JUDGMENT Honble Prakash Krishna, J.—These two writ petitions were heard together and are being disposed off by a common judgment as was suggested by the learned counsel for the parties. They jointly gave a statement that identical controversy is involved in both the writ petitions and the judgment rendered in the writ petition of Mewa Lal will also cover the controversy involved in the case of Vishnu Bhagwan and others. 2. The writ petition No. 22330 of 2002 was treated as the leading case. The facts in brief may be noted. Respondent Lav Kush Kumar filed an application under Section 21 (1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act No. 13 of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for ejectment of the petitioner on the ground that the said accommodation is bonafide required by him to establish his son Atin Kumar in retail business of utensils and for residential purposes as well. The accommodation in dispute consists of one shop and also residential accommodation. It was stated that Atin Kumar has now become major and the shop is needed to establish him in a business. The residential portion shall be utilized by Atin Kumar for his residential purposes. The release application was contested by denying the facts as stated therein. The petitioner tenant also stated that the landlord has got no son and Atin Kumars need is irrelevant. 3. The parties led evidence in support of their respective cases. The Prescribed Authority by the order dated 20th May, 1999 passed in the case No. 10 of 1997 released the disputed accommodation in favour of landlord after recording a finding that the need, of the landlord is bonafide and genuine and he will suffer greater hardship in case the release application is rejected. It was found that the petitioner tenant has got his own residential house just opposite the disputed accommodation wherein he could easily shift his business as well as the residence. The said judgment has been confirmed in the rent control appeal No. 4 of 1999 filed under Section 22 of the said Act vide judgment and order dated 3rd of May, 2000. Challenging the aforesaid two judgments, the present writ petition has been filed. 4. The said judgment has been confirmed in the rent control appeal No. 4 of 1999 filed under Section 22 of the said Act vide judgment and order dated 3rd of May, 2000. Challenging the aforesaid two judgments, the present writ petition has been filed. 4. The only point raised by Shri A.N. Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner, is that the release application was filed to establish Atin Kumar in business and to provide him residential accommodation as well. During the pendency of the release application one shop was got vacated in another Mohalla Dankenganj which instead of giving to Atin Kumar has been given to Awadhesh Kumar, the brother of the landlord. This being so, the submission is that need of the landlord is not bonafide and genuine. Further, it was argued that Awadhesh Kumar has also died in the month of June, 2002 and as such the said accommodation which has been given to Awadhesh Kumar is now available for the need of Atin Kumar. The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that the petitioner tenant has got a residential house just opposite the accommodation in dispute and as such, no interference in the present writ petition is called for. It was submitted that so far as the death of Awadhesh Kumar is concerned, he left behind him his widow, son and daughters who are carrying on their business in the shop left by Awadhesh Kumar and the same is not available to the present respondent landlord. 5. I have given careful consideration to the aforesaid submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. At the outset, it may be noted that the shop which was vacated is not exclusive property of the respondent landlord but the said property is a joint property of the respondent landlord and his brother Awadhesh Kumar. The said shop cannot be taken into account for considering the bonafide need of the respondent landlord. Indisputably, the respondent landlord is a co­sharer in the said shop and the said shop was got vacated by his brother Awadhesh Kumar who entered into compromise with the outgoing tenant. He got the said shop vacated for his need. 6. The said shop cannot be taken into account for considering the bonafide need of the respondent landlord. Indisputably, the respondent landlord is a co­sharer in the said shop and the said shop was got vacated by his brother Awadhesh Kumar who entered into compromise with the outgoing tenant. He got the said shop vacated for his need. 6. In such circumstances, in Julieta Antonieta Tarcato v. Suleiman Ismail, (2008) 1 SCC 173 the Apex Court has held that it cannot be lost sight of the fact that the premises which the landlord requires for her bonafide need belonged to her exclusively. In that case, the landlady who suffered burn injuries shifted to her brother’s residence and resided therein for number of years. Subsequently, landlady decided to move her own house. During the pendency of the proceedings, the brother expired and it was found that she has got a share in her brothers house. On these facts it was held by the High Court that she should remain in occupation of her brother’s house wherein she has become a co-sharer and the release application was rejected. Reversing the judgment of the High Court, the Apex Court observed that it cannot be lost sight of the fact that the premises which the landlady required for her bona fide need belongs to her. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the disputed shop exclusively belongs to the respondent landlord. 7. In this view of the matter, if the respondent landlord wants to settle his son in the property exclusively owned by him, there is no justification not to allow the release application and ask the landlord to occupy the joint property. 