Hon'ble CHAUHAN, J.—Before entering into the battlefield of Kurukshetra, the Pandavs had pleaded for grant of only five villages in their favour. The plea was contemptuously dismissed by the blind King of Hastinapur, Dhritrastra. Similarly in this case, the petitioner and its predecessorin-interest have been running from pillar to post pleading that the land which was bought by Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal, respondents No.4 and 5, in 1942 and which was subsequently transferred to the petitioner Trust, should be registered in the revenue records in favour of the Trust. Despite a labyrinth of litigations, inspite of its chequered history, the petitioner is hopelessly hoping that justice would be done to it. Like a voice in the wilderness, the petitioner has floated in the corridors and courtrooms with a glimmer of hope that someone some day would hear its pleas. Like the Pandavs, the petitioner is still out in the legal wilderness. 2. The petitioner has challenged the order dated 25.4.2003 passed by the Board of Revenue (`the Board' for short), whereby a reference made by the Additional Collector, Jhunjhunu has been accepted. The learned Board has cancelled the mutation made in favour of the petitioner, and has directed that the land in question be declared as Gochar (pasture land). The petitioner has also prayed that the land in question should be recorded in its name in view of two favourable orders passed earlier, namely order dated 1.11.1954, passed by the Sub Divisional Officer, Jhunjhunu (`the SDO' for short) and order dated 7.11.1983, an order passed by the Settlement Commissioner. 3. This case has gone through a roller coaster ride for more than five decades. The journey begins in 1942: in order to earn pious deeds, Seth Pali Ram wanted to establish a pasture land for cows, who are considered holy by the Hindus. In order to establish a pasture land, he bought land situated in village Jakhod, Tehsil Chirawa, District Jhunjhunu, from the then Thikanedar of Bissau, Thakur Raghuvir Singh. He paid Rs.17,683/- for the said land. While the old khasra Numbers were 72, 140, 141, 143/2, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 181, 140/60 total kita 13 measuring 216 Bighas 13 Biswas, the new Khasra numbers are 52, 183, 199, 208, 202, 367, 494/202 total 7 kita measuring 53.59 hectares. He paid Rs.17,683/- for the said land. While the old khasra Numbers were 72, 140, 141, 143/2, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 181, 140/60 total kita 13 measuring 216 Bighas 13 Biswas, the new Khasra numbers are 52, 183, 199, 208, 202, 367, 494/202 total 7 kita measuring 53.59 hectares. According to the Patta (title-deed) issued by the then Thikanedar of Bissau, the land was to be used only as a pasture land for the cattle of the village. Even if part of the land were to be used for agricultural purpose, even then the income earned from the agricultural activities was to be plied back for the benefit of the pasture land. Moreover though a house could be built, but it was to be used only for the purpose of housing such persons who would look after the pasture land; the land could not be used for the personal usage of Seth Pali Ram. 4. Despite the patta issued by Thakur Raghuvir Singh in favour of Seth Pali Ram, the land was not mutated in his name. Till 1954 the land was shown in revenue record as Shamlat Deh (common land). Therefore, in 1954 Seth Pali Ram, and Brij Lal moved an application before the SDO, Jhunjhunu for correcting the revenue record. Before correcting the said record, the SDO called for a report from the Numberdar of the area. On 27.8.1954, the Numberdar submitted his report, to the SDO. In his report, he clearly stated that Seth Pali Ram ji and Brij Lal ji had bought the land mentioned in the report from Thikana Bissau. They were in possession of the land for the last twelve years. They have constructed a boundary wall around the said land. They have left the land as “Gochar-bhoomi”, i.e. as pasture land. Although camels and goats are not permitted to graze in the said land, other cattle is permitted to graze. Out of the total land, 16 Bighas of land has been kept for agricultural purpose. The said land is in possession of Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal. 5. Similarly, the SDO had called for the report of the Tehsildar. On 18.9.1954, the Tehsildar submitted his report. The Tehsildar also stated that although the land is being shown as Shamlat (common land), the land was sold by Thikana Bissau after taking a consideration. The said land is in possession of Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal. 5. Similarly, the SDO had called for the report of the Tehsildar. On 18.9.1954, the Tehsildar submitted his report. The Tehsildar also stated that although the land is being shown as Shamlat (common land), the land was sold by Thikana Bissau after taking a consideration. According to Tehsildar, he visited the said land and discovered that Seth Pali Ram had constructed a wall around the land. The land was in his possession. Cattle belonging to the villagers graze in the land without the villagers paying any taxes. Moreover, he noted that according to the Patta granted by Thikanedar Bissau, the said land could be used for agriculture purpose, and not for the purpose of construction of a house or for any personal usage. He further noted that he had taken the statement of Numberdar. The Numberdar had informed him that the land was in possession of Seth Pali Ram for the last twelve years. The Tehsildar also got a site plan prepared of the area by the Patwari, which formed part of his report. According to the Patwari, the land, in fact, should have been recorded in the name of Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal. The Tehsildar also recommended that the revenue record be corrected and the land should be shown in the name of Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal. Having considered these two reports, vide order dated 1.11.1954, the SDO directed that revenue record be corrected and the land be entered in the name of Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal. It is pertinent to note that no one has challenged the said order. It has, therefore, achieved finality. However, despite the clear direction of the SDO, the necessary correction was not carried out in the revenue record. 