Judgment :- K.N. Keshavanarayana, J. As common questions of fact and law arise for consideration in these appeals, they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. 2. The appellants in W.A. No. 1433 of 2007 are the respondents 2(a) to 2(d) in W.P. No. 8657 of 2007. The appellants in W.A. No. 1434 of 2007 are the respondents 2(a), 2(b) and 3(a) to 3(f) in W.P. No. 8517 of 2007. The common respondent 1 in these appeals is the petitioner in the writ petitions. The appellants are aggrieved by the orders passed by the learned Single Judge allowing the petitions and quashing the impugned orders passed by the Executing Court and remanding the matter to the Executing Court for fresh consideration. 3. The undisputed facts are as under: Certain lands owned by the appellants situated in Lakkammanahalli, Dharwad, were acquired as per the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for the benefit of Karnataka Housing Board. The Land Acquisition Officer by his award dated 8-5-1989 determined the market value of the acquired lands at Rs. 25,000/- per acre. On reference under Section 18 of the Act the Reference Court determined the market value of the acquired lands at Rs. 13,800/- per gunta, and further held that the claimants are entitled for solatium at 30% on the market value, additional market value at 12% p.a. on the market value from the date of preliminary notification up to the date of award less the amount paid under the award, and that the claimants are entitled for interest on the enhanced compensation at 9% p.a. from the date of dispossession for a period of one year and at 15% p.a. thereafter up to the date of payment. Against the said judgment and award of the Reference Court, respondent 1 filed appeals before this Court in M.F.A. Nos. 3939 and 3940 of 1998. The appeals were dismissed on 8-3-2006 and the award of the Reference Court was affirmed. Against the dismissal of the appeals, respondent has filed special leave petitions before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and they are pending. However, there is no order of stay. In the meanwhile the appellants in W.A. No. 1433 of 2007 filed Ex. P. No. 133 of 2006 in the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Dharwad claiming Rs. 90,00,580/- and the appellants in W.A. No. 1434 of 2007 filed Ex. However, there is no order of stay. In the meanwhile the appellants in W.A. No. 1433 of 2007 filed Ex. P. No. 133 of 2006 in the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Dharwad claiming Rs. 90,00,580/- and the appellants in W.A. No. 1434 of 2007 filed Ex. P. No. 135 of 2006 on the file of the same Court claiming Rs. 37,42,358/- as the amounts payable as per the awards of the Reference Court. The execution petitions were accompanied with memo of calculations. As per the memo of calculations, the claimants calculated interest on the total market value of the land at the rate determined by the Reference Court, additional market value and also solatium, from the date of award by the Land Acquisition Officer, as according to them the date of dispossession has not been stated either in the award of Land Acquisition Officer or in the award of Reference Court. In both the execution petitions the decree-holders sought attachment and sale of moveable properties of judgment-debtors and also arrest and detention of judgment-debtors in civil prison. Initially cause notice of execution petitions were issued to the judgment-debtors and upon service of cause notice only 2nd judgment-debtor namely respondent 1 herein appeared before the Court. However, as objections were not filed, the Executing Court directed issue of attachment warrants in both the petitions on 27-11-2006. Subsequently when the attachment warrants were sought to be recalled by judgment-debtor 2, a conditional order came to be passed on 4-12-2006. Pursuant to the said order, judgment-debtor 2, deposited by way of cheques Rs. 60,07,691/-in Ex. P. No. 133 of 2006 and Rs. 24,66,174/- in Ex. P. No. 135 of 2006, on 12-12-2006 and on such deposit, the attachment warrants were recalled. The amounts so deposited by judgment-debtor 2 were paid to the decree-holders by means of cheques. Thereafter on 22-2-2007 office of the Executing Court prepared calculation memo showing that the judgment-debtors are still due Rs. 53,38,472/-in Ex. P. No. 133 of 2006 and Rs. 21,84,229/- in Ex. P. No. 135 of 2006. Similar memo of calculations were also filed on behalf of decree-holders in both the cases on the same day. By holding that the memo of calculations filed by the decree-holders are correct, the Executing Court on 9-3-2007 ordered issue of attachment warrants against judgment-debtor 2. P. No. 133 of 2006 and Rs. 21,84,229/- in Ex. P. No. 135 of 2006. Similar memo of calculations were also filed on behalf of decree-holders in both the cases on the same day. By holding that the memo of calculations filed by the decree-holders are correct, the Executing Court on 9-3-2007 ordered issue of attachment warrants against judgment-debtor 2. On 17-4-2007 on behalf of judgment-debtors memo of