paid to the "non- executives". Due to the NJCS agreement, the upper limit of payment of gratuity in case of "non-executive" employees has become non-operative in the Gratuity Rules, which applies to all employees, whether "executives" or "non-executives". It has also been contended that "non-executive" and "executive" employees belong to two distinct categories and two different classes of persons. The "executives", being officers, enjoys different service benefits and are covered by different service conduct rules and are guided by different promotion policies of the company, whereas the "non- executives", which constitute workmen have protection under labour laws, namely, Standing Orders and different Conduct Rules and their wage structures, arrived at by way of negotiation with the unions, are different. Thus, it was submitted that "executives" and "non-executives" are unequal and cannot be said to constitute one class. Thus, it was submitted that "executives" and "non-executives" are unequal and cannot be said to constitute one class. (19) With regard to the contention of the writ petitioners that they are entitled to gratuity without ceiling as per the NJCS agreement as it was made clear in the order of promotion to "executive" posts that their terms and conditions of appointment would remain unaltered, the learned Advocate appearing oh behalf of SAIL submitted that the same was not correct, as in the order on appointment nothing was mentioned about payment of gratuity and, as such, the question of payment of gratuity as per agreement did not arise at all. (20) Learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the SAIL reiterated that the issue raised in these writ petitions was clearly decided by the Honble Delhi High Court in the judgment and order referred supra, in which the writ petition was filed by Steel Executives Federation of India, of which the writ petitioners are its members. It was submitted that the Honble Delhi High Court, after considering the submissions made on behalf of the parties, by its judgment and order dated 13th September, 1996, dismissed the claim of the "executives" as regards payment of gratuity as per the NJCS agreement holding, inter alia, that the "executives" and "non-executives" belonged to two different classes and there exists no agreement with the "executives" and as such "executives" were not entitled to the payment of gratuity as per the NJCS agreement. (21) The learned Advocate for the SAIL has also referred to a judgment and order passed by the Honble Madhya Pradesh High Court on 3rd November, 1999, in W.P.No.4926 of 1998, wherein it was, inter alia, held that the status at the time of retirement was relevant and at the time of termination of employment on attaining the age of superannuation, the concerned employee of Bhillai Steel Plant was working as an "executive" and therefore his gratuity had to be calculated on the basis of the rules governing "executives". He could not claim gratuity at the rate which was admissible to the "non-executives". He could not claim gratuity at the rate which was admissible to the "non-executives". The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the SAIL has also relied on the Division Bench judgment and order of the Honble Orissa High Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. The Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central) and Controlling Authority under Payment of Gratuity Act, Rourkela and 185 others reported in (2002)1 OLR 336 wherein the Honble Orissa High Court agreed with the reasons enunciated by the Honble Delhi High Court and came to the conclusion that payment of gratuity to "non-executive" employees was made in terms of the said Act, the SAIL Gratuity Rules read with the NJCS agreement arrived at the national level, whereas the "executive" employees were entitled to receive gratuity in terms of Section 4(3) of the said Act. Learned Advocate for SAIL thus submitted that in view of the clear enunciation of law by the three Honble High Courts, the employees who had initially joined as "non-executives" but retired as "executives", were not entitled to claim gratuity as per the NJCS agreement, which was admittedly arrived at with the workers and not with the "executives". (22) It was also submitted that there was no scope for the present writ petitioners to reagitate the same point before this Court, particularly when precedents which enunciate rules of law form the foundation of administration of justice under our judicial system and consistency in interpretation of law alone could lead to public confidence. The learned Advocate for SAIL thus prayed that the present writ petitions be dismissed. (23) In order to decide upon the issue as to whether the writ petitioners are entitled, as a matter of right, to get gratuity in terms of the NJCS agreement it may be necessary, perhaps, to dwell on a bit on the facts. Since the writ petitioners are more or less similarly situate, example of one of the writ petitioners, i.e., Nirendra Kumar Saha, is taken. (24) From the records it appears that Nirendra Kumar Saha was initially appointed on 31st December, 1959 to the post of upper division assistant in the Durgapur Steel Project of Hindustan Steel Ltd., with effect from 23rd November, 1959, on an initial pay of Rs. 807- plus allowances, admissible under the rules of the company. (24) From the records it appears that Nirendra Kumar Saha was initially appointed on 31st December, 1959 to the