8. So far as the effect of the death of Awadhesh Kumar is concerned, it is no longer in dispute that he got the said shop vacated by entering into a compromise with the outgoing tenant. After death of Awadhesh Kumar, he is survived by his widow, one son and two daughters. Obviously, the said shop is needed by the family of the deceased, co-landlord (Awadhesh Kumar). After death of Awadhesh Kumar, he is survived by his widow, one son and two daughters. Obviously, the said shop is needed by the family of the deceased, co-landlord (Awadhesh Kumar). At this place, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Rajesh D. Darbar and others v. Narasingrao Krishnaji Kulkarni and others, 2004 All CJ 39 wherein it has been held that subsequent event has to be considered and to avoid injustice, Courts can mould the relief. It was not a case wherein the Court was required to consider subsequent event in the case of death of a landlord who applied for release of the disputed accommodation on the ground of his bonafide need. 9. In Kamleshwar Prasad v. Pradumanju Agrawal, JT 1997 (4) SC 425, a case under the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, it was held by the Apex Court that the need of the landlord for premises in question must exist on the date of the application for eviction, which is the crucial date and it is on the said date the tenant incurred liability of being evicted therefrom. Even if the landlord died during the pendency of the writ petition in the High Court, the bonafide need cannot be said to have been lapsed as the business in question can be carried on by his widow or any other son. The same view has been reiterated in Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava, JT 2001 (2) SC 426 as also in G.C. Kapoor v. Hand Kumar Bhasin, JT 2001 (9) SC 558. The above cases have been followed in Shakuntala Bai and others v. Narain Dass and others, JT 2004 (Suppl.) SC 538. However, in Pratap Rai Tanwani and another v. Uttam Chand and another, 2004 AIR SCW 6858 the Apex Court has also noticed some other decisions taking a different view of the matter and has held that the Court should take care that subsequent events should have "wholly satisfied” the requirement of the party who petitioned for eviction on the ground of personal requirement. 10. Reverting to the facts of the present case, it may be noted that in the case of Kamleshwar Prasad (supra), the release of the accommodation was sought by the landlord to establish himself in a business who died during the pendency of the writ petition. 10. Reverting to the facts of the present case, it may be noted that in the case of Kamleshwar Prasad (supra), the release of the accommodation was sought by the landlord to establish himself in a business who died during the pendency of the writ petition. The Supreme Court held that after the death of the landlord, his widow and other heirs may carry on the business from the disputed shop and such subsequent event will not make the landlord disentitle to get the desired relief for release of the disputed accommodation. The Supreme Court, as pointed out above, in the case of Pratap Rai Tanwani (supra) has said that subsequent events should have "wholly satisfied" the requirement of the party who petitioned for eviction on the ground of personal requirement, is the crux of law. In the case on hand, the release application was sought for establishing the son in the business and also for his residential purposes. Here, it is not the case of the petitioned tenant that on account of death of Awadhesh Kumar, any residential portion has become available for occupation by the son of the landlord whose need was set up. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion is that on the death of Awadhesh Kumar, the requirement of the respondent landlord is not satisfied what to say about “wholly satisfied”. 11. There is another reason which is equally weighty and relevant as has been found by the two Courts below. It has been found that the building in dispute is situate in a market known as “market for utensils, wares of metals”. Whereas the building which was allegedly fallen vacant and was occupied by Awadhesh Kumar is in a different Mohalla known as Dankenganj which is not a market of utensils/wares of metals. Therefore, in any case, the said shop is not suitable for the need of the respondent landlord. The findings recorded by the two Courts below are perfectly justified on the question of bonafide need and calls for no interference. 12. Otherwise also the said finding is finding of fact. There is another reason not to interfere in the present matter. The petitioner tenant had the audacity to say that the respondent landlord is issue-less and has no son. He came out with the case that Atin Kumar whose need was set up in the release application is not son of the landlord. There is another reason not to interfere in the present matter. The petitioner tenant had the audacity to say that the respondent landlord is issue-less and has no son. He came out with the case that Atin Kumar whose need was set up in the release application is not son of the landlord. The landlord had to file voluminous evidence in the shape of voter list, High School certificate and affidavit to prove that Atin Kumar is his son. On the contrary, the petitioner tenant did nothing. This conduct of the petitioner tenant also disentitles him to get any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 13. In nutshell, it is held that the need of landlord is bonafide and genuine as the petitioner tenant has already got a house just in front of the disputed accommodation. The shop in the building wherein Allahabad Bank is tenant is situate in a different Mohalla at Dankenganj which is not market of utensils and the said shop was got vacated by co-sharer Awadhesh Kumar for his need and the said shop was not available to the petitioner and was rightly occupied by Awadhesh Kumar. After the death of Awadhesh Kumar, his widow, son and two daughters are in possession of the said shop. The respondent landlord is only a co-sharer therein. The respondent landlord has set up the need for residential as well as non residential purposes and in any case, the need for residential purposes i.e. for residence of Atin Kumar is not satisfied, even if the said shop is taken into consideration. 14. No other point was pressed. 15. In view of the above discussion, there is no merit in the writ petition. The writ petition is dismissed with cost of Rs. 5,000/-. 16. By way of an interim measure, this Court by the order dated 29th November, 2006 after hearing the counsel for the parties fixed Rs. 5,000/- per month as rent of the disputed shop w.e.f. December, 2006. 17. Time to vacate the disputed accommodation is granted up to 30th September, 2009 provided the petitioner files an undertaking on affidavit within a period of one month before the Prescribed Authority that he will vacate the disputed accommodation and hand over the peaceful and vacant possession to the respondent landlord on or before 30th September, 2009. 17. Time to vacate the disputed accommodation is granted up to 30th September, 2009 provided the petitioner files an undertaking on affidavit within a period of one month before the Prescribed Authority that he will vacate the disputed accommodation and hand over the peaceful and vacant possession to the respondent landlord on or before 30th September, 2009. If the petitioner fails to vacate the disputed accommodation on or before 30th September, 2009, he shall be liable to pay damages at the rate of Rs. 8,000/- per month commencing from May, 2009 for the use and occupation of the disputed accommodation to the date of actual delivery of possession. 18. In the result, both the writ petitions are dismissed with imposition of Rs. 5,000/- as cost, in each case. ———