calculations were filed and attachment warrants issued were sought to be recalled. In the said memo of calculations judgment-debtors contended that the claimants are entitled for interest on solatium only form 20-10-2001 (the date of judgment in Sunder v Union of India AIR 2001 SC 3516 : (2001)7 SCC 211 by Hon'ble Supreme Court) up to the date of payment. They also contended that interest on the market value determined is payable only from 4-2-1993 being the date of taking possession of acquired lands and not from the date of award as claimed in the execution petitions. They also showed deductions towards income-tax and interest thereon. According to the judgment-debtors only Rs. 2,91,009/-in Ex. P. No. 133 of 2006 and Rs. 1,72,525/- in Ex. P. No. 135 of 2006 is due to decree-holders. After hearing both sides the Executing Court by detailed order dated 17-4-2007 rejected all the contentions of judgment-debtors and directed issue of warrant for recovery of the balance amount as per the calculations of decree-holders. Thereafter, the respondent 1 herein who is the judgment-debtor 2 filed the writ petitions noted above seeking to quash the order dated 17-4-2007 passed by the Executing Court and for other consequential reliefs and also for a direction to accept the memo of calculations filed by him in the case and also to direct the appellants herein to redeposit the amounts received by them pursuant to the order dated 4-12-2006, urging various legal contentions. Upon service of notice of petitions the appellants appeared and opposed the petitions. The learned Single Judge by the orders which are questioned in these appeals allowed the petitions and quashed the order dated 17-4-2007 and remanded the matter to the Executing Court for fresh consideration. The learned Single Judge held that the petitioner therein is not entitled to deduct any amount towards income-tax. The learned Single Judge by the orders which are questioned in these appeals allowed the petitions and quashed the order dated 17-4-2007 and remanded the matter to the Executing Court for fresh consideration. The learned Single Judge held that the petitioner therein is not entitled to deduct any amount towards income-tax. It was further held that in the light of the Constitution Bench decision of the Apex Court in Gurpreet Singh v Union of India (2006)8 SCC 457 : 2006 AIR SCW 5813, the interest on solatium is payable only from the date on which the Apex Court rendered judgment in Sunder's, case i.e., 19-9-2001 and not from the date of award as ordered by the Executing Court. It is further held that as the date of taking possession of acquired land is indicated in the notification issued under Section 16(2) of the Act as 4-2-1993, the interest on the total market value is payable only from the date of dispossession' i.e., 4-2-1993 and not from the date of award. 4. In that view of the matter the learned Single Judge directed the Executing Court to hear the parties afresh on the memo of calculations and proceed to determine the amount due if any to the decree-holders, and after such determination, to stay its hands awaiting the judgment of Supreme Court in the special leave petitions pending. However the further relief sought for directing the decree-holders to redeposit the amounts already withdrawn was rejected. 5. Aggrieved by the orders of learned Single Judge the appellants have presented these appeals. Upon service of notice of appeals the respondents have appeared through their learned Counsels. 6. We have heard the learned Counsel appearing for parties. 7. Sri S.K. Venkatareddy, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants contended that as the Reference Court has specifically awarded interest on solatium also, the learned Single Judge is not justified in holding that interest on solatium is payable only from the date of the judgment of the Apex Court in Sunder's case. According to the learned Counsel, interest on solatium in these cases is payable from the date of award of Land Acquisition Officer as date of taking possession is not specified. According to the learned Counsel, interest on solatium in these cases is payable from the date of award of Land Acquisition Officer as date of taking possession is not specified. He further contended that having regard to the fact that the date of dispossession of claimants from the acquired lands is not mentioned in the particulars furnished by Land Acquisition Officer while sending the reference and since no material was produced before the Reference Court to show as to on which date possession of acquired lands was taken over, the learned Single Judge is not justified in holding that the interest on the market value of the lands is payable from the date of taking over the possession as indicated in the notification said to have been issued under Section 16(2) of the Act. He further contended that the order of remand directing the Executing Court to consider the matter afresh and to determine the amount due if any, and then to stay its hands till the disposal of the special leave petitions pending before the Supreme Court is erroneous and improper and in this regard the learned Single Judge has failed to see that the Supreme Court has not granted an order of stay of the execution of award and, therefore, there is no impediment for the Executing Court to proceed with the execution proceedings. With these submissions, the learned Counsel sought for setting aside the order under appeal. 