6. The Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (`the Act' for short) came into force on 15.10.1955. However, even after coming into force of the Act, even after the direction contained in the order dated 1.11.1954, unfortunately the land continued to be shown as “Shamlat Gochar” (common pasture land) till 1980. Therefore, on 16.6.1980 an application was moved before the Settlement department for correcting the revenue record. However, even after coming into force of the Act, even after the direction contained in the order dated 1.11.1954, unfortunately the land continued to be shown as “Shamlat Gochar” (common pasture land) till 1980. Therefore, on 16.6.1980 an application was moved before the Settlement department for correcting the revenue record. According to the order dated 28.6.1980 passed by the Assistant Land Settlement Officer-cum- Assistant Land Record Officer (`the Settlement Officer' for short), the land in question was being shown as Sivai-chak (government land). Moreover, the learned Settlement Officer noted the fact that according to the order dated 1.11.1954 passed by the then SDO, it was directed that the said land be entered in the name of Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal. He also noted that the necessary correction had not been carried out. Therefore, vide order dated 28.6.1980, he directed that the necessary correction be carried out and the said land should be entered in the name of Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal. 7. On 12.9.1980, the villagers of village Jakhod submitted an application, under Section 82 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act (`The Revenue Act', for short), praying that the order dated 28.6.1980 be quashed and set aside. The said application was transferred to the Settlement Commissioner-and-Land Consolidation Officer. Vide order dated 7.11.1983, the learned Settlement Commissioner dismissed the said reference. He dismissed the reference on the ground that the order dated 28.6.1980 should have been either appealed against, or a review petition should have been filed against the said order. Since, neither a review, nor an appeal had been filed, the reference was not maintainable. 8. Aggrieved by the order dated 7.11.1983, the Gram Panchayat Jakhod filed an appeal under Section 75 of the Revenue Act before the Board. However, vide order dated 26.8.1988, the learned Board dismissed the said appeal on the ground that once the Land Settlement Commissioner has declined to make a reference, then no appeal lies to the Board. Moreover, in case the Gram Panchayat were aggrieved by the order dated 28.6.1980, passed by the Settlement Officer, it should have filed an appeal or a revision or it should have requested the State Government to refer the matter. Since neither an appeal nor a revision was filed by the Gram Panchayat, therefore, the appeal was dismissed. The Gram Panchayat never challenged the order of the learned Board dated 26.8.1988. Since neither an appeal nor a revision was filed by the Gram Panchayat, therefore, the appeal was dismissed. The Gram Panchayat never challenged the order of the learned Board dated 26.8.1988. Therefore, the order passed by the learned Settlement Officer directing that the revenue record be corrected, that the land be entered in the name of Pali Ram and Brij Lal, achieved finality. Thus, the controversy should have rested with the order dated 26.8.1988 passed by the learned Board. 9. But that was not to be. After a silence of five years, suddenly in 1993, the Tehsildar, Chirawa submitted an application under Section 82 of the Revenue Act before the Additional Collector, Jhunjhunu requesting him to make a reference against the order dated 28.6.1980. Interestingly, the said application was filed against Seth Pali Ram, Brij Lal and the present petitioner Trust. While passing an exparte order, dated 17.7.1993, the learned Additional Collector made a reference to the learned Board. 10. After receiving the said reference from Additional Collector, but without issuing any notice to the petitioner or to Pali Ram and Brij Lal, vide order dated 6.5.1998, the Board accepted the reference and set aside the Khatedari rights of the petitioner. It ordered that the land be recorded again as Shamlat Gocharai (common pasture land). Since the said order was passed ex-parte, the petitioner moved an application before the Board for setting aside the ex-parte order. Vide order dated 20.5.1999, the said ex-parte order was recalled and the reference was directed to be placed before the Board. 11. Vide order dated 25.4.2003, the learned Board accepted the reference and again directed that the name of the petitioner and Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal should be removed from the record. And the land should be shown as common government pasture land. Since the petitioner is aggrieved by the said order, it has knocked at the doors of this Court. 12. With regard to the maintainability of the writ petition, Mr. Dinesh Yadav, the learned Additional Advocate General, has raised preliminary objections. According to him, the petitioner Trust cannot file the writ petition. For, the land was allegedly sold to Seth Pali Ram and the land was directed to be mutated in the name of Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal. With regard to the maintainability of the writ petition, Mr. Dinesh Yadav, the learned Additional Advocate General, has raised preliminary objections. According to him, the petitioner Trust cannot file the writ petition. For, the land was allegedly sold to Seth Pali Ram and the land was directed to be mutated in the name of Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal. There is no averment in the petition as to when the Trust was created, or when the land was transferred to the Trust. Moreover, when the land was gifted to the Trust, the gift deed was impounded. When the gift deed was impounded, the Trust asked that the gift deed be cancelled. In fact, the gift deed was cancelled; the cancellation deed was registered on 27.5.1993. Thus, the Trust is now pre-empted from raising any grievance about the land. Secondly, the Trust nowhere states that it would continue to use the land for the purpose of pasture. Considering the phenomenal rise in land prices in the State, there is a strong possibility that the land would be sold of to private builders. 13. On the other hand, Mr. Paras Kuhad, the learned counsel for the petitioner Trust, has countered that vide order dated 29.10.1993, the Collector (Stamps) had directed the petitioner Trust to pay stamp duty on the gift deed. Subsequently, the Trust paid the said stamp duty. Hence, the cancellation deed was impliedly set aside by the Collector (Stamps). Thus, the land belongs to the Trust. But despite this fact, the land is continuously being shown as “government land”. Hence, the grievance of the petitioner Trust before this court. Secondly, the Trust gives an undertaking before this court that in case the land were mutated in its name, the Trust would continue to use the land only as a pasture land. The Trust will abide by the conditions contained in the Patta. Thirdly, since the Trust was arrayed as party-respondent before the Board, the Trust is competent to file the present writ petition before this Court. 