ORDER Writ petition by a Government of India Enterprise by name M/s. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited, who it appears had been allotted ail extent of' 405.12 acres of industrial land as per lease-cum-sale agreement dated 28-10-1998 entered into between the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (for short, 'KIADB') and the petitioner (copy at Annexure-C). 2. It is in respect of this industrial area, the second respondent Mangalore Urban Development Authority had made the petitioner pay a sum of Rs. 1,31,32,563/- on the premise that the petitioner was attempting change of land use i.e., converting the land which was earlier having the character of agricultural land into an industrial land and without obtaining the prior permission of the second respondent as required under Section 14 of the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961 (for short, 'the KTCP Act') and therefore the petitioner was required to first pay this amount before going ahead with any developmental activity. 3. It is aggrieved by this extraction, the present writ petition by the petitioner-company for quashing the demand notice dated 4-4-2000 (copy at Annexure-A) demanding payment of this amount and also for quashing yet another notice dated 3-10-2000 (copy at Annexure-B) for the same amount. 4. 3. It is aggrieved by this extraction, the present writ petition by the petitioner-company for quashing the demand notice dated 4-4-2000 (copy at Annexure-A) demanding payment of this amount and also for quashing yet another notice dated 3-10-2000 (copy at Annexure-B) for the same amount. 4. The petitioner has approached this Court seeking for quashing of such collection of what is known as betterment fee contending, inter alia, that the subject land being classified as land in an industrial area and such being the declaration by the State Government way back in the year 1983 under the provisions of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 (for short, 'KIAD Act'), there is no obligation on the part of the petitioner to pay any fee towards betterment charges etc., as the petitioner is not changing the user of the land; that the land is proposed to put to industrial use only and the area having already been earmarked for development as an industrial area, there is no change of land user attracting the liability for payment of betterment fee as provided in Section 14-A read with Section 18 of the KTCP Act, but nevertheless, the second respondent-authority has by force and coercion extracted payment from the petitioner under the threat of pulling down the structures and the building; that the entire action taken by the second respondent-authority is illegal and therefore the demand notice should be quashed and amount' collected by the second respondent should be directed to be refunded to the petitioner. 5. It is also the version of the petitioner that the second respondent is not entitled to levy or collect any betterment fee as the second respondent has not effected any improvement in the subject land; that the entire development activity in the area has been carried out by the petitioner; that the second respondent in fact has no scheme for development of the area and therefore also there is no question of the second respondent seeking to levy and collect any betterment fee from the petitioner on the strength of Rule 37-A of the Karnataka Planning Authority Rules, 1965 (for short, 'KPA Rules'); that the second respondent is not entitled to demand such payment and therefore the demand should be quashed. 6. 6. Petitioner has also contended that the demand is per se arbitrary, illegal, violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 265 and 300-A of the Constitution of India and the second respondent cannot enforce such demand on the petitioner and is bound to withdraw the same. 7. One another ground urged in support of the writ petition is that the fee being always linked to service provided to the person liable to pay the fee and the petitioner being not provided any service whether directly or indirectly, there is no justification for levy and demand for payment of the fee as at Annexures-A and B. 8. It is alternatively pleaded that the computation of the amount and the sum indicated is not proper; that if at all the betterment charges that could have been collected in terms of Rule 37-A(1)(b) of the KPA Rules was at Rs. 5/- (sic) per sq. meter and. not at Rs. 8/- per sq. meter as provided under Rule 37-A(1)(a) of the KPA Rules and for this reason also the demand is required to. be revised and the amount collected from the petitioner in excess of the rate of Rs. 5/- per sq. meter is to be refunded to the petitioner. 