8. On the other hand Sri Basavaraj V. Sabrad, learned Counsel appearing for respondent 1 and Sri Sridhar Hiremath, learned Government Advocate for respondent 2 sought to support the reasonings of learned Single Judge and contended that there are no grounds to interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge and therefore they sought for dismissal of the appeals. 9. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case as noted above and in the light of the submissions made on both sides, following points arise for our consideration: (1) From which date, interest on solatium awarded under Section 23(2) of the Act, is payable, is it from the date of judgment in Sunder's case, or is it from the date of award by Land Acquisition Officer or is it from the date of taking over possession of the acquired lands? (2) Whether in the absence of any evidence placed before the Reference Court as well as the Executing Court regarding the date of taking over possession of acquired lands, the learned Single Judge is justified in holding that the interest under Section 28 of the Act is payable only from the date of taking over possession and not from the date of award as held by the Executing Court? (3) Whether the direction issued to the Executing Court to stay its hands awaiting the judgment of Supreme Court in special leave petitions, is legal and proper though there is no order of stay? Point No. 1: 10. Earlier to the year 2001 there were conflicting views as to whether interest is payable on solatium awarded under Section 23(2) of the Act which is one of the components of the compensation determinable under Section 23. In Sunder's case, decided on 19-9-2001 a Constitutional Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court set at rest the controversy by holding that the compensation awarded would include not only the total sum arrived at as per sub-section (1) of Section 23 but the remaining sub-sections thereof as well. The Apex Court further, stated that the expression `awarded amount' in Section 34 would mean that the amount of compensation worked out in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 23, including all the sub-sections thereof. Thus, now it is well-settled law that solatium under Section 23(2) of the Act is also one of the components of compensation determined under Section 23 of the Act and therefore interest under Sections 28 and 34 is payable even on solatium also. However in this decision the Apex Court did not indicate as to from which date the interest on solatium is payable. Another Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court in Gurpreet Singh's case, while considering the question as to how the amounts deposited in satisfaction of the award passed under the Act should be appropriated at different stages, which was referred for consideration, has also considered the question whether in the light of the decision in Sunder's case the awardee/decree-holder would be entitled to claim interest on solatium in execution though it is not specifically granted by the decree. Though this question was not referred to the Constitution Bench for consideration, the Court permitted the parties to raise the said question and considered the same in exercise of its power under Articles 141 and 142 of the Constitution of India. The law laid down on this question is found at paragraph 44 which reads as under: "It is well-settled that an Execution Court cannot go behind the decree. If, therefore, the claim for interest on solatium had been made and the same has been negatived either expressly or by necessary implication by the judgment or decree of the Reference Court or of the Appellate Court, the Execution Court will have necessarily to reject the claim for interest on solatium based on Sunder's case on the ground that the Execution Court cannot go behind the decree. But if the award of the Reference Court or of the Appellate Court does not specifically refer to the question of interest on solatium or in cases where claim had not been made and rejected either expressly or impliedly by the Reference Court or the Appellate Court, and merely interest on compensation is awarded, then it would be open to the Execution Court to apply the ratio of Sunder's case and say that the compensation awarded includes solatium and in such an event, interest on the amount could be directed to be deposited in execution. Otherwise not. We also clarify that such interest on solatium can be claimed only in pending executions and not in closed executions and the Execution Court will be entitled to permit its recovery from the date of the judgment in Sunder's case (September 19, 2001) and not for any prior period. We also clarify that this will not entail any reappropriation or fresh appropriation by the decree-holder. This we have indicated by way of clarification also in exercise of power under Articles 141 and 142 of the Constitution of India with a view to avoid multiplicity of litigation on this question”. 