14. Heard the learned counsel on the preliminary objections. Admittedly, the reference was made against the petitioner Trust, and the Trust was arrayed as party-respondent before the Board. Moreover, a copy of the Trust deed has been submitted before this court. According to the said deed, the Trust is engaged in propagation of Hindu religion. 14. Heard the learned counsel on the preliminary objections. Admittedly, the reference was made against the petitioner Trust, and the Trust was arrayed as party-respondent before the Board. Moreover, a copy of the Trust deed has been submitted before this court. According to the said deed, the Trust is engaged in propagation of Hindu religion. One of the deeds of a pious Hindu, one of the functions of a Hindu organization is to feed the cows which are considered holy by the Hindus. The Trust has also given an undertaking that it would continue to utilize the land as a pasture land. It has further given the undertaking that it would not use the land for any other purpose, but for the specific purpose for which the land was bought. The Trust is, thus, bound by its undertaking. Further, the order dated 29.10.93 clearly shows that the Collector (Stamps) had noted the fact that the gift deed of the land was impounded and was cancelled by the Trust. However, he was of the opinion that the Trust had agreed to have the gift deed cancelled in order to escape the liability of paying the stamp duty. Although the learned Collector has not specifically set aside the cancellation deed, but he did direct the Trust to deposit Rs. 1,47,965/- as stamp duty and as penalty. Thus, impliedly he has set aside the cancellation deed. Subsequently, the Trust did deposit the said amount with the Stamp department. Therefore, the land stood duly gifted to the Trust. Hence, the Trust is competent to file the present writ petition challenging the order of the learned Board. Thus, the preliminary objections are without force. 15. Mr. Kuhad, learned counsel for the petitioner, has raised plethora of contentions before this Court: 16. Firstly, a bare perusal of the patta issued by Thakur Raghuvir Singh clearly reveals that to earn pious deeds, Seth Pali Ram had bought land for a consideration of Rs.17,683/- in order to establish pasture land for the cattle of the village. Since the land was bought, obviously, the title passed from Thakur Raghuvir Singh to Seth Pali Ram. Although the purpose of buying the land was to create pasture land for the benefit of villagers, but nonetheless, the title of the land vested with Seth Pali Ram. However, the land continued to be shown as “common land” in the revenue record. Since the land was bought, obviously, the title passed from Thakur Raghuvir Singh to Seth Pali Ram. Although the purpose of buying the land was to create pasture land for the benefit of villagers, but nonetheless, the title of the land vested with Seth Pali Ram. However, the land continued to be shown as “common land” in the revenue record. Therefore, Seth Pali Ram was justified in seeking correction in the revenue records. 17. Secondly, according to Para 398 of the Khetri Revenue Manual (`the Manual' for short) “a Revenue Court is a Revenue Officer acting in a judicial instead of in an executive capacity”. Moreover, Para 400 of the Manual enumerates different kinds of Revenue cases. According to Para 400 (1), “suits regarding corrections in records of rights” are to be filed before the Revenue Officer. Thus, the Revenue Officer acts as the Revenue Court; he has ample power to correct the revenue records. 18. Since the Rajasthan Tenancy Act did not come into operation till 1955, the field was held by the Manual. It is under this Manual and especially under Para 400 (1) that an application was filed by Seth Pali Ram for correction of the revenue records before the learned SDO. The learned SDO called for the reports of the Numberdar and the Tehsildar. After considering both the reports, which were in favour of Seth Pali Ram, vide order dated 1.11.1954 the SDO directed that the revenue record be corrected and the name of Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal be shown in the revenue record. According to the learned counsel, this order has been passed by the SDO as a judicial officer and not as an executive officer. Thus, it is a judicial order. The said judicial order was never challenged either by the State or by the Gram Panchayat. Hence, it has achieved finality. 19. Thirdly, since the said judicial order was not implemented, in 1980 Seth Pali Ram again moved an application for correction of revenue record before the Assistant Land Settlement Officer-cum-Assistant Land Record Officer. Relying on the order dated 1.11.1954 and in order to give effect to the said order, vide order dated 28.6.1980, the learned Settlement Officer directed that necessary correction be made in the revenue record. Even this order was not challenged by way of review, revision or appeal by anyone. Therefore, even this order has achieved finality. 20. Relying on the order dated 1.11.1954 and in order to give effect to the said order, vide order dated 28.6.1980, the learned Settlement Officer directed that necessary correction be made in the revenue record. Even this order was not challenged by way of review, revision or appeal by anyone. Therefore, even this order has achieved finality. 20. Although the Gram Panchayat had tried to have a reference made against the order dated 28.6.1980, but vide order dated 7.11.1983 the Settlement Commissioner had refused to make the reference. Of course, the Gram Panchayat had filed an appeal against the said order before the Board. But vide order dated 26.8.1988, the learned Board had also dismissed the said appeal. Therefore, Mr. Kuhad has contended that there are four orders which are in favour of the petitioner, namely order dt. 1.11.1954 passed by the SDO, order dated 28.6.1980 passed by the learned Settlement Officer, order dt. 7.11.1983, passed by the Settlement Commissioner, and order dated 28.6.1988 passed by the Board. Hence, the controversy should have rested then and there. 21. While attacking the order dated 7.11.1983 passed by the Additional Collector, the learned counsel has raised the following contentions: 22. Firstly, the order dated 7.11.1983 was passed u/Sec. 82 of the Land Revenue Act. Once a competent authority has refused to make a reference, once the Board has upheld the said order, then a second reference could not be made by the Additional Collector. For, there has to be an end to litigation. 23. Secondly, the Additional Collector has not set aside the order dated 7.11.1983, whereby the Settlement Commissioner had refused to make the reference. Thus, two contradictory orders exist simultaneously namely, one refusing to make the reference, and the other making the reference. 24. Thirdly, the Additional Collector does not have the power to review the earlier order dated 7.11.1983, specially when the said order was upheld by the Board vide order dated 26.8.1988. 