Judgment :- 1. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the respondents. 2. The petitioner has stated that he had joined the police service, as a Grade-II Police Constable, on 8. 1984. He was promoted as a Grade-I Police Constable in the year, 1998. As such the petitioner had a blemishless and meritorious service, until he was served with a charge memo, in PR 61/99, under Rule 3(b) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service Rules, by the Superintendent of Police, Tiruvarur District, dated 212. 1999. The allegation in the charge memo is that the petitioner had some connection with certain prohibition offenders and that he had received `Mamool from them, on 210. 1999. During the oral enquiry conducted by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Mannargudi, Sub-Division, the crucial witnesses had not supported the charge. However, on 3. 2000, the enquiry officer, without properly analysing the evidence available, had come to the conclusion that the charges alleged against the petitioner had been proved. On 4. 2000, the Superintendent of Police, Tiruvarur District, had communicated the copy of the enquiry report and had asked the petitioner to submit his explanation. Even though the petitioner had denied the charges levelled against him, the first respondent had passed a final order, dated 26. 2000, imposing the punishment of reduction in time scale of pay, by two stages, for two years, with cumulative effect. 3. The main contention of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner is that the order imposing the punishment on the petitioner had not been passed based on the statements recorded during the oral enquiry. On the other hand, it had been passed based on the statements made by the witnesses during the preliminary enquiry, contrary to the statutory rules. He had also submitted that in spite of the main witnesses denying the involvement of the petitioner in the alleged activities, the punishment had been imposed on the petitioner by the order of the first respondent, dated 26. 2000, and the appellate order of the second respondent, dated 19. 2000, confirming the punishment imposed on the petitioner. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner had further submitted that it is a case of no evidence and therefore, the impugned orders are bad in the eye of law. Further, the appellate order of the second respondent, dated 19. 2000, and the appellate order of the second respondent, dated 19. 2000, confirming the punishment imposed on the petitioner. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner had further submitted that it is a case of no evidence and therefore, the impugned orders are bad in the eye of law. Further, the appellate order of the second respondent, dated 19. 2000, made in the appeal filed by the petitioner, challenging the order of the first respondent, dated 26. 2000, is a nonspeaking order. No reasons have been given by the appellate authority, namely, the second respondent herein, in confirming the order of the first respondent, dated 26. 2000. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner had placed reliance on a decision of this Court, reported in K.Kandasamy Vs. Deputy I.G. of Police ( 2006(4) MLJ 1382 ), passed under similar circumstances. 5. Even though a reply affidavit has been filed on behalf of the first respondent denying the claims made by the petitioner, nothing has been shown on behalf of the respondents to justify the appellate order of the second respondent, dated 19. 2000, which is bereft of reasons. 6. At this stage of the hearing of the writ petition, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner had submitted that it would suffice if the appellate order of the second respondent, dated 19. 2000, is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the second respondent to pass a speaking order, on the merits of the matter, in accordance with law, within a specified period. 7. In such circumstances, the order of the second respondent, dated 19. 2000, is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the second respondent to pass appropriate orders thereon, on merits and in accordance with law, within a period of twelve weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The writ petition is ordered accordingly. No costs.