11. The law declared as above, by the Supreme Court, in exercise of its power under Articles 141 and 142 of the Constitution of India, is binding on all the Courts in the country. 11. The law declared as above, by the Supreme Court, in exercise of its power under Articles 141 and 142 of the Constitution of India, is binding on all the Courts in the country. Thus from the above it is clear that, if the claim for interest on solatium is not either expressly or impliedly rejected by the Reference Court or by the Appellate Court, and under the award merely interest on compensation is awarded, then it is open to the Execution Court to apply the ratio of Sunder's case and hold that the compensation awarded includes solatium, and, therefore, interest is payable on solatium also but only from 19-9-2001, which is the date of judgment in Sunder’s case. In the light of the law laid down in Gurpreet Singh's case by the Supreme Court, there is no need to refer to other decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel. 12. In the light of the law declared in Gurpreet Singh's case, the learned Single Judge, considered the award passed by the Reference Court in these cases and noticed that the Reference Court has not either expressly or impliedly rejected the claim for interest on solatium and it has merely awarded interests on the compensation amount awarded and therefore held that the award in question has to be construed as the award where the compensation payable includes the market value of the property plus 30% solatium as such the decree-holders will be entitled to interest on solatium only from the date of the judgment in Sunder's case. As this finding of the learned Single Judge is seriously challenged, to satisfy ourselves, we perused the award of the Reference Court and found that there is no substance in the submissions of the learned Counsel for the appellants. As held by the learned Single Judge, the Reference Court in its award has not either expressly or impliedly rejected the claim for interest on solatium and it has held that the claimants are entitled to solatium at 30% of the marked value less the solatium paid under the award. As held by the learned Single Judge, the Reference Court in its award has not either expressly or impliedly rejected the claim for interest on solatium and it has held that the claimants are entitled to solatium at 30% of the marked value less the solatium paid under the award. The Reference Court has further stated that the claimants are entitled to interest at the rate of 9% p.a., on the enhanced compensation from the date of dispossession for a period one year and further interests at 15% p.a., on the enhanced compensation after the expiry of the above said one year till the date of payment. Therefore the learned Single Judge has rightly held that the interests on solatium is payable only from the date of judgment in Sunder's case (19-9-2001). Having regard to the terms of the award of Reference Court, the learned Single Judge is justified in applying the law laid down by the Apex Court in Gurpreet Singh's case and in holding that the interest on solatium is payable only from 19-9-2001. We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the learned Single Judge in this regard and we see no ground to differ from the said view. There is no substance in the contention of the learned Counsel for appellants that the Reference Court in its award has granted interest on solatium from the date of the award, since as per the law that existed on the date of the award of the Reference Court, interest was not payable on solatium. It is only in Sunder's case the law was made clear that interest under Section 28 is payable on solatium also. In Gurpreet Singh's case, position of law was further clarified as to from which date the interest on solatium is payable. Though the Executing Court refers to the decision in Gurpreet Singh's case, it has failed to apply the law laid down therein. The Executing Court has completely failed to notice that the decree-holders in their memo of calculations had claimed interest on solatium from the date of the award of the Land Acquisition Officer and inspite of the same the Executing Court has overruled the objections of the judgment-debtors. The Executing Court has completely failed to notice that the decree-holders in their memo of calculations had claimed interest on solatium from the date of the award of the Land Acquisition Officer and inspite of the same the Executing Court has overruled the objections of the judgment-debtors. The approach of the Executing Court is clearly opposed to the law laid down in Gurpreet Singh's case and therefore the learned Single Judge has rightly directed the Executing Court to work out the amount payable as