post of upper division assistant in the Durgapur Steel Project of Hindustan Steel Ltd., with effect from 23rd November, 1959, on an initial pay of Rs. 807- plus allowances, admissible under the rules of the company. Paragraph 2 of his appointment letter dated 31st December, 1959 specifies other terms and conditions of the appointment. In paragraph 2 (a) it has been specified that leave, travelling allowance, dearness allowance, other allowances (if any) and contributory provident fund will be regulated under the rules of the company in force from time to time. (25) It is an admitted position that when the NJCS agreement came into force on 27th October, 1970, this writ petitioner was covered under the said agreement. However, on 13th October, 1972, by an office order, Nirendra Kumar Saha was promoted to the post of an Assistant Accounts Officer. In paragraph 4 of the said office order it was stated that other terms and conditions of his appointment would remain unaltered. Nirendra Kumar Saha, after serving the respondent company finally retired as the Senior Manager of Finance and Accounts department of Alloy Steels Plant upon attaining the age of superannuation with effect from 29th February, 1996. It has been stated in one of the writ petitions [W.P.No.13004 (W) of 1999], citing the instance of Nirendra Kumar Saha, that upon retiring from service on 29th February, 1996, he was given a total sum of rupees one lakh for his entire period of 36 years 02 months of service in the company. Now, it is to be seen, taking the instance of Nirendra Kumar Saha into consideration, whether the writ petitioners are entitled, as a matter of right, to get gratuity without any ceiling for entire period of their service, since all of them, admittedly, came within the ambit and scope of the NJCS agreement dated 27th October, 1970, at the point of time it came into force. (26) The scope and coverage of the NJCS agreement dated 27th October, 1970 is set out hereinbelow : - "1. Scope and Coverage : This agreement shall cover : (i) All categories of workmen who are covered by the Recommendations of the First Central Wage Board for Iron and Steel Industry. (26) The scope and coverage of the NJCS agreement dated 27th October, 1970 is set out hereinbelow : - "1. Scope and Coverage : This agreement shall cover : (i) All categories of workmen who are covered by the Recommendations of the First Central Wage Board for Iron and Steel Industry. (ii) All categories of employees in respect of whom the Recommendations of the First Steel Wage Board have been made applicable by any Company by Agreement or otherwise. (iii) All categories of employees to whom the interim relief of Rs. 33/- in pursuance of the Agreement dated 19-12-1969 has been paid. (iv) All work-charged employees in the Steel Plant of Hindustan Steel Ltd." (27) Chapter V of NJCS agreement provides for retiring gratuity. Clauses 5.1 and 5.1 (e) reads as follows :- "5.1 Retiring Gratuity : The workers representatives demand gratuity being paid on total wages. This demand is not acceptable to the employers representatives. It is, however, agreed that : (e) There shall be no ceiling or limit on the amount of gratuity payable." (28) It is the admitted position that the writ petitioners have been promoted as "executives" from "non-executive" posts held by them during their tenure of service. (29) At this juncture, one may take notice of the provisions of the SAIL Gratuity Rules, which came into force on 08th August, 1978. The earlier Gratuity Rules, which were introduced in the company by Hindustan Steel Ltd. in the year 1966, were made applicable to the employees of the SAIL. (30) Clause 2.0 of the SAIL Gratuity Rules deals with the scope of the Rules and says as follows :- "2.0 SCOPE : These rules shall apply to all employees of the Company except casual employees, Government servants and other employed on deputation terms, Apprentices and Foreign Technicians. DECISION These Rules are applicable to all employees of the Company in so far as they may be inconsistent with the provisions of the Payment and Gratuity Act and Rules framed thereunder and the NJCS Agreement. Provisions from NJCS Agreement, 1983 are reproduced : (31) Clause 3 of the Gratuity Rules deals with payment of gratuity, whereas Clause 3.2.1 deals with the amount of gratuity payable. Provisions from NJCS Agreement, 1983 are reproduced : (31) Clause 3 of the Gratuity Rules deals with payment of gratuity, whereas Clause 3.2.1 deals with the amount of gratuity payable. In the said Clause 3.2.1, it has been stated that in respect of employees, governed by the Memorandum of Agreement of the NJCS, the amount of gratuity payment shall be as per the terms of the agreement. For convenience, relevant parts of the said clauses are reproduced hereinbelow :-"3.0 PAYMENT OF GRATUITY : 3.2.1 Amount of Gratuity The amount of gratuity shall be equal to 15 days emoluments for each completed year of service or part thereof in excess of six months subject to a maximum limit of 20 months emoluments or Rs. 36,000/- whichever is less provided that :-(a) In case of death, Gratuity shall be calculated as mentioned above and as given below and higher of the two will be admissible :- (i) Death during the first year of service. Two months emoluments. (ii) Death after one year but before 5 years service. Six months emoluments. (iii) Death after completion of give years service. 