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2009 DIGILAW 1874 (RAJ)

Babu Lal Meena v. State of Rajasthan

2009-08-25

RAGHUVENDRA S.RATHORE

body2009
JUDGMENT 1. - This revision petition has been filed by the complainant petitioner with the prayer that the impugned judgment dated 13.05.2008 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No.1, Jaipur District, Jaipur be quashed and set aside to the extent of the acquittal of the accused respondents under Sections 307, 307/149, 451 and 341 IPC. 2. In short, the facts of the case are that one Hanuman Sahay lodged a report against the respondents on 04.05.2007 stating that they had inflicted blows by various weapons like stick, Khurpada, iron rods, etc., resulting in injuries on various parts of the body. On the said report, an FIR No. 195/200/ was registered at Police Station Amer, Jaipur. On conclusion of the investigation, the police filed challan against the accused respondents under section 147, 341, 323, 325, 307 and 451 IPC. After committal of the case, the learned Sessions Judge transferred the same to Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No.1, Jaipur District, Jaipur, who conducted the trial and on conclusion of it, passed the impugned judgment on 13.05.2008. The learned trial court had convicted the accused respondents for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 323/149 and 325/149 IPC but had acquitted the accused respondents for the offence under Sections 341, 451, 307 and in the alternative 307/149. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the learned trial court has erred in passing the impugned judgment, whereby it has acquitted the accused respondents for the offence, inter alia, under Section 307 IPC. He has also submitted that in regard to the present incident, cross reports were lodged by the parties. In the other case, the complainant petitioner has also been convicted and an appeal against the same is pending. Therefore, he has submitted that both cases be decided together. He has also made submission by referring to the statements of the medical jurists, in support of his submission, that the offence under Section 307 IPC is made out against the accused respondents. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the accused respondents has supported the judgment passed by the learned trial court. He has also made submission by referring to the statements of the medical jurists, in support of his submission, that the offence under Section 307 IPC is made out against the accused respondents. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the accused respondents has supported the judgment passed by the learned trial court. He has further submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, where there had been civil dispute between the parties and the manner in which the incident had taken place, it cannot be said that there was any intention on the part of the parties to have committed an offence of attempt to murder. 5. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the counsel for the rival parties. So far as the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that this revision petition, against the part of the judgment whereby the accused respondents have been acquitted for some of the offences, be decided alongwith the appeal against conviction filed by the complainant petitioner, is concerned, I am of the opinion that the appeals against conviction in both the cases, if it arises out of the same incident, may be decided together. But so far as this revision petition against acquittal for some of the offences is concerned, the primary question is as to whether offence under Section 307 IPC Is made out or not from the medical evidence on record. In such view of the matter, I do not find it necessary that this revision petition, against the order of acquittal for some of the offences, must be decided alongwith the appeal filed against conviction awarded to the parties. 6. A perusal of the impugned judgment goes to show that the learned trial court has elaborately discussed the evidence on record and thereafter arrived to the conclusion on the basis of which the accused respondents have been acquitted for the offence under Section 307 while convicting them for the offence inter alia, under Section 325/149 IPC. 6. A perusal of the impugned judgment goes to show that the learned trial court has elaborately discussed the evidence on record and thereafter arrived to the conclusion on the basis of which the accused respondents have been acquitted for the offence under Section 307 while convicting them for the offence inter alia, under Section 325/149 IPC. the learned trial court has observed as under:- " bl izdkj /kkjk 307 Hkk0na0la0 dh pksV tks bl lk{kh us vkgr ckcwyky dh pksV la[;k ,d crkbZ gS&bl pksV dks izk.k?kkrd ekuus ds ckjs esa bl lk{kh }kjk