JUDGMENT : H.K. Rathod, J. Heard learned advocate Ms. Megha Jani appearing on behalf of appellant National Insurance Company Limited. 2. The appellant Insurance Company has challenged the award passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Aux.) Fast Track Court at Vadodara in MACP No. 1128 of 2004 Ehx. 44 dated 29th September 2008. The claims tribunal has awarded Rs. 98,000/- with running 7.5% interest from the date of application awarding the compensation in favour of respondent claimant. 3. Learned advocate Ms. Megha Jani appearing on behalf of appellant raised contentions before this Court that claims tribunal has failed to appreciate that the cheque paid by the insured towards payment of premium was dishonoured and subsequently, the policy of insurance company was cancelled by appellant insurance company on account of dishonour of cheque. She also raised contention that deposition of Pratapsinh Bheemsinh Sisodiya, Branch Manager has not been properly appreciated by claims tribunal at Exh. 43. She submitted that appellant insurance company had examined Pratapsinh Bheemsinh Sisodiya in support of their contention and he has specifically stated in his examination-in-chief that Rs. 5,000/- was received by insurance company in cash and remaining amount of Rs. 2,358/- was received through Cheque bearing No. 321668 of Bank of Baroda, Nagarwada Branch towards payment of premium for vehicle bearing registration No. GJ-6-X-9026. He has further deposed that when the cheque was given for collection by the insurance company, the cheque was dishonoured on account of insufficient balance and the same was returned by the Bank to the insurance company on 4.8.2003. The witness in support of his contention produced copy of cheque of Rs. 2,358/- dated 14.7.2003 paid towards payment of premium and copy of intimation letter dated 2.8.2003 given by Bank to the insurance company intimating about the dishonour of cheque. He has stated that the insured as well as RTO was intimated by the insurance company about the dishonour of cheque. The officer of insurance company had also stated that the policy of insurance of the insured was cancelled and the amount of Rs. 5,000/- which was paid by cash was refunded by the insurance company and a copy of the intimation voucher of the same was also produced by the officer. She relied upon the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. 5,000/- which was paid by cash was refunded by the insurance company and a copy of the intimation voucher of the same was also produced by the officer. She relied upon the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. Section 61 to 74 highlighted the issue that secondary evidence is admissible in evidence and it cannot be ignored if substantive evidence is not produced by party. She submitted that policy on the date of accident was not in existence, therefore, insurance company is not liable to pay compensation. The risk has been assumed by insurance company only on the payment of full consideration which was not paid by insured, therefore, claims tribunal has committed gross error in awarding compensation in favour of respondent claimant. 4. Learned advocate Ms. Megha Jani relied upon the recent decision of Apex Court in case of Deddappa and others v. Branch Manager, National Insurance Company Limited reported in (2008) 2 SCC 595 . Relying upon the aforesaid decision of Apex Court, she submitted that third party insurance - insurance company, held, not liable after rescinding insurance contract on account of non-payment of premium (due to bounced/dishonoured cheque) - insurance company undertaking third party insurance for a motor vehicle, for the period 17th October 1997 to 16th October 1998 Vehicle owner paying premium vide cheque dated 15th October 1997 which was dishonoured on 21st October 1997 due to insufficient funds insurance company consequently cancelling insurance policy and informing vehicle owner and RTO accident taking place on 6th February 1998 Held, contract of insurance stood rescinded due to failure of consideration and intimation to this effect had been given to all concerned on principle of law, insurance company not liable to compensate third party for the accident. The Apex Court said that condition precedent for valid contract and that aspect has been discussed in detail by appellant. Except that, no other submission is made by learned advocate Ms. Megha Jani appearing on behalf of appellant insurance company and no other decision is relied upon by her. 5. I have considered the submissions made by learned advocate Ms. Megha Jani and also considering the decision of Deddappa's case (supra). I also perused the award passed by claims tribunal. Except that, no other submission is made by learned advocate Ms. Megha Jani appearing on behalf of appellant insurance company and no other decision is relied upon by her. 5. I have considered the submissions made by learned advocate Ms. Megha Jani and also considering the decision of Deddappa's case (supra). I also perused the award passed by claims tribunal. The accident occurred on 14th May 2004 at about 5-00 p.m. when claimant was passing near Mujmahuda Circle and at that time, respondent No. 2 driver came from behind driving luxury bus bearing registration No. GJ-6-X-9026 in a rash and negligent manner and dashed with the motorcycle bearing registration No. GJ-6-EE-8001 on which claimant was riding, as a result, he was thrown of on the road and had received grievous injuries. The claimant was working as Technician with IPCL Company and his salary was Rs. 12,000/- per month. 