9. It is on such premise the writ petitioner has sought for the following reliefs in this writ petition: "(a) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari to quash the impugned notice dated 4-4-2000 bearing No. MUDA-TPM-AA-97-98, as at Annexure-A; (b) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari to quash the impugned notice dated 3-10-2000 bearing No. MUDA-TPM-95-96, as at Annexure-B; (c) A direction to the 2nd respondent to repay the sum of Rs. 1,31,32,563.00 to the petitioner together with interest at the Bank rate up to the date of payment; (d) Alternatively a direction to the 2nd respondent to refund a sum of Rs. 49,00,000/- being the difference of the betterment levy paid by the petitioner calculated at Rs. 5/- per square meter instead of Rs. 1,31,32,563.00 to the petitioner together with interest at the Bank rate up to the date of payment; (d) Alternatively a direction to the 2nd respondent to refund a sum of Rs. 49,00,000/- being the difference of the betterment levy paid by the petitioner calculated at Rs. 5/- per square meter instead of Rs. 8/- per square meter together with interest at the Bank rate upto the date of payment; (e) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the respondents to declare that the immovable property in an extent of 436.37 acres of land possessed by the petitioner within the jurisdiction of the 2nd respondent as 'industrial area' not liable for payment of any fee under the Karnataka Urban Development Authorities Act, 1987; (f) Grant such other relief/s as this Hon'ble Court deems fit under the facts and circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice and equity". 10. Writ petition had been admitted and the respondents had been put on notice. The first respondent-State is represented by Sri H.K Basavaraj, learned Government Pleader, second respondent-Mangalore Urban Development Authority is represented by Sri Vasudeva Reddy, learned Senior Counsel and Sri Pandurangaswamy, learned Counsel, third respondent-KIADB is represented by M/s. Gopalakrishna and Jagannath Rao, learned Counsel. 11. Statement of objections have been filed on behalf of the second respondent-Mangalore Urban Development Authority. It is contended, inter alia, that the second respondent is a planning authority and the impugned action is clearly sustainable in terms of the provisions of Section 180) of the KTCP Act read with Rule, 37-A of the KPA Rules; that the levy and demand is in consonance with the Government Notification dated 19-11-1993 which provides for levy of betterment fee at the rate of Rs. 8/- per sq. 8/- per sq. meter; that the petitioner if feels aggrieved by the levy can appeal to the higher authorities as provided under Section 18-A(3) of the KTCP Act and therefore the writ petition is not maintainable and the writ petition is to be dismissed; that the action on the part of the planning authority which is also an 'Urban Development Authority' within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the Karnataka Urban Development Authorities Act, 1987 (for short, 'KUDA Act') and in view of Section 86 (sic) of the KUDA Act, the provisions of the KUDA Act have an overriding effect and would prevail even over the provisions of the KIAD Act and therefore it is of no avail to the petitioner to contend that the area having been declared as an industrial area by the KIADB under the provisions of the KIAD Act to get over the liability for payment of betterment fee under the KTCP Act; that the impugned action is well-within the powers of the planning authority and the development authority and therefore the writ petition should be dismissed. 12. The matter is taken up for hearing and I have heard Sri Monesh Kumar, learned Counsel for the petitioner; M/s. Vasudeva Reddy, learned Senior Counsel and Sri Pandurangaswamy, learned Counsel appearing for the second respondent-authority, Sri H.K Basavaraj, learned Government Pleader appearing for the first respondent-State and M/s. I. Gopalakrishna and Jagannatha Rao, learned Counsel appearing for the third respondent-KIADB. 13. 13. Submission of Sri Monesh Kumar, learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the second respondent-authority is not at all justified in levying or collecting any betterment charges from the petitioner; that the land in question was the land which had been acquired by the KIADB; that the area had been declared as an industrial area in terms of Section 3 of the KIAD Act; that the notification to this effect had also been issued by the State Government; that the lands were acquired for the precise purpose and the petitioner has been allotted the extent of land as an industrial area and for petitioner's industrial use; that there is no change of land user either as is provided under the KTCP Act or even under the KUDA Act; that under both these enactments the subject land and the area is notified as an industrial area and when such is the state of affairs, there is no question of the second respondent-authority seeking to levy any betterment fee on the premise that there is change of •land user by the petitioner and that the manner of use of the land for industrial purpose without obtaining permission from the planning authority has contravened the provisions of Section 14(2) of the KTCP Act; that when there is not even the requirement to obtain permission as contemplated under the proviso to Section 14(2) of the KTCP Act, Sections 14-A, 15 or 18 of the KTCP Act are automatically not attracted; that the entire levy and the collection of betterment fee is illegal; that the authorities have extracted the amount by threat and coercion virtually threatening the petitioner of pulling down the structure and also threatening the petitioner of penal action under Section 73 of the KTCP Act; that the entire proposed action, demand notices, collection are all illegal and are liable to be quashed and the second respondent directed to refund the amount. 14. 