JUDGMENT 1. The petitioner has filed this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India praying for declaration that the order dated 23.4.2007 passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in Revision Application No.501 of 1995 is illegal and bad in law and the same is required to be quashed and set aside. The petitioner has also prayed for the declaration that the ex-parte order dated 18.7.1994 passed by the Dy. Collector in the suo motu revision in TNC/Revision/Case No.72/73/92 cancelling the order dated 25.2.1991 passed by the Mamlatdar & ALT in Tenancy Case No.459/460/43/Bhang/84C/90 is outside his jurisdiction and it is illegal and the same is required to be quashed and set aside. 2. Heard Mr.Shalin Mehta, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner and Ms.Trusha Patel, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for the respondent State. 3. It is the case of the petitioner that originally the subject matter of the land in Survey No.3319/2 admeasuring 0-41-48 and Survey No.3325 admeasuring 0-12-14 of Kakrakhad Party, Nadiad was sold through Court under Section 43 of the Bombay Tenancy & Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 with tenancy right to respondent No.2 i.e. Shankarbhai Punjabhai Parmar. However, the said Shankarbhai Punjabhai Parmar could not pay the purchase price and hence public auction of the said land was held. The respondent No.1 i.e. Shantilal M. Solanki residing at Nadiad purchased the said land at the auction. Since the auction purchaser of the land was not in possession of the said land and the respondent No.2, who originally obtained it with tenancy right was not willing to purchase the land, by resolution it was decided to vest the land in question with the Government and to dispose of the same in accordance with the provisions of Section 84C of the Tenancy Act. Thereafter, mutation entries were made in the revenue record by the concerned authority of Nadiad. Based on the resolution dated 7.1.1991 public notice in Form No.11 under Section 84C of the Tenancy Act was sent to the Talati-cum-Mantri. The said notice was published at Panchayat Office for wide circulation, which was also served on the original petitioner. The Talati-cum-Mantri submitted a report that no one belonging to SC, ST, agriculturist or landless category either as individual or as a society was ready and willing to purchase the said land. The said notice was published at Panchayat Office for wide circulation, which was also served on the original petitioner. The Talati-cum-Mantri submitted a report that no one belonging to SC, ST, agriculturist or landless category either as individual or as a society was ready and willing to purchase the said land. By an application dated 21.1.1991 the father of the petitioners, namely, Laluram Mohanlal Kabra having possession of the land had shown his willingness to purchase the said land. Even the earlier tenancy right holder or the auction purchaser has not lodged his claim to purchase the said land. By notice dated 22.2.1991 the father of the petitioners was asked to remain present and he remained present in the proceedings and filed reply stating that he was agreeable to purchase the said land at a price fixed by the authority and as per the conditions laid down by the Government and also agreed to cultivate the land as he was having agricultural equipments. He had also stated that he was holding the land admeasuring 0-11-93 at Kakrakhad Party of Nadiad in Survey Plot No.308. Considering all these documents, the Mamlatdar and ALT Nadiad vide his order dated 25.2.1991 granted the said land to the father of the petitioners at a sale price of Rs.1500/- as new tenure and restricted type of land on certain conditions. 4. After about three and half years of grant of the land to the father of the petitioners the Dy. Collector, Kaira District, suo motu took up the matter in revision by exercising the powers vested in him under Section 76A of the Tenancy Act. Notices were stated to have been issued to the parties on 16.7.1994, but no such notice was received by the father of the petitioners. By an ex-parte order, the Dy. Collector annulled the order passed by the Mamlatdar & ALT dated 25.2.1991 granting the land to the father of the petitioners on the ground that the decision to sell the property was not given wide publicity and remanded the matter to the Mamlatdar & ALT for deciding the matter afresh in accordance with law. 5. It is also the case of the petitioners that the father of the petitioners had not received the order passed by the Dy. Collector. 5. It is also the case of the petitioners that the father of the petitioners had not received the order passed by the Dy. Collector. He came to know about the existence of such an order for the first time when he received a notice dated 24.7.1995 from the Mamlatdar & ALT. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order of the Dy. Collector the father of the petitioners approached the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, Ahmedabad by way of Revision Application No.501 of 1995. 6. During the pendency of the Revision Application one of the parties, namely, Shankarbhai Punjabhai Parmar expired on 23.9.1996. Even Shri Mangalbhai Shankarbhai also expired on 17.8.2000. Shri Ravjibhai Shankarbhai Parmar expired on 19.9.2005 and the father of the petitioners, namely, Laluram Mohanlal Kabra expired on 17.9.2005. 7. By an order dated 23.4.2007 the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal rejected the Revision Application and confirmed the order passed by the Dy. Collector dated 18.7.1994 annulling the order dated 25.2.1991 passed by the Mamlatdar & ALT and remanding the same to the Mamlatdar & ALT for deciding the matter afresh in accordance with law, on the irrelevant ground that the father of the petitioners was originally from Rajasthan, owning a petrol-pump and that he was not an agriculturist. 8. It is this order which is under challenge in the present petition. 