JUDGMENT Hon'ble VYAS, J.—By this writ petition, the petitioner is challenging impu-gned order Annex.-13 dated 22.11.1993 and order Annex.-17 dated 19.12.1994, whereby he has been penalized under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958 (for short, “the CCA Rules” hereinafter) whereby he has been punished with dismissal from service. The petitioner has further prayed for quashing of the order dated 8.4.1994 (Annexure-18) and to reinstate him in service with all consequential benefits. 2. According to facts of the case, a charge memo was issued to the petitioner on 16.07.1991 by which it was alleged as under : ^^1- vkjksi la[;k & ,d & izcU/k funs'kd jktl la?k mn;iqj ds vkns'k fnukad 1-6-90 ds rgr vkidks ekgh ,oa ,Q Mh , ds tyk'k;ksa esa eRL;k[ksV o vU; eRL; lEcfU/kr dk;Z iwoZ ds vkns'k ds Øe esa lEikfnr djuk FkkA bl ij Hkh vkius ekgh ,oa dMkuk tyk'k ds eRL; foØ; vfxze jkf'k dh le; jgrs iz/kku dk;kZy; eRL; vuqHkkx A ys[kk vuqHkkx izcU/kd foÙk izcU/kd eRL; ls i= fy[kdj nqjHkk"k ijA fo'ks"k okgd Hkstdj lwpuk izkIr ugha djkus rFkk tkudkjh ugha ysus ls lEcfU/kr Bsdsnkj Jh lqjs'k vlukuh esa la?k dh eRL; foØ; jkf'k 4]36]940@& :- ;g jkf'k vf/kd Hkh gks ldrh gS cdk;k jgh gS ftlls la?k dks Hkkjh vkfFkZd gkfu gqbZ gSA;fn vki le; jgrs ;g lkjh dk;Zokgh djkrs rFkk le; le; ij eRL; foØ; vfxze dh lwpuk izkIr djrs rks ;g fLFkfr ugha vkrhA vkius vius v/khuLFk LVkQ ij izHkkoh lwijfotu ugha j[kk ftlls la?k dh bruh cM+h jkf'k Qal xbZ gS ftlds fy, vki nks"kh gSA** 3. The petitioner filed his reply to the charge-memo on 10.01.1992. According to the reply filed by the petitioner, the loss referred to in the charge-sheet was not occasioned to the respondents by the petitioner and it was due to lack of vigilance on the part of the officials in-charge. 4. After the petitioner filed his reply, he was called upon to appear before the Enquiry Officer on 23.07.1992 for enquiry along with his witnesses and record in support of his case. Thereafter, on several dates, the petitioner was called upon to appear for his statement before the Enquiry Officer and, ultimately, on 19.01.1993, statement of petitioner was recorded by the Enquiry Officer. As there was no presenting officer on behalf of the Sangh, the Enquiry Officer cross-examined the petitioner. Thereafter, on several dates, the petitioner was called upon to appear for his statement before the Enquiry Officer and, ultimately, on 19.01.1993, statement of petitioner was recorded by the Enquiry Officer. As there was no presenting officer on behalf of the Sangh, the Enquiry Officer cross-examined the petitioner. Case of the petitioner is that he was not given list of witnesses nor he was supplied the list of documents intended to be produced by the Sangh against the petitioner and without mentioning the purpose of hearing, the Enquiry Officer only gave notice to the petitioner to appear before him. Moreover, the petitioner was not afforded opportunity to submit his written submissions. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report to the Sangh and vide notice dated 19.10.1993 the petitioner was called upon to file reply upon the finding given by the Enquiry Officer. The petitioner submitted his reply to the said notice on 06.11.1993 and, on the same day, he was afforded opportunity of personal hearing, in which, his statement was recorded. Thereafter, through news-item published in the Rajasthan Patrika, daily news-paper on 23.11.1993, petitioner came to know that he has been ordered to be dismissed from service. Subsequently, petitioner was served with order dated 22.11.1993 whereby he was dismissed from service. 5. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order dated 22.11.1993, the petitioner preferred appeal before the appellate authority. The appeal filed by the petitioner was, however, dismissed by the appellate authority in its meeting dated 19.12.1994 and the petitioner was informed to this effect vide letter dated 21.01.1995. 6. It is submitted by the petitioner in the writ petition that after passing of the order dated 22.11.1993, the Registrar, Jan Jati Up-Yojana Kshetriya-cum-Managing Director vide its order dated 08.04.1994 imposed a penalty of dismissal from service in the proceedings under Section 74 of the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Act. 7. In this case, main contention of the petitioner is that in regard to the same charges inquiry proceedings were initiated against Shri M.K. Sharma, the then Manager, Shri Gordhan Singh Bordiya, the then Fishes Marketing Officer, Shri Mangi Lal Seth, the then Assistant Accounts Officer, Shri Gopal Lal Jingar, Junior Accountant and Shri Sawa Lal Meena, Junior Accountant. All of them were found guilty of the charge levelled against them. All of them were found guilty of the charge levelled against them. At the relevant time, Shri Gopal Lal Jingar and Shri Sawa Lal Meena were posted at the Head Office at Udaipur and they were charged and found guilty of the allegation that they did not properly account for the sale of fishes and, on account of their negligence, the Sangh suffered huge losses. In the writ petition, therefore, the petitioner has contended that once a charge has been levelled against a person posted in the Head Office with the allegation that he did not account for the sale proceeds, then, it clearly meant that so far as the petitioner is concerned, he could not at all be found guilty of the charge levelled against him because the recovery could only be made at the Head Office. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that in this case the Inquiry Officer has conducted the inquiry in flagrant breach of the provisions contained in Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958 because neither the witnesses have been examined on behalf of the department nor any document has been produced and proved on behalf of the department. Moreover, even the Presenting Officer was not appointed on behalf of the department and the Inquiry Officer himself acted for the prosecution also. 9. It is further contended on behalf of the petitioner that order Annex.-18 dated 08.04.1994 has been passed illegally without jurisdiction because in the proceedings under Section 74 of the Act no penalty can be imposed on the petitioner in relation to his service conditions. The finding recorded by the authority under Section 74 is totally perverse and illegal and the same is not based on record. Moreover, petitioner having already been dismissed from service on 22.11.1993, thereafter, there was no question of imposing penalty again on the petitioner. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the order dated 22.11.1993 is illegal and bad in law because the same is non-speaking order. The Disciplinary Authority is required to record its own finding upon the charges levelled against the petitioner and is further required to record reasons for non-acceptance of the reply filed by the petitioner; but, in the present case, the Disciplinary Authority did not discuss in any manner the stand of the petitioner. The Disciplinary Authority is required to record its own finding upon the charges levelled against the petitioner and is further required to record reasons for non-acceptance of the reply filed by the petitioner; but, in the present case, the Disciplinary Authority did not discuss in any manner the stand of the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that in addition to the petitioner, four more persons were found guilty of the same charge jointly by the Inquiry Officer; but, the Disciplinary Authority in flagrant discrimination imposed the extreme penalty of dismissal from service upon the petitioner and no serious action was taken against the others who were jointly found guilty of the same charge besides the petitioner. The impugned action of the Sangh is, therefore, a case of hostile discrimination and in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that the report of the Inquiry Officer is patently laconic and the Inquiry Officer, in its report, did not care to discuss the evidence to prove the charges but, in a mechanical manner, recorded finding of guilt against the petitioner, therefore, report of the Inquiry Officer is not based on any material on record. It is argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that the whole inquiry was conducted in utter breach of the principles of natural justice. The Department did not even care to appoint any Presenting Officer to produce evidence on record on behalf of the Sangh and, in complete vitiation of the proceedings, the Inquiry Officer itself acted for the prosecution on the side of the Department. No list of witnesses was produced nor list of documents proposed to be relied upon by the Department was presented at the inquiry and, in the absence of the list of documents and list of witnesses, while defence of the petitioner was left prejudiced, entire proceedings of the inquiry was carried out which is totally in contravention of the CCA Rules, 1958 and, so also, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that no witness appears to have been examined on behalf of the department nor any document has been proved, therefore, the charge levelled against the petitioner has not been proved by any evidence, therefore, it is a case of no evidence. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that no witness appears to have been examined on behalf of the department nor any document has been proved, therefore, the charge levelled against the petitioner has not been proved by any evidence, therefore, it is a case of no evidence. According to him, the petitioner was given no notice in regard to examination of any witness or production of any document in support of the prosecution case. In this view of the matter, the finding of Inquiry Officer is totally perverse and illegal. In the inquiry, at no stage, petitioner was supplied all the documents relied upon by the department and while the statement of the petitioner was recorded, he was cross-examined by the Inquiry Officer himself. 13. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents, first of all, submitted that this writ petition suffers from mis-joinder of causes of action. The services of the petitioner were terminated vide order dated 22.11.1993, Annex.-13 and the said order was further upheld by the appellate authority vide order dated 19.12.1994. Further, according to the second prayer, the subsequent termination order which is said to be passed on 08.04.1994, Annex.