14. In support of such submission, Sri Monesh Kumar, learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bangalore Development Authority v Vishwa Bharathi House Building Co-operative Society Limited and with reference to this judgment it is submitted that the observation contained in this judgment aptly applies to the petitioner's case also; that when an area which was earmarked and classified as residential area was in possession of the private house building co-operative society and the house building co-operative society and its members plan to put up construction for residential purpose, it has been ruled that there is no requirement to pay any conversion charges; that there was no need to obtain any prior permission from the Deputy Commissioner under the provisions of Section 95 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 for change of land user from agricultural to residential purpose and in the case of the petitioner also the land user being industrial even as per the outline development plan of the planning authority and also in the comprehensive development plan, the petitioner is not liable to pay any betterment fee. 15. It is also the submission of Sri Monesh Kumar, learned Counsel for the petitioner that the KIADB itself has collected all charges from the petitioner towards developmental activity; that it is not necessary for the petitioner to pay such developmental charges or betterment charges once again to the second respondent just because the second respondent has of late come on the scene; that so long as the petitioner is not seeking any change of land user from industrial purpose, there is no liability on the part of the petitioner to pay any betterment fee and for this reason also the writ petition should be allowed and the prayer sought for in the writ petition should be granted by this Court. 16. 16. Sri Jagannatha Rao, learned Counsel for the respondent-KIADB has supported the version of the petitioner and it is submitted that when an area is declared as an industrial area by the KIADB, the planning authority has no jurisdiction to levy and collect any betterment fee; that the entire gamut of developmental activities is taken care of by the KIADB and there is no question of the planning authority seeking for collection of betterment fee yet again and therefore submits that the petitioner's case for relief sought for in the writ petition is justified and to be granted. 17. Sri H.K Basavaraj, learned Government Pleader appearing for the State Government supports the stand of the second respondent-authority. 18. 17. Sri H.K Basavaraj, learned Government Pleader appearing for the State Government supports the stand of the second respondent-authority. 18. Appearing on behalf of the second respondent - submission of M/s. Vasudeva Reddy, learned Senior Counsel and Sri Pandurangaswamy, learned Counsel is that the area had come within the jurisdiction of the planning authority even as per the notification dated 26/29-11-1965 issued under Section 4-A of the KTCP Act; that it is only thereafter the area has been declared as an industrial area by the KIADB; that notwithstanding the area having been declared as an industrial area, the provisions of the KTCP Act applies; that the provisions of Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 18 of the KTCP Act are all attracted to the case in hand; that this is a case where the lands which were having the character of agricultural land initially and which have not undergone any change from the character of agricultural land either to the industrial use or for other non-agricultural purposes notwithstanding the declaration and action taken under the KIAD Act; that the planning authority has the jurisdiction to develop all areas within the State; that the industrial area if at all comes within this and is part of the comprehensive development plan published by the planning authority for the entire State; that the jurisdiction of the planning authority under the provisions of the KTCP Act is never ousted or lost notwithstanding the areas being declared as industrial areas or otherwise by subsequent developments; that the second respondent being not merely a 'planning authority' within the meaning of Section 2(7) of the KTCP Act but also an 'authority' as per clause (a) of Section 2 of the KUDA Act read with Section 3 of the KUDA Act and therefore it is competent to regulate and enforce the provisions of both these enactments in the areas coming under the two, enactments and it is for this reason it is contended that the provision 3 of the KIAD Act does not in any way detract from the powers of the second respondent for levy and collection of betterment fee; that the fee is sustainable and no interference is warranted and the writ petition is to be dismissed. 19. 19. It is also pointed out with reference to the mentioning of the judgment of this Court in the case of Mangalore Refinery and Petrochemicals Limited v State of Karnataka] (copy at Annexure-F) that the land allotted to the petitioner being under the same scheme and by the very board as was in the case of Mangalore Refinery and Petrochemicals Limited and in this order the liability for payment of betterment fee by such allottees who get land from the KIADB having been recognised and settled, the petitioner is also liable to pay betterment fee on the same basis; that the petitioner was called upon to pay this amount and action was contemplated under Section 14 of the KTCP Act for violations committed by the petitioner in developing the land without seeking the prior permission/certification from the planning authority; that the betterment fee levied is only in terms of the fee as contemplated under Rule. 37-A of the KPA Rules and therefore the demand and collection is well-sustained in law and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. . 