dksbZ dk;Zokgh u rks Lo;a dh xbZ vkSj u gh budh ekStwnxh esa et:c ds vkWijs'ku uksV~l rS;kj fd;s vkSj u gh ;g xokg /kkjk 307 vkbZ0ih0lh0 dh pksV dk fV~Vhax MkDVj gh jgk gSA " 7. Further, the learned trial court has taken into consideration the evidence of Dr. Manish Agarwai (PW-11) and observed as under:- " mDr vkgr ckcwyky dh mDr pksV ds lEcU/k esa xokg ih0M0 11 MkW0 euh"k vxzoky dks vfHk;kstu us is'k fd;k gS] ftUgksaus ftjg esa dgk gS fd mUgsa /;ku ugha fd ckcwyky dks dkSu ysdj vk;k Fkk] ;g dc HkrhZ gqvk] irk ughaA pksVsa rktk FkhA izn'kZ ih0 18 fdlds }kjk lVhZQkbZM fd;k x;k gS] irk ugha] muds gLrk{kj gSA ;g Lohdkj fd;k gS fd mUgksaus bl pksV dk bykt iwjk dj fy;k Fkk] ftlls ;g vkneh ej ugha ldk] ;fn le; ij bykt ugha gksrk rks ejus dh lEHkkouk gks ldrh FkhA bl izdkj /kkjk 307 Hkk0na0la0 ds rgr bl pksV dks izk.k?kkrd ekuus ds lEcU/k esa dksbZ mfpr vkSj fof/kd vk/kkj ij bl lk{kh }kjk Hkh O;Dr ugha fd;k x;k gSA dkfjr pksV dk le; ij bykt dj fn;k x;k gSA vly vkWijs'ku fjdkWMZ vkSj uksV~l ekeys esa is'k ugha gq, gSaA " 8. Apart from it, the learned trial court has also considered the evidence i on record as to whether there had been any intention on the part of the assailants to cause death and in this regard he has observed as under:- " ckcwyky vkgr us Hkh vius c;kuksa esa mYVh dqYgkM+h ls mlds flj esa pksV dkfjr djus ckcr dFku fd;k gS] ftlls Hkh mldks tku ls ekjus dh fu;r ls ekjihV djus dk rF; izekf.kr ugha ekuk tk ldrkA eqfYteku dk ckcwyky ds lkFk ekjihV djrs le; mldks tku ls ekjus dk vk'k; vkSj Kku rRle; vofLFkr jgk gks&,slk Hkh dksbZ vfHkys[k ugha gSA " 9. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances and looking to the evidence on record, I am of the opinion that the learned trial court has not 1 committed any error in holding that the accused respondents are not guilty of the offence under Section 307 IPC. It is a settled principle of law that in order to attract the offence of attempt to murder, the medical evidence on record has to be in the term that the injuries sustained are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. In the case of Bhiyan Ram & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan, 1980 Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 688 , Hon'ble Court, in para 27, had observed that:- "Dr. Kothari has not stated that the injury on the head was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, so he has only said that it was dangerous to life." 5 10. This view also finds support in the judgment delivered by Hon'ble S.C. Agrawal, J. (as he then was), in the case of Munna v. State of Rajasthan, 1984 Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 529 , wherein His Lordship had observed as under:- "I have perused the statement of Dr. Y.K. Sharma and I find that during the course of examination-in-chief he has stated that the injury found : after operation could result in death. Dr. Sharma has not stated that injury that was found on the person of Jafar Mohd. was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. In the circumstances it cannot be said that if Jafar Mohd. had died, the appellant would have been guilty of the offence under section 302 IPC. Dr. Sharma has not stated that injury that was found on the person of Jafar Mohd. was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. In the circumstances it cannot be said that if Jafar Mohd. had died, the appellant would have been guilty of the offence under section 302 IPC. In the facts and circumstances of the : case the offence that would have been made out against the appellant in case Jafar Mohd. had died, would have been culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under section 304 IPC inasmuch as the appellant could only be attributed with the intention to cause an injury which was likely to cause death." 11. Similarly, in the case of Milkhi Ram v. State of Rajasthan, 1999 Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 718 , the aforesaid principle was reiterated. In that case, injury was caused to Kashmirilal by a pistol. The injury, as per report prepared by Dr. Satya Prakash Sharma, was grievous. The learned Sessions Judge was of the view that it may be sufficient to cause death but in view of the medical evidence that the injury was not sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, it could not be held so. There was no fracture of any bone though X-Ray were taken. Consequently, the conviction of Milkhi Ram under Section 307 IPC was altered to Section 324 IPC. 12. For the reasons mentioned hereinabove, I am of the view that the learned trial court has not committed any error in passing the impugned judgment of acquittal. 13. Consequently, this revision petition filed by the complainant-petitioner, against the acquittal of the respondents under Section 307 IPC, stands dismissed as being devoid of merits.Revision dismissed. *******