18% disability assessed by Dr. Tushar Modi, Orthopedic Surgeon and claim was made about Rs. 2 lakhs. Reply was filed by insurance company Exh. 12 where, contentions which are raised in memo of appeal about cancellation of policy is specifically not raised by insurance company, but, right has been reserved to take defence under Section 64(v)(B) of Insurance Act. The issues have been framed by claims tribunal and thereafter, documentary evidence have been produced by claimant and oral evidence led before the claims tribunal. Claimant Pareshbhai Harshadbhai Brahmbhatt has deposed on oath at Exh. 27 and one witness of insurance company Pratapsinh Bheemisinh Sisodiya has also deposed at Exh. 43. Issue No. 1 is decided by claims tribunal in affirmative coming to conclusion that accident in question occurred solely on account of rash and negligent driving of opponent No. 1 driver of luxury bus and there was no any contributory negligence on the part of claimant. Thereafter, quantum has been fixed on the basis of 18% disability considering 32 days, he remained out of job and salary Rs. 12,000/- and injury which has been caused to the claimant described in Para 9/4 and thereafter, in all, Rs. 98,000/- has been awarded to claimant. Out of that, Rs. 54,000/- towards future loss, Rs. 15,000/- for pain, shock and suffering, Rs. 2,000/- for transportation, Rs. 15,000/- for medical expenses, Rs. 5,000/- for special diet, Rs. 2,000/- for attendant charges and Rs. 5,000/- for loss of leave. 6. 98,000/- has been awarded to claimant. Out of that, Rs. 54,000/- towards future loss, Rs. 15,000/- for pain, shock and suffering, Rs. 2,000/- for transportation, Rs. 15,000/- for medical expenses, Rs. 5,000/- for special diet, Rs. 2,000/- for attendant charges and Rs. 5,000/- for loss of leave. 6. Now, question of liability has been raised by insurance company before claims tribunal on the ground that on the date of accident, there was no valid insurance policy of the bus bearing registration No. GJ-6-X-9026 was available. One witness Pratapsinh Bheemsinh Sisodiya was examined at Exh. 43. On 31st July 2003, the policy was started and Rs. 5,000/- cash was paid on the same day, but, on 14th July 2003, cheque of Rs. 2,358/- was issued by insured in favour of insurance company. The cover note was issued on the same date 31st July 2003. On 4th August 2003, cheque was dishonoured and on 12th August 2003, intimation has been issued by insurance company to insured and Rs. 5,000/- was also refunded to insured. 7. Learned advocate Ms. Jani raised contention also relying upon Section 168 of the M.V. Act that this being an inquiry, secondary evidence is permissible and claims tribunal can consider such documents. However, she admits that inquiry before claims tribunal is judicial proceedings not quasi judicial proceedings. There is a short controversy between parties. The question of liability in Para 11 Page 12 has discussed by claims tribunal in detail which is quoted as under: 11. LIABILITY 11.1 As per the defence of insurance company, at relevant time of the accident there was no valid insurance policy of the bus bearing registration No. GJ.6X.9026 and therefore when cheque towards premium was dishonoured and thereafter policy in question was cancelled and intimation thereof was sent to insured in that circumstances no risk is to be assumed and there was no any contract which exists between the opponent No. 2 and opponent No. 3. 11.2 On the other hand, the learned advocate Mr. Shah appearing for the claimant has vehemently argued that, Rs. 5000/- towards cash premium was withheld with the insurance company and there is no any evidence on record showing that, the intimation letter had been duly served regarding cancellation of cover note or policy. So, insurance company cannot escape from its liability to indemnify the amount to the claimant who is 3rd party. 5000/- towards cash premium was withheld with the insurance company and there is no any evidence on record showing that, the intimation letter had been duly served regarding cancellation of cover note or policy. So, insurance company cannot escape from its liability to indemnify the amount to the claimant who is 3rd party. 11.3 In order to determine the issue, whether the cover note and policy had been issued by the insurance company ? And second issued arises that whether insurance company has proved the facts that they have cancelled the insurance policy and cover note and intimation thereof had been duly served ? 11.4 It appears from the record that, insurance company opponent No. 3 have examined witness Pratapsinh Bhimsinh Sisodiya at Exh. 43, wherein, he has stated on oath that, insured Nileshbhai had paid Rs. 5000/- towards premium by way of cash and remaining amount of Rs. 2358/- had been paid issuing Account Payee cheque of Bank of Baroda, dated 14.7.2004 and the same was dishonoured and on date 12.8.2003 the intimation thereof had been given to the insured and RTO, Vadodara by registered post letter and xerox copies of proceedings have been produced with list and the said evidence may be treated as secondary evidence with the request to admit the same. 11.5 The witness Pratapsinh has said in his cross examination that, he did not issue intimation to insured to intimate him regarding cancellation of the policy. He has also denied the suggestion asked by the claimant that, there was no any intimation served upon the insured and RTO and has stated that the original documents are with our Ahmedabad Branch. 