20. Reliance is sought to be placed on the Division Bench ruling of this Court in the case of Special Deputy Commissioner v Narayanappa, to submit that a levy of this nature is well-sustained. It is urged that so long as there is an attempt to change the original character of the land which was agricultural to industrial is not disputed, the second respondent is well-justified in levying and collecting the betterment fee and therefore the amount realised is sought to be sustained and prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 21. I have perused the petition pleadings, statement of objections filed on behalf of the second respondent and examined the submissions made at the Bar by the learned Counsel for the parties with reference to the statutory provisions under the three enactments, namely, Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961, Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 and the Karnataka Urban Development Authorities Act, 1987. I have also examined the authorities relied upon and cited by the learned Counsel for petitioner and the second respondent. 22. The main statutory provisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the second respondent-authority to sustain the levy are Sections 2(7), 4-A, 9, 10, 14, 14-A, 14-B, 15 and 18 of the KTCP Act, most relevant of which read as under: "2. 22. The main statutory provisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the second respondent-authority to sustain the levy are Sections 2(7), 4-A, 9, 10, 14, 14-A, 14-B, 15 and 18 of the KTCP Act, most relevant of which read as under: "2. Definitions.- (7) "Planning Authority" means.(a) in the case of.- ------------------------------ (i) the local planning area comprising the City of Bangalore, the Bangalore Development Authority; and (i-a) the local planning area comprising any urban area defined in the Karnataka Urban Development Authorities Act, 1987, the Urban Development Authority of such urban area; (i-b) the heritage area as defined in the Hampi World Heritage Area Management Authority Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as 'heritage area'), the Hampi World Heritage Area Management Authority constituted under that Act; (ii) any other local planning area in respect of which the State Government may deem it expedient to constitute a separate planning authority, the planning authority constituted under this Act; (b) in the case of any local planning area in respect of which a planning authority is not constituted under this Act, the Town Improvement Board constituted under any law for the time being in force having jurisdiction over such local planning area, and where there is no such Town Improvement Board, the local authority having jurisdiction over such local planning area. 14. Enforcement of the Master Plan and the Regulations.-(1) On and from the date on which a declaration of intention to prepare a Master Plan is published under sub-section (1) of Section 10, every land use, every change in land use and every development in the area covered by the plan subject to Section 14-A shall conform to the provisions of this Act, the Master Plan and the report, as finally approved by the State Government under sub-section (3) of Section 13. (2) ........ No such change in land use or development as is referred to in sub-section (1) shall be made except with the written permission of the Planning Authority which shall be contained in a commencement certificate granted by the Planning Authority in the form prescribed: Provided that where the use or change of land use under this section needs the diversion of agricultural land to non-agricultural purposes, such use or change of use shall not be permitted, unless permission is obtained in accordance with the provisions of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 for such diversion. Explanation.-For the purpose of this section.- (a) the expression 'development' means the carrying out of building or other operation in or over or under any land or the making of any material change in the use of any building or other land; (b) the following operations or uses of land shall not be deemed to involve a development of any building or land, namely.- (i) the carrying out of works for maintenance, improvement or other alteration of any building, being works which affect only the interior of the building or which do not materially affect the external appearance of the building; (iv) the use of any building or other land within the curtilage of a dwelling house for any purpose incidental to the enjoyment of the dwelling house as such; (v) when the normal use of land which was being temporarily used for any other purpose on the day on which the declaration of intention to prepare the Master Plan is published under sub-section (1) of Section 10 is resumed; (vi) when land was normally used for one purpose and also on occasions for any other purpose, the use of the land for that other purpose on similar occasions. (3) Every application for permission under sub-section (2) shall be accompanied by a plan, drawn to scale showing the actual dimension of the plot of land in respect of which permission is asked, the size of the building to be erected and the position of the building upon the plot and such other information as may be required in this behalf by the planning authority. 