9. Mr.Shalin Mehta, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner has mainly challenged this order on the ground that despite the fact that the Dy. Collector has exercised jurisdiction under Section 76A of the Tenancy Act beyond the period of limitation prescribed in the said section, neither the Collector nor the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal has taken cognizance of the said issue. It is also challenged on the ground that though the original petitioner was an agriculturist and it was recorded by the Mamlatdar and ALT in his order that the father of the petitioner was holding the land bearing Survey Plot No.300 admeasuring about 0-11-93 and that he himself was doing agricultural activities and 7 X 12 extract was also produced to that effect, the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal has observed that the father of the petitioners did not hold any agricultural land in the State of Gujarat. Thus, the order of Tribunal was challenged on the ground of perversity. It is further challenged on the ground that though the Dy. Thus, the order of Tribunal was challenged on the ground of perversity. It is further challenged on the ground that though the Dy. Collector has remanded the matter to the Mamlatdar to decide it afresh the Tribunal has decided the matter on merits and made certain observations whereby the petitioner have become worst of and by virtue of the observations made by the Tribunal, the remand has become useless. 10. Ms.Trusha Patel, learned Assistant Government Pleader, appearing for the State authorities, on the other hand, has submitted that none of the grounds raised by the petitioners in the present petition is sustainable and the order passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal does not call for any interference by this Court while exercising its writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India. She has further submitted that the Dy. Collector has suo-motu exercised powers under Section 76A of the Act within the prescribed period and this fact was also recorded in the order itself. She has further submitted that the opportunity was given and notice was issued on 16.7.1994 and despite service of notice nobody remained present. She has further submitted that no wide publicity of the auction sale was made by the Mamlatdar and there was only one purchaser in whose favour the land was sold. While affecting the sale in favour of the father of the petitioners the Mamlatdar has not taken into consideration the provisions contained in Section 32P(2)(c) of the Tenancy Act. As per the priority enumerated therein, the tenant comes first and, thereafter, agricultural labourers, landless persons, small holders etc. would come. The father of the petitioners was running a petrol-pump and having his income more than Rs.5,000/- and hence he would not fall in any of the categories mentioned in Section 32P(2)(c) of the Act. She has, therefore, submitted that the Tribunal has rightly decided the Revision and it does not call for any interference by this Court. 11. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the parties and having considered their rival submissions in light of the statutory provisions as well as the documents produced before the Court, the Court is of the view that the order of the Tribunal does not call for any interference of this Court while exercising its writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. There is no illegality in the order passed by the Dy. Collector while exercising its suo-motu jurisdiction under Section 76A of the Tenancy Act. Section-76A reads as under; 76A Where no appeal has been filed within the period provided for it, the Collector may, suo motu or on a reference made in this behalf by the State Government, at any time;- (a) call for the record of any inquiry or the proceeding of any Mamlatdar or Tribunal for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed by, and as to the regularity of the proceedings of such Mamlatdar or Tribunal, as the case may be, and (b) pass such order thereon as he deems fit: Provided that (no such record shall be called for after the expiry of one year from the date of such order and) no order of such Mamlatdar or Tribunal shall be modified, annulled or reversed unless opportunity has been given to the interested parties to appear and be heard) 1. The plain reading of this section makes it clear that the time limit is prescribed only for the purpose of calling for the records of any inquiry or the proceedings of any Mamlatdar or Tribunal for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed by such Mamlatdar or Tribunal. The period of one year is prescribed for such purpose. No time limit is prescribed for the purpose of passing the order after calling for the records and proceedings. Another requirement of Section-76A is that the order should not be passed without giving an opportunity of being heard to the interested parties. The order itself makes it clear that the notice was issued to the concerned parties, however they did not remain present. Simply because the specific date is not mentioned in the order by the Dy. Collector as to on which date the records were called for it cannot be presumed that the records were called for after expiry of time limit. As a matter of fact, the Dy. Collector has recorded the Revision Case Nos.72 and 73 of 1992 and that the case papers were reached to the Collector Office, Kheda for revisional proceedings before the expiry period of one year and hence the proceedings are not barred by limitation. 2. As a matter of fact, the Dy. Collector has recorded the Revision Case Nos.72 and 73 of 1992 and that the case papers were reached to the Collector Office, Kheda for revisional proceedings before the expiry period of one year and hence the proceedings are not barred by limitation. 2. As far as Tribunal's order is concerned, the Tribunal has not thought it fit to disturb the order passed by the Dy.Collector to the extent of remand. However while supporting its decision to confirm the Dy. Collector's order, the Tribunal has also recorded certain facts which were placed before it. There was no dispute about the fact that the original petitioner was owner of the petrol pump, his income was more than Rs.5,000/-, and he belongs to Rajasthan. No wide publicity of sale of land was made by the Mamlatdar. If all these facts are recorded in the order and there was some controversy with regard to holding of an agricultural land by the petitioner within State of Gujarat, it cannot be said that the order passed by the Tribunal is perverse or the Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction while passing the impugned order against the petitioner. In any case, since the father of the petitioners did not fall in any of the categories enumerated in Section 32P(2)(c) of the Tenancy Act, the order of the Mamlatdar allotting the land to the father of the petitioners is absolutely illegal, unlawful and contrary to the statutory provisions. Thus, it was rightly interfered with by the Dy. Collector and further by the Tribunal making certain observations based on facts and recording finding to that effect while confirming the order of the Dy. Collector. 3. In view of the above discussion, the Court finds no substance or merit in the present petition and it is accordingly dismissed at the threshold.