25. Fourthly, by making a reference, in fact, the Additional Collector has set aside the order dated 26.8.1988 passed by the Board. However, under Section 82 of the Land Revenue Act, the Additional Collector does not have the power to do so. Therefore, he has overstepped his jurisdiction. 26. Fifthly, the Additional Collector has made the reference after a lapse of thirteen years. The power of making reference should be exercised within a reasonable time. However, under Section 82 of the Land Revenue Act, the Additional Collector does not have the power to do so. Therefore, he has overstepped his jurisdiction. 26. Fifthly, the Additional Collector has made the reference after a lapse of thirteen years. The power of making reference should be exercised within a reasonable time. The power certainly cannot be exercised after an inordinate delay of thirteen years. In order to buttress this contention, the learned counsel has relied upon the case of Anandi Lal vs. State of Raj. ( 1995(1) R.L.R. 555 ). 27. While challenging the order dated 25.4.2003, Mr. Kuhad has raised the following contentions: 28. Firstly, that the said order suffers from non-application of mind. For, the Board has totally ignored the previous history, narrated above, while considering the facts of the case. 29. Secondly, the learned Board has ignored the fact that the land was bought by Seth Pali Ram. Merely because the land was being used as a pasture land, for a public purpose, it does not denude the ownership of land vested in Seth Pali Ram. Once the title of the land passed to Seth Pali Ram, the land could not be shown as “government land”. For, in order to show it as a “government land”, obviously, the land would have to be acquired by the government. But there is no evidence to show that the land was ever acquired. Hence, the Board should have examined the ownership of the land, rather than be swayed by the usage of the land. This aspect has been ignored totally by the learned Board. 30. Thirdly, the learned Board has given two reasons for accepting the reference: firstly that for a long period the land was shown as “a public land”. According to Section 16 (1) of the Revenue Act, a pasture land cannot be transferred to a private person. However, as stated above, this reasoning overlooks the fact that the land vested in a private person and the said land was never acquired by the government. Therefore, merely because the land was used as a pasture land, the title of the land does not change. Secondly, the learned Board was of the opinion that the Settlement Officer has limited power. He could not have conferred khatedari right without any finding of a competent court. Therefore, merely because the land was used as a pasture land, the title of the land does not change. Secondly, the learned Board was of the opinion that the Settlement Officer has limited power. He could not have conferred khatedari right without any finding of a competent court. According to the learned counsel, even this reasoning is flawed, as the learned Board has overlooked the fact that the order dated 1.11.1954 was passed by a Revenue Court, and the order dated 28.6.1980 was passed on the basis of the order passed by the Revenue Court. Moreover, the Settlement Officer has merely corrected the revenue record and has not conferred a khatedari right. 31. Lastly, the Board has ignored the fact that the reference has been made after inordinate delay of thirteen years. Thus, clearly the reference was hit by limitation. 32. Mr. Dinesh Yadav has raised the following counter-contentions: 33. Firstly, that the land could not have been sold by Thakur Raghuvir Singh to Seth Pali Ram under the Manual. For, Para 5 of the said Manual clearly states that Biswedar has a right to sell biswedari land but under certain restrictions. According to para 5 (a) “no biswadari land shall be sold or mortgaged to any Mahajan or money lender without the special sanction of the Ijlas”. Since Pali Ram belonged to the Mahajan community, and since Thakur Raghuvir Singh was a biswedar, he could not have sold the land to a Mahajan without the special sanction of the Ijlas. Moreover, according to Para 6 of the Manual, if Biswedari land is sold in contravention of the law, the purchaser or mortgagee shall have no right in the land. Since the land was sold in contravention, therefore, Seth Pali Ram did not have any interest in the land. Furthermore, according to Para 34 of the Manual, a Jagirdar does not have any power to mortgage or sell the Jagir in any circumstances. Thus, Thakur Raghuvir Singh could not have sold part of his Jagir to Seth Pali Ram. Thus, according to Mr. Yadav, Thakur Raghuvir Singh was not competent to sell the land; Seth Pali Ram was equally incompetent to buy the land. Therefore, the Patta issued by Thakur Raghuvir Singh is hit by Section 23 of the Contract Act. 34. Thus, Thakur Raghuvir Singh could not have sold part of his Jagir to Seth Pali Ram. Thus, according to Mr. Yadav, Thakur Raghuvir Singh was not competent to sell the land; Seth Pali Ram was equally incompetent to buy the land. Therefore, the Patta issued by Thakur Raghuvir Singh is hit by Section 23 of the Contract Act. 34. Secondly, the conduct of Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal creates a doubt about the genuineness of the entire transaction. According to the petitioner, the patta was issued in 1942, yet the first application for correction of revenue record was not filed till twelve years later, i.e. in 1954. The petitioner has not offered any explanation for the inordinate delay of twelve years. Moreover, the Rajasthan Tenancy Act came into operation in 1955, which created the office of SDO, yet curiously the order dated 1.11.1954 has been passed by a SDO. Interestingly, the order has been passed by the SDO, even when the office of SDO did not exist. According to Mr. Yadav, the sale of land was back dated in order to escape the rigors of Section 52 of the Jagir Resumption Act. Further, the sale was also back dated in order to escape the rigors of Section 16 of the Tenancy Act. Section 16 of the Tenancy Act clearly prohibits transfer of pasture land to a private person. The said Act came into being in 1955. Therefore, in order to escape from the prohibition, the sale was back dated to pre- 1955 period. Further, although the order was passed on 1.11.1954, no action was taken by Seth Pali Ram, or by the Trust to get the said order implemented till 1980 i.e. after a delay of twenty-six years. Thus, the periodic and the enigmatic silence creates doubt about the veracity of the entire transaction. 