14-A. Change of land use from the Master Plan.-(1) At any time after the date on which the Master Plan for an area comes into operation, the Planning Authority may, with the previous approval of the State Government, allow such changes in the land use or development from the Master Plan as may be necessitated by topographical cartographical or other errors and omissions, or due to failure to fully indicate the details in the plan or changes arising out of the implementation of the proposals in Master Plan or the circumstances prevailing at any particular time, by the enforcement of the plan: Provided that.- (a) all changes are in public interest; (b) the changes proposed do not contravene any of the provisions of this Act or any other law governing planning, development or use of land within the local planning area; and (C) the proposal for all such changes are published in one or more daily newspapers, having circulation in the area, inviting objections from the public within a period of not less than fifteen days from the date of publication as may be specified by the Planning Authority. . (2) The provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 14 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the change in land use or development from the Master Plan. . (3) Notwithstanding anything contrary contained in the Act, if the change in land use or development is from commercial or industrial to residential or from industrial to commercial and the stipulated fee is paid and the local planning authority is informed prior to effecting the change, the permission for such change of land use or development shall be deemed to have been given. 15. Permission for development of building or land.-(1) On receipt of the application for permission under Section 14, the Planning Authority shall furnish to the applicant a written acknowledgement of its receipt and after such inquiry as may be necessary either grant or refuse a commencement certificate: Provided that such certificate may be granted subject to such general or special conditions as the State Government may, by order made in this behalf, direct. (2) If the Planning Authority does not communicate its decision to the applicant within three months from the date of such acknowledgement, such certificate shall be deemed to have been granted to the applicant: Provided that the land use, change in land use or the development for which permission was sought for is in conformity with the Master Plan and the regulation finally approved under sub-section (3) of Section 13. (3) Subject to the provisions of Section 16, no compensation shall be payable for the refusal of or the insertion or imposition of conditions in the commencement certificate. (4) If any person does any work on, or makes any use of, any property in contravention of Section 14 or of sub-section (1) of this section, the Planning Authority may direct such person by notice in writing, to stop any such work in progress or discontinue any such use; and may, after making an inquiry in the prescribed manner, remove or pull down any such work and restore the land to its original condition or, as the case may be, take any measure to stop such use. (5) Any expenses incurred by the planning authority under sub-section (4) shall be a sum due to such authority under this Act from the person in default or from the owner of the land. Explanation.-The power to grant necessary permission under this section for a change of user of land shall include the power to •grant permission for the retention on land of any building or work constructed or carried out thereon before the date of the publication of the declaration of intention to prepare a Master Plan under sub-section (1) of Section 10 or for the continuance of any use of land instituted before the said date. (6) Any person aggrieved by the decision of the Planning Authority under sub-section (1) or sub-section (4) may, within thirty days from the date of such decision, appeal to such authority as may be prescribed. (7) The prescribed authority may, after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the appellant and the Planning Authority, pass such orders as it deems fit, as far as may be, within four months from the date of receipt of the appeal. 18. (7) The prescribed authority may, after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the appellant and the Planning Authority, pass such orders as it deems fit, as far as may be, within four months from the date of receipt of the appeal. 18. Recovery of a fee in certain cases of permission for change in the use of land or building.