-18 is also under challenge. Admittedly, Annex.-13 dated 22.11.1993 was passed while issuing charge-sheet to the petitioner under Rule 16 of the CCA Rules whereas order Annex.-18 was passed while exercising power under Section 74(3) of the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Act, 1965. As per learned counsel for the respondents, the petitioner cannot be permitted to challenge two distinctly separate orders passed for his dismissal from service in this writ petition. 14. It is worthwhile to observe here that during the course of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner made a submission that in this petition he is only pressing prayer No.1, by which, he has challenged the order passed on 22.11.1993, Annex.-13 passed by the Managing Director of the respondent Department. Further, it is prayed that he may be given liberty to challenge order Annex.-18 dt. 8.4.1994 by way of separate writ petition. In this view of the matter, the objection raised by the respondents melts away into redundancy. 15. Learned counsel for the respondents vehemently argued that order Annex.-13 was passed by the Disciplinary Authority after due inquiry and providing opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. 8.4.1994 by way of separate writ petition. In this view of the matter, the objection raised by the respondents melts away into redundancy. 15. Learned counsel for the respondents vehemently argued that order Annex.-13 was passed by the Disciplinary Authority after due inquiry and providing opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. It is strenuously contended that due to misconduct committed by the petitioner, the respondents have suffered financial loss, therefore, it was thought proper by the respondent department to initiate departmental inquiry against him. The respondents, after following due process of law and procedure laid down under the CCA Rules, concluded the inquiry; and, thereafter, an opportunity was granted to the petitioner while issuing notice under Rule 16 (10), CCA Rules and copy of inquiry report was sent to the petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioner was permitted to file his explanation to the inquiry and after receiving the explanation, the impugned order was passed which is perfectly in consonance with law. 16. As per the respondents, the petitioner was working on a responsible post and if he has committed the misconduct, then, it is always open to the employer to take departmental action against him, therefore, no illegality has been committed by the respondents while terminating the services of the petitioner after due inquiry and having provided reasonable opportunity of hearing to him. The order is perfectly legal and has been passed within the four corners of law, therefore, it does not require any interference. Likewise, order passed by the appellate authority, Annex.-17 dated 19.12.1994, is also in consonance with the provisions of law which does not require any interference. 17. After hearing both the parties, I have carefully gone through the pleadings and the order impugned Annex.-13 as well as order passed by the appellate authority, Annex.-17. 18. Obviously, from the facts, it is clear that initially the petitioner was charge-sheeted under Rule 16 of the CCA Rules and, thereafter, inquiry was ordered to be conducted against the petitioner. First of all, charge-sheet was issued on 16.07.1991 and, thereafter, the respondents proceeded to hold inquiry against the petitioner and, finally, the inquiry report was submitted on 22.2.93 by the Inquiry Officer, in which, he has recommended that appropriate punishment may be awarded against the delinquents including the petitioner. Copy of the inquiry report is on record as Annex.-9. I have also perused the inquiry report. Copy of the inquiry report is on record as Annex.-9. I have also perused the inquiry report. After perusing the inquiry report, I am of the opinion that the Inquiry Officer has conducted inquiry in a very casual manner. 19. It appears from the inquiry report that no evidence, either oral or documentary, was produced before the Inquiry Officer and whole of the inquiry is in two phases and, that, too, it does not disclose how the petitioner is responsible for the misconduct so alleged against him. Likewise, when the said inquiry report was communicated to the petitioner for seeking his expla-nation, then, again, statement of the petitioner was recorded on 6.11.1993. 