11.6 It also appears that, insurance company has filed to produced the acknowledgment slip of the intimation letter duly signed by the insured. They have also not produced the xerox copy of acknowledgment slip and there is no any reasonable explanation given by the witness Pratapsinh that, why the original documents like cheque, intimation letter, voucher, acknowledgment slips, etc., have not been produced and without any reasons all the documents remain with the Ahmedabad Branch ? They have also not produced the xerox copy of acknowledgment slip and there is no any reasonable explanation given by the witness Pratapsinh that, why the original documents like cheque, intimation letter, voucher, acknowledgment slips, etc., have not been produced and without any reasons all the documents remain with the Ahmedabad Branch ? If the insurance company wants to treat the said xerox copies of the documents as secondary evidence, they have to comply the procedure prescribed as per Section 66 of the Evidence Act and no notice to produce has been given to the insured for the production of the necessary documents and to admit the contents of the xerox copies. It also appears that, as per Section 65 of the Evidence Act, no any circumstances exists in the favour of insurance company to treat the said documents as secondary evidence and admit it into evidence. So, it is not a case of the insurance company that, the contents of the documents have been admitted by the other side, or original documents have been lost or destroyed or are not easily movable. Even it appears that, the xerox copies of documents produced with the list at Exh.38 are not certified copies and have not been attested by the officer concerned or witness Sisodiya. Therefore, looking to the nature of the documents, the premium refund intimation voucher is without any signature as well as the intimation letter to the insured is also without any signature of the officer concerned. So, merely a production of the xerox copies which are in suspicious nature and without any certification of concerned authorities and in the absence of any reasons stated as per Section-65 of the Evidence Act, the said documents produced with Exh. 38 cannot be admitted into evidence. 11.7 So, on the basis of oral evidence of Mr. Pratapsinh Sisodiya, the defence of the insurance company regarding cancellation of the policy has not been proved and when documentary evidence in this regard is available and in the possession of the insurance company, the oral testimony in this regard cannot be believed and accepted unless and until the documents in question have been produced and proved. Pratapsinh Sisodiya, the defence of the insurance company regarding cancellation of the policy has not been proved and when documentary evidence in this regard is available and in the possession of the insurance company, the oral testimony in this regard cannot be believed and accepted unless and until the documents in question have been produced and proved. 11.8 Therefore, as per Section 147(5) of the Motor Vehicle Act, it say that, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, the insurer seeing the policy of insurance under this Section shall be liable to indemnify the person or classes of persons specified in the policy in respect of any liability which a policy purports to cover in the case of that person or those classes of persons. So, looking to the provisions of compulsory insurance towards 3rd party as per Section 147(5) and 149(1) of the Motor Vehicles At, the insurance company will be liable to indemnify the amount of compensation to the claimant who being a 3rd party is entitled to recover the same. 11.9 This Tribunal is very much conscious regarding the settled legal position enumerated in Section 64 VB of the Insurance Ac which provides for issuance of a valid policy only on a receipt of payment of premium and no risk is to be assumed unless premium is issued. 11.10 In the instant case, the accident in question occurred on date 14.5.2004 and according to defence of insurance company the policy in question No. 300304/31/ 03/6304192 was cancelled and intimation thereof was sent to insured opponent No. 2 on date 12.8.2003 but as discussed hereinabove no any cogent and reliable evidence has been adduced by the insurance company to prove the facts that, before the accident the policy in question was cancelled and the intimation thereof had been duly served to the insured and RTO and Rs. 5000/- had been refunded to the insured. So, merely stating by the witness that, intimation regarding cancellation of policy had been sent by Registered Post, that is not enough, but it has been duly intimated and served to the concerned parties and documents thereof would be required to be brought on record. So, the insurance company miserably failed to prove their defence that at the time of accident there was no any contract between insured and insurance company and there is no any valid insurance. So, the insurance company miserably failed to prove their defence that at the time of accident there was no any contract between insured and insurance company and there is no any valid insurance. So, under this backdrop, the defence of the insurance company fails on the two grounds i.e. (1) The documents produced with list are not certified or attested and are xerox copies and without any legal ground as stated into Evidence Act, Section 65, merely the production of the documents would not automatically be treated as secondary evidence and cannot be admitted into evidence. (2) That the