interest on solatium only from 19-9-2001. Therefore we answer Point No. 1 accordingly. Point No. 2: 13. As per the award of the Reference Court, the claimants are entitled to interest on the enhanced compensation from the date of dispossession up to the date of payment. The Executing Court accepting the contention of the decree-holders has held that in the absence of any material to show as to on which date the possession of the lands was taken, the decree-holders are entitled to interest on the enhanced compensation from the date of the award. The learned Single Judge has opined that this finding of the Executing Court is erroneous and cannot be sustained as the decree of the Reference Court specifically says that the interest is payable from the date of dispossession and therefore the Executing Court cannot go behind the decree. The learned Single Judge, relying on the gazette notification issued on 10-6-1993 under Section 16(2) of the Act, produced by the respondents herein, has held that the Executing Court was not justified in overruling the objections of the judgment-debtors and further has noticed that as per the said notification, possession of the land has been taken on 4-2-1993. The learned Single Judge has further observed that though copy of the said notification was not produced before Executing Court that by itself do not absolve the obligations on the part of the decree-holders or even on the part of the Court in ascertaining the date of dispossession. 14. The learned Counsel for the appellants did not dispute the position of law that the Executing Court cannot go behind the decree. In fact this was the contention of learned Counsel for the appellants. In the award, the Reference Court has clearly stated that the claimants are entitled to interest on the enhanced compensation from the date of dispossession. 14. The learned Counsel for the appellants did not dispute the position of law that the Executing Court cannot go behind the decree. In fact this was the contention of learned Counsel for the appellants. In the award, the Reference Court has clearly stated that the claimants are entitled to interest on the enhanced compensation from the date of dispossession. No doubt the Reference Court, in its award has not indicated the date of dispossession of the claimant from the acquired lands. It is for this reason the learned Counsel for the appellants contended that since the Reference Court has not mentioned the date of dispossession in its award, the interest on the enhanced compensation has to be calculated from the date of the award of Land Acquisition Officer. As noticed above the learned Single Judge has rejected this argument and has directed the Executing Court to calculate interest on the enhanced compensation from the date of taking possession of the acquired lands as mentioned in the Gazette notification issued under Section 16(2) of the Act. Therefore, it is necessary to consider as to whether, in the event of date of dispossession not being mentioned in the award of the Reference Court, the interest under Section 28 of the Act is payable from the date of the award of Land Acquisition Officer. Sections 34 and 28 of the Act read as under: "34. Payment of interest.— When the amount of such compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon at the rate of nine per centum per annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited: Provided that if such compensation or any part thereof is not paid or deposited within a period of one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per centum per annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of compensation or part thereof which has not been paid or deposited before the date of such expiry. 28. 28. Collector may be directed to pay interest on excess compensation.— If the sum which, in the opinion of the Court, the Collector ought to have awarded as compensation is in excess of the sum which the Collector did award as compensation, the award of the Court may direct that the Collector shall pay interest on such excess at the rate of nine per centum per annum from the date on which he took possession of the land to the date of payment of such excess into Court: Provided that the award of the Court may also direct that where such excess or any part, thereof is paid into Court after the date of expiry of a period of one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per centum per annum, shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of such excess or part thereof which has not been paid into Court before the date of such expiry". 