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2009 DIGILAW 1900 (PNJ)

Naurang v. Vinod Kumar

2009-11-04

VINOD K.SHARMA

body2009
JUDGMENT Vinod K. Sharma, J.:-This order shall dispose of Civil Revision No. 5206 of 2008 titled Naurang Vs. Vinod Kumar and others and Civil Revision No. 5205 of 2008 titled Chetan Vs. Vinod Kumar and others, as the impugned order is the same. 2. For brevity sake, facts are being taken from Civil Revision No. 5206 of 2008 titled Naurang Vs. Vinod Kumar and others. 3. The petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, to challenge the order dated 30.9.2006 passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rewari. 4. The petitioner filed a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the rules thereunder, seeking compensation for the injuries sustained in the motor accident. 5. The claim petition was referred to the Lok Adalat, wherein a compromise was effected between the parties, and the petitioner agreed to accept Rs.30,000/- (Rupees thirty thousand only) as full and final settlement of his claim. 6. The order passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal reads as under: - “File was taken up in the Lok Adalat as held on 16.9.2006. Compromise had been effected between the parties and learned counsel for the petitioner had agreed to accept a sum of Rs. 30000/- (Rupees Thirty thousand only), as full and final settlement of his claim and it had also been agreed between the parties that the insurance company would pay the agreed amount within a period of two months from 16.9.2006 and in case, it failed to do so, then it would have to pay interest on the above said amount at the rate of 7.5 per cent per annum, from the date of filing of this petition till its actual realization. Joint statement of learned counsel for the petitioner and the representative of the insurance company alongwith learned counsel for respondent No. 3 had been recorded in this regard. Heard. In view of the above referred joint statement of the parties, the present claim petition is hereby disposed of in terms thereof, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. It is directed that the entire amount of compensation shall be paid to the petitioner in cash. Memo of costs be prepared accordingly. File be consigned to the record room after due compliance.” 7. It is directed that the entire amount of compensation shall be paid to the petitioner in cash. Memo of costs be prepared accordingly. File be consigned to the record room after due compliance.” 7. The petitioner, thereafter moved an application for setting aside the award on the plea that sufficient amount was not given by the learned Tribunal. It was also the case of the petitioner that he never authorised his counsel to enter into compromise in Lok Adalat. 8. The application was dismissed. The operative part of the order reads as under: - “Both the referred citations are not applicable in the circumstances of the present case. The award was announced before the Lok Adalat with the consent of learned counsel for the parties. The counsel put his signatures on the compromise as permissible in power of attorney. The consent statement operates as an estoppels. It is settled law that any order pronounced by the Lok Adalat cannot be challenged before any competent authority. The application moved on behalf of the applicant is frivolous and this stands dismissed. Papers be consigned along the main file.” 9. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has challenged the order, by contending that Lok Adalat has no adjudicatory or judicial functions. The functions of the Lok Adalat are purely conciliatory and are to be based on compromise or settlement between the parties, and any award which is not based on compromise or settlement, is to be treated to be void. 10. In support of this contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab and another Vs. Jalour Singh and others, [2008(3) LAW HERALD (SC) 2113] : 2008(1) Supreme Court Cases (L&S) 535. 11. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the petitioner had not consented to the passing of consent order, therefore, the impugned order deserved to be set aside. Learned counsel for the petitioner also contended, that as per the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a compromise has to be in writing and signed by the parties and unless there is a signed agreement between the parties, the compromise would be void. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner also contended, that as per the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a compromise has to be in writing and signed by the parties and unless there is a signed agreement between the parties, the compromise would be void. 12. In support of this contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gurpreet Singh Vs. Chatur Bhuj Goel, AIR 1988 Supreme Court 400. 13. On consideration, I find no force in the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In the present case, the order would show, that the matter was disposed of in Lok Adalat on the basis of compromise. The order was signed by both the counsel. Therefore, it cannot be said that the consent order was not signed so as to contend that this was void under Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is well settled law, that an Advocate is competent to enter into compromise without the consent of the party. The learned Court rightly held that, as per the authority given under the power of attorney, the counsel was duly authorised to enter into settlement, that is what was done. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner finally placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Smt. Jamilabai Abdul Kadar Vs. Shankarlal Gulabchand and others, AIR 1975 Supreme Court 2202, to contend that in case, the counsel does not act in good faith and for the benefit of his client, then the power to compromise would be deemed to have been withdrawn, and furthermore it is necessary for the counsel to have consulted the petitioner before entering into compromise. 15. This plea again deserves to be noticed to be rejected. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Smt. Jamilabai Abdul Kadar Vs. 15. This plea again deserves to be noticed to be rejected. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Smt. Jamilabai Abdul Kadar Vs. Shankarlal Gulabchand and others(supra) had laid down as under: - “While we are not prepared to consider in this case whether an Advocate or pleader is liable to legal action in case of deviance or negligence, we must uphold the actual, though implied, authority of a pleader (which is a generic expression including all legal practitioners as indicated in Section 2(15), C.P.C. to act by way of compromising a case in which he is engaged even without specific consent from his client, subject undoubtedly to two over-riding considerations: (i) He must act in good faith and for the benefit of his client ; otherwise the power fails (2) it is prudent and proper to consult his client and take his consent if there is time and opportunity. In any case, if there is any instruction to the contrary or withdrawal of authority, the implicit power to compromise in the pleader will fall to the ground. We need hardly emphasise that the bar must sternly screen to extirpate the black-sheep among them, for Caesar’s wife must be above suspicion, if the profession is to command the confidence of the community and the court.” 16. It would be seen, that the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in fact, recognised the authority of the counsel to enter into compromise. There was nothing on record to show, that the counsel had not acted in good faith or for the benefit of his client, to hold that the authority to compromise stood withdrawn, as contended. For the reasons stated above, there is no merit in this revision petition. Dismissed. No costs. ------------