decision of the cancellation of the policy and refund of Rs. 5000/- to the insured have not been duly proved and it is a mandatory breach committed by the insurance company and therefore, insurance company is liable to indemnify the amount of compensation to the claimant and he is a 3rd party. So, I disagree with the arguments of Mrs. K.D. Tanna appearing for the insurance company and finally, I come to the conclusion that on date 14.7.200 after receiving the amount of Rs. 5000/- and cheque of Rs. 2358/-, the cover note had been issued and copy thereof in question was issued on date 31.7.2003, which was for a period of one year i.e. upto date 30.7.2004 and receipt in the form of cover note is produced at Exh. 44. So, in the absence of any evidence regarding cancelling of the policy presumably on the day of accident dated 14.5.2004, the valid insurance was there and being a 3rd party the insurance company is also liable to indemnify the amount of compensation on behalf of the opponent No. 2 to the claimant. Hence, all the opponents are jointly and severally liable to pay the amount of compensation of Rs. 98,000/- to the applicant with running interest of 7.5% with proportionate costs from the date of application till realization. Hence, I pass the following order : 8. The secondary evidence produced by insurance company that cheque has been dishonoured, intimation was given to insured and RTO about cancellation of policy, but, important fact is that whether such intimation of cancellation of policy issued by insurance company has been duly served to insured or not or whether it has been duly served to RTO or not. For that, there is no evidence on record produced by insurance company. For that, there is no evidence on record produced by insurance company. Whatever the secondary evidence suggests intimation, but, no proof that such intimation is received by insured from the insurance company, so long, cancellation of policy is not received by insured, the policy is remained in tact. This aspect has been examined by claims tribunal that mere intimation to the insured and RTO is not enough but that intimation must have to be received by insured and RTO. The insurance company has placed on record secondary evidence and also evidence is recoded by Mr. Pratapsinh Bheemsinh Sisodiya Exh. 43, but, in both, oral and documentary evidence, there is no evidence on record produced by insurance company which proved the facts that insurance policy is cancelled by intimation whether that intimation was received by insured or not. Not a single document is produced on record which established the fact that intimation of cancellation is received by insured. So long, insured is not aware about cancellation of policy remained in existence for the purpose of insured and that insurance company is duty bound to comply the condition of policy for third party by making payment of compensation. The claims tribunal has discussed this aspect that defence of the insurance company that cancellation of policy has not been proved when documentary evidence in this regard is available in the possession of the insurance company, the oral testimony in this regard cannot be believed and accepted. 9. The Insurance Company has failed to establish the fact before the claims tribunal concerned that intimation was received by insured, because, no acknowledgment received from insured and RTO is produced on record by insurance company before the claims tribunal. The insurance company after the cheque is dishonoured, according to them, insurance policy cancelled prior to accident, then, insurance company must have to prove the facts producing the receipt or acknowledgment from insured to the effect that insured has received intimation from insurance company that policy or cover note is cancelled, but, no such document even secondary evidence was produced on record by insurance company for establishing the facts before the claims tribunal. The intimation of cancellation of cover note or insurance policy must have to be reached to the insured, otherwise, there is no purpose of sending such intimation to insured. The intimation of cancellation of cover note or insurance policy must have to be reached to the insured, otherwise, there is no purpose of sending such intimation to insured. Whatever secondary evidence produced on record except acknowledgment of insured and acknowledgment from RTO in respect of cancellation of insurance policy. This being a relevant documents, but, even, for that, secondary evidence is also not produced by insurance company. If the insurance company has sent such intimation through registered A.D., then, original acknowledgment of insured and RTO must be sent him even though, not produced and proved by leading proper evidence before claims tribunal. In case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Abhaysing Pratapsinh Waghela & Ors. reported in 2009(1) AICJ 419 , where, effect of dishonour of cheque when subsequently the amount of premium has been accepted in cash by insurer has been considered with Section 64(v)(B) of Insurance Act, 1938. In facts of this case, the claimant was riding motorcycle on 14th May 2004. At that time, opponent No. 1 driver of luxury bus came from behind driving bus in a rash and negligent manner dashed with motorcycle on which claimant was riding, therefore, claimant for luxury bus is considered to be a third party. So, the liability of insurance company for claimant is statutory liability under Section 147 of the MV Act. In light of this undisputed facts that claimant is third party, following observations are made by Apex Court in Para 15 to 18 which are relevant, therefore, quoted as under : 15. One of the grounds which are available to the insurance company to deny its statutory liability as envisaged under sub-Section (2) of Section 149 of the Act is that the policy is void on the ground that it was obtained by the non-disclosure of a material fact or by a representation of fact which was false in some material particulars. 