-(1) Where permission for change of land use or development of land or building is granted under Section 14-A or Section 14-B or Section 15 or Section 17 and such change of land use or development is capable of yielding a better income to the owner, the Planning Authority may levy a prescribed fee not exceeding one-third of the estimated increase in the value of the land or building in the prescribed manner for permitting such change of land use or development of land or building. (2) Any person aggrieved by the levy of fee under sub-section (1), may within such period as may be prescribed, appeal to the District Court having jurisdiction on the ground that the change or development is not capable of yielding a better income to the owner. The decision of the District Court on such appeal shall be final. . (3) The State Government may exempt any board: authority or body constituted by or under any law and owned or controlled by the State Government or Central Government or an infrastructure project promoted or implemented by any company or person and approved by the State Government or Central Government from the payment of fee specified under sub-section (1). " Explanation.-For the purpose of this section and Section 15-A. "infrastructure project" means.- (a) road, bridge, airport, port, inland water ways and inland ports, rail system or any other public facility of a similar nature as may be notified by the State Government from time to time; (b) a highway project including housing or other activities being an integral part of that project; (c) water supply project, irrigation project, sanitation and sewerage system; (d) a tourism project with an investment of not less than rupees one hundred crores as may be notified by the State Government from time to time". 23. It is submitted that the moment there is change of land user, these provisions are attracted and the consequential liability for payment of betterment fee etc. 24. 23. It is submitted that the moment there is change of land user, these provisions are attracted and the consequential liability for payment of betterment fee etc. 24. Learned Counsel for the petitioner on the other hand has mainly relied upon the provisions of Sections 2(6), 3 and 47 of the KIAD Act. 25. The controversy regarding overriding effect of the enactments may be cleared first. When there are several enactments containing such provisions, the provisions of the latest enactment will prevail and if there is any inconsistency with any existing legislation, the rule is that the latest of such legislation has to be given way. 26. The two enactments, particularly, the KTCP Act and the KIAD Act having undergone several amendments, it will have to be ascertained as to which of the provision is later when there is inconsistency or competition for prevailing of one of the two enactments and the provisions contained therein. 27. In the present case, the controversy that is sought to be projected on behalf of the petitioner is that the subject area having been declared as an industrial area and having been allotted as an industrial area in favour of the petitioner, there is no question of the second respondent again seeking to levy and collect betterment fee etc. 28. The conflict can only be if there is any inconsistency. Even to avoid such conflict, Section 18(3) of the KTCP Act provides for the State Government granting exemption in favour of any board, authority or body constituted under other enactments etc., from levy of payment of fee under Section 18(1) of the KTCP Act. 29. When these provisions are examined, it becomes clear that the betterment fee which is sought to be levied and collected is essentially a levy in the nature of 'fee' for service and only in the wake of a person seeking for conversion of land user deriving better benefit from conversion as is clear on a reading of the provisions of Section 18 of the KTCP Act read with Rule 37-A of the KPA Rules. 30. 30. In fact, the rules provide that if a person should dispute there was no benefit which he has derived by the grant of permission to change the use of the land, he need not pay any fee or he can agitate the question of fee by filing an appeal is indicative of the fact that the levy is not in the nature of general levy or the amount to be levied in all situation but only subject to the condition that there is a commensurate benefit to the person who has to pay the fee. 31. Section 18 of the KTCP Act is not in the nature of a charging section in a taxing statute but is made dependent on the authority granting permission for change of land use and such permission resulting in benefit to the seeker. The writ petitioner never sought for any permission and it is the precise stand of the petitioner that he need not seek permission. Therefore, the provisions of Section 18 of the KTCP Act are not automatically attracted. 32. It is to get over this impediment, learned Counsel for second respondent-authority has contended that when there was violation of Section 14 of the KTCP Act, in the sense, the petitioner without obtaining permission or certificate was attempting change of land user and therefore the authorities were forced to take preventive action under Section 17 of the KTCP Act and had also apprised further consequential action under Section 73 of the KTCP Act, the petitioner volunteered himself to pay the amount and if the petitioner had paid the amount there is no question of calling it an illegal levy or seek for refund of the same. 33. It cannot be said that the petitioner volunteered to pay the amount in the light of the coercive demand on the part of the respondent-authority. 