15. The interest under Section 34 is payable if the compensation amount determined by the Land Acquisition Officer is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land. Such interest is payable from the time of taking possession until the date of payment or deposit. Similarly under Section 28 also, the interest on the enhanced compensation awarded by the Reference Court is payable from the date on which possession of the land was taken over to the date of payment. The reading of Sections 28 and 34 makes it clear that the interest as contemplated under these sections is not payable from the date of the award by Land Acquisition Officer. As per the scheme of the Act, possession of the land can be taken only after passing of the award by the Collector/Land Acquisition Officer except where the possession of the land is taken under Section 17 of the Act even before passing of the award. It is not the case of the appellants that the possession of acquired lands in the cases on hand was taken earlier to the passing of the award. Therefore, it is not a case falling under Section 17 of the Act. It is not the case of the appellants that the possession of acquired lands in the cases on hand was taken earlier to the passing of the award. Therefore, it is not a case falling under Section 17 of the Act. Therefore the interest on the enhanced compensation awarded by the Reference Court in these cases has to be calculated only from the date of taking possession of lands as provided under Section 28 of the Act. It is for this reason only the Reference Court in its award has clearly stated that the claimants are entitled to interest on the enhanced compensation from the date of dispossession. No doubt while referring the matter to the Civil Court, the Land Acquisition Officer has not furnished the date of taking possession. We do not know the reason as to why the said particulars were not furnished by the Land Acquisition Officer. It is also true that during the enquiry before the Reference Court, no effort seems to have been made to furnish the date of taking possession of acquired lands. However, the omission or the failure on the part of the authorities to furnish these particulars would not automatically entitle the claimants to claim interest from the date of award of LAO. When the award specifically says that the claimants are entitled to interest on the enhanced compensation from the date of dispossession, the Executing Court could not have gone behind the decree and ordered recovery of interest from the date of award by LAO. As rightly pointed out by the learned Single Judge, it was obligatory on the part of the Executing Court to find out the date of dispossession by directing the parties to place acceptable evidence in that regard. By doing so, the Executing Court was not in any way deviating from the terms of the decree, on the other hand, if the Executing Court had taken such steps to find out the actual date of taking possession of acquired lands for the purpose of calculating the amount of interest payable, it would have amounted to implementing the decree in its letter and spirit. However, the Executing Court has not made any such efforts in this regard. This approach of the Executing Court is perverse, and it has acted contrary to the terms of the award under execution. However, the Executing Court has not made any such efforts in this regard. This approach of the Executing Court is perverse, and it has acted contrary to the terms of the award under execution. The decisions of the Supreme Court namely, in the case of Smt. Lila Ghosh (dead) through L.R. v State of West Bengal AIR 2004 SC 288 : (2004) 9 SCC 337 and in the case of State of Madras v K.N. Shanmugha Mudaliar and Others AIR 1976 SC 1057 : (1976)2 SCC 406 , relied upon in this regard by the learned Counsel for the appellants do not support his contention that if the award of the Reference Court do not specify the date of dispossession, then the interest under Section 28 of the Act has to be calculated from the date of the award by the Land Acquisition Officer. In both the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court, the possession of the lands were taken long prior to issuance of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and therefore the Apex Court held that question of determining compensation and passing of award would arise only after initiation of acquisition proceedings by issuing preliminary and final notifications as contemplated by the Act, and if possession of the land is taken even prior to issuance of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, such act would be an illegal act and therefore interest either under Section 34 or under Section 28 is not payable from any date anterior to the date of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and under such circumstances the interest would become payable only from the date of award. The ratio laid down in these decisions cannot be applied to a case where the possession of the land is taken subsequent to the passing of the award. In such cases, as stated under Sections 28 and 34 of the Act, the interest is payable only from the date of taking possession of the acquired lands and not from the date of award. Therefore no sustenance can be drawn from these decisions. In such cases, as stated under Sections 28 and 34 of the Act, the interest is payable only from the date of taking possession of the acquired lands and not from the date of award. Therefore no sustenance can be drawn from these decisions. Therefore we are in respectful