16. Indisputably, the first respondent is a third party in relation to the contract of insurance which had been entered into by and between the appellant and the owner of the vehicle in question. We have noticed hereinbefore that a document was produced before the Tribunal. Even according to the appellant, although it was only a Motor Input Advice cum Receipt, it contained the Cover Note No. 279106. We, therefore, have to suppose that a Cover Note had, in fact, been issued. We have noticed hereinbefore that a document was produced before the Tribunal. Even according to the appellant, although it was only a Motor Input Advice cum Receipt, it contained the Cover Note No. 279106. We, therefore, have to suppose that a Cover Note had, in fact, been issued. If a Cover Note had been issued which in terms of clause (b) of sub-Section 1 of Section 145 of the Act would come within the purview of definition of certificate of insurance; it also would come within the purview of the definition of a insurance policy. If a Cover Note is issued, it remains valid till it is cancelled. Indisputably, the insurance policy was cancelled only after the accident took place. A finding of fact, therefore, has been arrived at that prior to the deposit of the premium of insurance in cash by the owner of the vehicle, the cover note was not cancelled. 17. It is in the aforementioned situation, we are of the opinion, that the judgment of the High Court cannot be faulted. No doubt, a contract of insurance is to be governed by the terms thereof, but a distinction must be borne in mind between a contract of insurance which has been entered into for the purpose of giving effect to the object and purport of the statute and one which provides for reimbursement of the liability of the owner of the vehicle strictly in terms thereof. In that limited sense, a contract of insurance entered into for the purpose of covering a third party risk would not be purely contractual. We may place on record that an ordinary contract of insurance does not have a statutory flavour. The Act merely imposes an obligation on the part of the insurance company to reimburse the claimant both in terms of the Act as also the Contract. So far as the liability of the insurance company which comes within the purview of Sections 146 and 147 is concerned, the same sub-serves a constitutional goal, namely, social justice. A contract of insurance covering the third party risk must, therefore, be viewed differently vis-a-vis a contract of insurance qua contract. 18. In National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Laxmi Narain Dhut (2007) 3 SCC 700 ], this Court opined: "23. As noted above, there is no contractual relation between the third party and the insurer. A contract of insurance covering the third party risk must, therefore, be viewed differently vis-a-vis a contract of insurance qua contract. 18. In National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Laxmi Narain Dhut (2007) 3 SCC 700 ], this Court opined: "23. As noted above, there is no contractual relation between the third party and the insurer. Because of the statutory intervention in terms of Section 149, the same becomes operative in essence and Section 149 provides complete insulation. 24. In the background of the statutory provisions, one thing is crystal clear i.e. the statute is beneficial one qua the third party. But that benefit cannot be extended to the owner of the offending vehicle. The logic of fake license has to be considered differently in respect of third party and in respect of own damage claims." The same view was reiterated in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Meena Variyal & Ors. [ (2007) 5 SCC 428 ] stating : "14. The object of the insistence on insurance under Chapter XI of the Act thus seems to be to compulsorily cover the liability relating to their person or properties of third parties and in respect of employees of the insured employer, the liability that may arise under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 in respect of the driver, the conductor and the one carried in a goods vehicle carrying goods." This Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.v. Sudhakaran K.V. and Ors. 2009(1) AICJ 321 held : "14. The provisions of the Act and, in particular, Section 147 of the Act were enacted for the purpose of enforcing the principles of social justice. It, however, must be kept confined to a third party risk. A contract of insurance which is not statutory in nature should be construed like any other contract." This Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Inderjeet Kaur [(1998) 1 SCC 71] held that once a certificate of insurance is issued, the insurance company would not be absolved of its obligations to third parties. Yet again in Deddappa & Ors. v. Branch Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd. [ (2008) 2 SCC 595 ], having regard to the provisions contained in Section 54(v) of the Insurance Act, 1938, in the fact situation obtaining therein, it was opined : "A contract is based on reciprocal promise. Reciprocal promises by the parties are condition precedents for a valid contract. v. Branch Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd. [ (2008) 2 SCC 595 ], having regard to the provisions contained in Section 54(v) of the Insurance Act, 1938, in the fact situation obtaining therein, it was opined : "A contract is based on reciprocal promise. Reciprocal promises by the parties are condition precedents for a valid contract. A contract furthermore must be for consideration." 