20. The relevant extract of the said statement is as follows : ^^Jh lqFkkj us mu ij yxk;s x;s vkjksiksa ds lEcU/k esa viuk tokc is'k fd;k rFkk crk;k fd o"kZ 90-91 esa Bsdsnkj }kjk jkf'k iz/kku dk;kZy; esa gh tek djokbZ tkrh Fkh {ks-iz- dk;kZy; ls dksbZ fMfyax ugha gksrh Fkh] lEiw.kZ O;oLFkk iz/kku dk;kZy; }kjk gh ns[kh tk jgh Fkh tSls ,xzhes.V djuk] jkf'k tek djuk] flD;ksfjVh lsy ,MokUl vkfn iz/kku dk;kZy; esa gh tek dh xbZ Fkh ek= rksy dsUnz ij eky nsus dh tks O;oLFkk Fkh] ftlesa eky ds lkFk fMyhojh pkyku iz/kku dk;kZy; dks Hksts tkrs FksA Jh lqFkkj us ;g Hkh crk;k fd ysf.Max lsUVj ls ikf{kd lwpuk iz/kku dk;kZy; dks fHktokrs Fks Jh lqFkkj ls vU; vkjksfir deZpkjh Jhthuxj ls iz'u fd;k fd D;k iSlk iz/kku dk;kZy; ls gh gksrk Fkk bl ij Jhthuxj us dgk fd iSlk iz/kku dk;kZy; esa gh tek gksrk Fkk bl ij Jh thuxj ls iwNk x;k fd D;k vkids }kjk dksbZ iSlk olwyh dk iz;kl fd;k x;k rks crk;k ,slk dksbZ iz;kl ugha fd;k x;kA Jhthuxj ls iqu% iwNk x;k fd Bsdk gksus ;k iSlk tek gksus ds ckjs esa vkidks irk gS rks Jhthuxj us Bsdk gS ;k ugha ,slk dgk isesUV vkj ,e dk;kZy; ls gh gksrk gS ;g isesUV vkfnokfl;ksa dks eNyh idM+kbZ dk gksrk FkkA Jhthuxj us ;g Hkh crk;k fd Bsdsnkj iz/kku dk;kZy; esa gh iSlk tek djkrk FkkA Jh lqFkkj us bl izdj.k esa dk;kZy; }kjk fd;s x;s i=kpkj dh tkudkjh nh xbZA <span> 21. Upon perusal of the aforesaid note Annexure-11, it is revealed that after filing explanation by the petitioner, the petitioner's explanation was considered but no finding is given by the Disciplinary Authority. Upon perusal of the aforesaid note Annexure-11, it is revealed that after filing explanation by the petitioner, the petitioner's explanation was considered but no finding is given by the Disciplinary Authority. Thereafter, straightaway the impugned order Annex.-13 was passed whereby the petitioner's services were terminated. In this case, the petitioner has placed on record Annexure-19 along with the rejoinder which is order dated 24.9.2002 passed by the Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Jaipur, by which, it is ordered that recovery of the amount may be made from Shri Suresh Asnani and, for the same, suit may be filed against him. In the said inquiry, it is held that no embezzlement or misappropriation of money of the Society has been made by the petitioner and other employees against whom allegation for causing financial loss was levelled; meaning thereby, the crux of the matter is that the petitioner was charge-sheeted for supervisory negligence and, for the same, the inquiry was to be conducted while following Rule 16, CCA Rules because the charge-sheet was issued under Rule 16 of the CCA Rules; but, upon perusal of the inquiry report, it is apparent that in the said inquiry no oral or documentary evidence was recorded and in a very casual manner the inquiry was conducted, upon which, the Disciplinary Authority after providing opportunity of hearing to the petitioner while sending copy of the inquiry report, recorded his statement but by a non-speaking order Annex.-13 dated 22.11.1993 the services of the petitioner were terminated. 22. In my opinion, the inquiry so conducted is not in consonance with the procedure laid down in the CCA Rules, 1958 under which petitioner was charge-sheeted under Rule 16 of the CCA Rules, so also, order impugned is totally non-speaking order. The Disciplinary Authority has not recorded reasons, so also, not even considered the statement as well as plea taken by the petitioner in his explanation filed after receiving the copy of the inquiry report. Therefore, order impugned is totally non-speaking order, so also, inquiry in question is also conducted while giving complete good-by to the procedure laid down in the CCA Rules, in which, the petitioner was found to be guilty of supervisory negligence. Therefore, order impugned is totally non-speaking order, so also, inquiry in question is also conducted while giving complete good-by to the procedure laid down in the CCA Rules, in which, the petitioner was found to be guilty of supervisory negligence. Therefore, in view of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.N. Mukherjee's case, reported in (1990) 4 SCC 595, in which, the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority must be passed after recording reasons and the quasi judicial authority is under obligation to pass a speaking order. Relevant para 35, 36, 39 and 40 of the said judgment run as under : “35. The decisions of this Court referred to above indicate that with regard to the requirement to record reasons the approach of this Court is more in line with that of the American courts. An important consideration which has weighed with the court for holding that an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions must record the reasons for its decision, is that such a decision is subject to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution as well as the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution and that the reasons, if recorded, would enable this Court or the High Courts to effectively exercise the appellate or supervisory power. But this is not the sole consideration. The other considerations which have also weighed with the Court in taking this view are that the requirement of recording reasons would (i) guarantee consideration by the authority; (ii) introduce clarity in the decisions; and (iii) minimise chances of arbitrariness in decision-making. In this regard a distinction has been drawn between ordinary courts of law and tribunals and authorities exercising judicial functions on the ground that a Judge is trained to look at things objectively uninfluenced by considerations of policy or expediency whereas an executive officer generally looks at things from the standpoint of policy and expediency. 