35. Thirdly, according to the learned counsel the Settlement Officer is not empowered to correct the entries in the revenue record. Under the Rajasthan Land Revenue (Survey, Record & Settlement) (Government) Rules, 1957, the power of the Settlement Officer is restricted to touring the area placed under the Settlement Officer, to studying the existing rent rate or assessment reports of the area concerned, to make proposal for changing the assessment circles, changing the soil classification, the span of years which should form the basis of produce estimates and for commutation prices. Thus, the Settlement Officer does not have the power to correct the entries in the revenue records. Therefore, the Settlement Officer has overstepped his jurisdiction while passing the order dated 28.6.1980. 36. Lastly, since the land did not belong to Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal, since the Settlement Officer did not have the power to mutate the land in the name of Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal, the order dated 17.7.1993 and the order dated 25.4.2003 are legally valid. 37. In rejoinder, Mr. Sunil Nath on behalf of Mr. Kuhad, has argued that Thakur Raghuvir Singh was not a Biswedar. Section 5 (5) of the Tenancy Act defines the word Biswedar as meaning “a person on whom a village or portion of a village in any part of the state is settled on the Biswedari system and who is recorded as Biswedar or as an owner in the record of rights and shall include a khatedar in the Ajmer area”. 38. According to the learned counsel, while Princely State were ruled by Maharajas and Rajas, Thikanas were ruled by Thikanedars. The Thikanedar of Bissau were scion of the dynasty which ruled Jaipur, namely the Kachhwa dynasty. Having split from the main dynasty, the ancestors of Thakur Raghuvir Singh conquered the land around Bissau and established the Thikana of Bissau. The Thikanedar of Bissau owed only a social and political allegiance to the Jaipur Maharaja. Being the ruler of the Thikana, the Thikanedar could grant land as he pleased. Therefore, the Thikanedar of Bissau cannot be compared either to a Jagirdar or to a Biswedar. Hence, the prohibition contained in Para 34 of the Manual debarring a Jagirdar from selling the Jagir, the said bar did not operate against Thakur Raghuvir Singh who was Thikanedar of Bissau. Moreover, the restriction placed by Para 5 (a) of the Manual, preventing a Biswedar to sell the land to a person belonging to a Mahajan community, equally did not apply to Thakur Raghuvir Singh. Therefore, both Thakur Raghuvir Singh, and Seth Pali Ram were competent to enter into the sale-deed. Hence, the land was legally and validly sold. 39. Mr. Nath has also contended that it is too late for the State to question the veracity of the transaction which took place in the year 1942. Therefore, both Thakur Raghuvir Singh, and Seth Pali Ram were competent to enter into the sale-deed. Hence, the land was legally and validly sold. 39. Mr. Nath has also contended that it is too late for the State to question the veracity of the transaction which took place in the year 1942. Except surmises and conjectures, there is nothing to prove that the patta of 1942 is back dated, that the order dated 1.11.1954 is a forged order. It is also too late to cast any aspersions on the conduct of Seth Pali Ram or on the Trust. Moreover, the contentions raised by Mr. Yadav have never been raised by the State in any of the earlier proceedings. In fact, the State has never challenged the order dated 1.11.1954, or the order passed by the Additional Collector dated 7.11.1983, or the order dated 26.8.1988 passed by the Board before any competent authority. If the State were convinced that the Patta, or the order dated 1.11.1954 were forged, it could have challenged the same. Furthermore, the plea taken by Mr. Yadav has not been taken by the State before the Additional Collector, or before the Board. A plea based on facts cannot be raised for the first time before this Court. Therefore, such pleas should not be entertained. 40. Lastly, the order dated 28.6.1980 was passed by the Assistant Land Settlement Officer-cum-Assistant Land Record Officer. Therefore, the order was passed by the Land Record Officer. The said order was passed under Section 125 of the Revenue Act. Under Section 125, the Land Record Officer is empowered to settle the disputes as to entries in record of rights. Thus, the said order has been passed validly and legally. 41. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order. 42. But before discussing the merits of the case, it may be useful to throw light on the history of Rajputana and to understand the political structure of its princely states. For, the land was sold by a Thikanedar, and as objections have been raised about his competence, the appreciation of history and political structure is essential. 43. The annals of Rajputana reveal that the princely state of Jaipur was ruled by a Rajput clan know as the Kachhwa dynasty for about seven hundred years. During this period, different branches of the dynasty emerged, namely the Rajawats, the Shekhawats, the Chundawats etc. 43. The annals of Rajputana reveal that the princely state of Jaipur was ruled by a Rajput clan know as the Kachhwa dynasty for about seven hundred years. During this period, different branches of the dynasty emerged, namely the Rajawats, the Shekhawats, the Chundawats etc. Since all the family members could not be accommodated comfortably within the Jaipur principality, many of the adventurous members of the dynasty went out to conquer other parts of Rajputana. The land which presently lies in districts of Sikar and Jhunjhunu was earlier under Muslim rulers. Since the Rajputs saw the Muslim rulers as “invaders and foreigners”, they constantly fought with them. The battles were more for political power than as clashes between two communities. In 1746, Thakur Keshri Singh established his rule in and around Bissau. Thus, emerged the Thikana of Bissau. For the next three hundred years, Bissau sent her gallant sons to fight the Marathas and the British. Thakur Raghuvir Singh not only served in the Man Singh Guards, but also served as the ADC to Sawai Man Singh, the Maharaja of Jaipur. Thus, clearly Thakur Raghuvir Singh was the Thikanedar of Bissau. 44. As in feudal England so in India, the feudal states had a hierarchy of nobility. While England had her Lords and Dukes and Master of the Manor, feudal India also had its share of Thikanedars, Jagiridars, and Biswedars. As in England, the feudal nobility owed its political allegiance and social relationship to the Ruler of the principality. On social occasions and on the occasions of war, the Thikanedar would adhere to code of conduct of the Rajput community. But it would be unfair to compare a Thikanedar to a Jagirdar and a Biswedar. A Thikanedar, being head of a Thikana—a large geographical area--was certainly higher in rank than a Jagirdar or a Biswedar. Therefore, the restriction placed by Para 34 of the Manual on the Jagirdar in selling part of his jagir, or by Para 5 (a) of the Manual on the Biswedar in selling the land to a person belonging to the Mahajan community cannot be read against the Thikanedar. Being the head of his estate, the Thikanedar was certainly free to sell part of his estate to whomsoever he liked. Being the head of his estate, the Thikanedar was certainly free to sell part of his estate to whomsoever he liked. Moreover, since the bar against the right of a Biswedar cannot be read in this case against the Thikanedar, therefore Seth Pali Ram was equally competent to buy the land from Thakur Raghuvir Singh. Thus, the sale was legally valid. Hence, the first set of contentions raised by the learned counsel for the State is unacceptable. 