10. The claims tribunal has also considered that before the accident, the policy in question was cancelled and intimation thereof has been duly served to the insured or not, for that, there is no proof is produced on record by insurance company before claims tribunal and therefore, on the date of accident, there was a valid insurance policy in existence and insurance company cannot deny the liability. 11. Learned advocate Ms. Megha Jani submitted that claims tribunal has not admitted documents produced by insurance company as a secondary evidence. The witness was examined by insurance company before claims tribunal. The witness admitted that original documents are lying with insurance and person who has dealt with is working in Ahmedabad Office. Even though, insurance company has not explained as to why original documents were not produced and person who has dealt with was not examined before the claims tribunal. The contention raised by learned advocate Ms. Megha Jani relying upon the various provisions of Evidence Act in respect of secondary evidence are not applicable to the facts of this case, because, when original documents are lying with the party and without explaining the same, if secondary evidence is produced naturally Court will not accept such documents as a secondary evidence. The person who was examined by insurance company was not aware about the facts of present case and who has not dealt with correspondence with insurance company, RTO and insured. Therefore, the contentions raised by learned advocate Ms. Jani cannot be accepted, hence, the same are rejected. The witness has not admitted the facts that letter for cancellation of insurance policy was received by insured and RTO. The original acknowledgment must have to be received by insurance company. Even xerox copy of that was also not produced by insurance company as a secondary evidence. Jani cannot be accepted, hence, the same are rejected. The witness has not admitted the facts that letter for cancellation of insurance policy was received by insured and RTO. The original acknowledgment must have to be received by insurance company. Even xerox copy of that was also not produced by insurance company as a secondary evidence. So, there is no evidence on record produced by insurance company to the effect that insurance policy is cancelled and that intimation received by insured bears the signature and also received by RTO also bears the signature. 12. So, procedure prescribed under Section 64(v)(B) is not followed by insurance company for cancellation of insurance policy, then, policy issued by insurance company remained in existence for third party and liability of third party cannot be denied on such ground by insurance company. Therefore, also, contentions raised by learned advocate Ms. Megha Jani rejected. The insurance company has not examined owner of vehicle who is insured. The owner respondent No. 2 remained absent before claims tribunal. No written statement is filed. Matter remained ex-parte against owner. If according to insurance company, intimation of cancellation send to owner and owner has received it then it should be proved by cogent evidence if receipt from owner was not produced then owner can be examined before claims tribunal by insurance company or original document which are lying in office must have to be produced before claims tribunal, but, insurance company failed in proved the said facts. 13. It is not the case of insurance company before the claims tribunal that insured has received the intimation of cancellation and therefore, merely production of document would not automatically be treated as secondary evidence and cannot be admitted to the evidence and therefore, the facts must have to be proved by insurance company before the claims tribunal. That fact has not been proved, intimation of cancellation of policy not received by insured and RTO and no proof has been produced on record by insurance company, therefore, according to my opinion, the facts are very clear, correct and rightly appreciated by claims tribunal concerned, for that, claims tribunal has not committed any error which requires interference by this Court. In light of these facts, that intimation of cancellation is not received by insured and RTO, for that, there is no proof produced on record by insurance company, then, all the arguments including the decision of Deddappa's case (supra) and relevant Sections from 61 to 74 of the Evidence Act, according to my opinion, it becomes irrelevant which will not helpful to learned advocate Ms. Jani. Therefore, only on this ground, contentions raised by learned advocate Ms. Megha Jani are rejected. 14. Therefore there is no substance in present appeal. Accordingly, present first appeal is dismissed. 15. When first appeal is dismissed by this Court, no order is required to be passed in civil application. Hence, Civil Application is also dismissed. 16. The amount, if any, deposited by appellant insurance company before registry of this Court, be transmitted to claims tribunal concerned immediately.