JUDGMENT N. P. GUPTA :- This appeal has been filed against the judgment of learned single judge dated December 5, 2001 dismissing the writ petition. The petitioner by the writ petition prayed for quashing the decision dated April 7, 1999 taken by the District Level Screening Committee, and for declaring clause 2 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Exemption Scheme, 1998 to be ultra vires, and for declaring the petitioner to be entitled for availing of the benefit of the scheme. The necessary factual averments are that the petitioner's predecessor in title got converted certain agricultural land for commercial purposes under and in accordance with the Rajasthan Land Revenue (Allotment, Conversion and Regularisation of Agricultural Land for Residential and Commercial Purposes in Urban Areas) Rules, 1981, hereafter referred to as the Rules of 1981, and obtained patta, annexure 1, and later on the petitioner purchased the said land, and decided to establish an industry of HBPE and HDPE pipes and sprinkler system, and domestic plastic pipes. It is claimed that no-objection certificates were obtained from sub-division officer, and Municipality, and then application was submitted for seeking exemption under the Rajasthan Sales Tax Exemption Scheme, 1998 furnishing requisite informations, receipt whereof was acknowledged vide annexure 4. However, vide annexure 5 the benefit of incentive was refused. The copy of the minutes of the meeting refusing the benefits is produced as annexure 6. A look at annexure 6 shows that reason given by the District Level Screening Committee was that the industry has been commissioned in banned area as defined in the Scheme. The learned single judge has reproduced the definition of "banned area" as given in clause 2(a) of the Scheme, and found that it is not in dispute that under master plan of Barmer there is a separate industrial area, but the petitioner's industry is not in the said area. The learned single judge has also relied upon the provisions of Rajasthan Industrial Areas Allotment Rules, 1959, and the fact that the petitioner did not get any allotment of land under the said Rules. Inter alia on this basis, learned single judge declined to interfere with the orders, annexure 5 and 6. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner.
The learned single judge has also relied upon the provisions of Rajasthan Industrial Areas Allotment Rules, 1959, and the fact that the petitioner did not get any allotment of land under the said Rules. Inter alia on this basis, learned single judge declined to interfere with the orders, annexure 5 and 6. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner. It was firstly submitted that under 1981 Rules, the land can be converted either for residential or commercial purposes, and the commercial purposes include industrial purposes also, and since vide annexures 2 and 3, no-objection was granted by the S.D.O., and Municipality, it cannot be said that the petitioner was not entitled to the benefit under the Scheme inasmuch as with the grant of no-objection certificate, annexures 2 and 3 the rigor of banned area stood watered down, and learned single judge was in error in dismissing the writ petition. The arguments looks to be attractive but on closure scrutiny we do not find any substance in the same. True it is that in the 1981 Rules conversion can be either for residential, or commercial purposes, but that is not the end of the matter, inasmuch as the 1959 Rules do separately exist, and rule 11 thereof takes care of situation, where industrial area does not exist, and provides mechanism for handling such an eventuality. A collective reading of the Rules of 1959 including rule 11 thereof does make it clear, that the whole idea is that if any industry is to be commissioned, it is to be commissioned in the industrial area earmarked, or established, and where no such industrial area is earmarked, or established, then recourse can be had to provisions of rule 11, but then resort to subterfuge of 1981 Rules, and obtaining no-objection certificates like annexures 2 and 3 cannot have the effect of liquidating the rigor of clause 2(a) of the Scheme. In that view of the matter, we do not find any error, to interfere with, in the impugned order. The appeal thus has no force, and is hereby dismissed.