36. Reasons, when recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it while exercising quasi-judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate the exercise of its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory authority. 36. Reasons, when recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it while exercising quasi-judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate the exercise of its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory authority. But the other considerations, referred to above, which have also weighed with this Court in holding that an administrative authority must record reasons for its decision, are of no less significance. These considerations show that the recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decision making. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. In our opinion, therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. It may, however, be added that it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge. 39. The object underlying the rules of natural justice “is to prevent miscarriage of justice” and secure “fair play in action”. As pointed out earlier the requirement about recording of reasons for its decision by an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions achieves this object by excluding chances of arbitrariness and ensuring a degree of fairness in the process of decision making. Keeping in view the expanding horizon of the principles of natural justice, we are of the opinion, that the requirement to record reason can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which govern exercise of power by administrative authorities. The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Keeping in view the expanding horizon of the principles of natural justice, we are of the opinion, that the requirement to record reason can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which govern exercise of power by administrative authorities. The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The extent of their application depends upon the particular statutory framework whereunder jurisdiction has been conferred on the administrative authority. With regard to the exercise of a particular power by an administrative authority including exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions the legislature, while conferring the said power, may feel that it would not be in the larger public interest that the reasons for the order passed by the administrative authority be recorded in the order and be communicated to the aggrieved party and it may dispense with such a requirement. It may do so by making an express provision to that effect as those contained in the Administrative Procedure Act, 1946 of U.S.A. And the Administrative Decision (Judicial Review) Act, 1977 of Australia whereby the orders passed by certain specified authorities are excluded from the ambit of the enactment. Such an exclusion can also arise by necessary implication from the nature of the subject-matter, the scheme and the provisions of the enactment. The public interest derlying such a provision would outweigh the salutary purpose served by the requirement to record the reasons. The said requirement cannot, therefore, be insisted upon in such a case. 40. For the reasons aforesaid, it must be concluded that except in cases where the requirement has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is required to record the reasons for its decision.” 23. In this case, inquiry report as well as order impugned Annex.-13 dated 22.11.1993 and order passed by the appellate authority, Annex.-17 dated 19.12.1994 reveal that these orders are totally non-speaking orders. So also, inquiry is not conducted as per procedure laid down in the rules. 24. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case observed hereinabove, while following the judgment in S.N. Mukherjee's case (supra), this writ petition is partly allowed. So also, inquiry is not conducted as per procedure laid down in the rules. 24. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case observed hereinabove, while following the judgment in S.N. Mukherjee's case (supra), this writ petition is partly allowed. The order Annex.-13 dated 22.11.1993 passed by the Disciplinary Authority, so also, order Annex.-17 dated 19.12.1994 passed by the appellate authority are hereby set aside with liberty to the respondents to hold fresh inquiry against the petitioner in accordance with law. Such inquiry shall, however, be conducted within six months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. 25. It is made clear that upon objection raised by the respondents that two separate orders passed under different rules have been challenged in this writ petition which is not permissible under law, the petitioner has not pressed prayer No.2 of the writ petition and has prayed for liberty to challenge order Annex.-18 dated 08.04.1994 separately, therefore, in the interest of justice, the petitioner is hereby granted liberty to challenge order Annex.-18 dated 08.04.1994 which is passed under Section 74, Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Act separately in accordance with law. There shall however be no order as to costs.