45. Mr. Yadav has vehemently argued about the genuineness of the sale. He has claimed that the sale of land was back dated in order to escape the prohibition of Section 16 of the Tenancy Act, and to escape the rigors of Section 52 of the Jagir Resumption Act. However, these contentions are equally unsustainable for the following reasons. Firstly, the State never raised these pleas either before the learned Additional Collector or before the learned Board. Since these pleas would raise questions of fact, since these pleas were not raised earlier, they cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time before this court. (Ref. to Joginder Singh Sodhi vs. Amar Kaur ((2005) 1 SCC 31). Secondly, these pleas have not been mentioned in the pleadings. By raising new pleas, the State is trying to spring a surprise on the petitioner. The State, like any other litigant, is equally bound by its pleadings. According to the Hon’ble Supreme Court, a plea not raised in a pleading need not be accepted. (Ref. to Sea Lark Fisheries vs. United India Insurance Company and Ano. ( (2008) 4 SCC 131 ). Thirdly, in case the State were of the opinion that the original sale was a fraud being played on the State, it was free to challenge the sale deed. However, ever since 1942 it has never challenged its genuineness. Even today, it has not challenged its veracity or validity. Thus, it does not lie in the mouth of the State to claim that the Patta is back dated so as to escape the rigors of different statutes. Fourthly, when this court asked the State to produce the entire record of the case, the State frankly admitted that the relevant records were missing. The State, therefore, cannot be permitted to take advantage of its own fault in losing the record. Fourthly, when this court asked the State to produce the entire record of the case, the State frankly admitted that the relevant records were missing. The State, therefore, cannot be permitted to take advantage of its own fault in losing the record. It cannot be permitted to cast aspersions on the bona fides of Seth Pali Ram, on the bona fides of Thakur Raghuvir Singh and on the bona fides of the petitioner Trust after a lapse of five decades. Lastly, the contention is based on surmises and conjectures. It is not buttressed by any evidence. Hence, the contention is without force. 46. Mr. Yadav has also challenged the authenticity of the order dated 1.11.1954 ostensibly on the ground that the office of SDO did not come into being till 1955, yet the said order claims to have been passed by a SDO in the year 1954. Even this contention deserves to be dismissed. For, again the State has nowhere challenged the said order. The petition has been filed by the Trust and not by the State. Therefore, the State cannot argue that the order dated 1.11.54 is a forged one. Since the State was the custodian of all the records, since the State has lost the record, the State cannot be permitted to take advantage of its own fault and to raise a frivolous plea. Moreover, the report of the Numberdar dated 27.8.1954 and the report of the Tehsildar dated 18.9.1954, both these reports were addressed to the SDO. Therefore, these reports clearly prove the existence of the Office of SDO even before the coming into force of the Tenancy Act in 1955. Hence, this contention on part of the State is devoid of any merit. 47. Section 3 (i) of the Revenue Act defines “the Land Record Officer” as “meaning the Collector and shall include Additional or Assistant Land Record Officer”. Section 125 of the Revenue Act, as it stood prior to its amendment in 1995, had empowered the Land Record Officer to settle the disputes as to entries in record of rights. Thus, the Assistant Land Record Officer was duly empowered to correct the entries in record of rights. Section 125 of the Revenue Act, as it stood prior to its amendment in 1995, had empowered the Land Record Officer to settle the disputes as to entries in record of rights. Thus, the Assistant Land Record Officer was duly empowered to correct the entries in record of rights. A bare perusal of the order dated 28.6.1980 clearly reveals that the said order was not only passed by the Assistant Land Settlement Officer, but was also passed by the person in his capacity as Assistant Land Record Officer. Thus, the concerned officer was duly authorised under Section 125 to correct the entries. Therefore, the observations made by the learned Board that “the Settlement Officer does not have the power to correct the entries is misplaced”. For, the learned Board has over-looked the fact that the concerned officer was acting in his dual capacity as Assistant Land Settlement Officer-cum- Assistant Land Record Officer. Apparently he had passed the order dated 28.6.1980 in his capacity as Assistant Land Record Officer. Moreover, as the learned Assistant Land Record Officer, the concerned officer had relied upon the order of the SDO dated 1.11.1954, in order to “correct the entries in the revenue record”. Thus, the learned Assistant Land Record Officer had invoked and utilized a jurisdiction vested in him. Therefore, the said order was validly and legally passed. Hence, the contention raised by Mr. Yadav that the Settlement Officer has overstepped his jurisdiction is baseless. 48. This case is a paradigm example of missing the trees for the woods. In 1993, the Tehsildar submitted his application under the impression that as the land was shown as Samlat Deh (common land) in the revenue records, the same could not be mutated in the name of a private person. Similar views were expressed both by the learned Additional Collector in his order dated 17.7.1993 and by the learned Board in its order dated 25.4.2003. However, all the three authorities have ignored the cardinal fact that the land was sold by the Thikanedar to Seth Pali Ram for a consideration. Thus, it was a out right sale of land which transferred the title of the land from the Thikanedar to a private individual. The State has failed to demonstrate that the land in question was actually “a pasture land” even before its sale. Thus, it was a out right sale of land which transferred the title of the land from the Thikanedar to a private individual. The State has failed to demonstrate that the land in question was actually “a pasture land” even before its sale. It has further failed to prove that there was any prohibition over the power of the Thikanedar to sell of “pasture land” to a private person. A bare perusal of the patta clearly shows that the words used are “Gochar bhumi ke vaste zameen” i.e. “land for the purpose of creating a pasture land”. Thus, a piece of land was being bought for the purpose of creating a pasture land. But the purpose for which the land is being used would not, and cannot, adversely affect the ownership of the land. Hence, although the land was bought for “a public purpose”, but the land does not become “public” in nature. It continues to be owned privately, but used for “a public purpose”. Thus, from 1942 the title of the land vested in Seth Pali Ram. Once the title vested in him and thereafter in the Trust, the land could no longer be shown as Samlat Deh (Common land) or as Gocharai (pasture land). 