agreement with the observations of the learned Single Judge that in the cases on hand, the interest on the enhanced compensation payable as per Section 28 has to be calculated from the date of dispossession of the claimants from the lands as stated in the award of the Reference Court. The learned Single Judge placing reliance on the copy of the Gazette notification issued under Section 16(2) of the Act has held that possession of the lands was taken on 4-2-1993, therefore the interest on enhanced compensation is payable only from 4-2-1993. No doubt copy of Gazette notification issued under Section 16(2) of the Act was not produced either before the Reference Court or before Executing Court. As noticed above, though particulars regarding the date of taking possession of the lands had not been furnished, in the award the Reference Court clearly has stated that the claimants are entitled to interest on the enhanced compensation from the date of dispossession. In the light of this the Executing Court was under an obligation to ascertain the date of dispossession by directing the parties to place evidence in that respect. Perusal of the records of the Executing Court clearly indicates that the Executing Court without making any endeavour to find out the actual date of dispossession has proceeded to consider the objections of the judgment-debtors to the claim of decree-holders and by the order impugned in the writ petitions has rejected the objections. Therefore the judgment-debtor had no opportunity to place the copy of the Gazette notification issued under Section 16(2) of the Act. As per Section 16(2) of the Act the fact of taking possession is required to be notified in the Official Gazette and such notification shall be evidence of such fact. Therefore, copy of Gazette notification issued under Section 16(2) of the Act produced at any stage will have to be accepted as evidence of fact of taking possession. Therefore the learned Single Judge has not committed any error in placing reliance on the copy of said notification. Therefore, copy of Gazette notification issued under Section 16(2) of the Act produced at any stage will have to be accepted as evidence of fact of taking possession. Therefore the learned Single Judge has not committed any error in placing reliance on the copy of said notification. However if the appellants dispute the fact of taking possession of acquired lands on 4-2-1993 as stated in the notification, as the learned Single Judge has directed the Executing Court to consider the matter afresh and determine the amount due, if the decree-holder is permitted to place evidence in that regard and if the Executing Court is directed to take into consideration such evidence also while determining the amount due, if any, it would meet the ends of justice and by doing this, no prejudice would be caused to any of the parties. By doing so the Executing Court would be well-within its jurisdiction in ascertaining the date of dispossession so that the award under execution could be implemented in its true letter and spirit. Subject to this modification, we agree with the observation of learned Single Judge that the interest under Section 28, is payable only from the date of dispossession as stated in the award of Reference Court. However, the Executing Court shall ascertain the date of dispossession by affording opportunity to the parties to place evidence. Accordingly we answer Point No. 2. Point No. 3: 16. The grievance of the appellants in this regard is, though the Supreme Court in the special leave petitions filed by the respondents herein has neither granted an order of stay staying the execution of award of Reference Court nor has stayed the further proceedings in the execution petitions, the learned Single Judge has directed the Executing Court to stay its hands till the judgment of the Supreme Court in the special leave petitions. This direction of learned Single Judge, according to the learned Counsel for appellants is contrary to law and it is uncalled for. 17. Reading of Order 41, Rule 5(1) of the CPC, makes it clear that, mere filing of an appeal before an Appellate Court do not operate as stay of proceedings under the decree appealed nor execution of decree shall be stayed merely by reason of filing of an appeal against such decree. 17. Reading of Order 41, Rule 5(1) of the CPC, makes it clear that, mere filing of an appeal before an Appellate Court do not operate as stay of proceedings under the decree appealed nor execution of decree shall be stayed merely by reason of filing of an appeal against such decree. Admittedly, in the special leave petitions filed by the respondents herein against the judgment of this Court in M.F.A. Nos. 3939 and 3940 of 1998 where under the judgment and award of Reference Court came to be affirmed, the Supreme Court has not granted an order of stay. However, Order 41 of the CPC only deals with appeals from the original decree and those provisions do not deal with civil appeals before the Supreme Court. Section 109 of the CPC read with Article 133 of the Constitution