12 months emoluments. DECISION In respect of employees governed by the Memorandum of Agreement arrived at in the NJCS, the amount of gratuity payment shall be as per the terms of the Agreement. (32) A short question, therefore, naturally arises as to whether the writ petitioners, who were admittedly "non-executive" cadre employees to begin with, could avail the benefits of the NJCS agreement dated 27th October, 1970, having been promoted to "executive" posts subsequently (emphasis supplied). To come to a finding on this aspect of the matter, it may be relevant to peruse the office order dated 13th October, 1973, whereby Nirendra Kumar Saha, a "non-executive", was posted to a higher post, that of an "executive". As reproduced hereinbefore, clause 4 of the said office order says that other terms and conditions of his appointment will remain unaltered. Although the NJCS agreement had already come into force by that time, clause 4 indicates towards the appointment of Nirendra Kumar Saha, who was admittedly appointed to a "non-executive" post on 23rd December, 1959. As reproduced hereinbefore, clause 4 of the said office order says that other terms and conditions of his appointment will remain unaltered. Although the NJCS agreement had already come into force by that time, clause 4 indicates towards the appointment of Nirendra Kumar Saha, who was admittedly appointed to a "non-executive" post on 23rd December, 1959. The NJCS agreement dated 27th October, 1970 did not provide any clause therein which specifically factored in those "non-executive" employees who were appointed prior to come into force of the NJCS agreement and who were likely to be promoted to "executive" posts subsequently. Therefore, in the ultimate analysis it may not be possible to stretch the logic to the extent that Clause 4 of the office order dated 13th October, 1973, included in its fold, the NJCS agreement dated 27th October, 1970, or that the NJCS agreement contemplated inclusion of future "promotee executives". It cannot be, therefore, concluded that the benefit of non-ceiling on the amount of gratuity payable to retiring employees remained saved in case of these writ petitioners by virtue of the NJCS agreement and Clause 4 referred above. Moreover, a plain reading of subsection 1 of Section 4 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 makes it clear that payment of gratuity to an employee comes into effect only upon termination of the employment and not otherwise (emphasis supplied). The said provision of law reads as follows :-"4. Payment of gratuity.-(1) Gratuity shall be payable to an employee on the termination of his employment after he has rendered continuous service for not less than five years,-(a) on his superannuation, or (b) on his retirement or resignation, or (c) on his death or disablement due to accident or disease : Provided that the completion of continuous service of five years shall not be necessary where the termination of the employment of any employee is due to death or disablement : (33) In this context, the Honble Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of J. R. Lilariya v. Steel Authority of India Ltd., Bhilai and Anr. (supra) has held that an employee gets the right to receive gratuity only on termination of his employment, either on superannuation, retirement or resignation or on death or disablement due to accident or disease. (supra) has held that an employee gets the right to receive gratuity only on termination of his employment, either on superannuation, retirement or resignation or on death or disablement due to accident or disease. The Honble Madhya Pradesh High Court in that matter was considering a case of an employee of Bhilai Steel Plant of SAIL, who was initially appointed as Assistant (Store and Purchase). This employee had put in 38 years of service on various posts, before being superannuated. 22 months prior to his superannuation, he was promoted to the "executive" cadre. The grievance of the employee was that although he had worked in a "non-executive" post for the greater period of his service and was in the "executive cadre" for about 22 months, he had been paid an amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- as gratuity, whereas other persons who retired as "non-executives" were paid double the amount received by him. The fact situation before the Honble Madhya Pradesh High Court is quite identical to the facts of the present writ petitions. The Honble Madhya Pradesh High Court, by the said judgment and order, set aside the order of the Controlling Authority and the Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 holding, inter alia, that the employer had classified his employees as "executives" and "non-executives" and the petitioner had been promoted as an "executive" and had availed the benefits admissible to such "executive" and therefore he could not be permitted for the first time to contend before the Court that he was, in fact, a non-executive. (34) The judgment of the Honble Delhi" High Court (supra), which has been relied on by the learned Advocate for SAIL, also goes into the issue involved in the present writ petitions. The Honble Delhi High Court in Steel Executives Federation of India and Anr. v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. held, inter alia, as follows :-"It is crystal clear that payment of gratuity to the non-executive employees is being made by the respondent on terms of Gratuity Rules read with the agreement arrived at National Level whereas. Executive employees are being paid gratuity