49. Since the land was privately owned, it could be declared as “common land” or as “a pasture land” only if the land were acquired by the government in order to maintain the public purpose. However, it is not the case of the State that it had acquired the land. In the absence of acquisition, the land would continue to vest in Seth Pali Ram and thereafter in the petitioner Trust. 50. In fact, from day one the entire plea of Seth Pali Ram and later on of the Trust is that the land is being wrongly shown as common land or as pasture land, whereas the land should be entered in their names. Merely because an illegality was continued over a long stretch of time would not make the entry legal or valid. For, a revenue entry which is illegal in its inception does not become legal only because it was continued for decades. Time may heal, but it does not transform an illegal entry into a legal one. 51. Merely because an illegality was continued over a long stretch of time would not make the entry legal or valid. For, a revenue entry which is illegal in its inception does not become legal only because it was continued for decades. Time may heal, but it does not transform an illegal entry into a legal one. 51. As far as the impugned order dated 25.4.2003 is concerned, the said order suffers from many lacunae: firstly while passing the said order the learned Board has totally ignored the history of the litigation mentioned above. It has, thus, ignored the existence of the order dated 1.11.1954 passed by the competent authority—the SDO, order dated 28.6.1980 passed by Assistant Land Settlement Officer, order dated 7.11.1983 passed by Settlement Commissioner, whereby he refused to make reference under Section 82 of the Tenancy Act, and lastly the order dated 26.8.1988 passed by learned Board itself rejecting the appeal filed by the Gram Panchayat. The learned Board has not only ignored these orders, which are in favour of Seth Pali Ram/ the petitioner, but it has also failed to discuss the consequences of these orders upon the present case. Thus, the impugned order suffers from the virus of non-application of mind. 52. Secondly, the learned Board has ignored the fact that once the Settlement Commissioner had refused to make a reference against the order dated 28.6.1980, vide his order dated 7.11.1983, a second reference under Section 82 of the Revenue Act could not be made by the Additional Collector. For, by making the reference, the learned Additional Collector has reviewed the order dated 7.11.1983—a power that the Additional Collector does not have under Section 82 of the Revenue Act. Moreover, by making a reference under Section 82 of the Tenancy Act, an anomalous situation has arisen, namely, two orders simultaneously exist under Section 82 of the Revenue Act— one refusing to make a reference, and the second making a reference. Such an anomalous situation should have been avoided by the Additional Collector himself. Further, once the order dated 7.11.1983 was upheld by the Board, vide its order dated 26.8.1988, there was, in fact, no occasion for the Additional Collector to invoke his power under Section 82 of the Tenancy Act. Furthermore, the power to make a reference cannot be invoked ad infinitum. Further, once the order dated 7.11.1983 was upheld by the Board, vide its order dated 26.8.1988, there was, in fact, no occasion for the Additional Collector to invoke his power under Section 82 of the Tenancy Act. Furthermore, the power to make a reference cannot be invoked ad infinitum. According to Roman Jurists it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end of litigation (interest republicae ut sit finis litium). Thus, the Additional Collector should not have invoked his power once the Settlement Commissioner declined to make the reference vide his order dated 7.11.1983. In fact, once the Board had upheld the order dated 7.11.1983, the controversy should have rested then and there. 53. Thirdly, the Board has overlooked the fact that the reference made by the Additional Collector is after an inordinate delay of thirteen years. Vide order dated 28.6.1980 the Assistant Land Settlement Officer had directed that the land be recorded in the name of Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal. The Additional Collector has made the reference on 17.7.1993. Thus, the reference has been made after thirteen long years. In the case of Anandi Lal (supra) a Division Bench of this Court dealt with the power of making a reference under Section 82 of the Revenue Act. The issue before the learned Division Bench was whether in absence of any period of limitation being prescribed under Section 82 of the Revenue Act, the power to make a reference could be exercised at any time, even after lapse of unreasonable long period of time? After referring to various decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Division Bench held as under:-In view of the settled position of law, as stated above, simply because the provisions of Section 82 of the Act of 1956 and Section 232 of the Act of 1955 do not provide for the period of limitation, it does not mean that the authority on whom the power is conferred, can invoke the same at any time. This is so because each and every authority on whom the power is conferred, is expected to exercise the same in just and reasonable manner. The concept of exercise of power in a reasonable manner inheres with it the concept of exercising the same within a reasonable time. This is so because each and every authority on whom the power is conferred, is expected to exercise the same in just and reasonable manner. The concept of exercise of power in a reasonable manner inheres with it the concept of exercising the same within a reasonable time. If the power is not exercised within reasonable time, the invocation of the power after inordinate delay and the exercise of the same after unreasonable length of time, would be unjust, arbitrary and