of India, provides that an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court, from any judgment, decree, or final order in a civil proceedings of a High Court, if the High Court certifies that the case involves substantial question of law of general importance, and that in the opinion of the High Court, the said question needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. Under Article 136, the Supreme Court may grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed by any Court or Tribunal. However, there is no statutory provision similar to Order 41, Rule 5(1) of the CPC regarding the appeals filed before the Supreme Court. As per Order 45, Rule 13 of the CPC even if the High Court grants certificate as provided by Section 109 read with Article 133, for the admission of any appeal, the decree appealed from shall be unconditionally executed unless the Court otherwise directs. Thus, from the provisions of Order 41, Rule 5(1) and Order 45, Rule 13 of the CPC, the intention of parliamentarian is clear that mere filing of an appeal or grant of certificate to appeal, should not act as stay of proceedings under the decree or stay of execution of decree, unless the Appellate Court specifically grants stay. Though these provisions are not directly made applicable to the appeals before the Supreme Court, the object behind these provisions can be safely applied to the proceedings before Supreme Court. Though these provisions are not directly made applicable to the appeals before the Supreme Court, the object behind these provisions can be safely applied to the proceedings before Supreme Court. The object behind these provisions is to see that the decree-holder should not be prevented from reaping the fruits of the decree obtained after a prolonged trial, merely on the ground that an appeal is filed before the Appellate Court against such decree, unless the Appellate Court specifically grants an order of stay staying the operation or execution of the decree. In the case of Atma Ram Properties (Private) Limited v Federal Motors (Private) Limited (2005)1 SCC 705 , the Apex Court has observed in para 8 thus: "8. It is well-settled that mere preferring of an appeal does not operate as stay on the decree or order appealed against nor on the proceedings in the Court below. A prayer for the grant of stay of proceedings or on the execution of decree or order appealed against has to be specifically made to the Appellate Court and the Appellate Court has discretion to grant an order of stay or to refuse the same”. In the case of Harinagar Sugar Mills Limited v State of Bihar and Others (2003)11 SCC 40 , the Apex Court has held "Mere filing of the appeals does not absolve the appellant nor suspends the liability assessed during pendency of the appeal. It continues unless paid or set aside". Therefore, mere pendency of special leave petition before Supreme Court cannot be a ground to direct the Executing Court to stay its hands. No doubt, the learned Single Judge, in the light of order dated 4-12-2006 passed by the Executing Court, has directed the Executing Court to stay its hands. In our opinion, on the basis of the order dated 4-12-2006 passed by the Executing Court, the learned Single Judge ought not to have directed the Executing Court to stay the hands. This direction would amount to staying the further proceedings in the execution petitions, though the Supreme Court has not granted any order of stay. Therefore, the said direction of the learned Single Judge is uncalled for. 18. This direction would amount to staying the further proceedings in the execution petitions, though the Supreme Court has not granted any order of stay. Therefore, the said direction of the learned Single Judge is uncalled for. 18. In this view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the direction issued by the learned Single Judge to the Executing Court to stay its hands after determining the amounts due to the decree-holders, and await the judgment of Supreme Court, cannot be sustained. If the respondents want stay of execution proceedings, they should move the Supreme Court and seek necessary orders in that regard. Till a specific order of stay is granted and is communicated, the Executing Court cannot stay its hands. Therefore the direction issued by the learned Single Judge in this regard is required to be set aside. Accordingly we answer Point No. 3. 19. Accordingly, appeals are allowed in part. In modification of the orders under appeal, the Executing Court is directed to determine afresh the amount due if any to the decree-holders by calculating the interest on enhanced compensation from the date of dispossession to the date of payment by ascertaining the date of dispossession after affording reasonable opportunities to the parties to place evidence in that regard. After so determining the amount due, the Executing Court shall proceed with the execution for recovery of amount unless an order of stay from the Supreme Court is communicated. In all other respect the order of learned Single Judge is left undisturbed.