34. Even a combined reading of the provisions of Sections 14, 14-A, 14-B, 15, 17 and 18 of the KTCP Act do not necessarily indicate that when an activity for the purpose of commencing an industrial activity for use as an industrial land is sought to be carried on in an industrial area, the person is violating any provision of law under the KTCP Act or is required to seek permission. Reading of these provisions clearly indicate that it is only when the land user is sought to be changed from the one provided for by the planning authority and as per the comprehensive development plan such a permission is required. 35. It is not in dispute that even before the petitioner got into the land by way of allotment by the KIADB in the year 1998, the Mangalore Urban Development Authority had declared the subject land as an industrial area in the year 1992 and therefore it cannot be said that the writ petitioner is trying to change the land user. A change will occur only when the land is used for a purpose other than the industrial purpose. 36. This argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is also supported by the Division Bench ruling of our High Court in the case of Vishwa Bharathi House Building Co-operative Society Limited. On the other hand, the judgment relied upon by learned Counsel for second respondent in no way advances the cause of the second respondent-authority for the reason that both in this decision and the later judgment of the Division Bench in Vishwa Bharathi House Building Co-operative Society Limited's case, this Court had taken the view that it is not necessary for the owner of the land to seek permission of revenue authorities for change of land user, particularly, as under Section 95 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 and want of such permission cannot be a ground for the planning authority to reject a plan for development of the land in conformity with the planning authority's declaration and earmarking of the area so long as it confol11ls to the outline development plan. 38. A perusal of the statutory provisions, particularly, proviso to sub-section (2) to Section 14 of the KTCP Act which is an addition by way of amendment as per Act No. 2 of 1991 and with effect from 20-3-1991 while no doubt indicates that the change of land user should not be permitted unless the person has obtained permission of the revenue authorities as per the provisions of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 for diversion of the land user, it appears this amendment has escaped the notice of the Division Bench in Vishwa Bharathi House Building Co-operative Society Limited's case. 39. 39. Be that as it may, a plain reading of Section 14(1) of the KTCP Act clearly does not make out a case of requirement on the part of the petitioner to obtain permission from the second respondent for using the subject land for industrial purpose. Whether a prior permission for change of land user was requirement of law or not is not the question which falls for consideration in this case. That question would have arisen if the petitioner should have applied for permission for change of land user and in the present case it is not in dispute that no such permission had been sought for by the writ petitioner from the second respondent. 40. In this state of affairs, when the amount collected from the petitioner cannot be sustained with reference to Sections 14, 14-A and 18 of the KTCP Act and when it is not even the case of the second respondent that they have provided certain facilities which has benefited the petitioner, there is no question of retaining the amount. May be in a situation where the petitioner is compelled to obtain permission, the question may arise, but as of now they are merely hypothetical. 41. In the circumstances, there is no other option except to quash the demand notices dated 4-4-2000 and 3-10-2000 in term of Annexures-A and B respectively and to direct the second respondent to return the amount which it had collected from the petitioner by way of betterment fee. . 42. However, liberty is reserved to the second respondent to take such action was is contemplated in law and if they are able to sustain the proposition that they have provided some facilities which has actually benefited the petitioner, it is open to the second respondent-authority to put the petitioner on notice and taken action in accordance with law after following due procedure. 43. The next argument and stand of the second respondent that the petitioner could avail of the remedy of appeal as per Section 18 of the KTCP Act read with Rule 37-A of the KPA Rules is also suggestive of the fact that there was something lacking in levying and collecting this amount even before this question had been determined. It is for this reason, this writ petition has to be allowed. 44. It is for this reason, this writ petition has to be allowed. 44. The second respondent now having been directed to refund the amount collected from the petitioner, it is incumbent on the part of the second respondent to refund the amount as expeditiously as possible within three months from the date of this order. 45. Writ petition allowed. Rule made absolute.