unreasonable. Therefore, the action taken by exercise of such power would be illegal and void. If the requirement of exercise of power within reasonable time is not read into the provisions of Section 82 of the Act of 1956 and Section 232 of the Act of 1955, then the provision itself would become unconstitutional. It can never be presumed that the legislature intended to confer power on any authority to exercise the same in unjust and unreasonable manner. Therefore, to uphold the constitutionality of the aforesaid provisions, the requirement of exercise of the same power within reasonable period had got to be read into the same. It concluded as under:- In our opinion, the settled legal position as stated above, would apply to the agricultural land in possession of the tenants/ khatedars also once the cases of such tenants/ khatedars are decided and their rights have been concluded and pursuant to the same they are in possession of the land. Ordinarily the revisional power under Section 82 of the Act of 1956 and under Section 232 of the Act of 1955, cannot be exercised after a period of one year from the date of the order sought to be revised. Once a tenant/ khatedar acquires tenancy/ khatedari rights and continues to be in possession of the land, his rights cannot be called in question after unreasonable delay. Such tenants/ khatedars are required to be treated at par, for all purposes, with all other tenants/ khatedars who acquired tenants/ khatedari rights over the land. To permit the exercise of revisional power under Section 82 of the Act of 1956 and/ or under Section 232 of the Act of 1955 after unreasonable delay, would amount to putting imprimature of the courts on the unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of power. To permit the exercise of revisional power under Section 82 of the Act of 1956 and/ or under Section 232 of the Act of 1955 after unreasonable delay, would amount to putting imprimature of the courts on the unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of power. Within a period of one year the tenant/ khatedar of the land would have spent money for the improvement of the land, he would have arranged his affairs of life on the basis that he is in occupation of the land, he would have entered into several transactions on this basis and made many commitments. Therefore, ordinarily revisional powers under Section 82 of the Act of 1956 and under Section 232 of the Act of 1955, cannot be exercised after a period of one year. If this requirement of reasonable length of time is not read into the aforesaid provisions, the provisions would become unconstitutional. 54. However, in the present case the power under Section 82 of the Revenue Act has been invoked after thirteen years. Therefore, the invoking of the power amounts to abuse of discretionary power. This aspect has totally escaped the notice of the learned Board. In fact, the learned Board should have declined to accept the reference. 55. Fourthly, the learned Board has been swayed by the fact that the land was repeatedly being shown as “Shamlat Deh” (common land), or “Gochrai” (pasture land). While ignoring the history of the case, the learned Board has overlooked the fact that while the usage of the land is for a public purpose, but nonetheless, the land was owned by an individual and is owned by the Trust. The usage of the land cannot over shadow the ownership of the land. Even if the land is being used for public purpose, the ownership does not belong to public at large. Since the land originally belonged to Seth Pali Ram, since the said land was subsequently gifted to the Trust, the land belongs to the Trust and not to the villagers. These aspects have totally escaped the learned Board. 56. Fifthly, the learned Board has also erred in observing that the “Settlement Officer bestowed Khatedari rights without any finding of a competent Court”. Such an observation is contrary to the record. For, under the Manual the Revenue Officer was to act as a judicial officer. These aspects have totally escaped the learned Board. 56. Fifthly, the learned Board has also erred in observing that the “Settlement Officer bestowed Khatedari rights without any finding of a competent Court”. Such an observation is contrary to the record. For, under the Manual the Revenue Officer was to act as a judicial officer. Moreover under Para 400 (1) of the Manual, he was empowered to correct the entries made in the revenue records. The concerned SDO had called for two reports, one from the Numberdar, and the other from the Tehsildar. The order dated 1.11.1954 was based on these two reports. Thus, a competent revenue court had directed the correction of entries in 1954. Furthermore, Assistant Land Settlement Officer had based his order dated 28.6.1980 on the order dated 1.11.1954. Thus, clearly the order dated 28.6.1980 was based on the order of a competent Court. Hence, the above noted observation made by the learned Board is, indeed, contrary to the record. 57. Sixthly, the learned Board has erroneously concluded that Khatedari rights were being bestowed by the Assistant Land Settlement Officer. Considering the fact that the land was originally bought by Seth Pali Ram from the then Thikanedar, considering the fact that the title stood transferred to Seth Pali Ram, and thereafter to the Trust, only the revenue record needed to be corrected; the revenue record needed to be aligned to the true facts of the case. Therefore, the Assistant Land Settlement Officer-cum-Assistant Land Record Officer had merely directed that on the basis of the order dated 1.11.1954 the entries need to be corrected. Hence, he has not bestowed the Khatedari rights. 58. Lastly, the learned Board has ignored the fact that the order dated 1.11.1954 was based on the reports of the Numberdar and the Tehsildar who had actually visited the site and had given their reports in favour of Seth Pali Ram. Further, the order dated 1.11.1954, the order dated 28.6.1980, the order dated 7.11.1983, and the order dated 28.6.1988 were never challenged; these orders had achieved finality. In these facts and circumstances, the learned Board was unjustified in disturbing these orders. 59. For the reasons stated above, this writ petition is, hereby, allowed; the order dated 25.4.2003 is quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to forthwith enter the land in dispute in the name of the petitioner Trust. In these facts and circumstances, the learned Board was unjustified in disturbing these orders. 59. For the reasons stated above, this writ petition is, hereby, allowed; the order dated 25.4.2003 is quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to forthwith enter the land in dispute in the name of the petitioner Trust. However, this Court does expect the petitioner Trust to adhere to and to fulfill the undertakings given by it before this Court. There shall be no order as to costs.