in terms of Gratuity Rules. The Classification nearly, extending better benefit/advantage to the non-executive employees thereon purchaser of negotiation and agreement allowed of between the management and the Union of India prentive circle which is permissible under the provision of Section 405 of the Act. Executive employees are being paid gratuity in terms of Gratuity Rules. The Classification nearly, extending better benefit/advantage to the non-executive employees thereon purchaser of negotiation and agreement allowed of between the management and the Union of India prentive circle which is permissible under the provision of Section 405 of the Act. The validity of the said provision of sub-section (5) of the Section 4 of the act is not under challenge in that writ petition. In the present case, therefore, there is a rational relationship with the object sought to be achieved in extending better terms of activity to the non-executive Employee in pursuance of the agreement and in terms of subscription the be of Section 4 on the Act. Therefore, I am of the considered opinion. That there is no irresponsible classification in the present case and that the submission of the satisfied counsel for the petitioner it without case." (35) The Honble Orissa High Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. The Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central) and Controlling Authority under Payment of Gratuity Act, Rourkela and 185 Others, reported in (2002)1 OLR 376 took notice of the judgment of the Honble Delhi High Court and agreed with the views by observing, inter alia, as follows :- "We are in agreement with the reasons enunciated by the Delhi High Court (supra) and reiterate that the Executives being Officers, constitute a different class than the non-Executives which constitute workmen and that the classification is based on intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons put together from those left out of the group. The differentia is also clearly distinguishable and has a rational relationship to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in as much as the non-Executives have the protection under the Labour Laws and clearly distinguishable. The differentia is also clearly distinguishable and has a rational relationship to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in as much as the non-Executives have the protection under the Labour Laws and clearly distinguishable. The payment of gratuity of the non-Executive employees is made in terms of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972; the Rules framed thereunder the SAIL Gratuity Rules, read with Agreement arrived at Nation level, whereas the Executive employees are entitled to receive gratuity in terms of Section 4(3) of the Payment of Gratuity Act in the absence of any agreement." (36) Clause 4 of the office order dated 13th October, 1973, issued in favour of Nirendra Kumar Saha, one of the writ petitioners, for reasons discussed hereinbefore, cannot give Nirendra Kumar Saha or the other writ petitioners a vested right to get gratuity in terms of the NJCS agreement dated 27th October, 1970. Moreover, at the relevant point of time, when the writ petitioners were entitled to receive gratuity they had admittedly been holding "executive" posts and as observed by the Honble Madhya Pradesh High Court (supra), the right to receive gratuity is not a vested right and an employee gets the right to receive gratuity only on his termination of his employment (emphasis supplied), either on superannuation, or on retirement or resignation or death or disablement due to accident or disease. (37) In view of the foregoing discussions, in my opinion, the issue as to whether writ petitioners are entitled to higher amount of gratuity, taking benefit of the provision of sub-section 5 of Section 4 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, while relying on the NJCS agreement, is no more res nova. (38) In the facts and circumstances, as stated above, the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed and the same are hereby dismissed. (39) Before parting with this case I am, however, of the considered opinion that a few words may be said regarding the doctrine of comity of Court which demands that Courts take a consistent and uniform approach towards administration of justice by taking adequate care to ensure elimination of conflicting orders. The issue raised in these writ petitions has been substantially answered by no less than three High Courts and I have found no reasons to differ with them. The issue raised in these writ petitions has been substantially answered by no less than three High Courts and I have found no reasons to differ with them. The Honble Supreme Court, in the case of India Household and Healthcare Ltd. v. LG Household and Healthcare Ltd. reported in (2007) 5 SCC 510 : (2007)2 WBLR (SC) 8 has, inter alia, held that the doctrine of comity or amity requires a Court not to pass an order which would be in conflict with another order passed by a competent Court of law. Thus, additionally, I am also of the view that the present case is an instance where the doctrine of comity or amity of Court is applicable, since Courts of coordinate benches as well as a Division Bench of another High Court have substantially addressed the issue raised in the present writ petitions and have come to uniform and consistent findings and therefore there is no scope of passing any conflicting order herein.